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SUMMARY
The hypothesis explored in this thesis is that the management of 
labour in the 1980s may take a less planned and consistent form than 
many writers have suggested. Instead, other objectives to which 
managements attach greater priority will interact with labour 
management policies and practices, and lead to a variety of 
managerial approaches to labour issues within the firm. In certain 
circumstances management control of dimensions of labour management 
will be diminished. To explore this hypothesis, an extensive 
empirical investigation was conducted on British Rail since that 
organization appeared to be taking a strategic approach to re­
structuring it's management of labour. Data was provided by a large 
number of interviews with managers, employees and union 
representatives and officials.
Government objectives towards nationalized industries of encouraging 
the reform of labour relations and the adoption of commercial 
priorities have not led to a more uniform approach to labour by BR 
since government interventions have occurred in an unpredictable 
way. A recent re-organization of BR's management structure to 
respond to these pressures has made the formulation and 
implementation of consistent labour policies more difficult by 
intensifying competing pressures within the management hierarchy. 
Greater variety in management decision-making has failed to achieve 
flexibility because of the continuing strength of railway workforce 
organizations.
This analysis is extended by a study of patterns of labour management 
in the train driving and train signalling functions. Examination of 
work re-organization in the driving function shows that a 
comprehensive strategy broke down because of governmental 
interventions and those elements of the strategy that were 
implemented have failed to increase managerial control of work 
organization. Investigation of the signalling function shows that 
labour management policies have generally not been integrated with 
technical priorities, and that current features of management 
strategy and structure are re-inforcing this tendency.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
It should be a pleasant job to acknowledge the help and encouragement 
received during the preparation of a doctoral thesis. But so many 
people have assisted in the making of this one that singling-out 
those for thanks by name is an invidious task. Virtually everyone I 
met on British Rail and in the rail unions actively co-operated in 
the provision of information. Many went beyond this to give 
enthusiastic encouragement. To them a special thanks. I am grateful 
also to Roz Chand, Mario Garrett, Diane Jackson, Allister McGregor, 
Pete Scott, Gill Tipping and Judy Wright, of the School of Humanities 
and Social Sciences at the University of Bath, for their forbearance 
and expressions of solidarity whilst I was writing the thesis.
Howard Gospel and Sarah Vickerstaff of the University of Kent 
contributed much both in giving encouragement and in discussing and 
criticising my thoughts on management strategies and structures. 
Eileen Robertson, also of the University of Kent, proof-read the 
thesis and endeavoured to correct the many mistakes and 
inconsistencies that had crept in. I am very grateful for her 
patience and understanding in the final stages of writing. Most of 
all I must thank Bryn Jones, of the University of Bath, for his 
encouragement, support, and helpful criticism throughout his 
supervision of the project. Needless to say the errors that remain 




In the 1980s the managerial role in labour relations has come to be 
the favoured topic of study amongst industrial relations 
researchers. Such a degree of interest in management is 
unsurprising since product market developments since 1979 have 
frequently necessitated the formation of new approaches to the 
management of labour, whilst labour market movements have apparently 
enabled policies which would hitherto have been obstructed by trade 
union and workforce organizations to be successfully implemented. It 
was decided to research the nature of management strategy and labour 
relations on British Rail because new management policies had been 
hotly contested, to varying degrees, by the three rail unions. The 
first section of this chapter briefly surveys the recent literature 
on management to pinpoint those questions which seemed worthy of 
further study. The second outlines the reasons for selecting 
British Rail for empirical investigation and how the research 
project was designed and implemented.
1. NEW DIRECTIONS IN LABOUR MANAGEMENT
Since 1979 there have been major changes in the management of 
British organizations and the conduct of labour management within 
them. In many large organizations management hierarchies have been 
re-structured with the aim of both decentralizing operational 
responsibility and, at the same time, enhancing the capacity for 
strategic decision-making (Confederation of British Industry (CBI), 
1985; British Institute of Management (BIM), 1985). In most cases
2
the objective has been to re-define product market niches and to 
increase the potential for flexible responses to external pressures 
in the internal arena of production.
One important element of this seems to be changes in the management 
of labour. There is now widespread evidence that managements are 
seeking greater flexibility in labour deployment (Atkinson, 1984; 
Incomes Data Services (IDS), 1986), whilst in the sphere of labour 
relations there are good grounds for believing that managerial 
approaches are shifting away from a ’constitutional’ to a less 
formal 'consultative style’ (Sisson, 1984).
Unfortunately, what has often been absent from accounts of these
organizational changes is detailed analysis of the extent to which
changes to business strategy and structure are integrated with such 
shifts in the practice of labour management. Furthermore, little 
empirical research appears to have been conducted on the 
effectiveness of those changes that have taken place. Accounts in 
the business press tend to proclaim the success of aligning labour 
management with strategic business objectives (for instance, 
Boulter, 1982; Norman, 1983). It is also commonly argued that the 
devolution of operational decision-making to lower tiers of 
management has facilitated both the formulation and successful 
implementation of production policy. However, the basis of these
evaluations is often unclear. Detailed and comprehensive attention
to the longer term results of such changes seems to be rare.
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More radical commentaries, exemplified by that of Hyman and Eiger 
(1981), adopt a similar stance if from an opposing perspective. 
They tend to argue that product market collapse have directly forced 
managements to ’claw-back’ concessions ’granted’ to workforce 
organizations when economic circumstances were more favourable to 
labour. Managerial control of labour deployment and task 
performance has been re-asserted through the dismantling of job 
controls built up through labour relations institutions. Common to 
both managerial and radical perspectives is a belief, often 
insufficiently supported by empirical evidence, that the connections 
between business strategy and labour management are direct (1) , and 
that through this medium managerial control of labour has been 
enhanced. The twin themes that dominate this literature, then, are 
those of management strategy and control of labour.
Mainstream academic industrial relations research has generally 
been less ambitious in its scope. Many commentators have continued 
to focus on workplace labour relations largely without reference to 
managerial activity at higher levels of organizations (for example, 
Roberts, 1984; Gennard, 1985; Bright, Rees and Sawbridge, 1983). It 
could well be argued as a result that the exhortations to study the 
processes of management now often found in the industrial relations 
literature (in Wood, 1982 for instance) have not in practice 
amounted to much. Significant exceptions include Kinnie's (1983, 
1985a, 1985b) and Purcell and Gray's research (1983) into the
management of labour relations. Ironically, the criticism that 
could be levelled against these, however, is that the concentration
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on management tends to preclude in practice a sufficiently
comprehensive treatment of trade unions. As a result, the 
impression could be conveyed that managements are able to organize 
for labour relations and to select bargaining structures more or 
less at will (2). Similarly, Marginson's work (1982) on M-Form 
organizational structures seems to suggest that managements have a 
free hand to choose bargaining structures that bypass the main locii 
of trade union power. There are ample grounds for suspecting that 
union power has declined in the 1980s but its extent should not be
taken for granted in this way.
If there has been little progress on researching patterns of labour 
management, even less has been made in following the suggestions
that more attention be paid by researchers to exploration of the 
impact of business strategy and structure on labour management 
(Timperley, 1980; Kochan, McKersie and Capelli, 1984; Strauss,
1984). Other than historical work undertaken by Howard Gospel 
(1983b), the main exception to this is Batstone, Ferner and Terry's 
study (1984) of the formation of business strategy in the 
telecommunications and postal services activities of the Post Office 
in the late 1970s. These authors show how contradictory influences 
on strategy formulation, largely arising from state ownership, 
fostered a distinctive labour relations 'style' characterised by 
consensual relationships between top managers and union 
representatives. This relationship came under stress, particularly 
in the telecommunications sector, as the Post Office responded to 
governmental pressure to foster 'commercial' patterns of operation.
5
The contribution of Batstone et al's work is twofold: firstly, it 
deepens our understanding of labour relations in nationalized 
industries; secondly, it provides a set of insights into the inter­
connections between business strategy and labour relations 
strategies. The main weakness of the study, ironically in the 
light of the concerns of industrial relations researchers in the 
1970s, is that insufficient attention is paid to the conduct of 
labour relations at the workplace. As a result it is difficult to 
assess how far strategies determine workplace practices, and how far 
strategists’ objectives have been achieved.
Summarising the concerns of the literature to date, it could be 
characterised as falling into two main camps. Those accounts which 
have highlighted the formation of strategies have tended to be 
unable to assess how successful their implementation has been. By 
contrast, the large number of articles which have monitored 
workplace developments have not sought to determine to what extent 
these are the outcomes of strategic plans. Since the literature 
displays these divergent concerns it is difficult to decide how far 
management strategies are aimed at achieving greater control of 
labour and to what extent such an objective is achievable. On the 
one hand, some argue that a shifting industrial balance of power has 
permitted managements to develop strategic approaches to personnel 
and labour relations issues (for example, Brewster and Connock, 
1985)* On the other, structural transformations of managerial 
hierarchies to achieve market objectives, such as the 
decentralization of authority for operating decisions and the
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emphasis on ’business management', may well reinforce existing, ad 
hoc characteristics of labour management since this sphere of 
decision-making is likely to become subjugated to other managerial 
priorities.
2. THE CHOICE OF BRITISH RAIL FOR EMPIRICAL RESEARCH
The fundamental rationale for the research project was to 
investigate which of these two perspectives more accurately 
characterizes contemporary developments in British labour relations. 
As has already been shown, there is a tendency in much of the 
current literature to assume that the former is the more likely 
scenario. Yet the alternative suggestion seems equally likely 
since evidence from the management science literature (for example, 
March and Simon, 1958* Cyert and March, 1963; Pettigrew, 1973; 
Blackler and Brown, 1980) indicates that managerial decision-making 
often lacks rationality and frequently contains inconsistent 
objectives. The project set out to answer this question through 
conducting a detailed assessment of the extent to which managements 
are formulating change strategies in the sphere of labour 
management, how far these are integrated with other corporate 
strategies, how far these are aimed at increasing managerial control 
of task performance, work organization and labour relations, and how 
far strategic objectives are realised in successful outcomes for 
management?
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The project was designed to complement an ESRC-financed study (3), 
conducted by Drs. Michael Rose and Bryn Jones, which had aimed to 
assess whether the ’managerial offensive’ perspective found in many 
radical and union commentaries on industrial relations was a 
realistic portrayal of contemporary developments in British 
workplaces. These researchers went about this by exploring the 
linkages between work re-organization schemes and labour relations 
objectives in a number of plants in manufacturing industry. The 
results suggested that these two areas of labour management 
possessed a separate momentum which militated against all-embracing 
aggressive strategies suggested by the notion of a ’managerial 
offensive’ (see Rose and Jones, 1985; and Jones and Rose, 1985 for a 
summary of these findings).
In common with much of the other literature in the area, Rose and 
Jones' investigation was focussed primarily on the workplace. To 
answer the question posed at the beginning of this section, it was 
thought desirable to design the empirical element of the linked 
project to focus both on the 'horizontal' connections between 
management specialisms and activities, and on the ’vertical’ 
distribution of authority between the tiers of the management 
hierarchy. In this way attention could be given to both the degree 
of integration of managerial strategies and to their translation 
into practice. The detailed examination which this implied of all 
levels of managerial decision-making and workplace labour relations 
was thought to justify a focus on just one employer.
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It was decided early on to select British Rail for this empirical 
study. A market-oriented company in the public sector seemed a 
relevant organization to choose because in addition to the market 
difficulties faced by private sector industries, they have been 
faced with considerable government pressure since 1979 to attach 
greater priority to commercial practices and to improve the quality 
of their managerial decision-making. British Rail has had 
particularly acute difficulties since the Thatcher Governments have 
sought significant reductions in the Public Service Obligation Grant 
(PSOG) which in the late 1970s contributed over 30% of the British 
Railways Board's annual turnover. As well as intensifying the 
financial pressures on the Board, this financial dependence has also 
been exploited by the Government (this is not in itself a new 
development) to urge a reformulation of labour management 
objectives. The Thatcher Governments have viewed BR, more than most 
of the other nationalized industries, as a hotbed of union 
'restrictive practices' and run by an 'indulgent' (Gouldner, 1964) 
management willing to defer to the rail unions at all levels of the 
organization. It could be anticipated, then, that high-level 
strategies to align labour management with business objectives would 
be especially likely to be found on the railways.
A number of events during 1982 suggested the choice was a sound one. 
In that year the railways lost more days through industrial action 
than in any other single year since nationalization in 1948 
(Bagwell, 1984, p. 82). Most of these days were lost through 
resistance organized by the train drivers' union, the Associated
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Society of Locomotive Engineers and Firemen (ASLEF), to the 
imposition of new work rosters. The ’hawkish' stance adopted by the 
British Railways Board on this issue was followed by a refusal by BR 
management to honour the 1982 pay award until the rail unions, ASLEF 
in particular, agreed to new arrangements for the manning of trains. 
Concurrent with this a major study of BR's financial affairs was 
being undertaken by the Serpell Committee on Railway Finances 
(1983). At the beginning of 1982 the upper reaches of BR’s 
management hierarchy had been extensively re-structured to emphasize 
'business' considerations, and it soon became clear that a 
transformation of the management structure in BR's five Regions was 
in the pipeline. Thus, the issues of strategy, structure and 
control were at the forefront of railway affairs at the time the 
project was being planned.
On the basis of these contextual developments on British Rail and 
the issues that were arising in the academic literature three 
working hypotheses were adopted to guide the research:
1) the practice of labour management would become increasingly ad 
hoc since the primary objective of BR strategists would be to 
emphasize 'business' at the expense of production considerations 
in managerial decision-making. The managerial structures that 
were under construction would institutionalize these priorities 
and could well provide blockages to coherent labour management 
policies;
2) the Government's twin priorities of improving industry 
performance and reforming labour management would not in practice
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reinforce each other. Instead, the product market strategies 
adopted to respond to financial imperatives would often be 
incompatible with consistent attempts to reduce the involvement 
of the rail unions in the day-to-day conduct of labour 
management, and the achievement of uniform policy in this sphere. 
Furthermore, because the labour relations priorities established 
by the Government are symbolic as well as substantive, the 
content of labour management strategies may not take the best 
form to achieve improvements in performance;
3) since management practice and decision-making in the management 
of labour will display growing variation as a result of (1) and 
(2), the policies that are adopted will not be sufficiently 
comprehensive in scope to ensure that managerial control is 
enhanced. The stronger the trade union, the more likely it is 
that they will be able to subvert management objectives.
To assess these hypotheses it was thought necessary to choose for 
detailed study a number of occupational groups on British Rail. 
This would provide a focus at the workplace for management 
strategies, thus enabling an analysis of the consistency and success 
of managerial decision-making. The train-driving and signalling 
functions were those selected. The number of train drivers and 
other footplate staff at the end of 1982 was 23, 05 ,^ and that of 
signalmen (including crossing keepers) 8,227 out of a total British 
Rail workforce of 161,402 (BRB, 1983c). These two groups are 
arguably the most important occupational groups in the supply of 
railway services since they share control of the movement of trains
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between them. It could well be anticipated that this role would be 
reflected in substantial degrees of labour relations power and 
considerable control of work organization. There was a useful 
comparative dimension in that train drivers are largely organized in 
a craft union, whilst signalmen form one section of an industrial 
union, the National Union of Railwaymen (NUR).
Train drivers were a near obvious choice for research precisely 
because of their centrality at the time to managerial plans to 
reform working practices. Of the package of changes proposed by the 
British Railways Board (BRB, 1979) shortly after the election of the 
first Thatcher Government, flexible rostering for train drivers came 
to assume particular prominence because its implementation came to 
be a test of management legitimacy with the government (Ferner,
1985). In addition to flexible rostering, the Board's proposals 
included changes in the division of labour between drivers and 
guards through Driver-Only-Operation (D.O.O.), modifications of the 
drivers' career and promotion structure by the Trainman Concept and 
relaxation of the locomotive manning agreements. The
implementation of flexible rosters was selected for detailed 
investigation since it was unclear when the Trainman Concept and 
revisions to the Manning Agreements would come into operation (4), 
and problems of access prevented more than a superficial study of 
Driver-Only-Operation.
Signalmen were chosen because British Rail management's attempts to 
re-structure operations methods especially alters their work and
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status. Furthermore, the combination of a high degree of worker 
autonomy with detailed control of signalling tasks suggested that 
railway signalling would be a fruitful area for the examination of 
prevailing orthodoxies in the literature on the links between skill, 
power and control. This element of the project centred on an 
examination of the impact of such changes on work organization and 
labour relations, and to what extent technical strategies were 
accompanied by labour-focussed policies (5)*
From the outset it was intended to trace the involvement of 
managerial functions at various levels in the formulation and 
implementation of strategies. From an early stage of the project 
this assumed even greater importance than initially anticipated 
because of the large-scale re-organization of BR’s management 
structure and re-formulation of railway objectives taking place at 
the same time as the project. Investigation was made of the main 
dimensions of these changes and how they seemed to be moulding 
policy formulation in areas additional to those of management of the 
driving and signalling function. On the union side attention was 
paid to union functions above the workplace, and a study was made of 
labour relations practices at all levels of the labour relations 
machinery.
Since the research objectives were largely contextual and concerned 
with establishing the nature and extent of causal relationships, a 
qualitative rather than a quantitative approach seemed most 
appropriate. Accordingly, most of the evidence was obtained by in-
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depth interviewing, using semi-structured interview schedules 
(details of which can be found in Appendix One). The method used in 
interview was to seek respondents evaluation of the impact of 
changes in labour management, and business strategy and structure. 
Through subsequent analysis of these responses it was possible to 
assess whether workplace practices were the outcome of strategic 
intent or whether instead they arose from contingencies particular 
to the workplace.
In addition a large number of informal discussions took place with 
the wide range of contacts established in the duration of the 
project. Since the formal interviews varied from interviews lasting 
around an hour to 'sessions’ lasting for whole days, and the 
informal discussions similarly ranged from brief conversations to 
extensive social contact it is difficult to state precisely the 
numerical balance between formal and informal interviews.
To investigate the changes in the driving function interviews 
supplemented by informal conversations were conducted at seven 
traincrew depots (Electric, Northern, Stone, Junction, Western, 
Mixed and Freight ) , brief details of which can be found in Appendix 
Two. Twenty one formal interviews took place with depot managers, 
supervisors or administrators, workforce representatives on the 
Local Departmental Committee (LDC), and workforce representatives on 
the Sectional Council, the next tier of the negotiating machinery.
In addition, it was possible to 'sit-in' on two sessions of the 
Sectional Council and attend an ASLEF weekend school.
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Fifteen signalling locations were visited. Detailed information was 
acquired on twelve of these, and a further two in the planning and construction 
stage. Brief details of each can be found in Appendix Three. In addition, 
two Control Offices were visited. Since much of the information had to be 
acquired whilst signalmen were operating signalling equipment, many 
of the interviews were less structured than those conducted at traincrew 
depots. A significantly large number of interviews were conducted in the
I
signalling function because the pilot fieldwork was conducted in signalboxes.
!
jFurthermore, some of the data acquired early on was not of a high quality 
ince an industrial dispute over a mangerial policy to re-organize the
^taffing of a number of signalboxes made data collection difficult. In
all, forty five interviews took place, supplemented by informal sessions
ith the line managers, supervisors, signalmens’ LDC and Sectional Council
epresentatives, and Control Office staff. A great deal of information
(6 )
as also acquired by attending the annual Signalmens’ Conferences
ocumenting analysis of labour relation practices was also undertaken at 
Union head offices. This part of the investigation stretched as far back 
Is the mid-1960s for drivers, when diesel and electric locomotives replaced 
$team, and the late 1960s for signalmen, when a 'control centre' signalling
I
|trategy emerged. Ten interviews were conducted with union officials and
I
Representatives at head offices in addition to the large number of informal
I
lontacts that inevitably arise when conducting archival research.
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iIn addition to seventeen interviews with local managers, twenty one interviews 
ere conducted with senior managers, largely in the engineering, personnel,
|nd operating functions, at all levels of British Rail’s organization. As 
iith other interviews, a range of informal discussions arose as a result 
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The empirical phase of the project lasted from May 1983 to -October 1984.
Overall, ninety seven indepth interviews were conducted, supplemented by 
~he large number of informed discussions already alluded to. To this authors 
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and workforce organization. The other is the form that management strategies 
and structure are currently taking. Whilst accounts that report the extensive 
changes that are taking place in bargaining pay relatively little detailed 
attention to the role of management’s objectives, studies of management strategy 
and structure aften tend to assume that managerial intentions are straight­
forwardly translated into outcomes.
Taking this material together, a number of issues are raised. These are (1) 
the degree of linkage between managements’ objectives and practices in the 
sphere of labour management: (2) the degree of integration of labour 
management with core business strategies and structure. There is a widespread 
belief, found in both the managerial and radical literature, that the weakness 
of workforce representation in the 1980s has enabled a more uniform management 
approach towards labour management to be adopted, consistant with the primary 
goals of the organization. It seemed equally likely, however, that the 
greater importance that many organizations now attach to strategic' 
business rather than production objectives could generate greater variability 
in the management of labour within them, and that this could be especially 
marked where workforce power has not declined to the degree that many observers 
have charted. As a result, managements may not have increased their control 
of aspects of labour management to the extent maintained by some commentators.
B.R. appeared a good choice for empirical investigation of this issue since 
the Thatcher Governments have placed pressure on nationalized industries 
to loth reform elements of labour relations and work organization, and to 
take more account of 'business’ 'objectives in management decision-making.
Prior to reporting the results of the empirical investigation, Chapter 
Two explores the use of the concepts of ’strategy’ and ’control’ in the 
literature since the meanings of these seem likely to substantially determine 
the outcome of empirical research. Chapter Three shows how variability in 
governmental objectives has in the past stimulated a consensual pattern 
of labour relations on British Rail, and how the features of the current 
Government's labour relations approach has, contrary to the arguments of 
radical critics, made the formulation and implementation of uniform labour 
management strategies more difficult rather than easier. In Chapter Four 
the labour relation ’system’ on B.R. is introduced. It is argued that the 
s.power of workforce organizations on the railways has not declined to the
jextent observed by some in manufacturing industry, with the result that
;■
Management strategies continue to face substantial union obstacles. Chapters 
'Five and Six show how B.R.’s management structure has been re-organized, 
and how the strategies arising from this have tended to fragment labour 
management practices. A reduction in the organizational standing of the 
personnel function has freed sections of management to persue work organization 
policies which depart from past practice but, since workforce organization is still 
ptrong, the grievances that have arisen as a result have reinforced the 
[*ole of labour relations management. Futhermore, the reduced authority 
pf the personnel department overall has largely prevented B.R. management
t*rcm successfully re-shaping the structure of employee relations towards
!
, more ’consultative’ form.
he rest of the thesis reports the findings of the case study exploration
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to both reform elements of labour relations and -work organization, and to 
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Prior to reporting the results of the empirical investigation, Chapter 
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power of workforce organizations on the railways has not declined to the 
extent observed by some in manufacturing industry, with the result that 
management strategies continue to face substantial union obstacles. Chapters 
Five and Six show how B.R.’s management structure has been re-organized, 
and how the strategies arising from this have tended to fragment labour 
management practices. A reduction in the organizational standing of the 
personnel function has freed sections of management to persue work organization 
policies which depart from past practice but, since workforce organization is still 
strong, the grievances that have arisen as a result have reinforced the 
role of labour relations management. Futhermore, the reduced authority 
of the personnel department overall has largely prevented B.R. management 
frcm successfully re-shaping the structure of employee relations towards 
a nnore ’consultative’ form.
The; rest of the thesis reports the findings of the case study exploration
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of the train driving and signalling functions. Chapters Seven and Eight 
show how a consistent labour management strategy broke down because of the 
Government’s labour relations objectives with the result that managerial 
control of work organization was diminshed. Chapters Nine and Ten investigate 
the extent to which a technical strategy to transform signalling operation 
has been accompanied by a set of consistent labour managment policies.
The overall conclusion of the thesis is that, contrary to a number of propositions 
derived from the literature, management objectives to reform labour 




MANAGEMENT STRATEGY AND CONTROL OF LABOUR
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INTRODUCTION
The nature of the project’s objectives require that empirical and 
theoretical consideration be given to management strategy and to what 
extent strategies aspire to increase managerial control of the 
various dimensions of labour management. There is a rapidly growing 
literature on this issue (see Gospel and Littler, 1983; Thurley and 
Wood, 1983; Batstone et al, 1984; Knights, Willmott and Collinson, 
1985; Kinnie, 1985b). Within this literature, however, there appears 
to be little consensus on what constitutes management strategy. 
Perspectives range from those accounts that tend to view strategies 
as little more than consistency of objectives, policies and practices 
(for instance, Nichols and Beynon’s (1977) study of Chemco) to those 
which perceive strategies as a distinct form of managerial decision­
making. It seems likely that definitional approaches to ’strategy’ 
will substantially influence the outcome of empirical research. The 
looser the definition the greater the liklihood that research findngs 
will indicate that labour considerations are a central focus of high- 
level management decisions.
Some of the impetus for the analysis of management strategies comes 
from the centrality accorded to managements’ labour objectives in the 
radical literature. Braverman (1974) set this process in motion in 
the mid-1970s with his contention that the degradation of labour is 
the primary management strategy in the era of monopoly capitalism. 
Central to this process is the achievement of managerial control over 
task performance. Subsequent work in this genre, such as that of
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Friedman (1977) and Richard Edwards (1979) suggested that this 
primary objective of securing control of workforces can be embodied 
in a number of types of managment strategy. But as accounts became 
more sensitive to variations in management strategy, so the object of 
control became more varied. In Edwards' work, for instance, the 
object of control shifts from immediate control of task performance 
through 'simple' and 'technical' control, to a more generalized 
control of workforce orientations and behaviour achieved through 
'bureaucratic' control.
Since the approach to control is not uniform in the literature, it is 
necessary to consider the meaning of 'control' too. The objects of 
control needs to be established, and the methods of regulating work 
relationships need to be separated-out from more generalized 
assessments of the balance of power between managers and workforces. 
This is necessary since, as with strategies, the scope and meaning of 
control seems likely to influence the approach to and results of 
empirical research. The use of both 'strategy' and 'control', then, 
are reviewed here in turn.
1 THE MEANING OF 'MANAGEMENT STRATEGY'
There is considerable divergence in the academic literature in
discussions of the focus of management strategies. Broadly speaking 
the literature divides into those writers who view strategies as all- 
embracing expressions of imperatives facing managements in capitalist
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econonies and those who believe strategies have a more sharply- 
defined focus. Thurley and Wood argue that,
"Discussion of management industrial relations strategies 
reflects the fact that different writers have taken different 
problems as the focus of their argument. In a real sense there 
has been no debate, only a set of competing and somewhat ill- 
defined arguments about management, making quite different 
assumptions in their explanation of managerial actions” (1983. 
P. 207).
As a result it is difficult to examine whether strategies are in 
operation and, where they are, to what extent labour relations 
strategies are integrated with other labour-focused strategies and 
with business strategies. At the extreme, some radical accounts 
suggest that they are but one strategy.
The scope of strategies and the meaning of ’strategy’ are closely 
related. Generally, the broader the scope strategies are perceived 
to have, the lesser attention is thought necessary to the components 
of managerial decision-making. Those accounts, such as Braverman’s, 
which point to comprehensive strategies against labour suggest that, 
because these derive from fundamental imperatives, the details of 
decision-making are of secondary importance. Batstone et al make the 
similar point that such writers,
’’tend to see labour strategies as flowing unproblematically from 
the goals of the capitalist firm. Management is often viewed 
in a crudely functionalist way as a kind of transmission belt 
converting the 'law of value’ into strategies for the
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exploitation of labour" (1984, P-2).
Since the differing perspectives can substantially affect the focus 
of research, it is necessary to examine both the scope of strategies 
and the components of management actions before empirical work can be 
successfuly carried out.
The broad differences in approach in the literature arise from 
distinct disciplinary traditions. It is arguably unsurprising that 
accounts in the American school of radical political economy have a 
broader scope than those in the mainstream of industrial relations 
writing in Britain. The latter, in examining the details of "the 
institutions of job regulation" (Flanders, 1965, p. 10), has almost 
been bound to have a narrower focus than accounts which seek to 
generate generalizations about management objectives in various 
historical periods. Such differences in perspective would probably 
not be problematic if they could be clearly delineated. But many 
British industrial relations writers have extended the scope of the 
subject to what Hyman has termed "the process of control over work 
relations’ (1975. P*10) (1). Thus, defined industrial relations can 
cover the whole arena of labour-management relationships in much the 
same way as labour process writing tends to. In the absence of clear 
boundaries to the subject of industrial relations it is often unclear 
what labour relations strategies identified by writers in this 
discipline refer to.
These problems are compounded by variations in the focus of 
management strategies in the radical literature. In Richard Edwards'
24
work, for instance, ’simple* and 'technical* control strategies are 
largely aimed at directing task performance and the division of 
labour, whilst 'bureaucratic* control strategies seek to generate 
employee consent through the systematic application of rules in the 
sphere of employment relationships. In Edwards' view these 
strategies possess a common objective in aiming to constrain the 
inherent variability of worker performance that arises because
"labour power is always embodied in people, who have their own 
interests and needs, and who retain their power to resist being 
treated like a commodity" (1979. P* 12).
Leaving aside the question of whether those features grouped under 
these types of strategies are, in fact, introduced by managements 
with this intent (see Penn, 1981; and Batstone et al 1984, PP« 290-8 
for useful critiques of this), it is apparent that Edwards evidence 
for the three phases of strategy is insufficient. It is assumed 
rather than proved that the bureaucratization of employment 
conditions will lead to the successful implementation of managerial 
objectives in the sphere of work organization. His main instances of 
bureaucratic control are grading structures, which seem inadequate 
guides to either the division of labour or the achievement of 
consent, and a small number of job descriptions which cannot be 
assumed to be equivalent to formal rules of task performance. The 
operational rules on the railways, for instance, are considerably 
more extensive than job descriptions found in contracts of 
employment.
The confusions that arise from this sort of approach to strategy
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suggest the importance of distinguishing separate dimensions of 
labour-management relationships to which strategies could be applied. 
Littler (1982) distinguishes between the bureaucratization of work 
tasks and the bureaucratization of employment conditions. Gospel 
(1983a) draws attention to three categories - work relations, 
employment relations and industrial relations. Work relations refers 
to the area of work organization and task performance, employment 
relations to job structure and employment benefits, and industrial 
relations to management-union relations and the institutions of 
collective bargaining. Such an analytical schema is preferable to 
that of Littler's since it directs attention to the institutions in 
which conflicts over work relations and employment relations may take 
place but which nevertheless have a separate dynamic of their own. It 
is then possible using such categories to empirically investigate how 
far management strategies are aimed at these dimensions and how far 
management policies towards them are integrated.
Once the focus of management's labour strategies have been 
established, it is possible to turn to the issue of how far 
managerial decision-making can be viewed as strategic. Labour 
process writing has a tendency to view all managerial actions in the 
sphere of labour managemnt as reflecting one of a small number of 
basic strategies to extract surplus value in furtherance of a 
fundamental imperative of achieving profit. The problem with this is 
that it puts all managerial actions on a similar level, in effect 
conflating the day-to-day activities of individual managers with the 
coordination of management decision-making necessary to achieve
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substantial shifts in the way an organization performs (2). 
Furthernore, it grants managerial action a sense of purpose which may 
not in reality be present.
Although industrial relations writing has tended to focus more on the 
details of management-labour relations, it has shared this tendency 
to impute a consistency and clarity of objectives to management 
decision-making whihc may not be warranted. Examples of this can be 
found in much of the material that has outlined the process of 
rationalization and formalization of British labour relations that 
has taken place since Donovan (Royal Commission, 1968). Yet these 
developments (evidence of which can be found in Purcell, 1981; Brown, 
1981; Daniel and Millward, 1983). are not proof of a labour relations 
strategy even though they were consciously brought about by
managements. One account which describes them as strategic 
nevertheless notes,
"very rarely did a management set out with an explicit policy of 
restructuring workplace industrial relations. Most introduced 
reforms in a piecemeal and ad hoc fashion in response to events" 
(Purcell and Sisson, 1983. P. 103).
It is apparent from this brief discussion that the meaning of 
strategy is often unclear. In the current debates in sociology and 
industrial relations on management strategy the protagonists fall 
into two main camps (though, as Thurley and Wood suggest, the
boundaries are not always distinct). Firstly, there are those who
adopt what is sometimes called a ’stringent’ definition. Often
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making explicit comparisons with military usage (see Anthony, 1965) 
proponents of this view suggest that ’strategy’ is a combination of a 
comprehensive analysis of a given problem, a suggested solution and a 
set of mechanisms to achieve it. On the other hand there are those, 
such as Child (perhaps surprisingly in the light of his previous work 
on 'strategic choice') who appear to suggest that in the key 'labour 
process' area 'strategy' need not have explicit goals (see Child, 
1985).
The former approach is perhaps best exemplified by Rose and Jones 
(1985) in their analysis of work re-organization schemes. They 
devote little explicit attention to the meaning of 'strategy' in 
their work but they argue that the views of those who discern a 
'management offensive' are mistaken since policies and objectives for 
work re-organization and labour relations rarely display the 
consistency and integration to be seen as strategic. As Child 
summarises the Rose and Jones approach, the criteria for a labour 
process strategy are (1) that managers be demonstrated to hold a 
coherent set of policy rationales, which (2) are directed 
specifically at key labour process dimensions such as control, 
discretion and skill, and (3) that there is a close and effective 
follow-through from policy to implmentation. (Child, ibid.). This 
may well seem a fairly common-sense definition of a 'labour process 
strategy', but Child is highly critical of this approach.
The main reason for this seems to be that satisfaction of all three 
criteria is feared to be so unlikely that 'strategy' will be rendered
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management actions with little or no ranking of significance. Yet 
what those both within and outside organizations call 'corporate 
strategy' does appear to be qualitatively distinct from the everyday 
activities of line, middle and, in many cases senior, managers. 
Corporate strategies are concerned with the medium and long term 
direction of the business. They are thus quite different from the 
main range of policies held and operated by managers. Whilst it is 
reasonable to assume that policies, defined as consistent ways of 
reacting to certain events, may well be implicitly held (Brewster and 
Richbell, 1983) this is not the case with strategies. A 'strategy', 
as commonly understood, has a clearly-defined goal and is thus 
clearly intentional. On this basis a labour process strategy has to 
be explicitly aimed, contrary to Child's suggestion, at changing some 
aspect of the labour process.
In addition, since strategies have a wider focus than individual 
policies, the process of arriving at and implementing strategies is 
distinctive. Because organizational development (which is what 
strategies are aimed at) generally involves a number of management 
functions, coordination and agreement between departments, both in 
the analysis of the problem and the formulation of acceptable 
solutions, is necessary. This is quite different from the everyday 
process of managerial decision-making even at senior levels. There 
are some grounds, then, for suggesting that strategy, as Child and 
Francis argue (1981), is a structured formulation of decision-making. 
This is not incompatible with accounts stressing the political, 
negotiated nature of such decision-making (such as that of Pettigrew,
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1973)* Indeed there is some evidence that corporate planning is most 
successful where the participants recognise the 'political* nature of 
this activity (Grinyer and Norburn, 197*0» and also that the process 
of strategy formulation can assist in the creation of political 
consensus amongst other groups of managers in the organization (Child 
and Francis, ibid.) .
A further necessary component of strategy, in the definition proposed 
here, is an action plan and a set of controls and mechanisms to 
ensure that staff, particularly management, at other levels of the 
organization carry out its architects' wishes. The implications of 
Child's critique of the 'stringent' definition is that the existence 
of revisions of strategy during implementation once again cast doubts 
on the conceptual relevance of strategy. This criticism is,
however, misplaced. What is necessary to a stringent definition is 
that strategy architects attempt to foresee and forestall problems in 
implementation. This is quite compatible with unanticipated 
difficulties modifying its substantive content. In the case of work 
re-organization strategies it may be the case that strategies aimed 
at altering workplace controls over aspects of work organization are 
implemented as their designers wished but yet nevertheless fail to 
achieve their objectives. In brief, strategies conforming to the 
stringent definition can produce unintended effects.
It is worth paying some attention to the implementation of strategies 
and the control of outcomes. In the past there has been considerable 
interest in management science in management control systems (see
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Anthony, 1965; Mills, 1970* Lowe, 1971; Nelson and Machin, 1976). 
The growing management literature on contemporary changes in business 
strategy and structure is, however, so far largely speculative on 
their outcomes. The study of strategy implementation in sociology 
and industrial relations is similarly under-developed. There is a 
widespread tendency, in part the consequence of unsystematic and 
’weak' definitions of ’strategy’, not only to ’read-off’ strategies 
from the implementation of change, but also to imply that statements 
of managerial intent are unproblematically translated into action or 
that once a strategy aimed at increasing some aspect of managerial 
control is put into practice management have succeeded in effecting a 
shift in control.
The most detailed attention to the implementation of strategy is to 
be found in the 'new technology’ literature (see, for instance, 
Wilkinson, 1983; Buchanan and Boddy, 1983; Child and Tarbuck, 1985). 
Even here many accounts suffer from a lack of depth because their 
focus does not go beyond the immediate implementation process. The 
study conducted by the New Technology Research Group at Southampton 
University on British Rail's Total Operations Processing System 
(TOPS) (see McLoughlin, Smith and Dawson, 1983) is a good example of 
this limitation. It omits detailed study of the implementation of 
TOPS at local level since it is largely based on retrospective study 
of the strategists' objectives. Since the change scheme was aimed at 
solving a specific problem - hoarding of freight wagons in sidings 
and marshalling yards - the initial success in achieving this tends 
to obscure from the researchers the possible creation of new and
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unintended customs and practices.
In summary, a strategy has a distinctive set of characteristics which 
distinguish it from other forms of managerial decision-making. Not 
only must a strategy embody a clear set of objectives it must also 
contain a set of steps to achieve these objectives. It seems to be a 
corollary of such a definition that the focus of the strategy will be 
more sharply defined than is often found in many accounts in the 
literature. To examine strategies in the field of labour management 
it is worthwhile separating the spheres of work relations, employment 
relations and industrial relations from each other. Once we have an 
adequate conceptualization of strategy we are able to systematically 
investigate the widespread changes in strategy and structure that are 
currently taking place in British industry. In this study of British 
Rail, clarity in the dimensions of managerial decision-making enables 
an appraisal of how far strategies are in operation and the degree of 
integration between them.
2 MANAGEMENT AND CONTROL
Interest in the issue of managerial control of labour has developed 
in tandem with that in management strategy. As with strategy, 
control came to occupy a central place in academic research with the 
publication of Labour and Monopoly Capital (Braverman, 197*0» though 
the broader question of organizational control has a longer pedigree 
in organizational studies (for instance, Tannenbaum, 1968) and in
33
management science (4). The problem with much of the subsequent
literature is that the object of control is not always entirely
clear. In Richard Edwards* work, for instance, the object of control 
shifts from the definition of the division of labour and work 
intensity by technological means to that of limiting the variability 
of human behaviour more generally. Furthermore whilst it is often 
assumed that the range of management-labour relationships can be 
summed up by a simple linear continuum of control, exemplified by the 
notion of a 'frontier of control* (Goodrich, 1920), there are 
precious few guides on how this might be operationaliz-ed. To 
investigate how far management strategies increase managerial control 
of labour requires some clarification of the application of 
* control'.
In Braverman's account control was used in a relatively 
straightforward manner. As Edwards* did subsequently, Braverman
viewed the achievement of the conversion of labour power into labour
as the fundamental problem faced by employers. The solution that 
Braverman believed modern managements have adopted is the progressive 
wresting of control of work from labour through the separation of 
task conception from execution. As a consequence of the application 
of the techniques of 'scientific management* skilled craftsmen have 
been deskilled to the point that they become what Braverman calls 
'detail workers’. Through the removal of their craft skills, 
workers lose their power vis-a-vis employers and managers. Thus, the 
removal of workers' control in the arena of task performance has 
'knock-on effects' in other areas of worker-management relations.
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Braverman has been extensively criticised for making this latter 
assumption since there is substantial evidence that workers have been 
able to resist de-skilling (Littler and Salaman, 1982) and to retain 
job controls after de-skilling has taken place (Thompson, 1983). But 
at least the core concept of control is relatively clear, and can be 
subjected to empirical investigation. Such research that has taken 
place has examined how far managements aim to to gain control of task 
performance when implementing new technology. Micro-processor 
technology in particular appears to offer the potential for managers 
to exert greater control, whilst the introduction of new technology 
more generally often gives management the opportunity to bypass 
traditional workplace controls which might have hitherto prevented 
this. Research findings have indicated, however, that such 
aspirations are not necessarily at the forefront of management 
objectives (Buchanan and Boddy, 1983; Pendleton, 1984; McLoughlin, 
Smith and Dawson, 1983; Rothwell, 1985), and also that there is a 
continuing requirement for ’traditional skills' after new technology 
has been introduced (Jones, 1982; Scott, 1985)* Even where formal 
skill requirements are in fact lessened, employers are nevertheless 
dependent on less formal, 'tacit skills' (Kusterer, 1978; Jones, 
1984; Jones and Wood, 1984; Manwaring and Wood, 1985)•
The conclusion from these studies that greater managerial control of 
task performance is neither a necessary objective nor an easily 
attainable result of technological change is now something of a 
'conventional wisdom'in academic circles. It sits uneasily, however, 
with the observable trend of corporate strategists seeking increased
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control of organizational activities, of which labour performance is 
one element, since the late 1970s, with the objective of facilitating 
flexible and speedier responses to uncertain market situations. 
Alternatively, this latter objective could just as easily direct 
managerial attention to securing employee consensus and motivation 
(cf. Cressey and Maclnnes, 1981) (5)* This could be particularly so 
where the market strategy adopted is one of seeking ’up-market' 
product niches since particular attention has to be paid to achieving 
higher standards of product quality at minimum cost, or in service 
industries where the sphere of production is in close proximity to 
the customer.
How do we decide between or assess these apparently conflicting 
possibilities? Part of the problem is undoubtedly a methodological 
one in so far as the wealth of empirical case studies refuting the 
mono-causal, deterministic accounts of the labour process school do 
not provide a satisfactory base from which to make wider 
generalisations (cf. Storey, 1985a). As the literature currently 
stands, therefore, researchers are not well placed to resolve this 
inconsistency in evidence.
Although it is not easy to overcome the difficulties arising from 
much of the literature being based on specific organizational 
environments, the problem can be substantially resolved if much 
closer attention is paid to the areas of labour-management 
relationships to which control is applied. It seems likely from 
other work, such as that of Boddy and Buchanan on the implementation
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of new technology (Boddy and Buchanan, 1983) that control objectives 
differ between levels and specialisms of management, with senior 
managers displaying more interest in control of organizations through 
coordination of functions, whilst line managers are more concerned 
with discrete areas of labour-management relationships. From the 
outset, then, a distinction can be made between ’zero-sum’ and 
’positive-sum' areas of control.
Having established this it is necessary to specify which elements of 
labour-management relationships can be seen as zero-sum since it is 
here that a notion of a ’frontier of control’ could be meaningful. 
One solution might be to assess the three main areas of this 
relationship as outlined earlier in the chapter. However, the area 
of work relations, for instance, could be characterised both by 
zero-sum forms of control when discrete elements of it are examined 
and by positive-sum control when work relations as a whole are looked 
at. For instance, an increase in managerial control of work 
relations might be achieved by a loosening of individual controls on 
the way workers perform their tasks. Paul Edwards (1983a) notes how 
the gang system in parts of the British motor car industry gave 
considerable control of the details of work to the shop floor yet 
assisted management in the pursuit of its wider aims in production.
To distinguish, then, between the two forms of control seems to 
require that the locus of zero-sum control be specific instances of 
labour-management relations. This distinction can be highlighted by 
distinguishing control from controls. Controls are applied to
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particular aspects of work relations, employment relations or 
industrial relations and may be perceived as zero-sum in so far as 
they constrain management or labour (cf. Purcell and Earl, 1977). 
whilst 'control' refers to an assessment of the success or failure of 
these controls. This distinction is very similar to that made by 
Paul Edwards (op. cit.) between detailed and general control of the 
labour process. Detailed control refers to the detailed regulation 
of work whilst general control refers to the degree to which the 
organization as a whole contributes to the achievement of surplus 
value and is, as a result, not a zero-sum phenomena.
The logic of these distinctions is that the notion of a 'frontier of 
control is neither meaningful in the sphere of general control nor in 
that of detailed control since the collection of controls seems to 
bear no necessary or calculable relationship to any overall balance 
of control between management and labour. This runs counter to those 
accounts which discern a 'management offensive' since in directing 
attention to a frontier of control they implicitly suggest that a 
'calculus of control' can be constructed out of the sum of job 
controls. In the view of it's observers, the distinguishing feature 
of this offensive is that it embodies a generalized assertion of 
management control in contrast to earlier attention to small numbers 
of discrete job controls (Hyman and Eiger, 1981). Nevertheless this 
wider assertion of management perogatives is essentially composed of 
changes to a collection of controls. But it is empirically doubtful 
that managements have in practice been able to assert such control 
across the whole field of management-labour relationships (Rose and
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Jones, 1985). Furthermore, it is not possible to quantify an overall 
distribution of control between management and labour since the whole 
range of controls do not have any simple, unambiguous significance. 
Those controls which are amended in one sphere of relationships may 
have a contrasting effect viewed from another aspect of management- 
labour relations (cf. Rose and Jones, ibid.).
The simple framework of the dimensions of control proposed in this 
section bears comparison with categories that were developed earlier 
in the discipline of management science. R.N.Anthony (1965) 
distinguishes 'management control', embracing the balancing of all 
aspects of the organization's operations, from 'operational control' 
which focuses on specific tasks. This distinction between holistic 
control and atomistic controls is indeed central to. management 
writing on control and can be found in similar form in Tannenbaum 
(1968), Lowe (1971) (who distinguishes 'Control-in-the-large' from 
'Control-in-the-small'), and Nelson and Machin (1976). In the 
latter's study of the National Health Service it is argued that the 
introduction of formal procedures permitted a greater degree of 
control to be exercised on the management process without raising the 
level of constraint on individuals. The most extreme expression of 
this view that greater control can be achieved through the absence of 
restraint is to be found in Peters and Waterman's discussion of 
'excellent' US companies (1982). They argue that the absence of 
bureaucratic controls stimulates a strong shared value system amongst 
members of these organizations with the result that organizational 
control overall is increased.
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Once a distinction is accepted between controls and control, or 
general control and detailed control, and that it is not conceptually 
possible to calculate an overall distribution of control between 
management and labour, the study of control in management-labour 
relationships can become comparatively straightforward. It becomes 
possible to pose a number of questions which can be answered 
empirically. First, what effect does the construction or
destruction of regulations have on managements’ and labours' ability 
to achieve their objectives? Secondly, does the creation of control 
throigh closer coordination of managerial functions have any effect 
on controls in the sphere of labour-management relationships (6)? 
Thirdly, to what extent do strategies aimed at improving overall 
organizational performance make explicit reference to changing 
controls in the labour arena?
The usefulness of the distinctions proposed can be briefly 
illustrated by reference to one of the set of case studies chosen for 
detailed investigation as part of the project. The flexible 
rostering dispute in 1982, over changing the content of work 
programmes, appears an ideal example of the management offensive, 
embodying a sustained managerial strategy to 'regain control' of work 
scheduling from ASLEF, the traindrivers' union. Managerial success 
in forcing the introduction of these rosters could well indicate that 
management's control of work allocation has been increased. However, 
in so far as the new forms of rostering were accompanied by a new set 
of job regulations it cannot be assumed that management control was 
increased. Even if management control of scheduling was increased,
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it could be that management control in the sphere of employment 
relations has been diminished.
SUMMARY
This chapter has explored the use of ’strategy’ and ’control’ in the 
literature and attempted to identify the conceptual problems that 
arise from the manner in which they are used. It is often unclear 
both what the focus of strategies are, and what distinguishes 
strategies from other forms of managerial decision-making. Indeed, 
these two weaknesses are connected in that the more ’diluted’ the 
definition of strategy, the greater the liklihood that the focus of 
them is likely to be broad in scope, and vice versa. Conversely, the 
more rigorous the definition of strategy, the more specific the 
objectives of the strategy can be expected to be. The preference in 
this chapter is for the latter since it accords with ’every-day’ 
useage and permits a more rigorous analysis of the degree to which 
strategies are in operation, their coverage and the extent to which 
they are integrated. Three main areas of management-labour 
relationships, drawn from the work of Gospel, were identified as 
useful analytical categories for such an investigation.
The assumption in much of the literature is that management 
strategies are aimed primarily at achieving enhanced managerial power 
over labour. Once again, however, the use of ’control’ has often 
been unclear. This lack of clarity has often made it difficult to
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compare developments between organizations, and to make sense of 
contrasting developments within organizations. The suggestion here, 
following Paul Edwards and a number of writers in management science, 
is that a distinction be made between holistic and atomistic 
controls. It is not possible to evaluate the overall degree of 
management control of labour, in terms of a 'frontier of control' but 
it is empirically possible to explore whether and how changes to 
atomistic controls contribute to more generalized control, and what 
implications movements in holistic control have for atomistic 
controls and management-labour relationships.
CHAPTER THREE
GOVERNMENT AND THE RAILWAYS: THE CONTEXT OF MANAGEMENT STRATEGY
3^
INTRODUCTION
An investigation of strategy formulation and implementation in 
nationalized industries requires an assessment of the governmental 
role. This task is necessary since a central principle of 
nationalization in post-war Britain has been that industry Boards 
have the duty of day-to-day management whilst responsibility for 
policy formulation rests with the relevant Minister. The 
difficulties of defining this division in practice (see Minkes, 1985) 
gives rise to a fundamental question in the consideration of 
governmental-nationalized industry relationships. That is, how far 
have governments exercised strategic direction of these industries 
and to what extent have governments intervened to influence lower- 
order management decision-making?
The argument here will be that governments have largely failed to set 
strategic objectives for the railways. Attempts by the British 
' Railways Board to fill this vacuum by developing its own strategic 
planning (a move supported in general by successive governments) has 
■ibeen decisively compromised by government interventions to achieve 
I wider political or more short-run financial objectives. To develop 
j this argument requires an understanding of three key processes: 
jl) how far has the series of reconstructions and re-definitions of
1
railway activity that have taken place since nationalization 
embodied strategic goals on the part of governments?
i
!
12) What has been the involvement of governments in what can be seen
<)
! as lower level (compared with the strategic) management decision-
taking?
3) Hew has this prevented the British Railways Board from fully 
developing its own strategic capabilities?
The first of these questions is answered in Section One, whilst the 
others are explored in Section Two.
After dealing with these three questions, the third section assesses 
the inpact of government on railway labour relations. Leaving aside 
governmental influence on labour relations through macro-economic 
policy, the government shapes public sector labour relations in two 
main ways, one indirect, one direct. Apart from direct government 
interventions in the labour relations sphere to promote certain 
labour relations policies, governmental influence on the 
specification of business policies is also likely to indirectly 
affect, intentionally or otherwise, the conduct of labour relations. 
For example, tightening constraints on the availability of financial 
| support from central government will, at the very least, fail to 
promote calm labour relations. This feature is likely to be 
prominent in those industries that are heavily dependent on the 
Exchequer for financial support.
The interplay of these two dimensions of government provides the 
basis for analysis of the Thatcher Governments' policies towards the 
railways in Section Four. A notable feature of these Governments is 
that they have withdrawn to a large extent from detailed involvement 
in the management of nationalized industries. Thus, the greater 
determination displayed by industry managers in labour management
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could be seen as the product of greater exposure to market forces. 
At the same time direct interventions by government in the labour 
relations sphere seem to have increased. However, the net effect of 
this is not, as might be expected, a consistency of labour relations 
practice, and nor does it always contribute to the achievement of 
newly-stated business goals.
1. GOVERNMENT STRATEGY AND NATIONALIZED INDUSTRIES
Political scientists studying the relationship between government and 
nationalized industries have concentrated their attention on the 
thorny political issue of accountability (1), and their accounts tend 
I to focus on government culperability. The reverse is true of 
: economic historians. Taking industry performance as their point of 
[departure, they have tended to focus on industry operating costs to 
j the relative neglect of the governmental role ((2). A significant 
element of this is often an emphasis on the centrality of trade union 
’restrictive practices’ in obstructing cost reductions (see, for 
instance, Pryke and Dodgson, 1975) and this has come to dominate much 
political discussion of nationalized industries (3)«
However, from the political sociological (usually Marxist) 
[perspective, governments in advanced capitalist societies have taken 
infrastructural industries into public ownership to maintain a core 
jframework for the operation of the capitalist economy (Jessop, 1980). 
This approach, which has more than a hint of functionalism, often
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1seems to assume that the government-nationalized industry 
relationship is an unproblematic element of an imperative facing the 
state to maintain ’capitalist laws of accumulation’.
Both the views of economic historians and political sociologists 
grant a consistency to government policy which may not be shared by 
those managing nationalized industries. From the mid-1970s there was 
increasing criticism of governments for their reluctance to formulate 
strategic goals, and their obstruction, through a variety of 
political interventions, of attempts by nationalized industries to 
; make good this deficiency. The investigation in 1975~6 by the 
j National Economic Development Office (NEDO) showed that the division 
f of responsibilities between government and industry embodied in the 
iconcept of the 'Morrisonian Corporation’ (ty) - that governments were 
I to give strategic direction whilst industry Boards took charge of
I
|
I day-to-day management - was in disarray (NEDO, 1976). In this period 
|nationalized industry publications were often openly critical (see 
■BRB, 1976) and disillusioned industry leaders trenchant in their 
tcondemnation of government policy. The British Railways Board's then 
Chairman, Sir Richard Marsh, commented,
| "I find it extraordinary that any business - let alone one the 
size and importance of this one - should be allowed to drift 
into a position where it is fixing short-term objectives but has 
no sort of longer term strategy" (Marsh, 1976, p. 71)*
5
j
|A review of the main elements of rail policy bears this out. The 
jjevidence suggests that British governments have been reluctant to
7^
define fundamental objectives and strategic goals, and the statutory 
obligations on the British Railways Board provide little indication 
of the services that should be provided (NEDO, op. cit.). Its main 
obligations (as listed in the Annual Report and Accounts until 1983 
(5)) are limited to the following:
"to secure that the combined revenues of the authority and of 
its subsidaries taken together are not less than sufficient to 
meet their combined charges properly chargeable to revenue 
account, taking one year with another" (Transport Act 1968).
And
"the British Railways Board shall from 1st January 1975 operate 
a railway passenger system so as to provide a public service 
which is comparable generally with that provided by the Board at 




jThe 197^ legislation exemplifies the difficulties faced by the BRB. 
fGovernments have largely failed to define in more detail a desirable 
Jnetwork size or the level and nature of rail services that should be 
loperated with the result that senior railway managers have little
rh
|idea of what is expected of them (Marsh, 1976). Tightening
|
Iconstraints on the Public Service Obligation grant from 1976 (the
!
|state payment to the Board for the provision of passenger services)
I
Jhas intensified this uncertainty since, in the absence of agreed 
priorities, the Board have had few criteria upon which to amend 
services. As service planning on BR has to commence some eighteen 
months prior to the introduction of the timetable (see Ford, 1979)* 
forward planning is made more difficult still by the annual
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establishment of SPO and the External Financial Limit (Glyn Williams, 
1983).
Though the absence of long-term strategic direction by government 
appears to have been common to most major nationalized industries 
(NEDO, 1976). it is rendered particularly acute in the railway's case 
by chronic deficits (measured by costs against receipts exclusive of 
PSO and other specified state payments) since the late 1950s. As a 
result, the railways have been particularly affected by the 
differing political philosophies and objectives of succesive 
governments. The British Railways Board has been subject to a series 
of reconstructions (1962 Transport Act; British Railways Board, 1963; 
1968 Transport Act; 197^ Railways Act) and reviews (Ministry of 
Transport, 1966; Ministry of Transport, 1977; Monopolies and Mergers 
jCommission, 1980; Serpell, 1983).
jA number of these reconstructions are examined shortly but it is 
I important to note at the outset that the 'dialectic' structuring 
|these interventions is the fundamental political question of the 
{function of state enterprise. Should industries such as the railways
|be run as a public service or on more explicitly commercial lines?
§
IHowever, the wider rationale for either of these options does not 
appear to have been fully developed by policy makers, and a 
comprehensive, coherent theory of the function of state enterprise 
seems to be largely absent (Hadley, n.d.). Instead, these two 
philosophies have co-existed in an uneasy tension, highlighting and 
intensifying the absence of strategic purpose. All this suggests
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that those theories which maintain that the over-riding function of 
the state is to secure favourable conditions, of which transport 
infrastructure would seem to be one, for the operations of capital 
are largely misplaced, at least in this case. The reactions of 
governments, as embodied in the legislation and reports listed above, 
has been dominated by relatively narrow and short-term financial 
considerations.
Deteriorating financial performance from the late 1950s suggested to 
governments (in the absence of any well-developed conceptions of 
broader goals) the necessity of more detailed criteria to guide 
management decision-making as a supplement to the basic Morrisonian 
model. A number of White Papers (Treasury, 1967; Treasury, 1978) 
established criteria for pricing, costing and investment evaluation.
!|At the heart of these is the establishment of 'market proxies' to 
Stimulate forms of decision-making more akin to those in the private
i'
isector and to cement the 'arms-length’ relationship between industry£
I
jBoards and government (Batstone et al, 1984). However, since
4
governments possess a multiplicity of objectives this quasi-market
I
JjLogic was rarely pursued to its extreme. A variety of political
Considerations have intervened, of which the strongest is the notion
I
f/idely held by the electorate that railways should provide a public 
service. These political constraints suggest that an expectation 
shat governments will respond functionally to short-term and narrow 
lemands of economic and financial management is as misplaced as that 
fhich anticipates that governments will respond to the dictates of 
some abstract imperatives of capitalism.
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The political mediations that temper financial considerations are 
well illustrated by this dialectic of public service and commercial 
practice on the railways. There has been a retreat since 
nationalization from the notion of public service but it has been a 
highly uneven one. Whilst Conservative Government legislation in the 
1950s sought to prune elements of the ’bureaucratic* structure of the 
British Transport Commission, no major attempt was made to re-define 
railway objectives (Channon, 1978). It was the package of changes in 
the early 1960s in response to the mounting deficit- the creation of 
the British Railways Board separate from other transport undertakings 
and the ’Beeching Report’ - that marked the most significant shift 
: towards a more commercial ethos. This philosophy was often 
^compromised in practice, however, because of the political 
^unpopularity of the strategy of line closures. The 1964-70 Labour 
jlGovernment sought to resolve this tension between service and profit
k
I
|through segmentation of railway passenger operations between those
y
ftrunk services which ought to operate to profit criterion and those|




^Though frequent political interventions have embodied these differing 
philosophies, party labels are not an entirely accurate predictor of 
governmental action since party ideologies themselves also display 
this dialectic if to varying degrees. The 1974 Railways Act, 
replacing grant funding of specific services with a block grant for 
passenger services as a whole (the PSO), though passed by a Labour 
jovernment was in fact largely drawn up by the previous Conservative
51
Government (Pryke and Dodgson, 1974 P»24). This Act’s stipulation 
that the Freight and Parcels business of British Rail should aim for 
profitability was supplemented by a requirement in the 1977 White 
Paper that the Intercity sector should aim for profitability 
(Department of Transport, 1977; see Beesley and Gwilliam, 1977)* 
Reductions in the real value of the PSO and the imposition of ’cash- 
limi ts' on the total level of external funding available to public 
sector organisations were introduced by this same Labour Government.
The absence of a coherent, wider transport policy in Britain has 
mirrored, and in part explains, this variability in railway 
objectives. The dialectic between public service and industry profit 
is accompanied by persistent failure of successive governments to 
decide between market and bureaucratic allocation of resources and 
! co-ordination of services. For a brief spell after the 1947 
Transport Act Britain had something approaching an ’integrated’
System of inland transport whereby the principal means of surface
t
i
transport were welded together under unified direction and control.
i'a
jjrhis was steadily undone by Conservative Governments in the 1950s 
|tfith the abolition of the Railway Executive (the body charged with 
jiirecting the Regions), the creation of Area Boards to supervise the 
Regional managements, and the denationalization of the state road 
laulage fleet (Pearson, 1964; Bonavia, 1971)*
rrom the 1962 Transport Act, which ended bureaucratic integration of 
:he main forms of inland transport, to 1980 government transport 
policy has shared the same parameters. The philosophies of both
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political parties is well expressed in the 1976 Transport Policy 
Consultation Document,
"governments must...develop a controlled and managed market in 
transport, rejecting both the market philosophy of a free-for- 
all and, at the other extreme, the approach of those who would 
rigidly allocate transport between different modes by 
administrative direction" (Department of Environment, 1976 p. 
22).
The one partial exception to this pattern of pragmatic balance was 
the 1968 Transport Act, and its failure illustrates the reluctance of 
governments to take decisive action to develop a transport 
infrastructure for wider economic ends. The Minister of Transport, 
jparbara Castle, sought to develop a more rational approach to freight
: i
ftransport through some measure of integration. Accordingly the
*£
Rational Freight Corporation was established and British Rail’s 
Container train ('Freightliners') business transferred to it.
Iflowever, this initiative came to little as the Freight Integration 
jpouncil, whose purpose was to encourage integration, was found to be
I
|t toothless talking-shop and soon fell into decay (Thomson and 
lunter, 1973) and the limited system of lorry quantity licensing was 
lot implemented by the time the Government fell (Kelf-Cohen, 1973)• 
Subsequent Labour Governments have shared Conservative Party 
lostility to the proposal, advanced by the TUC and the rail unions 
[eg. ASLEF, 1976; Buckton, 1982), for a national transport planning 
Luthority.(8).
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The tension between philosophies of public service and commercialism 
has not only contributed to the absence of a coherent set of 
objectives for the railways, it has also created persistent 
uncertainty over the appropriate size of the railw*^ network. An 
influential and persistent belief is that there is a profitable 
'core* to railway operations which will be revealed once the 
unprofitable layers of activity have been stripped away. As one 
economist reacted to the Beeching proposals,
"the right size of the system can only be found by ruthlessly 
chopping off the useless parts until a paying system is 
discovered.” (Munby, 1962).
This philosophy first found common currency as the railway industry 
began to incur mounting losses in the late 1950s, though some route 
closures had taken place earlier in the 1950s (SCNI, I960), and some 
| Regions, notably the Eastern, had already started to eliminate 
considerable numbers of country stations (Fiennes, 1967).
The spur to decisive action arose from the critical report of the
I
JSelect Committee on Nationalized Industries (i960) and the Stedeford
i
fCommittee Report to the Minister which, it is believed (it has never
|
jjjbeen made public), was more critical still (Bonavia, 1971) (9)* 
frhe conclusions of this report found public expression in the report
I by the Chairman of the newly-formed British Railways Board, Richard 
Beeching, on 'The Reshaping of British Railways' (BRB, 1963). 
Studies undertaken for this report found that approximately one third 
of railway stations generated only 1% of revenue {ibid.). The 
central tenet of the report was that the services using these
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stations (generally cross country and branch line services) should be 
discontinued and the lines closed. At that time the Beeching 
administration envisaged an eventual route mileage of the order of
12,500 miles against that existing in 1961 of 17,830 {ibid. ) though 
by the end of Beeching's tenure as Chairman it was planned to reduce 
it further to around 8,000 miles (see BRB, 1965).
Though there was a positive aspect to the Beeching philosophy - 
development of major trunk routes and the creation of container 
trains (1freightliners') - the strategy was soon discredited (10). 
There was criticism of the report's supporting data from those 
otherwise sympathetic to its recommendations (Munby, 1963) and line 
Closures were politically unpopular. Probably the most compelling 
Reason, however, was mounting deficits from the mid-1960s onwards, 
jft came to be realised that elimination of branch lines cut off a
4
I
|ource a feeder revenues to the main system (Hillman and Whalley,
1980), and that whilst such revenue ends immediately, the costs of
1
flosure, such as staff transfer payments, continue for some years.|
|s an element of the philosophy surrounding the 1968 Transport Act
J
|he route network was stabilized at around 11,000 miles and a system
§
jf subsidy payments introduced for specified unremunerative services 
hich British Rail would otherwise have withdrawn.
y the early 1970s mounting losses on BR's current account led the 
apartment of Environment in 1972 to investigate the potential of 
urther route closures (Pryke and Dodgson, 1975)• At the same time 
ihe Board's economists conducted a major investigation of the notion
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of the profitable core (SCNI, 1977). and concluded that one could not 
be found. In a significant victory the Board managed to convince the 
Minister of Transport, John Peyton, of this, and in the resulting 
Interim Rail Strategy, agreed in the absence of any long term 
government plans for the railways, network cuts were rejected and a 
programme of increased investment set in motion (BRB, 1973)•
The issue was to resurface in a veiled form in the 1976 Transport 
Consultation Document (Department of Environment, 1976), and came to 
occupy a prominent place in the SCNI's susbsequent investigation 
(1977) largely because of the evidence submitted on railway costs by 
two academics, Richard Pryke and John Dodgson (op. cit.). Nothing 
eame of it on that ocasion probably because it seemed a lower order 
1 priority for the Callaghan Government compared with the burning 
|ssues of macro-economic management and sustaining a viable incomes
e size of the network rose once again as a central theme in the
lerpell Report on Railway Finances (1983)* Despite initial optimism
Ind Government (11) , the Committee did not depart from the tradition 
f focusing on short term financial options and the contraction of 
etwork size. The fallacious assumptions upon which the cost and 
evenue targets supporting these were based (including the assumption 
hat lines that were closed would continue to bring in revenue from 
raffic) earned the Report near universal comdemnation in the
|n the railway industry that this review would decisively settle 
|uestions of major strategy and the future relationship between Board
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transport industry (BRB, 1983a, Hope, 1983; Freeman Allen, 1983) and 
in political circles (House of Commons Transport Committee, 1983; 
Railway Gazette International, 1983a). Though the Government 
initially expressed interest in further consideration of a network 
reduction (Howell, 1983), the Report's hostile reception precluded 
this. In a major Commons debate the Secretary of State ruled out the 
major network cuts suggested in the Report (12).
The review above illustrates how successive governments have largely 
failed to develop coherent long-term strategic objectives for the 
railways in Britain. Instead government policy has been
Characterized by competing and under-developed rationales. All this 
Suggests that those accounts which view the state's foremost 
Objective as securing the most favourable conditions, of which 
fransport policy and infrastructure would seem to be one, for the 
:|aintenance of private capital- are mistaken (of. Zeitlin, 1985). 
i|t least as far as the nationalized industries are concerned.
!overnment activities in their dealings with nationalized industries 
ave been dominated by short-term financial and political
ionsiderations rather than those of strategic economic planning.
I
(
. POLITICAL INTERVENTIONS AND OVERLAPPING RESPONSBILITIES
t may thus seem reasonable to infer from the reluctance of 
overnments to provide strategic direction that nationalized 
ndustries have come to possess considerable autonomy. On this basis
57
the 'arms length* relationship would operate in British Rail's
favour, allowing both substantial freedom to make key decision that 
go beyond day-to-day management (at least on one interpretation) and 
to the generation of long-term strategy itself. It will be argued 
here that such an assumption is almost entirely unjustified. The
lack of strategic governmental purpose has resulted in BR being
subject to recurrent government interventions in management decison- 
making precisely because the absence of a clear division of functions 
results in few, if any, self-imposed restraints on government. The
processes at work here will be examined through a brief review of 
some key areas of management decision-making, such as pricing policy 




the irony of government interventions in decision-making is that they
I
lave often conflicted deeply with attempts by industry Boards to meet
iovernment-set financial objectives. Probably the most striking xample of this was provided by pricing policy in the early 1970s
I
113). The operation of the Heath Government's prices and incomes 
|olicy led to the prices of nationalized industry services being held 
iell below the rate of inflation and that of their competitors. In 
Iritish Rail's case, its finances deteroriated to such a degree that 
he financial reconstruction of the 1968 Transport Act was wrecked, 
the Heath Government's concern subsequently about the ensuing 
eficit and its effect on public expenditure resulted in 
successful) pressure for fare increases that were substantially 
igher than those desired by the British Railways Board, and which BR
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managers feared would lead to a decline in traffic (Harris and 
Williams, 1980).
The often contradictory nature of government expectations of 
nationalized industries have been intensified since the early 1970s 
because of concern about the level of public expenditure (cf. 
Batstone et al, 1984, ch. 2). BR has been especially subject to
policies of restraint on public expenditure since the railways have 
been dependent, along with the National Coal Board, on particularly 
high levels of government subsidy. The imposition of the External 
Financing Limit from 1976 constrained the already limited ability of 
ttie Board to invest to improve operating and business performance. 
Ibrthermore, government interventions to set or substantially 
Influence prices and wages levels, alongside restraints on the PSO
Iants from 1977 onwards, the remit to make Freight and Parcels 
mmercially viable by 1978 and the political refusal to countenance 
rther substantial line closures seemed to BR management to make 
eir job near impossible (Marsh, 1976, p.72). Thus, the impact of 
|)mpeting government goals, as outlined earlier, has been intensified 
interventions with wider political and economic objectives.
!>
ie lack of clarity in the division of responsibilities between Board 
id government has been intensifed by such interventions. Indeed, 
lomson and Hunter (1973) suggest that the weaknesses of the 
)rrisonian theory of ministerial control over nationalized 
idustries are most obvious in the railways case. 'Market proxies', 
kch as marginal cost pricing, have failed to provide useful
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guidelines because of the difficulties of allocating railway costs 
{ibid. ; Aldcroft, 1975) whilst government interventions have been 
aore frequent than in other industries. The 1978 Select Committee on 
Nationalized Industries' Report on Ministerial Control noted that
"the Committee believe that the continuance of the detailed 
Ministerial interference that has been experienced by British 
Railways would seriously call into question the position of the 
Board as a partly autonomous public corporation" (quoted in 
Thompson and Beaumont, 1978, p. 202).
|ich pressures as these were intensified by the 197^ Railways Act. 
fiis Act, in stipulating that the Board 'should act on lines settled
f^ om time to time with the approval of the Secretary of State', broke
I
|bw ground in nationalized industry-government relations by formally 
Involving the Secretary of State more fully in the approval of the 
|)licies surrounding the five year rolling industry plan (Fowler, 
jp7*0 • However in the absence of clear strategic intent on 
jpvernment's part, this potentially innovative legislation merely
#grved to strengthen the accounting officer role of the Department of
]
iansport (Harris and Williams, 1980) and further confused the1
|.vision of responsibilities between Board and government.
le low levels of trust that result from this confusion of roles 
‘tween the British Railways Board and government is well illustrated
r the process of investment authorization. Though a key objective
.
1 the standardization of investment policy guidelines proposed by 
ie 1967 White Paper on Nationalized Industries (Treasury, 1967) was
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a firmer definition of the 'arms length' relationship, in practice 
government involvement in investment evaluation has remained
substantial (at least until very recently). Such involvement has 
been particularly evident on British Rail (NEDO, 1976), probably as a 
reaction to the earlier findings of the Select Committee on 
Nationalized Industries (i960) that the Ministry of Transport had 
exercised virtually no financial control at all over the 1955
Modernisation Plan (14).
fhe very low level of trust by government in British Rail evaluation
|rocedures has been reflected by the existence of a parallel
Investment appraisal unit within the Department of Transport. As the 
|erpell Report noted,
f "the Department have built up their own expertise in certain
I
ilI fields and, in their own words, "have substituted their own
'$I
| commercial judgement for the Board’s" (Serpell, 1983* p. 44).
3
2,
ft the same time such judgements have not formed elements of a wider
f;
|overnment business strategy for the railways. The Report goes on to 
bte that
"the Department have exercised little control over the Board's 
I investment priorities" {ibid. , p.44).
ie annual submission to government by the Board of its five-yearly 
ivestment projections is instead largely for the benefit of the 
?easury's Public Expenditure Survey Committee exercise (Monopolies 
id Mergers Commission, 1980).
jiis pattern of parallel project evaluation has stimulated a cycle of
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that those theories which maintain that the over-riding function of 
the state is to secure favourable conditions, of which transport 
infrastructure would seem to be one, for the operations of capital 
are largely misplaced, at least in this case. The reactions of 
governments, as embodied in the legislation and reports listed above, 
has been dominated by relatively narrow and short-term financial 
considerations.
Deteriorating financial performance from the late 1950s suggested to 
governments (in the absence of any well-developed conceptions of 
broader goals) the necessity of more detailed criteria to guide 
management decision-making as a supplement to the basic Morrisonian 
model. A number of White Papers (Treasury, 1967; Treasury, 1978) 
established criteria for pricing, costing and investment evaluation. 
At the heart of these is the establishment of 'market proxies' to 
stimulate forms of decision-making more akin to those in the private 
sector and to cement the 'arms-length' relationship between industry 
Boards and government (Batstone et al, 1984). However, since
governments possess a multiplicity of objectives this quasi-market 
logic was rarely pursued to its extreme. A variety of political 
considerations have intervened, of which the strongest is the notion 
widely held by the electorate that railways should provide a public 
service. These political constraints suggest that an expectation 
that governments will respond functionally to short-term and narrow 
demands of economic and financial management is as misplaced as that 
which anticipates that governments will respond to the dictates of 
some abstract imperatives of capitalism.
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The political mediations that temper financial considerations are 
well illustrated by this dialectic of public service and commercial 
practice on the railways. There has been a retreat since 
nationalization from the notion of public service but it has been a 
highly uneven one. Whilst Conservative Government legislation in the 
1950s sought to prune elements of the ’bureaucratic' structure of the 
British Transport Commission, no major attempt was made to re-define 
railway objectives (Channon, 1978). It was the package of changes in 
the early 1960s in response to the mounting deficit- the creation of 
the British Railways Board separate from other transport undertakings 
and the 'Beeching Report’ - that marked the most significant shift 
towards a more commercial ethos. This philosophy was often 
compromised in practice, however, because of the political 
unpopularity of the strategy of line closures. The 1964-70 Labour 
Government sought to resolve this tension between service and profit 
through segmentation of railway passenger operations between those 
trunk services which ought to operate to profit criterion and those 
services which were highly unprofitable, but nevertheless 'socially 
desirable' services. (7) •
Though frequent political interventions have embodied these differing 
philosophies, party labels are not an entirely accurate predictor of 
governmental action since party ideologies themselves also display 
this dialectic if to varying degrees. The 197^ Railways Act, 
replacing grant funding of specific services with a block grant for 
passenger services as a whole (the PSO), though passed by a Labour 
Government was in fact largely drawn up by the previous Conservative
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Government (Pryke and Dodgson, 1974 P*24). This Act’s stipulation 
that the Freight and Parcels business of British Rail should aim for 
profitability was supplemented by a requirement in the 1977 White 
Paper that the Intercity sector should aim for profitability 
(Department of Transport, 1977; see Beesley and Gwilliam, 1977)* 
Reductions in the real value of the PSO and the imposition of ’cash- 
limits' on the total level of external funding available to public 
sector organisations were introduced by this same Labour Government.
The absence of a coherent, wider transport policy in Britain has 
mirrored, and in part explains, this variability in railway 
objectives. The dialectic between public service and industry profit 
is accompanied by persistent failure of successive governments to 
decide between market and bureaucratic allocation of resources and 
co-ordination of services. For a brief spell after the 1947 
Transport Act Britain had something approaching an ’integrated’ 
system of inland transport whereby the principal means of surface 
transport were welded together under unified direction and control. 
This was steadily undone by Conservative Governments in the 1950s 
with the abolition of the Railway Executive (the body charged with 
directing the Regions), the creation of Area Boards to supervise the 
Regional managements, and the denationalization of the state road 
haulage fleet (Pearson, 1964; Bonavia, 1971)*
From the 1962 Transport Act, which ended bureaucratic integration of 
the main forms of inland transport, to 1980 government transport 
policy has shared the same parameters. The philosophies of both
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political parties is well expressed in the 1976 Transport Policy 
Consultation Document,
"governments must...develop a controlled and managed market in 
transport, rejecting both the market philosophy of a free-for- 
all and, at the other extreme, the approach of those who would 
rigidly allocate transport between different modes by 
administrative direction" (Department of Environment, 1976 p. 
22).
The one partial exception to this pattern of pragmatic balance was 
the 1968 Transport Act, and its failure illustrates the reluctance of 
governments to take decisive action to develop a transport 
infrastructure for wider economic ends. The Minister of Transport, 
Barbara Castle, sought to develop a more rational approach to freight 
transport through some measure of integration. Accordingly the 
National Freight Corporation was established and British Rail's 
container train ('Freightliners') business transferred to it. 
However, this initiative came to little as the Freight Integration 
Council, whose purpose was to encourage integration, was found to be 
a toothless talking-shop and soon fell into decay (Thomson and 
Hunter, 1973) and the limited system of lorry quantity licensing was 
not implemented by the time the Government fell (Kelf-Cohen, 1973)• 
Subsequent Labour Governments have shared Conservative Party 
hostility to the proposal, advanced by the TUC and the rail unions 
(eg. ASLEF, 1976; Buckton, 1982), for a national transport planning 
authority.(8).
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The tension between philosophies of public service and commercialism 
has not only contributed to the absence of a coherent set of 
objectives for the railways, it has also created persistent 
uncertainty over the appropriate size of the railwA^ network. An 
influential and persistent belief is that there is a profitable 
’core' to railway operations which will be revealed once the 
unprofitable layers of activity have been stripped away. As one 
economist reacted to the Beeching proposals,
"the right size of the system can only be found by ruthlessly 
chopping off the useless parts until a paying system is 
discovered.” (Munby, 1962).
This philosophy first found common currency as the railway industry 
began to incur mounting losses in the late 1950s, though some route 
closures had taken place earlier in the 1950s (SCNI, I960), and some 
Regions, notably the Eastern, had already started to eliminate 
considerable numbers of country stations (Fiennes, 1967).
The spur to decisive action arose from the critical report of the 
Select Committee on Nationalized Industries (i960) and the Stedeford 
Committee Report to the Minister which, it is believed (it has never 
been made public), was more critical still (Bonavia, 1971) (9)*
The conclusions of this report found public expression in the report 
by the Chairman of the newly-formed British Railways Board, Richard 
Beeching, on ’The Reshaping of British Railways’ (BRB, 1963)• 
Studies undertaken for this report found that approximately one third 
of railway stations generated only 1% of revenue (ibid. ). The 
central tenet of the report was that the services using these
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stations (generally cross country and branch line services) should be 
discontinued and the lines closed. At that time the Beeching 
administration envisaged an eventual route mileage of the order of
12,500 miles against that existing in 1961 of 17,830 {ibid, ) though 
by the end of Beeching's tenure as Chairman it was planned to reduce
it further to around 8,000 miles (see BRB, 1965)•
Though there was a positive aspect to the Beeching philosophy - 
development of major trunk routes and the creation of container 
trains (’freightliners') - the strategy was soon discredited (10).
There was criticism of the report's supporting data from those
otherwise sympathetic to its recommendations (Munby, 1963) and line 
closures were politically unpopular. Probably the most compelling 
reason, however, was mounting deficits from the mid-1960s onwards. 
It came to be realised that elimination of branch lines cut off a 
source a feeder revenues to the main system (Hillman and Whalley, 
1980), and that whilst such revenue ends immediately, the costs of 
closure, such as staff transfer payments, continue for some years. 
As an element of the philosophy surrounding the 1968 Transport Act 
the route network was stabilized at around 11,000 miles and a system 
of subsidy payments introduced for specified unremunerative services 
which British Rail would otherwise have withdrawn.
By the early 1970s mounting losses on BR's current account led the 
Department of Environment in 1972 to investigate the potential of 
further route closures (Pryke and Dodgson, 1975)• At the same time 
the Board's economists conducted a major investigation of the notion
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of the profitable core (SCNI, 1977). and concluded that one could not 
be found. In a significant victory the Board managed to convince the 
Minister of Transport, John Peyton, of this, and in the resulting 
Interim Rail Strategy, agreed in the absence of any long term 
government plans for the railways, network cuts were rejected and a 
programme of increased investment set in motion (BRB, 1973)•
The issue was to resurface in a veiled form in the 1976 Transport 
Consultation Document (Department of Environment, 1976), and came to 
occupy a prominent place in the SCNI’s susbsequent investigation 
(1977) largely because of the evidence submitted on railway costs by 
two academics, Richard Pryke and John Dodgson (op. cit.) . Nothing 
came of it on that ocasion probably because it seemed a lower order 
priority for the Callaghan Government compared with the burning 
issues of macro-economic management and sustaining a viable incomes 
policy.
The size of the network rose once again as a central theme in the 
Serpell Report on Railway Finances (1983)• Despite initial optimism 
in the railway industry that this review would decisively settle 
questions of major strategy and the future relationship between Board 
and Government (11) , the Committee did not depart from the tradition 
of focusing on short term financial options and the contraction of 
network size. The fallacious assumptions upon which the cost and 
revenue targets supporting these were based (including the assumption 
that lines that were closed would continue to bring in revenue from 
traffic) earned the Report near universal comdemnation in the
56
trausport industry (BRB, 1983a, Hope, 1983; Freeman Allen, 1983) and 
in political circles (House of Commons Transport Committee, 1983; 
Railway Gazette International, 1983a). Though the Government 
initially expressed interest in further consideration of a network 
reduction (Howell, 1983), the Report’s hostile reception precluded 
this. In a major Commons debate the Secretary of State ruled out the 
major network cuts suggested in the Report (12).
The review above illustrates how successive governments have largely 
failed to develop coherent long-term strategic objectives for the 
railways in Britain. Instead government policy has been
characterized by competing and under-developed rationales. All this 
suggests that those accounts which view the state’s foremost 
objective as securing the most favourable conditions, of which 
transport policy and infrastructure would seem to be one, for the 
maintenance of private capitalism are mistaken (cf. Zeitlin, 1985)» 
at least as far as the nationalized industries are concerned. 
Government activities in their dealings with nationalized industries 
have been dominated by short-term financial and political 
considerations rather than those of strategic economic planning.
2. POLITICAL INTERVENTIONS AND OVERLAPPING RESPONSBILITIES
It may thus seem reasonable to infer from the reluctance of 
governments to provide strategic direction that nationalized 
industries have come to possess considerable autonomy. On this basis
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the 'arms length' relationship would operate in British Rail’s
favour, allowing both substantial freedom to make key decision that 
go beyond day-to-day management (at least on one interpretation) and 
to the generation of long-term strategy itself. It will be argued 
here that such an assumption is almost entirely unjustified. The
lack of strategic governmental purpose has resulted in BR being
subject to recurrent government interventions in management decison- 
making precisely because the absence of a clear division of functions 
results in few, if any, self-imposed restraints on government. The
processes at work here will be examined through a brief review of 
some key areas of management decision-making, such as pricing policy 
and investment evaluation, and the attempt by British Rail to 
generate Corporate Plans.
The irony of government interventions in decision-making is that they 
have often conflicted deeply with attempts by industry Boards to meet 
government-set financial objectives. Probably the most striking 
example of this was provided by pricing policy in the early 1970s 
(13). The operation of the Heath Government's prices and incomes 
policy led to the prices of nationalized industry services being held 
well below the rate of inflation and that of their competitors. In 
British Rail's case, its finances deteroriated to such a degree that 
the financial reconstruction of the 1968 Transport Act was wrecked. 
Tthe Heath Government's concern subsequently about the ensuing 
deficit and its effect on public expenditure resulted in 
(successful) pressure for fare increases that were substantially 
highem than those desired by the British Railways Board, and which BR
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mansgers feared would lead to a decline in traffic (Harris and 
Williams, 1980).
The often contradictory nature of government expectations of 
nationalized industries have been intensified since the early 1970s 
because of concern about the level of public expenditure (cf. 
Batsione et al, 1984, ch. 2). BR has been especially subject to 
policies of restraint on public expenditure since the railways have 
been dependent, along with the National Coal Board, on particularly 
high levels of government subsidy. The imposition of the External 
Financing Limit from 1976 constrained the already limited ability of 
the Board to invest to improve operating and business performance. 
Furthermore, government interventions to set or substantially 
influence prices and wages levels, alongside restraints on the PSO 
grants from 1977 onwards, the remit to make Freight and Parcels 
commercially viable by 1978 and the political refusal to countenance 
further substantial line closures seemed to BR management to make 
their job near impossible (Marsh, 1976, p.72). Thus, the impact of 
competing government goals, as outlined earlier, has been intensified 
by interventions with wider political and economic objectives.
The lack of clarity in the division of responsibilities between Board 
and government has been intensifed by such interventions. Indeed, 
Thomson and Hunter (1973) suggest that the weaknesses of the 
Morrisonian theory of ministerial control over nationalized 
industries are most obvious in the railways case. ’Market proxies’, 
such as marginal cost pricing, have failed to provide useful
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guidelines because of the difficulties of allocating railway costs 
{ibid. ; Aldcroft, 1975) whilst government interventions have been 
more frequent than in other industries. The 1978 Select Committee on 
Nationalized Industries' Report on Ministerial Control noted that
"the Committee believe that the continuance of the detailed 
Ministerial interference that has been experienced by British 
Railways would seriously call into question the position of the 
Board as a partly autonomous public corporation" (quoted in 
Thompson and Beaumont, 1978, p. 202).
Such pressures as these were intensified by the 197*1 Railways Act. 
This Act, in stipulating that the Board 'should act on lines settled 
from time to time with the approval of the Secretary of State', broke 
new ground in nationalized industry-government relations by formally 
involving the Secretary of State more fully in the approval of the 
policies surrounding the five year rolling industry plan (Fowler, 
197*0 • However in the absence of clear strategic intent on 
government's part, this potentially innovative legislation merely 
served to strengthen the accounting officer role of the Department of 
Transport (Harris and Williams, 1980) and further confused the 
division of responsibilities between Board and government.
The low levels of trust that result from this confusion of roles 
between the British Railways Board and government is well illustrated 
by the process of investment authorization. Though a key objective 
in the standardization of investment policy guidelines proposed by 
the 1967 White Paper on Nationalized Industries (Treasury, 1967) was
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a firmer definition of the ’arms length* relationship, in practice 
government involvement in investment evaluation has remained 
substantial (at least until very recently). Such involvement has 
been particularly evident on British Rail (NEDO, 1976), probably as a 
reaction to the earlier findings of the Select Committee on 
Nationalized Industries (i960) that the Ministry of Transport had 
exercised virtually no financial control at all over the 1955 
Modernisation Plan (14).
The very low level of trust by government in British Rail evaluation 
procedures has been reflected by the existence of a parallel 
investment appraisal unit within the Department of Transport. As the 
Serpell Report noted,
’’the Department have built up their own expertise in certain 
fields and, in their own words, ’have substituted their own 
commercial judgement for the Board's" (Serpell, 1983* P* 44).
At the same time such judgements have not formed elements of a wider 
government business strategy for the railways. The Report goes on to 
note that
"the Department have exercised little control over the Board's 
investment priorities" (ibid. , p.44).
The annual submission to government by the Board of its five-yearly 
investment projections is instead largely for the benefit of the 
Treasury's Public Expenditure Survey Committee exercise (Monopolies 
and Mergers Commission, 1980).
This pattern of parallel project evaluation has stimulated a cycle of
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mistrust between Board and Government which has often resulted in the 
revision of project targets. A number of large projects have been 
substantially modified by the Department in recent years because, as 
the Serpell Report puts it, of unrealistic {sic) estimates of 
revenue gains and cost savings (particularly in the maintenance 
areas) (Serpell, op. cit.) accruing from such schemes. Yet is is 
precisely the susceptibility of nationalized industries to wider 
public expenditure policies and unsympathetic evaluation by 
government departments that has led some of these organisations to 
inflate the benefits of investment schemes to provide some degree of 
protection against possible cuts in public expenditure (NEDO, 1976) 
(16).
This confusion of roles, institutionalized distrust, persistent 
uncertainty over network size and conflicting philosophies highlight 
and intensify the absence of strategic objectives for the railways. 
BR itself has been largely unable to develop its own strategic 
capabilities to fill this gap since the importance of relatively 
short-term financial objectives to government does not provide a 
stable context in which long-term planning can take place. It might 
be argued that external uncertainty is common to all firms since 
markets are apt to change, and that nationalized industries are 
better off than most since they are protected from the full extent of 
market forces by government subsidy (Pryke, 1981). This review 
suggests that the opposite could be the case. Whilst large firms 
have the capacity, at least to some degree, to respond strategically 
to market movements or even to substantially mould them, similar
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attempts by public sector firms can be decisively compromised by 
government interventions which deeply conflict with such goals. To 
illustrate this it is worthwhile briefly examining the record of 
corporate planning on BR.
The adoption of formalized corporate planning in the late 1960s was 
hailed as the most significant development at BRB Headquarters of its 
era (Bonavia, 1971)* However, much of the subsequent record is one 
of abject failure. All six Corporate Plans produced between 1970 and 
1980 had to be scrapped either because of changes in government 
policy or else because of problems arising from rapid inflation 
(Harris and Williams, 1980, p.8).
Particularly problematic for railway managements was that it was 
difficult to obtain long-term commitment from central government to 
future investment levels given the combination of concern about 
public expenditure and the absence of strategic purpose. This is 
most graphically illustrated in the early 1970s when, after the Heath 
Government accepted the Interim Rail Strategy’s proposals for the 
development of high speed trains, new commuter rolling stock and the 
modernisation of track and signalling (BRB, 1973). the investment 
element of these proposals was cut only a few weeks later. Thus, 
although the Interim plan was ’accepted' as rail policy, it was in 
reality a ’dead-duck’, almost from the start (Marsh, 1976). Later in 
the 1970s, as the majority of the assets ordered under the 1955 
Modernisation Plan approached life-expiry, the problem of investment 
constraints became critical for the Board. There was a deep fear
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that if governments did not overcome their reluctance to commit 
themselves to increased investment the railways would rapidly enter a 
cycle of decline from about 1983 (Parker, 1978; BRB, 1981a).
Whilst corporate planning in the 1970s largely failed the Board did, 
nevertheless, attempt to formulate business strategies. From the 
late 1970s the Board responded to the recurrent failures of the 
Corporate Plan by a shift of emphasis to sector and sub-sectoral 
strategy development (Harris and Williams, 1980 p.98). But this 
process of fragmentation was already well in hand. As these same 
authors describe this development,
"In effect, what has happened is that individual strands which 
together made up a corporate plan have been pursued. 
Unfortunately, not all of these strands have been accepted by 
goverment or progressed, so that what was initially evaluated 
has become a political patchwork based on the ' art of the 
possible'" (ibid., p.129).
Probably the most significant feature of those strands that were 
successful was their apparent capacity to reduce railway manpower 
(Glyn Williams, 1983). This coalesced with those elements of 
academic thinking which suggested that one of the most promising 
avenues for a major reduction in railway costs was reform of 
'restrictive' working practices (Pryke and Dodgson, 1975)* It is to 
the impact of this political environment on railway labour relations 
that we turn in the next section.
By way of conclusion to these two sections, the history of
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governmental-BRB relationships has been shown to be characterized by 
a combination of mistrust, overlapping responsibilities and the 
absence of agreed objectives. At first sight this pattern might 
appear surprising given the attempts since the early 1960s to 
distance nationalized industries from government. Such an 'arms- 
length* philosophy was central to those measures §uch as the White 
Papers of 1961 and 1967 which sought to formalize guidelines for 
detailed policy criteria as a supplement to the general directions 
established by statute. However, it is precisely the arm's length 
relationship itself (and the adoption of more explicitly competitive 
forms) that has led to low degrees of autonomy from central 
government. Since the nationalized industries occupy a strategic 
role in the social, economic and political affairs of the country, it 
is unrealistic to expect governments not to intervene in their 
affairs in pursuit of wider objectives or to limit the logic of 
competitive forms where they are politically unpopular. As the NEDO 
Report points out,
"the pressure on government to intervene or otherwise influence 
management decisions have increased over the last decade. 
Specific interventions may be triggered by a variety of factors, 
including a commitment to implement Party policy, macro-economic 
policy decision, pressure from sectional interests, major 
industrial disputes and a variety of wider social cost/benefit 
considerations. Government has not been able to stand outside 
this widening arena even if it wished to" (op. cit. , p.^3) • 
However, the pretence that it does has resulted in few rules to 
govern this activity and the failure to create sharply defined areas
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of responsibility.
2. POLITICAL UNCERTAINTY AND LABOUR RELATIONS
In assessing the impact of the external context in which British Rail 
operates on the broad character of labour relations, two opposing 
perspectives can be constructed. On the one hand the uncertainty of 
the politically defined environment described earlier could be seen 
as stimulating persistent tension in the labour relations sphere. 
Oscillations in government policy, coupled with an underlying 
emphasis on reducing operating costs in virtually all policy options, 
seems likely to conflict directly with union and workforce 
aspirations to protect job numbers and income. On the other hand, 
right-wing commentators would argue that the relative insulation from 
'market forces' experienced by nationalized industries has created a 
'cosy' style of labour relations in which managers largely 
relinquished their 'right to manage'. Sheltered by government 
financial support from the ultimate sanction of bankruptcy, managers 
permitted 'restrictive practices' to develop with the result that 
industry costs were kept artificially high (Pryke, 1981). And as 
business objectives were poorly developed, managers allowed operating 
and engineering decision to assume an undue centrality in managerial 
decision-making. In this view, then, such production imperatives led 
to an emphasis on maintaining industrial peace at the expense of 
cost-effective performance.
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Both these perspectives offer partial analyses of the broad character 
of railway labour relations in the 1970s. What is striking about 
railway labour relations in this period, with the exception of the 
period immediately following the 1971 Industrial Relations Act (17). 
is their stability and harmony relative to other industries. 
Throughout the 1970s, the railways continued to be one of the least 
strike-prone industries, measured by the number of strikes per 
100,000 employees (see P.Edwards, 1983b, p. 202). However, these 
findings do not provide support for the ’feather-bedded’ perspective. 
Not only was British Rail not insulated from market forces but the 
problems arising from steadily rising competition from other 
transport modes were compounded by government re-definition of the 
markets themselves and the response the railways were expected to 
make to them. If anything 'right-wing' analysis more accurately 
characterizes the 1950s when governments were prepared, if 
reluctantly, to fund railway losses through deficit financing (as 
opposed to grant aid) and when railway management had little idea of 
the costs of the services it provided (18).
Public ownership in the 1970s, then, was notable not for producing 
insulation from markets but for compounding the problems faced in 
them. This measure of external uncertainty gave rise to a 
distinctive pattern of labour relations. During the 1970s the 
relationship between rail union leaderships and senior managers can 
be characterised as that of a 'tacit alliance' based on common, and 
often shared , perceptions of problems and objectives. Just as 
Batstone et at (1984) have argued in the case of the Post Office,
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both management and unions in state industries can have a common 
interest in developing and maintaining ’stable bargaining 
relationships' so as to constrain the effects of uncertainty in the 
external environment. Similarly, the degree of information possessed 
by NUM leaders about the 1981 pit closure proposals prior to their 
public release suggests a similar alliance between the National Coal 
Board and National Union of Mineworkers (see Goodman, 1984, pp.22-3).
Proof of the existence of such a 'tacit alliance' demands evidence 
not only of shared interests but some recognition by the actors 
themselves that they take that form. Precisely because this alliance 
was tacit such evidence is not always easy to find or its 
significance easy to assess. However, two types of source suggest 
that this analysis is not misplaced. The first is data obtained from 
research interviews. National union officials and representatives in 
particular repeatedly referred to a large measure of substantive 
agreement on rail policy and its implications for the conduct of 
labour relations in this era. Such an analysis was less explicitly 
made by managerial respondents but nevertheless cropped up regularly 
in interviews (19)* From these responses it was possible to discern 
a shared recognition between railway headquarters and unions that 
they both walked a political tightrope, and that if either party fell 
off the other would be likely to follow.
The second source is to be found in documentary material. Throughout 
jthe 1970s senior railway managers were publicly sceptical of the 
liklihood or desirability of improving labour productivity through
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the reform of working practices in isolation (see, for instance, 
i Bowick, 1976), despite repeated messages from the political arena 
that railway performance could best be improved through reduced 
labour . costs. Such messages were given credibility by academic 
accounts such as those of Pryke and Dodgson (1975). and Board members 
i  and managers had to devote considerable resources to challenging this
II
' analysis during the Select Committee on Nationalized Industries 
investigation of BR in 1977 (SCNI, 1977)*
The basis of this 'tacit alliance', then, was mutual defence against 
a hostile environment. Its main function was to maintain a capacity 
for an orderly response to external pressures so as to avoid 
catapulting potentially disruptive labour relations issues into the 
polticial area where they might be exploited by governments eager to 
limit their financial commitments to British Rail.
Public ownership had a distinctive effect on labour relations because 
of the susceptibility of BR to government policy. The consensus that 
arose in response to these external factors was reinforced by certain 
internal features of BR and trade union employment. Railway 
employment is characterized by long service and well-developed 
internal labour markets, both amongst management and workforce. 
Within the trade unions, recruitment of officials and employees is 
almost exclusively from within the railway industry, and the conduct 
of national level negotiations by practising railwaymen reinforces 
this. The result is high levels of commitment to the industry (20)
|
and it is possible to discern a distinct railway 'culture' (21) that
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cuts across divisions between managers and workers. The dimensions 
of this included commitment to public service and a pronounced sense 
of individual responsibility.
Before turning to the demise of the tacit alliance portrayed here, it 
is worthwhile briefly summarizing it origins. As others have noted, 
the stability of public sector labour relations for two decades after 
World War Two rested on well-developed centralised formal bargaining 
arrangements, and governmental sponsorship of ’good’ industrial 
relations (see Winchester, 1983) • With the exception of the 1955 
dispute over enginemen's differentials (22), railway labour relations 
were quiescent, and the major reduction in workforce size 
accompanying the Beeching plan was achieved without any major 
conflict (23) . From the late 1960s, as Thomson and Beaumont have 
shown (1978), industrial conflict arose in the public sector out of a 
combination of governmental attempts to restrain the growth in public 
expenditure, and the workings of incomes policy. However, in. the 
railways case, just as these factors strained the traditional 
consensual pattern of industrial relationships, so along with 
government indecision in the area of rail strategy, they served to 
create a ’tacit alliance’ to replace it.
The liklihood that the growing crisis in public expenditure in the 
late 1970s would stimulate variability in government decision-making, 
along with the debate on industrial democracy started to transform 
this alliance into one that was more explicit. The institutional 
Dasis for this was provided by the creation of the Rail Council in
1978 with a remit to discuss the strategic plans developed by BR 
i  Headquarters. The Council was (and is) composed of top BR managers 
and union officials, and was created as a result of governmental 
requests to nationalized industry Chairmen to draw up joint proposals 
for impovements in consultation and participation (Treasury, 1978).
Within the Council the interests of the railway unions in increased 
levels of investment to secure the future of the industry (and hence 
jobs) complemented the urgency of management’s need for greatly 
| increased levels of investment from the latter half of the 1970s to 
■ replace the bulge of assets approaching life-expiry (see BRB, 1981a; 
BRB, 1981b). This coincidence of interests was increasingly welded 
into a political alliance by the then BRB Chairman Peter Parker and 
the General Secretary of the NUR, Sidney Weighell. Initially the 
alliance was strengthened by the election in 1979 of a government 
that was likely to be considerably more hostile to the public sector 
than its predecessors. The strong mutual interest of BR and rail 
unions resulted in joint submissions to government for increased 
investment (Bowick, 1979; Weighell, 1983)• This strategy enjoyed 
some initial success, and Sir Peter Parker notes that the first 
Transport Secretary in the Thatcher Government, Norman Fowler, was 
greatly impressed by this joint approach (Weighell, 1984, p. 24l). 
However, such alliances as these were viewed by prominent sections of 
the Cabinet as obstacles to managements’ duty to manage and, as will 
be illustrated in the next section, they were not to last.
i
!
fin summary, then, the form that the government-industry relationship
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has taken in Britain has stimulated a distinctive pattern of 
consensual labour relations at senior levels. The absence of 
coherent government strategies and objectives for nationalized
I
industries, and frequent government interventions, both particularly 
jmarked in British Rail’s case, have pushed management and unions 
together. Though governments have periodically sought major 
reductions in manpower and some critics have strongly argued for 
reform of working practices, railway managements have not pursued 
these options with vigour, and labour relations were quiescent for 
much of the 1970s. This pattern in turn served to confirm critics of 
ilabour relations and manpower management of the ’indulgence* of 
railway management towards labour. It was this ’cosy’ style in 
public sector labour relations that the Thatcher Goverment sought to 
break up.
4. THE THATCHER GOVERNMENTS AND THE RAILWAYS
The Thatcher Governments’ objectives and policies towards the 
railways will be considered in some detail since they form the 
backdrop to a hypothesized 'management offensive’. To understand the 
impact of the Thatcher Governments on nationalized industry labour 
relations we need to differentiate labour relations policies from 
broader business strategies. This is necesary to resolve the paradox 
of government claims that the autonomy of such industries has been 
increased whilst events such as the 1984-5 coal strike suggest that 
it has been progressively reduced.
72
The election of this radical government in 1979 has heightened 
academic interest in public sector labour relations but, as yet, 
there is little material on the impact of this government in this 
sphere (an exception is Soskice, 1984). Batstone et al*s (1984) 
investigation of the Post Office largely stops at 1979. and although 
Willman and Winch's (1985) study of British Leyland continues to 
1983. its detailed examination of state strategy focuses on the mid- 
1970s. Earlier work on nationalized industries, such as that of 
Kelf-Cohen (1973)t being overwhelmingly descriptive provides little 
analytical framework that can be adapted for the rigorous study of 
developments since 1979*
Arguably the most striking development in railway labour relations in 
the 1980s is that the 'tacit alliance’ has been broken up. This 
seems to be the result of a combination of two developments which are 
linked by a concern with public expenditure and a desire to instill 
commercial practices into the public sector. The first is that the 
Government has withdrawn to a large extent from detailed involvement 
in establishing railway business policies, preferring to restrict 
itself to setting financial targets. The level of these targets 
creates pressure on traditional patterns of labour management and 
labour relations, whilst removing that uncertainty of government 
policy which seems to have stimulated close relationships between 
Board and unions. The second is that labour relations has become the 
jiost significant area of government interventions, and the 
government's hostility to trade unionism has directly challenged 
consensual traditions of labour relations on BR .
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In turning to an exploration of the business objectives set for the 
railways, what is most striking about the early years of the Thatcher 
Government is the lack of any coherence to government policy. It is 
not an exaggeration to suggest that the only consistency to 
government actions lay in hostility to British Rail. On gaining 
office in 1979 this Government seemingly arbitrarily cut £15 million 
from the PSO grant for that year, and shortly afterwards introduced a 
new cash limits procedure by turning quarterly cash forecasts into 
cash limits (Harris and Williams, 1980). But at the same time, the 
Government was sensitive to the political dangers of appearing to 
promote line closures. In November 1979 the Government was quick to 
dispell rumours that the closure of 900 route miles was on the 
agenda, and in September 1981 the Secretary of State re-affirmed that 
the Government did not seek major line closures (Dodgson, 1984).
Riddell (1983) suggests, in arguing against those Marxist 
commentators who claim a consistency to the Thatcher programme (such 
as Hall and Jacques, 1983). that it was not until 1981 that the 
Government developed a strategy for the nationalized industries. The 
main components of this were large-scale privatization and the 
formation of ’commercial* relationships between Boards and 
Government. It was not until considerably later still that a clear 
approach came to be applied to the railways, in part because the 
Serpell Committee inquiry was underway for much of 1982. 
Unfortunately for the government a number of options with which it 
had considerable sympathy (such as network reductions) were 
discredited even before the Report was published (25). It was only
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in mid-1983 that the Government's current objectives emerged, 
combining privatization of non-rail ancillaries, the introduction of 
privats capital to marginal rail operations and the extension of 
'market proxies'(26).
Thesa 'market proxies' were announced by the Secretary of State for 
Transport, Nicholas Ridley, in October 1983 (BRB, 1984c). The 
central element is that the PSO grant is to be reduced to £635 
million by 1986, two years sooner than that initially proposed by the 
BRB in its 1983 Corporate Plan (BRB, 1983b), and representing a 
reduction of 25# in real terms on the PSO grant for 1983* At the 
same time Ridley stipulated that the Parcels business should continue 
to make the modest level of profits earned since withdrawal from the 
heavily loss-making parcels Collection and Delivery Service in 1981, 
and that Freight should earn a 5# return at current cost on assets by 
1988/9. This principle was extended to InterCity passenger services 
in August 1984 (27) along with a requirement that InterCity should 
not consume any PSO from 1988/89 (BRB, 1985b). Public financial 
support is thus to be limited to 'provincial services' and the great 
majority of services in the London and South East area.
Ifarlier in the chapter it was suggested that past attempts to extend
k
jhe 'arms-length' relationship through the introduction of 'market
Iroxies' further confused the relationship since government bjectives were contradictory (cf. Batstone et at, 1984). It could ell be expected, then, that the current centrality of such financial bjectives has further reduced the autonomy of the Railways Board
fron gpvernment. However the reverse appears to be the case, and the 
Secretary of State's claim that the objective is to set targets and 
leave the professionals to get on with the job of meeting them (RGI, 
198*0 appears to be borne out in practice. The Government does not 
apear to have attempted to shape the content of the business 
strategies adopted by the Board and the Board seems to have been 
givei a free hand to define product markets and set fare levels as 
they wish. As a result, the Board has claimed a major victory in 
its relations with central government since these financial targets 
provide clear objectives for the railways. Furthermore, central 
gove?rment has, for the first time, indicated levels of funding for 
the duration of the Corporate Plan. In consequence, railway 
management claims that it has become possible to develop meaningful 
business strategies for the railways.
Though the autonomy of the Board in business strategy does seem to 
have been increased through greater clarity of objectives, this claim 
should be treated with a certain amount of caution. To some degree 
the Board's praise of the new relationship is political 'window-
#ressing'. In some respects the reduction in government involvement
I
|rises from the Board, in effect, policing itself. This is well 
Illustrated by investment evaluation policy. The BRB claim record 
.evels of investment authorization in 1984-5 as a result of this new 
*elationship. However, this is substantially lower than the level 
:he BRB claimed in 1981 was necessary to maintain rail services at 
ixisting levels (BRB, 1981b). Furthermore, to achieve current levels 
)f authorization the Board has modified its investment policy so that
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in mid-1983 that the Government's current objectives emerged, 
combining privatization of non-rail ancillaries, the introduction of 
private capital to marginal rail operations and the extension of 
'market proxies*(26).
These 'market proxies* were announced by the Secretary of State for 
Transport, Nicholas Ridley, in October 1983 (BRB, 1984c). The 
central element is that the PSO grant is to be reduced to £635 
million by 1986, two years sooner than that initially proposed by the 
BRB in its 1983 Corporate Plan (BRB, 1983b), and representing a 
reduction of 25# in real terms on the PSO grant for 1983* At the 
same time Ridley stipulated that the Parcels business should continue 
to make the modest level of profits earned since withdrawal from the 
heavily loss-making parcels Collection and Delivery Service in 1981, 
and that Freight should earn a 5# return at current cost on assets by 
1988/9. This principle was extended to InterCity passenger services 
in August 1984 (27) along with a requirement that InterCity should 
not consume any PSO from 1988/89 (BRB, 1985b). Public financial 
support is thus to be limited to 'provincial services' and the great 
majority of services in the London and South East area.
Earlier in the chapter it was suggested that past attempts to extend 
the 'arms-length' relationship through the introduction of 'market 
proxies1 further confused the relationship since government 
objectives were contradictory (cf. Batstone et at, 1984). It could 
well be expected, then, that the current centrality of such financial 
objectives has further reduced the autonomy of the Railways Board
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from government. However the reverse appears to be the case, and the 
Secretary of State’s claim that the objective is to set targets and 
leave the professionals to get on with the job of meeting them (RGI,
1984) appears to be borne out in practice. The Government does not 
apear to have attempted to shape the content of the business 
strategies adopted by the Board and the Board seems to have been 
given a free hand to define product markets and set fare levels as 
they wish. As a result, the Board has claimed a major victory in 
its relations with central government since these financial targets 
provide clear objectives for the railways. Furthermore, central 
government has, for the first time, indicated levels of funding for 
the duration of the Corporate Plan. In consequence, railway 
management claims that it has become possible to develop meaningful 
business strategies for the railways.
Though the autonomy of the Board in business strategy does seem to 
have been increased through greater clarity of objectives, this claim 
should be treated with a certain amount of caution. To some degree 
the Board's praise of the new relationship is political 'window- 
dressing' . In some respects the reduction in government involvement 
arises from the Board, in effect, policing itself. This is well 
illustrated by investment evaluation policy. The BRB claim record 
levels of investment authorization in 1984-5 as a result of this new 
relationship. However, this is substantially lower than the level 
the BRB claimed in 1981 was necessary to maintain rail services at 
existing levels (BRB, 1981b). Furthermore, to achieve current levels 
of authorization the Board has modified its investment policy so that
76
all schemes now submitted to the Department of Transport meet the 
Required Rate of Return established in the 1978 White Paper 
(Treasury, 1978) (28) .
However, the greater clarity that now seems to exist in the BRB’s 
relationship with government has on a number of occasions been 
decisively compromised by sudden government interventions in the 
sphere of labour relations. The net effect has been an 
intensification of the contradictions of the arms-length 
relationship. Labour relations has provided the focus of these 
interventions because the Government believes that the rail unions 
obstruct the full extension of commercial practices, introduced by 
financial targets, into the arena of production. Moreover the labour 
relations machinery is seen to impede the pace of change. In 
consequence, the conduct of labour relations has come to occupy a 
central determining role in the contradictory workings of the arms 
length relationship.
It would be a mistake to conclude from this that government actions 
are a simple unfolding of the secret report on the public sector 
prepared by Nicholas Ridley in the late 1970s (29) . Whilst
government preparations for and conduct of the coal dispute bears 
remarkable comparison with this report’s proposals, the coal dispute 
is exceptional for a number of reasons which are unlikely to be 
replicated elsewhere. The NUM posed a special symbolic threat to the 
Conservative Party because of its role in the fall of the Heath 
Government. Furthermore, the proximity of the railways to the public
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places political constraints on the levels of disruption that would 
be tolerated in the furtherance of labour relations goals. However 
inadequate as a description of Board-Government relationships, the 
notion of an ’arms-length’ relationship is nevertheless politically 
entrenched. Indeed, it is integral to the ethos of commercial 
responsibility promulgated by the Thatcher Government.
There are substantial political constraints, then, on the consistent 
implementation of governental labour relations policies in some 
nationalized industries. The Government’ claim for much of the coal 
strike that it was not involved is testament to this. This is not to 
argue that the Thatcher Government does not aspire to reduce union 
influence on the management of industrial organizations. It 
undoubtedly does. Indeed there are good grounds for arguing that the 
government has responded to private sector caution in reforming 
labour relations practices and institutions by selecting those 
organizations over which it has most control to take the lead in 
restructuring labour relations (as suggested by Soskice, 1984). 
However, there are political constraints, for the reasons outlined 
above, on the uniform and progressive implementation of strategies in 
particular industries (other than coal). Whilst Government 
philosophy may be coherent, a mixture of pragmatic, political reasons 
combine to select particular industries for particular interventions 
at particular times. Thus, many labour relations interventions are 
more accurately portrayed as ad hoc than as the outcomes of carefully 
constructed strategies(30).
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The flexible rostering dispute on the railways in 1982 (to be 
discussed in detail in Chapters Seven and Eight) is a good example of 
these tendencies. From one perspective, it is the logical outcome 
of a consistent state-inspired strategy to steadily reduce the 
involvement of railway unions in work organization (cf. Eiger and 
Hymai, 1981). However, despite the centrality of increased labour 
prodictivity to the Thatcher Government (Jones, 1983). governmental 
involvement in this case seems to have been inspired by wider 
political considerations. Whilst the Government was certainly not 
averse to the productivity proposals that had been tabled by the 
British Railways Board, flexible rostering seems to have emerged when 
it did as the key issue when it did because it served to heal 
divisions within the Cabinet over rail investment policy.
The lack of a consistent long-term strategy towards railway labour 
relations it further illustrated by the sluggish progress on labour 
productivity issues for over three years after the flexible rostering 
episode, arising again only in the spring of 1985* For some of that 
period the overwhelming political necessities of isolating the labour 
relations effects of the coal strike are responsible (31)* It was 
only after the coal dispute ended, along with the turning in of a 
large loss in 1984-5 (see BRB, 1985), that the railways vulnerability 
seems to have been exploited to 'test' the government's labour 
legislation on financial compensation for disputes and, it can be 
surmised (32), to government demands for renewed managerial 
determination on issues of labour productivity such as driver-only- 
operation.
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Tlhe ad hoc nature of labour relations interventions has intensified 
tlhe problems of the ’arms length' relationship because they often 
conflict with the business strategies that have been adopted to meet 
the Government's financial targets. Whilst the Board needs to 
display a more unitarist management ethos to show Government that it 
can manage the industry without deferring to the rail unions (Ferner,
1985). the product market strategy of seeking revenue improvements 
through substantially raising product quality requires a heightened 
degree of workforce consent. The notion of 'customer care' by 
railway staff (cf. Peters and Waterman, 1982) is integral to the 
attempts by the passenger sectors to improve their financial 
position, and sustained good operating performance is important for 
all sectors.
Thus, the Board is faced with a dilemna. It cannot afford to be seen 
to defer to the railway trade unions but it also cannot afford not to 
achieve agreement with the unions on most issues. The result of 
these contradictory pressures is often violent oscillations in the 
Board's position on contentious issues. This is exempliifed in the 
dispute around the rail service strategy for London and the South 
East in autumn 1984. The London and South East Sector had planned 
widespread service reductions but the manual rail unions' threat not 
to co-operate led to crisis talks, the outcome of which resulted in 
the NUR and ASLEF having more influence on the eventual service 
pattern than had often been common in more 'pluralist' eras of labour 
relations. At this same meeting a national review procedure for 
traincrew depot closures was agreed much to the surprise of the
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railw^r trade unions (see Locomotive Journal, Sept-Oct 1984).
The ccntradictions between labour relations and business strategy, 
arisin? from government objectives in both these areas is reinforced 
by contradictions within the practice of labour relations itself as a 
conseqience of the mode of government intervention described above. 
The problem is this: whilst the Board needs to display that it is 
taking a firm line with the railway unions, the lessons of flexible 
rostering, to be outlined in Chapter Eight, suggest that it should 
not push issues so far as to provide an opportunity for the 
Govemnent to intervene in a way that ties the Board's hands in 
negotiations. The aim, then, is to achieve some autonomy from 
govemnent in labour relations in a context where the Board, because 
of its weak financial position, is highly vulnerable to government 
intervention.
CONCLUSION
In this chapter the interplay between government objectives in 
British Rail's labour relations and the labour relations impact of 
business strategies derived from government policy has been examined 
in detail. Following Batstone et al (1984) it has been suggested 
that the view that the consensual character of nationalized industry 
labour relations has been due primarily to insulation from the full 
pressure of market forces is mistaken. Instead, where they have 
taken this form in the 1970s it is in large part due to inconsistent
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govenment policies presenting management and unions with a strong 
identity of interest in warding-off potentially damaging 
interventions.
The breakdown of this consensus in the nationalized industries after 
1980 las led some commentators to imply that the autonomy of these 
organizations has been steadily reduced. Conversely, members of the 
Thatcler Government have argued that the ’opening-up' of these 
industries to market forces has extended the ' arms-length* 
relationship. Leaving aside the political objectives of those making 
such statements, this inconsistency can be explained by the 
promulgation of labour relations objectives radically different from 
those of previous governments, and at the same time a retreat by 
government from detailed involvement in management decision-making. 
Insteai the Thatcher Government has preferred to establish stringent 
financial targets. The combination of these and its labour relations 
objectives have stimulated both a deterioration in labour relations 
and the encouragement of major schemes of work re-organization.
However, precisely because government interventions have a 
multiplicity of aims and because of this tension between autonomy and 
control, those inconsistencies which underpinned the labour relations 
consensus in the past could come to generate new instance of 
consensus, if less stable than in the past. The large measure of 
agreement formerly found is unlikely to be regained in the short term 
because of changes in the political complexion of BR management and 
the rail unions, the NUR in particular, and any such consensus is
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likely to be based in large part on mutual uncertainty of the other’s 
reactions. Fluctuating labour relations stances by BR management 
over the last eighteen months provide some support for this.
Thus, apparently coherent government philosophies of undermining 
trade unionism in nationalized industries and its influence over work 
organization is not necessarily reflected in coherent strategies 
either on the part of Board or government and, where it is, the scope 








In the mid-1980s British trade unions and workforce organizations do 
not appear well-placed to protect their past achievements. High 
levels of unemployment provide an unpropitious environment for 
successful union activity, whilst the Thatcher Government’s labour 
legislation has placed considerable constraints, where employers have 
chosen to make use of them, on the sanctions that can be successfully 
used by unions. Where employers have been determined to implement 
changes, union organizations have often been unable to stop them. 
Prime examples of this on British Rail are the defeats suffered by 
ASLEF in 1982 over flexible rostering and the NUR’s failure to win 
sufficient support from railway guards to prevent the implementation 
of driver-only-operation.
It may seem a reasonable assessment that the 1980s have witnessed a 
major shift in power from worker organizations to employers. My 
argument will be that the dramatic set-backs for union policy and 
legitimacy on the national stage obscure a continuing strength to 
railway workplace organization. Indeed, that attempts by BR 
management to forcefully implement productivity measures have been 
met by sustained (if ultimately unsuccessful) resistance is good 
evidence for this. Workforce and union organizations continue to 
retain effective controls in the sphere of work relations, employment 
relations and labour relations. In consequence, there are 
substantial obstacles to the implementation of managerial strategies 
and policies where these are aimed at reforming both labour relations
85
institutions and practices, and the organization of work.
The basis of this claim is that the sources of railway labour 
organizations’ power differs from those found in much of
manufacturing industry, with the result that, even if there has been
the alleged decline in the literature for the latter, this has not
been replicated to the same degree on British Rail. There may be
good grounds for suggesting that the power of shop stewards in 
manufacturing is fairly directly related to labour and product 
markets (McCarthy, 1966). On this assumption, with the collapse in 
both these spheres post-1980, workplace organization has fallen away, 
and shop stewards and union leaders have found it more difficult to 
mobilize their constituents.
Such a movement is illustrated by statistics on industrial action. 
The total number of strikes which, after making allowances for 
'strike prone1 parts of the public sector (coal mining and 
shipbuilding), largely refer to manufacturing has displayed a 
substantial decline since 1979 (Edwards, 1983b). By contrast, the 
numbers of days lost through industrial action in the public sector 
is now consistently exceeding those lost in the private sector (see 
Beaumont and Leopold, 1985). Case study evidence suggests that 
private sector managements have often been able to exploit trade 
union weakness and the falling-away of workplace organization to 
reduce the scope of collective bargaining (Terry, 1983b; 1984;
Chadwick, 1983), whilst many managements have sought to achieve a 
shift from collective bargaining to joint consultation in their
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dealings with labour organizations (Sisson, 1984).
Explanations of the decline in the power of workforce organizations 
and managerial success in side-stepping traditional bargaining 
practice take two main forms. Perhaps inevitably given the recent 
history of industrial relations research in Britain, both of these 
concentrate on manufacturing industry. One argument, advanced by 
William Brown (1983). suggests that the transition during the 1970s 
from industry-wide to plant or company bargaining created a form of 
workplace organization that was largely separate from the wider trade 
union movement. This species of representation - Brown calls it 
’enterprise unionism’ - was crucially dependent for its success in 
bargaining on the health of the plant or company since, by 
definition, it drew on resources internal to the firm rather than 
those supplied externally by trade unions. Underpinning this 
development were buoyant labour and product markets. When these 
collapsed in the early 1980s, the source of power for such enterprise 
organizations drained away, leaving shop steward organizations which, 
though largely intact, were nevertheless comparatively quiescent in 
the face of managerial action to restructure production and 
employment practices.
An alternative view put forward by, amongst others, Hyman (1979). 
Terry (1983a; 1984) and Lane (1982) argues that the formalization and 
centralization of plant level industrial relations (which went hand- 
in-hand with the developments outlined by Brown) stimulated the 
creation of structured shop steward organizations, characterised by
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some degree internal hierarchy. For as plant level bargaining was 
rationalised and centralized from the workshop to the plant as a
whole, so involvement in pay bargaining came to be the preserve of
an elite groip of senior stewards (see Bats tone et al, 1977 for an
account of the social structure of steward organization in a car 
assembly plart). One important consequence of this development, it 
is said (the evidence for this claim is often impressionistic), was 
a growing alienation of 'rank and file* workers from their
representativgs and institutions. As a result shop steward 
organizations now often find it difficult to mobilize shop floor 
consent to defend union institutions and practices when managerial 
policy switches from co-operation and support to hostility or 
indifference.
Both these explanations provide a plausible account of recent changes 
in labour relations activity in manufacturing workplaces. What can 
be demonstrated here is that the power of workplace organization may 
not have declined to the extent observed elsewhere where it is to 
some degree insulated from changes in the external environment and, 
furthermore, has not been subject to post-Donovan restructuring.
It is this hypothesis that will be advanced to explain the current 
pattern of labour relations at workplace level on British Rail. To 
do this it is necessary to focus on two areas. One is the degree of 
integration of workplace institutions and bargaining with both wider 
trade union organization and other levels of labour relations 
machinery. The other is the organization of representation at
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workplace level.
By first outlining the main characteristics of trade union 
organization and labour relations institutions, we can then go on to 
explore the hypothesis through an examination of the impact of the 
pattern of multi-unionism, the structure of bargaining, the 
democratic style of union government, and finally the structure of 
representation at and above the workplace. The chapter concludes 
with an examination of the varying strength of the representative 
organizations of the groups of railway staff selected for detailed 
study.
1. THE RAILWAY TRADE UNIONS
Prior to examining the main hypothesis proposed above, it is 
necessary to briefly outline the main contextual features of railway 
labour relations. The majority of British Rail employees are 
represented by three trade unions, the National Union of Railwaymen 
(NUR), the Associated Society of Locomotive Engineers and Firemen 
(ASLEF) and the Transport Salaried Staffs Association (TSSA). The 
NUR was formed in 1913 out of the Amalgamated Society of Railway 
Servants, the United Pointsmen and Signalmen's Society and the 
General Railway Workers Union. The inspiration for its formation 
derived from the inter-union co-operation of the 1911 national 
railway strike (Bagwell, 1963 P»326) and the commitment to
syndicalism of a sizeable minority of railway union activists
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(Bagwell, ibid., p.327; Holton, 1976, p.l66) (1). As an 'industrial 
union* the union aspires to represent all grades of railway employee, 
and it is the one union recognised by British Rail as representing 
all grades of staff. In addition to railway employees it represents 
a number of other occupations such as busmen and hotel employees, as 
a consequence of following the railway companies moves towards 
horizontal integration earlier in the century (2). Its membership in 
1985 amounted to \Z7,ouq of whom y & %  were employed by British Rail
(3).
The TSSA, prior to 1951 the Railway Clerks Association, has 
traditionally been composed of clerical and supervisory staff (it was 
one of the unions studied in Lockwood's The Blackcoated Worker 
(1958)), but in recent years it has come to represent a large number 
of managerial staff, including members of the senior management 
grades. Reflecting the experience of other industries (see Bain and 
Price, 1983) the TSSA benefited more in membership terms than the 
manual rail unions from the introduction of the closed shop in 1970 
(Seglow, Streeck and Wallace, 1982). It also represents a number of 
occupations outside the railways, having chosen in 1948 to organize 
in all activities coming under the aegis of the British Transport 
Commission. The total membership of TSSA in February 1986 was 
48,769 of whom 31,747 (65%) were employed by the British Railways 
Board (4).
ASLEF was formed in 1880 after enginemen members of the ASRS decided 
that their interests would be better protected by a craft
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organization (Bagwell, 1963, p.85) (5). It currently represents
those grades in the footplate line of promotion, namely traction 
trainees, drivers assistants, relief drivers and train drivers. Of 
the tlree rail unions, ASLEF is the only one that is purely a railway 
union. At the end of 1984 ASLEF’s membership stood at 22,735 of whom 
20,79^ (91*^#) were employed by British Rail (the remainder were 
employed by London Transport (now London Underground Limited) and the 
Tyne aid Wear Metro) (6).
It is worthwhile summarizing here two features of trade union 
organization on the railways which either contribute to trade union 
strength or else, where the effect is less clear-cut, place obstacles 
in the path of management. These are the levels of union density on 
the railways and the form that multi-unionism takes in the labour 
relations institutions.
The level of union membership is an important variable in explaining
union power (Bain and Price, 1983, P«l). The railways in Britain
have been characterized by high levels of union density for some 
years. On nationalization in 1948, union density stood at 88.7#, 
making the industry the most highly organized after docks and 
waterways (see Price and Bain, 1983, PP. 54-5)* By 1979, union 
density had risen to 97 .&% {ibid.). Explanations of union growth are 
beyond the scope of this thesis, but nevertheless it seems
incontrovertible to assert that governmental sponsorship of 
collective bargaining, through the application of the Whitley system 
to the railways in 1919 and the statutory obligations placed on the
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British Transport Commission in 19^8 to negotiate and consult, and 
the encouragement to unionism presented by the signing of a closed 
shop agreement in 1969, are important factors in explaining these 
high levels of union density. Supporting these are a number of
features of railway occupations such as long career service and
family continuity in railway employment (Seglow et al, 1982) .
High levels of union membership are distributed amongst the three
rail unions to create an entrenched multi-unionism which can cause
chronic difficulties to BR management in implementing change schemes. 
Indeed the then Chairman of British Rail, Stanley Raymond, in a 
speech to the TSSA annual conference in 1967. called for a federation 
of railway unions to overcome this problem (Bagwell, 1982, p.357)• 
The significance of this pattern of multi-unionism lies not so much 
in the area of job demarcations, as is the case in some parts of 
manufacturing industry, but more in that of the composition of labour 
relations institutions. Job functions are clearly established by 
the operating Rule Book on the railways and demarcation disputes are 
rare (7).
The pattern of multi-unionism on the railways replicates distinct job 
functions rather than cutting across them. Such a division can prove 
advantageous to management in so far as it permits ’divide and rule' 
tactics (it was this potential for inhibiting worker solidarity that 
lay behind managerial acceptance of Lloyd George's conciliation 
scheme in 1907 (see Bagwell, 1963* Ch. 10)), but there are also 
constraints on this because of overlapping union membership. There
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are pockets of NUR train drivers in some areas such as the North East 
(Weighell, 1984) though, as the number of footplatemen decline, ASLEF 
density is increasing. 98.79% of those in the footplate line of 
promotion belonged to ASLEF at the close of 1983 (8) compared with 
about 74# in i960 (Seglow, et al, 1982 p. 48). The presence of the
NUR amongst train drivers means that the NUR participates in the
locomotive section of the national bargaining institutions (the 
Railway Staff Joint Council (Loco)). In addition, a number of 
supervisors, footplate supervisors in particular, retain their 
original membership on promotion from wage grades, with the result 
that all three unions attend the salaried section (the RSJC 
(Salaried)).
The presence of a number of unions, with different and potentially 
competing policies and philosophies, in sectional bargaining 
institutions has been identified by management as introducing 
additional complexity into national level bargaining, particularly 
over change schemes (Palette, 1984). This is well illustrated by the 
flexible rostering episode in 1982. Whilst ASLEF was implacably 
opposed to the introduction of any variation around the eight hour 
day, the NUR's leadership was more favourably disposed to it since 
the 1919 guaranteed eight hour day agreement does not have the same 
significance for the NUR (Bagwell, 1984), and adoption of new forms 
of rostering formed part of the NUR's strategy to increase pay and
reduce working hours (9) • Though the BRB exploited these divisions
when the dispute was underway, these competing dynamics added 
complexity to the negotiating process prior to the strike.
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Though it has been argued that industry unionism can lead to better 
industrial relations (Bell, 1972.) t in the British context of complex 
multi-unionism, industrial unions are under pressures which can 
heighten labour relations instability. The PSI study describes the 
NUR’s dilemma
"if its’ demands (the NUR) for footplate and white collar staff 
are considered to be too high it runs the risk of antagonising 
these two groups (ASLEF and TSSA). If, however, its' demands
for these two groups are seen to be too low, it risks
prejudicing its claim to represent their interests effectively.
" (Seglow et al, 1982 p.53)
In addition, the NUR has to balance the often potentially competing 
claims of sections of its membership, some of which, such as
signalmen, have a pronounced sense of their occupational identity. 
(10) Hemingway (1978) has illustrated how the NUR was unable to 
meet the demands of Bridgend busmen for some decentralization of 
bargaining since they conflicted with wider union policy towards the 
maintenance of existing bargaining structures. As a result of the 
NUR leadership's policies, the busmen left to join the Transport and 
General Workers Union.
The instability in NUR internal politics that arises from the
composition of its membership has often fed through into the conduct 
of labour relations with BR management (see McLeod, 1970). Overall, 
then, the pattern of railway unionism can provide a number of 
obstacles to BR management in labour relations. Their significance 
here lies in the fact that they are not directly affected by the
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external environment in the short run. The ending of the closed shop 
agreeient in 1985 will no doubt reduce union membership but it is 
unlikily to occur to the extent that union power will be
substzitially reduced or the pattern of railway unionism
signiiicantly modi fed.
2. THE INSTITUTIONS OF LABOUR RELATIONS
The railway labour relations machinery is composed of institutions at 
workplace, Regional and headquarters level. The current Machinery of 
Negotiation and Consultation was introduced in 1956 but is very 
simila? to the institutions and division of functions introduced in 
1919 sad given statutory force through incorporation in the 1921
Railways Act (11). Thus a notable feature of railway labour 
relations procedures and institutions are their longevity. As Sid 
Weighell has noted, the industry possessed the main features found in 
the Donovan Commission's recommendations for some fifty years before 
the Conmission reported (Weighell, 1977)* Such a lengthy existence 
has helped to entrench the labour relations machinery and may have 
obstructed pressures for change (Thomson and Beaumont, 1978).
The railway negotiating machinery is structured both by occupation 
and organizational hierarchy. At the workplace groups of staff are 
entitled to form Local Departmental Committees (LDCs) of four
representatives to deal with management (where there are less than 35 
staff enployed two representatives act as spokesmen). The functions
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of IDG, as outlined in the Machinery Agreement of 1956, are to agree 
linl (ie* workgroup) arrangements and work rosters, piecework and 
bonis arrangements where they exist, questions of seniority of local 
application, health and safety and accomodation issues. The LDCs are 
specif ;cally excluded from consideration of national agreements 
except where they are specifically remitted to do so. The object of 
the -DC is to
"jrovide a recognised means of communication betweeen the staff 
ard local management for the negotiation and prompt settlement 
of local problems and applications... and to give the staff a 
wider interest in their work and the conditions under which it 
is performed, with a view to the maintenance, development and 
efficient working of British Railways” (Machinery of Negotiation 
and Consultation, 1956, reprinted in ASLEF, 1982a).
The next tier of the Machinery are the Sectional Councils at Regional 
level, consisting of anything up to twelve staff side members elected 
on a divisional basis. There are four Councils on each Region: A - 
Salaried and Supervisory; B - Footplate; C - Traffic (ie. guards, 
signalmen and terminals staff); D - Permanent Way, and Signals and 
Telecomnunications. The functions of the Councils, as laid down in 
the 1956 Agreement are "the application of national agreements 
relating to pay, hours of duty, and conditions of service; 
applications upon which there has been failure to agree at LDC level 
or by local representatives; the application of agreed promotion and 
redundancy arrangements; and applications for reclassification and 
regrading of posts" (ibid). Sectional Council is also the medium for
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fdiscujsson at Regional level of matters coming within the scope of 
the ccon.ultation procedure (to be described shortly).
A simil:ar division by grade is found in the four sections of the 
Railway Staff Joint Council, the lowest tier at national level. 
These aie the forum for negotiation of proposals to vary national 
agreements where they relate to specific groups of staff. ’Failure 
to agrees’ from the Councils (and from the LDCs via the Councils) can 
be presented to a section of the RSJC where there is an issue of 
principle at stake.
Above this is the Railway Staff National Council, consisting of eight 
union representatives - four from the NUR and two each from ASLEF and 
the TSSA, and an equal number of managers drawn from the operations 
and personnel functions. In the event of failure to resolve
disagreements at this level there is the Railway Staff National 
Tribunal, consisting of one union and one management nominated member 
and a chairman (currently Lord McCarthy). In contrast to arbitration 
in other parts of the public sector, either party can submit claims 
to this body for arbitration, without the agreement of the other 
(Thomson and Beaumont, 1978), and the decision of this body can be 
non-binding if the parties so wish (12). .
In addition to the negotiation arrangements there is a Consultation 
Procedure which, unlike many other industries, operates through the 
same institutions.
"The object of the scheme is to provide a regular means of
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consultation between the Management and the staff by affording 
opportunities for co-operation and discussion between the 
Management and the Staff on matters of mutual interest, 
including efficiency in the working of the railways and the 
development of their business and the best use of manpower" 
(Machinery of Negotiation and Consultation, Appendix 7t quoted 
in ASLEF, 1982a).
The type of issues listed for local level consultation include 
staffing arrangements and establishment, infrastructure layout, 
equipment, and train working. At Regional level efficiency measures, 
staffing arrangements and establishment where more than one station, 
depot or yard is involved, new working methods, new rolling stock and 
their operation, timetable planning and introduction of new apparatus 
are within the remit of consultation. At national level, anything of 
relevance to British Rail as a whole is permissable.
Though consultation takes place in the same institutions as 
negotiation, the two forms possess different procedures to 
differentiate the adverserial character of negotiations from the 
cooperative objective of consultation. In contrast to the
negotiating procedure, it is not generally possible to refer issues 
upwards in consultation, though it has been agreed that where 
difficulties are encountered the issue may be refered to union 
headquarters for assistance. Contrary to tendencies elsewhere 
(McCarthy, 1966), bothu workforce representatives and managers have 
maintained in practice a clear distinction between negotiation and 
consultation items (though, of course, representatives have sought to
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influeice managerial decisions in the consultation process).
The structure of labour relations institutions on BR underpins two 
features of labour relations which together inhibit the potential of 
the external environment to bring about a decline in union power. 
Firstlj, the centralized nature of pay bargaining obstructs the 
emergence of ’enterprise unionism’ in the form that Brown (1981) 
describes. One of the most noticeable differences between the 
railways (and indeed the public sector generally) and maufacturing 
industry is the importance of company-level bargaining on pay and 
conditions of employment (13)* Since national union leaders are 
responsible for bargaining on pay and conditions issues, trade union 
organizations have a relevance to employees which may not be found 
where decentralized pay bargaining is the norm.
Of course, it could be objected that the railway unions are a good 
example of enterprise unions, if more of a Japanese type than that 
outlined by Brown, since the majority of their members work for 
British Rail. Indeed, members of the unions* executive committees 
are BR employees. However, the background of the unions in several 
railway companies prior to nationalization and the growing proportion 
(due to privatization) of rail union memberships who work for 
organizations other than those managed by the BRB prevents the 
development of that kind of identification with the company found in 
certain sectors of the Japanese economy. Furthermore, whilst the 
bargaining behaviour of stewards participating in workplace pay 
negotiations in manufacturing may be influenced by an awareness that
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the noie successful they are the more likely it is that their plant 
will close, past experience indicates that BR will not be allowed to 
go out of business.
If it was not for centralized pay bargaining labour relations on the 
railways could have come to exhibit similar characteristics to 
manufacturing. As in much of the latter, the organization of union 
government from branch level upwards is bifurcated from the 
institutions of workplace representation (Undy, Ellis, McCarthy and 
Halmos, 1981). When the Whitley system was introduced to the 
railways, the unions did not object to constitutional provision for 
the par:icipation of non-union members in the workplace institutions 
(see Clegg, 1979* P* 32). This formal separation between union 
branch and the workplace can potentially stimulate bargaining 
activity at the workplace without reference to wider trade union 
goals and philosophies. However, because pay bargaining is 
centralized on the railways and is conducted by elected 
representatives (the twin channels of bargaining representation and 
union government are brought together at national level), the wider 
union hgs a more pronounced relevance to individual members than in 
much of manufacturing. This is reflected in high involvement of 
workplace representatives in branch affairs. Of the footplate LDCs 
interviewed, at least one member of each occupied a position in the 
branch organization. Of the eleven signalboxes where it was possible 
to interview LDC representatives, in nine cases one or more of the 
.representatives occupied a branch position (14).
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Adheresnce to union policy and philosophy seems to be strongest 
amongst train drivers. All driver representatives interviewed drew 
attention to union policy in describing the factors influencing their 
decision-making. Mention of union policy was much less common by 
signalling representatives. In the two interviews conducted with 
guards’ representatives NUR policy was repeatedly mentioned but 
described as something to be taken into consideration rather than 
followed without fail. The driver representatives’ perception of 
their role thus appears to be similar to that described by Brown as 
the 'print model’. In other words an important function of local 
representatives is to maintain loyalty to the external union.
The consent of local representatives to this structure of authority 
is particularly marked amongst train drivers because of their sense 
of craft solidarity. It is found more generally, if less strongly, 
throughout the railways because of the democratic ethos that 
characterises the internal processes of the rail unions (15)* This 
second key feature of labour relations on BR not only helps to 
generate consent for union policy, but also places obstacles more 
directly in the way of management change schemes since union 
negotiators are often unable to move away from formal union policy in 
bargaining.
jThere are a number of features of rail union government which explain 
this democratic style. Firstly, the annual conferences (Annual 
Assembly of Delegates in ASLEF's case) are not only the supreme 
policy making organs (the NUR’s conference rules the union for the
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fortnight it is in session) but are accepted as such in practice by 
union executives and officials. In both the flexible rostering 
dispute and the driver-only-operated trains episode union leaderships 
were unwilling to make concessions in negotiations for fear of 
violating conference policy. To settle these disputes special union 
conferences had to be called to change union policy in both cases.
Secondly, Executive members (who are working railwaymen) rather than 
officials are largely responsible for bargaining with BR management 
and for running the union headquarters organization (16). BR 
management have long been critical of this, particularly in the the 
NUR's case, because they argue such negotiators are unwilling to make 
agreements without the explicit consent of the rest of their 
Executives, and because the turnover of Executives obstructs the 
build-up of bargaining experience (Royal Commission, 1966a; McLeod,
1970). The unions' dependence on working railwaymen results in rail 
union organizations having considerably smaller staffs than is found 
on other rail networks (Seglow et alt 1982) and in other British 
unions (Royal Commission, 1966b; Weighell, 1977)(17).
At the start of the 1980s the democratic style was most in evidence 
in ASLEF and it was this union which seemed to provide the largest 
stumbling block to BR management. However, with the election of 
Jimmy Knapp to the General Secretaryship of the NUR in 1983. 
interviews with senior rail managers indicated that the NUR had come 
to pose more of a problem. Knapp's accession to the leadership in 
1983 was described as marking a shift to the left in the NUR
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(Guardian, 23/3/83). This analysis, however, does not do justice to 
the complexity of the situation. The significance of Knapp’s 
leadership is that he is more willing than his predecessors to 
respect the workings of union government. Traditionally, NUR leaders 
have seen their role as balancing the potentially competing interests 
of sections of NUR membership (see Royal Commission, 1966b). Sid 
Weighell took this further by attacking more openly the decisions 
being made by both the conference and executive (see Financial Times, 
10/7/81) to maintain the ’tacit’ and, in the late 1970s, the 
progressively more explicit alliance with senior BR management in 
pursuit, as Weighell saw it, of the long term health of British Rail 
and hence NUR membership.
So far in this chapter two features of the railway labour relations 
'system’ have been outlined - centralized bargaining on pay and 
conditions, and the democratic character of union government. The 
consequence of these are twofold. Firstly, workplace representatives 
display an awareness of union policy which might not be anticipated 
from the separation of institutions from union government at 
workplace level. Second, the rail unions’ leaderships exhibit a 
particularly marked adherence to union policy. As a result it can be 
difficult for managers to achieve union agreement to change schemes 
where these seem to conflict with union policy. Furthermore, union 
leaderships possess a greater capacity to mobilize their memberships 
in defence of union policy than would seem likely in the present 
environment. Attention inevitably focuses on the defeats in the 
guards' strike ballot and the failure of a strike on London
Underground over one-man-operation of trains but during 19&5
j
widespread industrial action took place in support of union policy 
over driver-only-operation in Soctland, Yorkshire, the West Country 
and London (18) and in the East Midlands and Yorkshire against the 
alleged victimisation of rail staff supporting the miners* strike
(19).
2. THE STRUCTURE AND PRACTICE OF WORKPLACE ORGANIZATIONS
The mobilization of trade union membership directs us to the linkages 
between workplace representatives and their constituency. The 
apparent failure in the 1980s of workplace representatives to defend 
industrial relations procedures and practices has been viewed by many 
as a consequence of a ’bureaucratization* of workplace representation 
during the 1970s (Terry, 1983a; 1984; Hyman, 1979)* In the
formalization of shopfloor labour relations and the transition to 
plant wide bargaining that took place post-Donovan, the primary role 
of many shop stewards shifted from direct representation of 
individual workgroups to greater involvement in plant-wide 
institutions.
Concomitant with this, and encouraged by managements, has come the 
development of hierarchy in shop steward organization. The Warwick 
survey indicated that management acknowledged senior stewards to be 
present in 74% of establishments where there were manual stewards 
(Brown, 1981, p.62), and that the number of full-time stewards has
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quadrupled since 1966 (ibid.. , p.66). Batstone et al's study
suggested that there is a ’quasi-elite' of stewards supporting full­
time stewards who, in common with them, possess ’strong bargaining 
relationships' with managers (Batstone, Boras ton and Frenkel, 1977. 
p. 45)• The formalization of plant level labour relations and 
development of shop steward organization in manufacturing has also 
led to a diminution of the significance of multi-unionism. Cross 
representation among manual unions was reported in 29% of cases, and 
"inclusion of more than one union is a ’regular’ occurrence in 52% of 
establishments which have steward meetings and more than one union" 
(Brown, 1981, p.67).
Since functional organization has been the predominant structural 
characteristic of Britain's railways and since the function of plant 
level works committees in the Whitley model was to deal with work 
organization matters workplace institutions on the railways are 
organized on a departmental basis. Thus, there are separate LDCs for 
footplate, white collar, traffic and maintenance staff. As railway 
labour relations have traditionally been 'good' - it is one of the 
least 'strike prone' industries (see Paul Edwards, 1983b, p.222) - 
and formal procedures are well established, top rail managers 
perceived no necessity to fundamentally reconstruct workplace 
Institutions along the lines that took place in manufacturing and 
jl.ocal government post-Donovan. Thus railway labour relations are 
largely fragmented (in the sense of a multiplicity of workplace 
Institutions), though neither informal (in Flanders' sense) nor 
lutonomous of trade union organization.
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Interviews with LDC representatives confirmed that LDCs operate 
largely independently of each other (20). Only at one location was 
it revealed that there was a joint LDC committee composed of 
representatives of all LDCs. However, this committee did not appear 
to meet frequently, and its remit seemed to be social and welfare 
arrangements rather than the conduct of bargaining (29).
A corollary of the fragmented system of workplace representation is 
that it is rare for representatives to undertake steward duties on a 
full time basis. All the representatives interviewed were working 
railwaymen and were only ’booked-off’ normal duties for specific 
purposes. It is most common for train drivers representatives to 
have time off since the compilation for new rosters for the twice- 
yearly timetable changes is a complex and time consuming process. 
Furthermore, it is a condition of the 1965 Manning Agreement that 
driver LDC representatives have the right to scrutinise weekly 
alterations to drivers’ work schedules to check that the requirements 
for single manning have been complied with (22).
Since workplace representation is organized on a departmental basis, 
representatives act as workgroup delegates in a way that may be more 
^difficult where steward committees are composed of representatives of 
|a number of groups of employees. As a result, structural features of 
the bargaining system at local level are less likely to lead to a 
divorce between representatives and workgroups that has been 
hypothesised to have taken place elsewhere. This facilitates both a 
greater responsiveness to work group opinion and, in the oppositer
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direction, makes it easier for representatives to convey union policy 
to work groups where they choose to adopt a 'leadership role' 
(Batstore et al, 1977)*
It is argued, then, that structural features of bargaining 
institutions on the railways permit a closer association between 
representatives and workgroups than is found elsewhere. This in turn 
indicates that railway LDCs may be more able to resist managerial
(change schemes than in much of manufacturing industry.
!
One important feature of railway labour relations is that well- 
developed representation exists above the workplace. On each Region 
there are Sectional Councils for each grade or group of grades, 
standing above the LDCs, and who have considerable involvement in 
workplace labour relations. Thus those studies of workplace 
representation on the railways which confine themselves to LDCs, such 
as Christine Edwards1 survey of workplace power (1982a and b), 
provide a partial picture of workplace labour relations (23). Until 
the data collection for the project reported here, the role and 
activities of Sectional Councils had not been systematically 
researched. (24) The reason behind the detailed attention given to 
the Councils was because of this well-developed role in workplace 
labour relations, particularly in the implementation of change 
schemes. The conclusion is that the primary role of Sectional 
Councils is not that of a negotiating forum but of providing 
individuals to act as ’trouble shooters’ and coordinators of 
Bargaining that outside BR might be conducted by senior stewards and
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convenors.
| One of the few academic studies to deal with the railway Sectional 
■Councils is Boras ton, Clegg and Rimmer's book, Workplace and Union 
! (1975)- They suggested that the "Sectional Councils’ staple business
J
j lies in appeals on gradings" {ibid., p.135)* The data collected for 
I this project suggests this claim is misleading for two reasons. 
First, the varying employment conditions of the grades of staff 
covered by the Councils results in variety between the Councils’ 
negotiating activities. Second, the formal negotiating functions of 
the Councils form only a small element of their activities.
Negotiations on individual grievances that are referred upwards by 
LDC take place in sub-committees (composed of Council members and 
Regional managers) that meet between four and six times a year. It 
is only on Sectional Councils A (salaried) and C (traffic) that 
grading issues form part of the agenda. Even here, interview 
evidence indicated that grading claims are a declining element of 
Council C's activity. Members of the occupational groups covered by 
’ C ’ can seek re-grading on the basis of job content but when the Pay 
and Efficiency Agreements of 1968-9 (25) created ’versatility grades' 
with a wide combination of duties for each, the scope for re-grading 
|claims became limited. As one senior personnel manager put it, 
j "the trade unions were happy (with the P & E Agreements) at 
first because large numbers of staff had their grades raised and
f an increase irv pay. But what they did not forsee was that when
?
they argue about gradings we have an objective document which we
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can wave at them. It is a lovely document from a management 
point of view. But it’s very frustrating for people like (the 
Sectional Council Secretary) because he knows he’s got to find 
something special to get away from the agreement in the book".
At Sectional Council A (the salaried council) the scope for regrading 
is greater since responsibility and performance are important factors 
in promotion. As this same personnel manager put it,
"this is where the real negotiations take place."
Re-grading claims are rarely presented at the drivers’ Councils since 
promotion is determined by a combination of seniority and competence 
in tests. Instead, agendas tend to be dominated by claims for 
payment where it is contended that driving jobs had been allocated to 
the wrong crew member as determined by local and national agreements. 
Some highly-organised footplate LDCs, such as that at Northern also 
consciously use the Councils to seek interpretations of and 
modifications to national agreements. The engineering maintenance 
Councils were not studied in the same depth as the other blue-collar 
Councils but interview evidence indicated once again that re-grading 
claims were not a significant part of their activities because 
promotion is dependent on the passing of tests of competence.
In their negotiating role the primary function of the Councils seems 
to be that of ’ Court of Appeal *. Much more important than this role 
is their involvement in the Consultation Procedure. The great bulk 
of their time, and that of the secretaries and chairmen in particular 
(27), is spent on issues arising from their role in consultation.
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The Councils have the right to be consulted on any scheme which 
affects more than one location which, given the geographical 
interdependence of railway operations, results in Councillors being 
involved in most change schemes on BR. This includes both major one- 
off changes, such as re-signalling schemes, and regular alterations 
to the organization of operations.
Both Sectional Councils B and C, because of their representation of 
traiicrews, are consulted on the bi-annual timetable changes since 
thes2 have implications for traincrew depot work allocation. The 
drivers’ Councils also have consultation rights on depot
establishments over a five year period which has in the past given 
them some informal negotiating ability on establishment and 
recruitment (Seglow et al, 1982). Regional practices vary in the 
extent to which Council's seek to influence work allocation but, in 
general, footplate Councils are less willing than the traffic 
Councils to be seen to usurp the functions of LDCs. Interviews with 
guards ’, drivers * and signalling representatives indicated that 
guards’ and signalling LDCs guard their prerogatives less jealously 
than footplate LDCs (28).
In consultation over change, the Councils organize and marshall (to 
varying degrees) the forces of the LDCs concerned. The logic of the 
Councils' role here is that in seeking to achieve the best solution 
for all affected they necessarily stand apart from the interests of 
individual LDCs. For example, it is rare for Councils to mount 
sustained opposition to closures because to do so, they argue, could
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seriously affect redundancy payments and the resettlement of 
displaced staff to other depots. The tacit condition of Council 
consent to BE change schemes, the vast majority of which on BR reduce 
employee nunbers, is that Regional personnel managers find 
alternative jobs for those displaced.
In the process of consultation around change, Councils largely 
perform a 'lubricant’role. The secretaries and chairmen, furthermore, 
act as ’trouble-shooters’ in the event of labour relations 
difficulties at local level. They do this because of their 
conception of the Councils as 'the guardians of the Machinery', and 
the desirability of maintaining the established procedures. That 
Councillors are not simply union delegates is illustrated by the 
practice of non-involvement in industrial disputes. When the 
Machinery breaks down, the Council bows out and the ’union’ in the 
form of the district official steps in (29).
To summarize, the functions of the Councils in practice go beyond 
those identified by Boraston, Clegg and Rimmer. Their involvement in 
maintaining procedures, progressing change schemes and marshalling 
groups of workplace representatives suggest that they occupy a role 
akin to that of senior stewards and convenors in manufacturing. 
Although Councils often restrain the activities of LDCs in 
consultation items and take up LDC grievances selctively they 
nevertheless facilitate a continuing strength to LDC representation. 
Precisely because the balancing of often divergent or competing 
workforce interests takes place through the Councils, then it is
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feasible for LDC members to perform a strong representational 
function without restraining workforce claims to the same extent as 
Batstone et al's 'leader* stewards appeared to. Furthermore, in 
their negotiating role as 'Courts of Appeal', Councils prevent failed 
LDC claims from developing into tests of legitimacy for the LDCs in 
their dealings with management. In other words, they provide an 
escape valve for LDCs (see Becket, 1982). In conjunction with the 
departmental basis of LDC representation, this feature of the labour 
relations system underpins the structural role of LDCs as workgroup 
spokespeople, and has facilitated the continuing importance of these 
representatives despite adverse external circumstances.
4. THE VARYING STRENGTH OF WORKPLACE INSTITUTIONS
A number of structural elements of the 'system' of workplace 
bargaining have been outlined which contibute to a continuing 
vitality of this form of representation. However, whilst these 
features are common to all occupational groups, it became clear at an 
early stage of the research that the power of workplace institutions 
is not uniform, and that some occupational groups possess a greater 
capacity to resist or influence managerial change schemes than 
others. In this final section, we consider which factors are 
responsible for this distribution of power.
Assessments by interviewees indicated, as anticipated, that footplate 
LDCs are virtually always the most powerful group, defined as "the
possession of the ability to influence aspects of local industrial 
relations" (30)* Edwards found that footplate LDCs are the best 
organized, as measured by levels of labour relations training, 
attendance at branch meetings, contact with local officials, 
dissemination of information, and time spent on LDC business both at 
home and work (C. Edwards, 1982b). She found that footplatemen are 
most committed to their representatives and that footplate LDC 
members can rely on membership support more than any other 
occupational group can. These findings are broadly supported by the 
comments of respondents interviewed for this project, and only one 
line manager thought his footplate LDC was of a lower calibre than 
other LDCs in the area (31)•
The sense of craft cohesion amongst train drivers is clearly 
important here as an explanatory variable, underpinned by the 
exclusivity of footplate workplace institutions and the entirely 
separate line of promotion from that of other railway staff. 
Representational specialization is permitted by the 1956 Machinery 
Agreement for other groups of staff where their numbers permit it (ie 
over 35)* Thus, at large depots guards will have their own LDC (32), 
as will signalmen where there is a large control centre (33)* Thus, 
the larger the work group, it seems more likely there is to be 
specialist representation and hence a greater identity between work 
groups and representative institutions.
Christine Edwards argues that the most important factor explaining 
variation in power is the characteristics of the representatives
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themselves, and that structural variables are less important, 
although strategic position defined as ’centrality within the railway 
network', along a somewhat crude traincrew/non-traincrew dichotomy, 
has a relatively high correlation (1982a., pp.14-15). The case study 
methodology adopted in the present project does not enable a fully 
rigorous appraisal of Edwards' research. However, the findings do 
nevertheless call into doubt the central thrust of her results and, 
contrary to her thesis, it is the centrality to train service
operations that is the most important variable. Thus, the footplate
grades (who drive the trains) and signalmen (who set the routes for 
them), are the most powerful groups.
Edwards' results indicate, as outlined above, that train drivers are 
the most powerful group at workplace level. Her findings also
suggest that train guards are nearly as powerful. The evidence from
this project conflicts with this since comments by union 
representatives and officials and managers indicated that guards' 
LDCs are considerably weaker than train drivers'. The explanation 
behind this discrepancy may well be that Edwards' variables pick out 
degrees of workplace organization in an administrative sense and not 
its effectiveness in practice. Whilst guards' representatives, like 
their footplate counterparts, are responsible for roster and link 
compilation they have little control, and nor do they seem to seek it 
over daily variations in work scheduling (34). However, since 
guards' LDCs have a role in timetable scheduling they have access to 
office facilities, unlike most occupational groups on British Rail, 
which permits relatively high levels of organization if the
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individuals involved should so choose. This could explain why she 
found the characteristics of individual representatives so important.
Workgroup power arising from centrality to production is translated 
into cohesive LDC groups amongst footplate staff because of the 
complexity of work scheduling (i.e. matching crews to trains) and the 
dailj variation in task requirements caused by the incidence of 
'special workings' (ie. train movements that are not planned in 
advance), in combination with the comprehensive coverage of national 
and local agreements in these respects. An important function, and 
one that is more developed than for any other grade of staff, of 
local representatives is the application of these agreements on a 
day-tD-day basis. The coverage of these agreements is much greater 
than in the case of guards, and may be explained by the presence of 
mileage bonuses for footplatemen since 1919 (this mileage bonus 
scheme was only extended to guards in 1965) and the perceived 
necessity of applying these fairly in situations where a number of 
conflicting criteria may be relevant.
However, though footplate LDCs are the best organized, all 
representatives interviewed downgraded the importance of formal LDC 
meetings. As one put it, "we only have one when we need it". Issues 
arising from the application of agreements to specific instances of 
work scheduling are generally sorted out informally between 
representatives, roster clerks, supervisors and traincrew managers. 
Similarly, Edwards' survey shows that footplate representatives have 
the most informal contact with management {ibid., 1982b). This is
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fnot so surprising as she seems to think since, despite the 
geographical isolation of driving itself, the spare time built into 
traincrew work diagrams can give a fair amount of time around the 
depot. The combination of extensive written agreements and informal 
bargaining tends to reinforce that evidence which suggests that the 
more comprehensive the formal rules surrounding workplace activities, 
the greater the degree of informal contact necessary to apply them 
(cf. Terry, 1977).
Though signalmen occupy a similarly important place in train service 
operations, the considerable power this gives them is not always 
converted into cohesive, formal LDC organization (cf. Edwards', 1982a 
and b). Once again, this suggests that her survey may pick -out 
degrees of organization rather than effective power. There are a 
variety of reasons that explain why these institutions are 
comparatively under-developed. One is that the relative day-to-day 
autonomy from management, both in task execution and the wider work 
environment, enjoyed by signalmen does not always suggest the need 
for strong formal organization against management. In addition, as 
the Tavistock survey of attitudes to participation on BR indicated 
(Hilgendorf and Irving, 1976), those workers in most contact with 
their representatives appear to see less need for formal organization 
- in large, modern power-operated signalboxes all, or nearly all, 
signalmen are grouped under one roof and hence are able to take up 
issues with their representatives informally.
Secondly, unlike traincrews there is not the necessity for complex
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work scheduling since the signalmen operate their work stations on a 
straightforward eight hour, three or four shift basis. Hence, there 
is not the need for frequent contact between representatives and 
management to deal with the allocation of work, nor the need for 
comprehensive agreements to govern it. This is reinforced by the 
absence of a generalized system of bonus payments for signalmen. In 
areas controlled by one power box, the details of work allocation can 
be controlled largely on a rotational basis by the signalmen 
concerned with little day-to-day intervention by management.
Though signalmen’s LDCs are often weaker organisationally than 
traindrivers, many line and operations managers are more mindful of 
signalmen than drivers which, given the definition of power presented 
earlier suggests that signalmens’ power is greater than that of 
drivers in some locations. Many managers see the power signalboxes 
under their responsibility as, as one Area Manager put it, ’their 
Achilles Heel'. In fact, some powerbox workgroups have been 
perceived as so powerful in the past that managements simply did not 
attempt to put certain issues, such as work re-organisation and staff 
reductions, onto the bargaining agenda. This emphasizes the 
importance of ’non-decisions’ in explanations of power (Lukes, 197*0, 
which Edwards' method of evaluation of influence over a list of 
specific areas may not be able to fully pick out.
Though the footplate LDCs are generally perceived as the most 
formidable bargaining opponents, many managers prefer this LDC to 
bargain with since the representatives can be relied upon to
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'delrver'. As one Area Operations Manager put it,
"the easiest to deal with (LDCs) are not necessarily the best
ones to deal with from a management point of view often you
make agreements with the LDC, you think that it's all been 
sorted out but then the men themselves reject it. With guards 
and drivers though when agreement is reached at LDC it sticks."
SUMMARY
There are a number of features of railway labour relations that 
provide workforce organizations with continuing power despite the 
recession. Of these the most important seem to be the integration of 
workplace representation with the wider union movement and railway 
labour relations system, and the structure of workplace institutions. 
Workplace representatives have largely unimpeded access to higher 
degrees of representation and the support of the external union 
movement. Though workplace representation is bifurcated from the 
official union organizations, as in much of manufacturing, the two 
are integrated in practice by the centralized nature of pay 
bargaining in conjunction with the democratic style of union 
government.
This linkage between national union and workplace organization is 
mirrored by a cohesive pattern of relationships between these 
organizations and their constituencies. Part of the explanation for 
this is provided by the factors just mentioned but in addition the
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Specialized structure of local representation results in LDC activity- 
reflecting workgroup concerns fairly directly.
The combination of these features provides railway workforce organizations 
with continuing strength. In contrast to manufacturing industry, where 
managements have often been able to mould the pattern of shop steward 
activity to their liking (Terry, 1983 , 198U; Chadwick, 1983}, these - 
features of the railway labour relations system continue to place 
constraints on local managers and can provide substantial obstacles to 
management strategies. The capacity of union organizations to obstruct 
management change schemes varies between occupational functions. The 
features summarized here are most marked in the case of train drivers, and 
it is this group which is most able to resist management plans. Their 
power in the production process is replicated in the structure of 
representation. Signalmens’ power in this process is; by contrast, generally 
not reflected in represent^.onal cohesion, with the result that once 
management decides to vary features of labour management, signalmen are 
less able than train drivers to resist such moves successfully.
CHAPTER FIVE
MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE AND ORGANIZATIONAL CONTROL
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INTRODUCTION
During the 1980s the BRB’s business strategies have not been the 
subject of detailed government involvement. Government interventions 
have concentrated instead on setting financial targets to guide these 
strategies and in forcing changes in the management of labour. It 
will be argued here that changing business strategies, and the 
structures through which they are implemented, have led to a 
deterioration in labour relations through their impact on aspects of 
work organization. However, the large number of changes that 
contribute to this deterioration do not exhibit the consistency 
necessary to be seen as the outcome of a 'management offensive1 . 
Instead, a number of features of current business strategy and 
structure inhibit the emergence of coherent labour management 
strategies.
This contention will be demonstrated by an examination of two recent 
changes in the organization of BR management. These are,
1) the creation of rail business sectors in 1982 and their 
superimposition on an organization structured by function and 
geography. These have been accompanied by major revisions of 
corporate planning and financial control procedures; and
2) the elimination of one tier of management within British Rail's 
Regions (1) and the decentralization of managerial authority to 
lower levels.
It has already been pointed out (in Chapter One) that the growing
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fmanagerial literature on contemporary organizational change has so 
far provided little evaluation of the success of these innovations in 
practice. Aacademic material on the impact of management strategies 
and structures have so far largely concentrated on making broad 
comparisons between the character of labour relations associated with 
the main type of company form (for example, Purcell, 1983; Gospel, 
1983b; 1983c). The objective here is to give more detailed attention 
to specific processes of organizational restructuring and their 
impact on labour dimensions by outlining each of the main features of 
the changes outlined earlier and the modifications to labour 
management that have accompanied them.
l.THE HISTORY OF RAILWAY MANAGEMENT
In 1982 the British Railways Board adopted a new structure to manage 
its railway activities. Management units based on business Sectors 
were created, each headed by a director with ’bottom-line' 
responsibility for the financial performance of that business. These 
sectors are Intercity, Provincial, London & South-East, Freight, and 
Parcels, and are superimposed on a management organization structured 
by geography and function. The new structure thus takes the form of 
a matrix (see Knight, 1977)*
The prime objective was to facilitate central strategic planning and 
to emphasise business priorities at the expense of those operating 
and engineering considerations which were perceived to have directed
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managerial attention away from cost effective performance in the past 
(2). One element of past practice had been the capacity of sub- 
headquarters units to define priorities without reference to the 
broader requirements of the financial constraints of the business 
(see Reid, 1982; BRB, 1983b; RGI, 1984a). To understand how BR 
management came to acquire these characteristics it is necessary to 
undertake a brief historical survey of British railway management.
Chandler (1977; 1984) has shown how railways provided the earliest 
j model for the creation of managerial hierarchies because of the need 
! to coordinate the dispersed nature of railway operations (3).
j
j
The British companies, like most of their American counterparts, 
reacted to the requirement to coordinate the four ’classic' functions 
of a railway - provision of track and structures, provision of motive 
power and rolling stock, obtaining traffic and carrying traffic - by 
creating departmental or functional management structures (Bonavia,
1971) with general management exercised at top level (4).
One important consequence of this structural form was the 
encouragement of occupational specialization and to emphasise 
professional expertise in the operating and engineering functions 
rather than business needs (Bonavia, ibid; Chandler, op. cit.). 
Recent research on U.S. railroad companies has shown how technical 
specialism leads managers to focus on individual departmental budget 
! costs rather than on all-round business performance (Kinnunen and
i
Janell, 1982) (5). In Britain occupational specialization was
reinforced by the British Transport Commission’s attempts to break
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down company loyalties after nationalization. The general management 
function in the six Regions was substantially less-developed than in 
the ' BLg Four' railway companies they replaced (the erstwhile General 
Managers were re-titled Chief Regional Officers), and supervision of 
the Regions activities passed to a functionally organized Railway 
Executive, leaving the Chief Regional Officers as co-ordinators. 
Thus tie departmental system was extended to the top of the railway 
structure (Pearson, 196*1; Bonavia, op. ctt.).
The otier distinguishing feature of railway management in Britain 
since rationalization has been (despite the efforts noted above) the 
entrenched role of the Regions and the weakness of corporate control. 
The British Transport Commission and Railway Executive (responsible 
to the BTC for running the six Regions) were run on a shoestring and 
when the Railway Executive was abolished (by Ministerial Order) in 
October 1953 a substantial degree of general management authority was 
passed to the Regions, each supervised in part by an Area Board. The 
Chief Regional Officers became Chief Regional Managers. Sir Brian 
Robertson (the head of the BTC from 1955) attempted, unsuccessfully, 
to fill the vacuum in central direction by creating a complex General 
Staff structure, akin to military structures, to assist the members 
of the Commission (see Pearson, 196*1, Bonavia, op. cit.).
The appointment of Dr Richard Beeching to head the newly-created 
British Railways Board in 1963 ushered in a new era of organizational 
thinking on the railways. Beeching sought to correct what many see 
as the excessive decentralization of the 1950s (Pryke, 1971* P*2*J7)
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by reserving the establishment of commercial policy, control of 
finance and investment and technical standards to the Board, leaving 
the Regions with responsibility for operations (see Bonavia, 1971. 
pp. 98-9 , pp. 101-3). The potential for coherent strategic planning 
was compromised, however, by Beeching's decision to organize the 
Board on functional lines. As a result the exercise of central 
control was often confused since overlapping and contradictory 
directives were frequently sent from headquarters to Regional General 
Managers (Bonavia, 1976). Beeching's aim to exercise strategic 
control from the centre largely failed since he was unable to break 
the the Regional Manager's ’fiefdoms'. Fiennes records (1967) how 
the Eastern Region's General Manager, H.C.Johnson, resisted the 
Beeching Plan as far as possible (p. 117) and how he himself
obstructed what he saw as BRB interference in the running of 'his1 
Region (p.130-1) (7).
By the time of the 1968 Transport Act the railway activities of the 
British Railways Board were an odd structure. Whilst the 
relationship between Board and Regions had a very strong functional 
component, the Regions themselves from the late 1950s onwards had 
replaced departmental with largely federal management structures (8). 
Following a report on internal organization by McKinsey & Co. (BRB, 
1969). the BRB adopted structures more akin to those of an M-Form 
company. The activities managed by the Board were substantially 
divisionalized with separate Chief Executives and Boards appointed 
for each business (9)• The Railways Board itself became non­
functional and Executive Directors were created, reporting to the
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Chief Executive, to take responsibility for freight planning and 
marketing, passenger planning and marketing, systems and operations, 
finance, personnel, and (later) planning. Consistent with the M-Form 
model, the objective was to enable the Board to "give greater 
emphasis to overall corporate planning, policy making and longer term 
direction" {ibid., p.10), whilst the primary function of the Regional 
General Managers (members of the Railway Management Group along with 
the Executive Directors) was defined as "the effective day-to-day 
management of the railways in the Regions" (p. 21).
This formal division of functions between Board Headquarters and 
Regions remained in place until the business Sectors were created in 
1982. However, though the management structure prior to 1982
i  embodied the main characteristics of M-Form organization (see 
Chandler (1984) and Williamson and Bhargava (1972)), it does not 
necessarily follow that management practice was in accordance with 
the key tenets of this model. As in many large U.K. firms, central 
strategic control has in practice been weak. In BR's case this seems 
to result more from chronic inconsistency in government policy and 
the vagaries of government interventions rather than from the 
distinctive British feature of company growth through amalgamation.
i1
!
Regional management, then, possessed substantial autonomy both in the 
spheres of operating management (as in the M-Form model) but also in 
that of wider business policy. Central monitoring of the Region's 
performance concentrated on short-term financial and physical 
measures rather than their contribution to more long-term business
126
strategies. In consequence, the criteria by which rail service 
specification were judged were often dominated by production 
considerations. At the same time, the shortcomings of the accounting 
system, which was unable to provide either a genuine Regional or 
business ’bottom-line* , impeded the development of meaningful 
budgetary measures capable of practical control by BR Headquarters. 
This reinforced operating and engineering considerations and, in 
turn, re-affirmed the Region's primacy in railway management (cf. 




This pattern of management activity had a distinctive effect on 
labour management which replicated the ’tacit alliance’ found at 
national level. Since authority in commercial management was 
concentrated in practice in the Regions, and since discussion of the 
organization of labour deployment to meet commercial targets was 
remitted to the Regional labour relations institutions, Sectional 
Council representatives gained considerable informal access to 
commercial specifications. In Consultation meetings on the 
implications for traincrews of the bi-annual timetable 
representatives often focused their attention beyond work 
organization issues to those of the commercial attractiveness of new 
or revised services. Furthermore, as production considerations 
weighed heavily in Regional management approaches to performance, the 
views of the rail unions on the operating feasibility of managerial 
plans were generally taken seriously.
i
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From one perspective Regional managers could be judged to have 
abroga:ed their 'right to manage'. Such a criticism would be unfair 
since managers rarely uncritically deferred to union objections. 
Equally, the criticisms of union representatives of management plans 
were inspired as much by a broad concern for good railway performance 
as the achievement of union goals in work organization. What is most 
significant about these relationships is that both workforce and 
manageiient viewed union participation in railway affairs as a 'matter 
of fact’. In particular the pattern of long career service amongst 
managers stimulated an awareness of the unions' concern for the 
railway's well-being, and an acceptance of the legitimacy of union 
involvement in railway affairs. A further influence is managerial 
dependence on the exercise of unsupervised responsibility amongst 
core operating groups such as traincrews and signalmen. In this way 
the 'tacit alliance' at national level has been replicated in the 
Regions. Just as the tacit alliance has been ruptured by recent 
government interventions, so this similarity of perspectives in the 
Regions has been substantially weakened by the new patterns of 
management organization to be described in the next section.
2. THE INTRODUCTION OF SECTOR MANAGEMENT
Sectorization revolutionized BR's management structure through the 
creation of Sector Directors with 'bottom-line' responsibility for 
Intercity, Provincial, London & South East, Freight and Parcels. It
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was clearly intended that this structure would weaken the power of 
the Regional General Managers and diminish the prominence of the 
operating and engineering functions. The 1983 Corporate Plan 
outlined the main elements of the new structure;
"This new Sector management structure has been integrated with 
the other essential forms of railway management - functional 
management and Regional management. Whilst Sector Directors 
give strategic direction, Functional Directors are technical 
experts responsible for identifying cost savings and 
productivity initiatives in the shared operating, engineering 
and administrative facilities and Regional Managers implement 
these and co-ordinate all rail activities on a geographical 
basis" (BRB, 1983b, p.13).
The philosophy that underpins this matrix is that of ' creative 
tension’ (RGI, 1984a) or, as Sir Peter Parker put it, "the human 
chemistry of creative conflict" (Parker, 1983)» in the belief that 
this will assist in cost reductions and creation of a more market- 
oriented product than hitherto (Reid, 1982).
The underlying principles of Sectorization are a clear identification 
and segmentation of product markets, and the direct linking of 
managerial responsibility to discrete patterns of business activity. 
The main effects of this have been centralization of managerial 
authority, a departure from uniformity in management structures, and 
a clear separation of business strategies. The main determinant 
behind the form and extent of these changes is the Sector Directors’ 
perceptions of product markets (for reviews of these see Ford, 1982a;
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1982b;1983a; 1983b) . These are now outlined through an examination 
of post-Sectorization developments in freight and the passenger 
businesses.
Sectorization has had the clearest impact on management structures in 
the Freight Sector. In September 1984 direct marketing
responsibilities were removed from Regional freight management, and 
the post of Regional Chief Freight Manager was reduced in status to 
that of a resource manager acting as a 'go-between* for the Freight 
Sector business managers and the operators (Abbott, 1985b; Freeman 
Allen, 1984). Commodity managers (National Business Managers) were 
appointed to cover each major group of freight traffic supported by 
outbased managers at key locations. These report to the Sector 
Director and all are headquarters managers with 'bottom-line' 
responsibilities. Thus, in this sector a management organization has 
been created that is almost entirely separate from operating 
management in the Regions.
Two features of the product markets lie behind this. One is that 
contracts are reached centrally and so the traffic flows do not bear 
any necessary relationship to the geographically-based Regions. The 
second is that market pressures are felt particularly keenly in this 
sector and strong central control of operating costs is especially 
necessary (11). As one commentator has described the new 
organization created to respond to this;
"Railfreight has developed into an aggressive commercial 
organization quite distinct from the old railway freight
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business based on geographical Regions which was a set-up with 
nore relevance to the commercial world of 1923 than that of 
3985" (Harris, 1985. P. 185).
As we shall see later, this has put considerable strain on prevailing 
pattens of work organization.
The passenger sectors have created somewhat more hybrid structures 
than tlose found in the Freight Sector. Headquarters staff have been 
kept snaller in size and business managers have been inserted into 
Regional management organizations, in place of the Regional Chief 
Passenger Manager, with dual responsibility to the Sector Director 
and th3 Regional General Manager. On the Southern Region the 
passeng3r business managers have no direct day-to-day 
responsibilities and are instead encouraged to prioritize forward 
planning (Harris, 1984). The structural patterns are not entirely 
uniform between the Regions. On the Western Region it was initially 
believed that the limited number of Provincial services did not 
justify a Regional Provincial Services Manager and instead 
considerable responsibility for service performance was devolved to a 
number cf Area Managers (Freeman Allen, 1985b).
The creation of three separate passenger sectors led to segmentation 
of passaiger market strategies. The Intercity strategy has to 
respond :o Government requirements that the sector should turn-in a 
5% current cost return on assets in 1988-89 (12). To achieve this 
demanding target the principles behind the sector strategy have been 
transfomed. The high-volume (’bums on seats’) philosophy of the
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Parker era has been replaced by a policy of developing higher quality 
traffic (BRB, 1984a). Over the period of the 1984 Corporate Plan it 
is planned that the Sector’s performance will improve by £103 million 
through a combination of Sector re-definition (£25 million), 
increased revenue (£31 million) and cost reductions (£47 million)
(BRB, 1984b). Whilst this strategy document is coy about how this 
will be achieved, changes in working practices are said to form only 
a relatively small element of this (£ 11 million).
In the Provincial and London & SouthEast (L & SE) Sectors the 
possibilities of acquiring major new sources of revenue to meet 
reductions in government grants are slight. On the Provincial 
Sector, for instance, working expenses are roughly four times as high 
as receipts (BRB, 1984a) and though operating some 33% of loaded
passenger train miles, achieves only 15% of receipts. The strategies 
in these sectors thus largely focus on reductions in operating
expenses. So far these have been achieved by much greater attention 
to the deployment and maintenance of physical, rather than human
resources and as a result the pressures on work organization have not 
been as severe as in the Freight Sector.
This discussion of sector management structures and objectives has 
highlighted the formation of product market strategies which, through 
clearer segmentation, have been more fully developed than in the 
past. An integral element of Sectorization has been the creation of 
new corporate planning and budgetary control procedures. These have 
resulted in these new strategies becoming more rigorously specified
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and monitored than in the past (Williams and Linney, 1985) t and it is
tc an outline of these that we now turn.
3.CORPORATE PLANNING AND BUDGETARY CONTROL
From the late 1970s BR attempted to enhance its strategic
capabilities. Criticism of its existing procedures centred on 
inadequate development of objectives, weak monitoring procedures and 
oversimplistic forecasting particularly on the revenue side.
(Williams and Linney, ibid. ) . The most significant shortcoming, 
however, was that the plan was not expressed in detailed action plans 
and neither was it integrated with annual budgets. Instead of 
implementing detailed action plans, Regional General Managers were 
handed down a set of budget objectives from which they compiled
annual Regional Rail Plans. Since the General Managers had no 
involvement in the preparation of the Plan and did not necessarily 
share its assumptions, their commitment to implement the Plan's
requirements was often half-hearted.
From 1984 the Corporate Plan has been produced by a new set of
procedures which fully integrate the Regional General Managers. In 
the preparatory stages the Sector Directors undertake strategy 
studies which review the medium-term prospects for their sector. 
These are then considered by the Strategy Committee, composed of
Board Members, after which predicted results are drawn up. At this 
early stage the forecasts are analysed into Regional Performance 
Goals (RPGs), and agreed with the Regional General Managers at a
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Railway Planning Conference. Measured against these ’top-down' RPGs 
are 'bottom-up* five year Regional forecasts produced function by 
fuiction within the Regions in the next stage of the process. In the 
fiial stage they are critically appraised by Sector and Functional 
Directors at headquarters before the plan is put to the Strategy 
Conmittee and then the Board itself.
A lumber of features of the new planning process heightens central 
control of the BR organization. The integration of Regional plans 
with the Corporate Plan provides the main context for this. In these 
Regional forecasts a named manager is made responsible for their 
implementation, and the timescale is specified through a series of 
action steps (which include consultation and negotiation with 
workforce and union). The Plans are diverse in scope and range from 
quite small-scale ones producing a net financial benefit of £10,000 
to system-wide initiatives (13)* These Plans are summarized by means 
of m  integrated computer system with terminals in BRB Headquarters, 
Regional headquarters and outbases.
Adhe?ence to the plan is ensured by a rigorous monitoring process. 
There are two strands to this - one is the formal monitoring system, 
the other the budgetary control system itself. Progress on the 
Action Plans is considered monthly by sub-groups of the Railway 
Executive with General Managers/Functional Directors reporting 
progress on a by-exception basis. Every quarter a brief summary is 
submitted to the Railway Executive summarising corrective action and 
reconmending the triggering of contingency plans where necesary.
13^
Fiiancial performance has been assessed through the Sector 
Peiformance and Monitoring System (SPAMS) developed for the 
introduction of Sector Management. From 1984 the Action Plans that 
male up the Corporate Plan have been integrated with the budgetary 
control system so that financial results can be assessed by function, 
sub-sector and individual budget responsibilities, to give what is 
calLed ’cost classification. All budgets and four weekly results on 
an Dut-turn basis are available to all sectors/sub sectors analysed 
on this basis.
Cosiing and budgetary control
The main feature of budgetary control that has been developed with 
sectorization is that net profit/loss accounts have been created for 
each sector. Previously, the difficulties of allocating railway 
costs and revenues meant that profit and loss could only be 
established at Chief Executive level for the railways as a whole. In 
consequence, budgetary control and profit/loss accounting were 
largely separate.
Though both costs and revenue present problems of assignment on 
railways, interest has generally focussed on costs because of chronic 
deficits on current account (excluding government contract payments). 
Railway costs have appeared an intractable problem since railway 
operations, involving use by large numbers of highly diverse services 
of shared track, signalling and terminal facilities leads to a 
relatively high level of joint indirect costs (in the region of ^0%).
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Though the great majority of firms experience joint costs, the 
railways face particular problems (1^). One Board member has 
described how,
"railway managers are under strong political pressure to devise 
rational and precise ways of allocating all costs. Without such 
allocations, the inability to state precisely who is subsidising 
what leads to accusations of objuscation, if not incompetence". 
(Fowler, 1977, p.^36).
Prior to sectoritation the budgetary control system operated 
Regionally. Performance was assessed by attention to budgeted rather 
than actual costs, whilst revenues were re-assigned to service groups 
using a Profit Planning and Cost Centre Analysis system (PP & CCA) to 
produce a net contribution to join indirect costs. The Regions and 
major functions within Regions accounted for costs and receipts 
originating within their geographical boundaries. Thus a ticket 
purchased from a Western Region station for travel on the Eastern 
Region was credited to the Western. Originating costs from cost 
centres were set against receipts to form a statement of Regional 
receipts and costs but one which did not approach a genuine profit 
and loss account of the services operated by the Region. Analysis 
of business results, then, could only be done at BRB Headquarters for 
the railways as a whole.
The extension of avoidable cost techniques to the network as a whole 
was integral to the introduction of sector management in 1982 since 
it then became possible to allocate all indirect costs to sector
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activities and hence permit the calculation of a sector bottom-line. 
The convention established by the 197^ Act that the freight and 
parcels sectors continued to pay only their avoidable costs (except 
where they were the sole user of a facility such as a siding) was 
retained. All other track, signalling and terminals was allocated 
to the three passenger sectors on a prime user basis with the other 
sectors paying that sector the avoidable costs incurred in their use 
of it. The BR network was divided into some 5.000 route sections for 
this purpose.
Since technical advances now allow costs to be assigned on actual 
rather than budgeted figures, the budgetary control system and profit 
and loss account have been integrated, with the result that financial 
results can now be tied much more precisely to the dimensions of 
railway activity. Thus, the combination of sectorization with 
refinements in budgetary control has created sharper management 
accountability and the capacity for more detailed central control. 
Hitherto Area cost centres were monitored by the Divisional tier of 
management with budget construction moving up through Region to BRB 
Headquarters. Now, prime user conventions and bottom-line 
responsibilities give Sector managers at Headquarters considerable 
interest in ground level performance since in this avoidable cost 
accounting system there is an obvious incentive for the sectors to 
keep their shared costs as low as possible.
14
|t is apparent that these new planning and budgetary procedures have 
>otentially far-reaching implications for management control. The
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detailed action focus of the planning procedures means that corporate 
managers have both greater interest in managerial activity at lower 
levels of the organization whilst the 'bottom-up' features of the 
process make them more visible. Once an initiative is introduced to 
the corporate plan it is difficult for the responsible managers to 
fail to fully implement it. In budgetary terms, local managers can 
now be effectively scrutinized directly by headquarters' managers. 
These features of the new planning and control procedures, the 
rigorous definition of management accountability that lie at the 
heart of them and Sectorization have thus reduced the scope for 
managerial discretion at lower levels of the management hierarchy.
4> MANAGERIAL EFFICIENCY AND THE ORGANIZATION OF WORK
What impact have the changes in management structure and practice 
had on labour management? The argument is that the pressures for 
changes in working practices widely observed on BR are best perceived 
as a set of discrete by-products from these rather than the result of 
a strategic 'management offensive*. Furthermore, the nature of the 
changes in structure tend to preclude rather than encourage the 
generation of comprehensive labour management strategies. These 
reforms, as outlined in previous sections, embrace 
a) the creation of new management structures which have shifted the 
locus of policy formulation away from Regional management;
|>) the clear segmentation of product markets and the development of
Ii strategic responses in which financial or 'business' objectives
play a more important role than hitherto; and 
c) the tightening of control of lower levels of the management
hierarchy through new planning and budgetary control procedures.
The impact of the Sector Directors has gone beyond the formulation of 
commercial strategies to profoundly influence the organization of 
production. As headquarters managers now make the core decisions on 
service specification, the content of operating decisions is now 
largely structured by managers situated both outside the production 
function and away from the locus of their implementation.
As an element of this the allocation of all motive power and rolling 
stock (except engineering departmental stock), along with all 
infrastructure on a prime-user basis, has been shifted from the 
Regions to the Sectors. Regional boundaries no longer have their 
traditional significance, then, for operating purposes.
But since the Sector Directors and their staff are sited away from 
the production function they are neither constrained by 'traditional* 
methods of organizing production nor have to face the immediate 
labour relations consequences of their decisions. As Sector bottom- 
lines are the most fundamental criteria for management activity, 
there are pressures on those traditional patterns of operations and 
associated patterns of labour deployment which conflict with Sector 
objectives. Because Sector managers closely monitor the generation 
of the costs which impact on their bottom-line, BR headquarters are 
more aware of Regional labour management practices than hitherto. As 
a result production managers may be pressurized to reform any working
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practices that obstruct sector management plans.
This is well illustrated by one case uncovered during the research 
which is cited here since both workforce and Regional managers 
interviewed believed it to be highly significant. Indeed, some 
workforce representatives claimed it could pave the way for wholesale 
revisions of working practices. The Freight Sector had won a 
contract vith an oil company in which it was stipulated that the 
train would run non-stop and would hence be operated throughout by 
crews from depots close to either the origin or destination of the 
train. In so doing, the 'sphere of influence' of an intermediary 
depot where it was traditional for a crew change to take place was 
violated. Traincrew representatives from this depot protested 
vigorously to Regional train planning managers (responsible for 
issuing the details of the train service and its crewing) but, since 
the contract had been negotiated by BRB headquarters managers, their
I
| hands were effectively tied.
Segmentation of product market strategies and the allocation of sill 
resources to specific sectors has fragmented resource management to 
some degree. The traditional belief that coordination and 
standardization achieved the most productive use of people and 
machines through economies of scale has been superceded. The Freight 
Sector, for whom cost reductions are the most imperative, is 
particularly hostile to the use of pooled resources (between Sectors) 
on the grounds that it blurs lines of managerial accountability. 
Their strategy has been, therefore, to reduce their proportion of
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shared costs and resources so as to maintain as high a level of 
control over the resources they use. In the human resources sphere 
the Sector has attempted in a number of instances to re-allocate work 
between traincrew depots to create specialist freight units. As well 
as modifying ’traditional' patterns of labour deployment, market 
pressures have been translated into moves to increase labour 
efficiency. One instance of this is the tighter scheduling of 
traincrew work programmes ('diagrams') by Regional train planning 
managers to achieve Sector resourcing requirements.
Close budgetary control and Sector scrutiny of workplace events seem 
to be raising the pressures on line managers as well as on production 
planners. For instance, the tightness of the budgetary control 
system makes it difficult for local managers to fill vacancies where 
budgets are being exceeded. But since many ground-level staff are 
now allocated to the Sectors, line managers' flexibility to 
temporarily re-deploy staff in accepted ways has often been reduced. 
Instead they may be forced to make use of different groups of staff 
in ways that may violate local, Regional or national agreements.
Many examples of this sort arose in interviews, providing evidence of 
how the attempt to raise managerial efficiency has put pressures on 
existing patterns of labour management. In many cases such attempts 
to modify prevailing forms of labour deployment have come up against 
strong workplace and union organizations. At the same time Sector 
Idemands on Regional management to attach greater importance to
pusiness rather than production priorities is in effect restricting
}
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the access of Sectional Councils to Regional management.
As a result of these twin developments, the workforce representative 
function of Sectional Councils is being strengthened at the expense 
of the ' trouble-shooterf role hitherto undertaken jointly with 
sections of Regional management. Taking these developments together, 
it is now more difficult for labour relations problems that arise at 
local level to be informally solved at higher levels of the 
organization.
It is difficult for union organizations to respond to these 
developments by seeking to influence the process at source, ie at 
Sector level, since the Regional operators are responsible for 
production (cf. Marginson's (1982) comments on the usefulness of M- 
Form structures to side-step union organization). Awareness of the 
implications of Sectorization is limited since the Sector structures 
are obscured behind the operating and engineering departments, and 
representatives have little reason or opportunity for day-to-day 
contact with commercial managers. Of all the Regional and local 
representatives interviewed only one group - a footplate Sectional 
Council - displayed any awareness of the potential impact of 
Sectorisation on work organization and labour relations. Within the 
trade union organizations at national level awareness is greater but 
the translation of this into new union strategies is limited both by 
the primacy of bargaining on specific items such as pay and 
conditions in the workload of officials and representatives, and the 
jnon-involvement of commercial managers in labour relations
finstitutions.\
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Although Sectorization has had a wide-ranging impact on labour 
management, it appears to make the formulation and implementation of 
work re-organization strategies more difficult rather than easier. 
Since the priority for each Sector is its own ’bottom line’, Sector 
managers' view of production performance tend to be limited to that 
which affects their own Sector. A good example here is the BRB 
traincrew depot strategy. For some time the strategy has been to 
steadily reduce the number of footplate depots, constructing in the 
process a small number of ’super depots’ (1.6). Whilst some 
specialization by sector activities may be possible, many of these 
new depots would inevitably supply traincrews for both passenger and 
freight services. However, Freight wants to develop its own 
specialized resources to gain greater control of its overheads (RGI, 
1984a). As an element of this it has sought to locate its traincrew 
depots to suit its own bottom line rather than comply with the 
existing traincrew strategy. For instance, one medium-sized freight 
depot visited which had been perceived as a very safe depot in the 
traincrew strategy (and which had been recently developed at the 
expense of a number of smaller depots nearby) is now listed for 
closure. In effect, the traincrew strategy is falling apart under 
the weight of conflicting Sector demands (17)*
The overall assessment of current developments in functional 
management re-organization must be that they do not easily accord 
with the analysis of contemporary managerial activity found in the 
'management offensive’ perspective. The evidence gathered from BR 
jjtoes not suggest that a new breed of 'macho managers' are single-
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mindedly rolling back the ’frontier of control’. At the same time,
, it does seem that the the greater strength and diversity of demands 
; originating from parts of the management hierarchy, along with
i
i tighter central control, has raised the pressures on production 
| managers. Their response has taken the form of ad hoc variations to
j
i traditional patterns of work organization since violations of 
\ existing agreements are often the easiest solution.
5. THE INTRODUCTION OF TWO-TIER REGIONAL MANAGEMENT
The argument so far has been that tighter budgetary control by 
corporate headquarters of subordinate tiers of management and the 
greater diversity of demands placed upon them have stimulated a 
retreat from the philosophies of standardization and co-ordination 
which have hitherto characterized railway management. This has been 
particularly felt in the twin spheres of work organization and labour 
relations. A further structural influence on labour management has 
been the impact of the two-tier re-organization of Regional 
management that took place on British Rail during 1984. This 
devolution of general management has further tightened budgetary 
accountability, hence increasing the pressures on local managers, 
whilst at the same time their responsibilities in labour management 
have been increased. By describing the main features of both the 
former and the new structures it will be seen that, like the 
commercial and functional re-arrangements described earlier, such
144
structural factors as these are stronger determinants of current 
changes in labour relations and much of the approach to working 
practices than any intentional over-riding management strategy aimed 
at labour.
The main feature of the two-tier re-organization is the 
decentralization of management responsibility and authority to Area 
Manager level (the lowest tier of BR management). Devolution of this 
sort, like the strengthening of commercial management, has been a 
widespread organizational response to the environmental context of 
the recession (see BIM, 1985; CBI, 1985; Cowling and Evans 1985; 
Evans and Cowling, 1985)• The benefits usually claimed are 
reductions in administrative costs, greater responsibility and 
motivation amongst local managers and heightened commercial 
flexibility. Furthermore, since the lines of communication between 
ground level and senior management are shortened, this pattern of 
decentralized management is thought to render easier the 
implementation of corporate strategies and to increase central 
control. Hence, in BR's case this re-organization does not 
necessarily conflict with the centralising tendencies of Sector 
management.
During 1984 the Traffic Divisions were eliminated from the Eastern, 
London Midland, Southern and Western Regions of British Rail leaving 
a 'two-tier 'structure of Region and Area. In all this involved the 
closure of 21 Divisonal Offices and a reduction in administrative and 
management staff of 6,000, some 13% of the total (BRB, 1985, p.4).
This re-organization primarily affected the operating function since 
regional engineering management was largely two-tier anyway. An
element of the restructuring was the movement of London Midland and 
Western Regional Headquarters out to Birmingham and Swindon
respectively, consistent with an office accomodation policy of 
reducing use of office space in central London.
Prior to outlining in greater depth the features of two tier 
organization, it is necessary to describe the structure it replaced. 
Regional headquarters were responsible for all aspects of running the 
railway. The organization of management in the Regions was (and 
remains) a hybrid of federal and departmental structures: the
Regional General Manager was supported by a management team
responsible for maintenance engineering, finance and planning, 
personnel, operations, public affairs, investment, and the passenger 
§nd freight commercial function. Reporting to the General Manager 
too were Traffic Divisions, were headed by a Divisional General 
Manager and supported by a team that largely replicated that found at 
Regional level. Area Managers reported to the Divisional General 
Manager. Area Managers in most Regions were supported by assistants 
who specialized in activities such as operations, but they did not 
possess a functional management team as such. Below Regional level, 
however, the engineering functions - Signals and Telecommunications, 
Hvil Engineering, and Mechanical and Electrical Engineering - were 
Organized as separate departments.
: the time of the re-organization, the formal division of traffic
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responsibilities was as follows: Regional headquarters had
responsibility for policy and operations planning, including 
timetable specification and planning, and the production of 
locomotive, rolling stock and traincrew diagrams to operate them. 
The Divisional tier was responsible for the current operation of the 
railway, leaving Area Managers with, in effect, day-to-day staff 
management.
Areas usually consisted of a major station and the lines leading into 
it. The role of the Area Manager was that of the day-to-day 
management of the railway, the core element of which was line 
management of traincrew, operating (ie signalling) and terminals (ie 
j yard and platform) staff. Divisional management, however, was also 
deeply involved in this function since they investigated all 
Qperating incidents and were responsible for the conduct of the 
disciplinary procedures. On the Southern Region the authority of 
Area Managers was particularly low: largely as a result of the dense, 
complex nature of services in much of that area, and the need for 
operations management to be conducted above ground level. The Area 
Manager had no functional assistants and, although traincrew 
ianagement was exercised at depot level such managers reported to the 
Division (18).
St was this three tier structure of Regional management that came to 
fecupy the cenral focus of a high level working party at corporate 
sadquarters charged with conducting a strategic review of
147
administration and organization. Both the Board and Government had 
become concerned at steeply rising administrative costs between 1978 
and 1981. This group’s remit was to find ways of reducing reduce 
administration costs and improving the quality of management 
decision-making. Its’ finding that the Regions should abolish the 
Traffic Divisions and should move to a two tier structure of Region 
and Area had three main supports: one, the gradual decline of
operations and withdrawal from the collection and delivery of parcels 
had substantially reduced the number of staff in many areas (19); 
two, the introduction of new technologies reduced administrative 
needs (20); three, the desirability of increased management 
accountability and the business advantages of decentralized 
management.
Interviews with BR managers supported the proposition that the 
Structure prior to two-tierdiffused managerial reponsibility. 
Respondents noted that the Divisions were in practice able to form 
their own policies and practices, and that they would not necessarily 
follow BRB and Region policies or transmit them to the Areas. As one 
commentator has described the effect on the Southern Region,
’’The Divisional level was predominantly concerned with day-to- 
day decision-making and efectively drew some of the 
responsibility away from local managers. It is also true that 
the Divisions tended to absorb some of the functions that 
rightly lay at Regional level, so that the effect was to 
’Balkanise’ the Southern Region and reinforce the image of a 
l railway harking back to its past” (Harris, 1984, p.581).
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structural factors as these are stronger determinants of current 
changes in labour relations and much of the approach to working 
practices than any intentional over-riding management strategy aimed 
at labour.
The main feature of the two-tier re-organization is the
decentralization of management responsibility and authority to Area 
Manager level (the lowest tier of BR management). Devolution of this 
sort, like the strengthening of commercial management, has been a 
widespread organizational response to the environmental context of 
the recession (see BIM, 1985; CBI, 1985; Cowling and Evans 1985; 
Evans and Cowling, 19&5)• The benefits usually claimed are
reductions in administrative costs, greater responsibility and 
motivation amongst local managers and heightened commercial
flexibility. Furthermore, since the lines of communication between 
ground level and senior management are shortened, this pattern of 
decentralized management is thought to render easier the 
implementation of corporate strategies and to increase central 
control. Hence, in BR's case this re-organization does not 
necessarily conflict with the centralising tendencies of Sector 
management.
During 1984 the Traffic Divisions were eliminated from the Eastern, 
London Midland, Southern and Western Regions of British Rail leaving 
a 'two-tier 'structure of Region and Area. In all this involved the 
closure of 21 Divisonal Offices and a reduction in administrative and 
management staff of 6,000, some 13% of the total (BRB, 1985. p.4).
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This re-organization primarily affected the operating function since 
regional engineering management was largely two-tier anyway. An 
element of the restructuring was the movement of London Midland and 
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respectively, consistent with an office accomodation policy of 
reducing use of office space in central London.
Prior to outlining in greater depth the features of two tier 
organization, it is necessary to describe the structure it replaced. 
Regional headquarters were responsible for all aspects of running the 
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remains) a hybrid of federal and departmental structures: the
Regional General Manager was supported by a management team 
responsible for maintenance engineering, finance and planning, 
personnel, operations, public affairs, investment, and the passenger 
and freight commercial function. Reporting to the General Manager 
too were Traffic Divisions, were headed by a Divisional General 
Manager and supported by a team that largely replicated that found at 
Regional level. Area Managers reported to the Divisional General 
Manager. Area Managers in most Regions were supported by assistants 
who specialized in activities such as operations, but they did not 
possess a functional management team as such. Below Regional level, 
however, the engineering functions - Signals and Telecommunications, 
Civil Engineering, and Mechanical and Electrical Engineering - were 
organized as separate departments.
At the time of the re-organization, the formal division of traffic
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responsibility for policy and operations planning, including 
timetable specification and planning, and the production of 
locomotive, rolling stock and traincrew diagrams to operate them. 
The Divisional tier was responsible for the current operation of the 
railway, leaving Area Managers with, in effect, day-to-day staff 
management.
Areas usually consisted of a major station and the lines leading into 
it. The role of the Area Manager was that of the day-to-day 
management of the railway, the core element of which was line 
management of traincrew, operating (ie signalling) and terminals (ie 
yard and platform) staff. Divisional management, however, was also 
deeply involved in this function since they investigated all 
operating incidents and were responsible for the conduct of the 
disciplinary procedures. On the Southern Region the authority of 
Area Managers was particularly low: largely as a result of the dense, 
complex nature of services in much of that area, and the need for 
operations management to be conducted above ground level. The Area 
Manager had no functional assistants and, although traincrew 
management was exercised at depot level such managers reported to the 
Division (18).
It was this three tier structure of Regional management that came to 
occupy the cenral focus of a high level working party at corporate 
headquarters charged with conducting a strategic review of
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administration and organization. Both the Board and Government had 
become concerned at steeply rising administrative costs between 1978 
and 1981. This group's remit was to find ways of reducing reduce 
administration costs and improving the quality of management 
decision-making. Its' finding that the Regions should abolish the 
Traffic Divisions and should move to a two tier structure of Region 
and Area had three main supports: one, the gradual decline of
operations and withdrawal from the collection and delivery of parcels 
had substantially reduced the number of staff in many areas (19); 
two, the introduction of new technologies reduced administrative 
needs (20); three, the desirability of increased management 
accountability and the business advantages of decentralized 
management.
Interviews with BR managers supported the proposition that the 
structure prior to two-tierdiffused managerial reponsibility. 
Respondents noted that the Divisions were in practice able to form 
their own policies and practices, and that they would not necessarily 
follow BRB and Region policies or transmit them to the Areas. As one 
commentator has described the effect on the Southern Region,
"The Divisional level was predominantly concerned with day-to- 
day decision-making and efectively drew some of the 
responsibility away from local managers. It is also true that 
the Divisions tended to absorb some of the functions that 
rightly lay at Regional level, so that the effect was to 
'Balkanise' the Southern Region and reinforce the image of a 
railway harking back to its past" (Harris, 198*1, p.581).
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At the same time, the diffusion of responsiblity arising from the 
structure restricted the capacity for vigourous managerial action. 
As one BR manager noted of these structures in interview,
"The Divisional role was largely sorting the mail and passing 
the buck. The principle used to be that if something smelt bad 
you handed it to some-one else".
In consequence the formulation and implementation of either Board or 
Regional strategies was highly problematic.
After the re-organization in 198*1, Region was made responsible for 
policy, planning and control in the sphere of operations whilst Area 
Managers were given responsibility for virtually all day-to-day 
operations in their area. The Area Manager’s authority has been 
increased in a number of ways. He/she is now entirely responsible 
for operations in yards and terminals (responsibility is shared with 
Regional managers for running lines) and staff discipline. Area 
management teams have been widened to include commercial and 
personnel managers in addition to upgraded functional assistants for 
operating, terminals and traincrews. On the Eastern Region a number 
Area Maiagers have been given responsibility, on an experimental 
basis, Tor the production of service and traincrew schedules for 
local services.
In some areas Area Managers have taken on Sector Management 
responsibilities through devolution of responsibility for the 
specification of train services. On the Western Region four Area 
Managers were initially made responsible for bottom-line management
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of Provincial services in their area (Abbott, 1985a; Freeman Allen, 
1985b) {21). In addition to their main operating functions, these
managers vere concerned with control of engineering costs and with 
revenue generation. A similar development is found on the Scottish 
Region where business management teams of operators, engineering and 
commercial managers, cutting across departmental lines, have been 
formed to improve the performance of specific lines (RGI, 1985c). 
On the London Midland region, Sectorization of Area management units 
has been taken furthest by the creation of a number of Sector 
specific Areas (22).
Devolution of responsibility to Area Managers and the elevation of 
business management in these functions has been thought by many to 
have led to a deterioration in operating performance (23). In part 
this is due to the teething problems of re-organization, but there 
may be deeper structural factors too. Some senior managers 
interviewed were critical of reduced levels of co-ordination arising 
from the elimination of the Divisions and the enhancement of the 
often separate interests of the Areas. One important function of 
Divisional offices had been the co-ordination of Area-managed staff 
during infrastructural maintenance activity which, because of the 
nature of railway systems, generally has significant knock-on effects 
in areas far removed from the original location. One senior 
engineering manager suggested that this feature of the re­
organization had created severe problems for the exercise by Regional 
managers of practical control of the technical implementation of 
change.
150
In turning to an analysis of the impact of two-tier on labour 
management, the two most important influences are the removal of some 
managerial controls on local management and the dissolution of the 
the traditional ground level management culture.
Since the introduction of two-tier, interview evidence and union 
publications suggest that there has been a dramatic increase in the 
level of disciplinary action now that Area Managers conduct the 
disciplinary process. This development could be interpreted as the 
first stage of an attempt by local managers to increase their control 
over task performance. However, the overwhelming assessment of trade 
union respondents was that it was more accurately viewed as the 
flexing of new-found managerial muscles once Divisional constraints 
had been removed. Prior to two-tier Divisional labour relations 
management regulated the application of the disciplinary procedures 
in combination with Sectional Council representatives and union 
district officials. Interview responses from both management and 
representatives stressed that ’fairness’ had been the fundamental 
philosophy behind the arrangements as they were then operated (24).
The variation in practice which is seen to be associated with the 
removal of restraints hitherto exercised by Divisional management has 
been reinforced by the more limited perspective possessed by Area 
level managers. One of the main dangers pointed out by both union 
representatives and senior managers is that Area Managers do not 
necessarily look beyond their own ’fiefdoms’ to ensure consistency of 
practice. One case described was where an Area Manager had cut down
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station staff with the result that passengers were unable to buy 
tickets when stations were busy. Since the Open Station concept (the 
removal of ticket barriers) had been implemented, passengers boarding 
trains without tickets could be fined by the train guard. In response 
to a public outcry a supervisor was posted on the station at busy 
periods to hand out xeroxed slips to passengers informing the guard 
that passengers could not be blamed for not holding tickets. The 
Area Manager did not notify Region of this practice with the result 
that guards from other depots not familiar with practice refused to 
accept the slips.
The fear that senior BR management was walking a tightrope between 
delegation and control arose repeatedly in interviews with senior 
Regional managers. The potential for diversity in Area management
practice seems to be greatest, if by default, in worker-management
relationships since budgetary techniques and commercial policy are 
tightly controlled from the centre whilst planning, investment and 
most operational planning are largely in the hands of Regional 
managers. Since budgetary control of local managers was further 
tightened by two-tier the pressures on them to find ad hoc solutions
to labour management problems was increased. All but two of the
senior personnel managers interviewed displayed concern that two-tier 
management could undermine Regional personnel policy for this sort of 
reason.
Diversity in managerial practice in the sphere of labour relations 
has been added to by the modifications of managerial career paths
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consistent with the elevation of the status of Area management teams. 
The management development policies adopted as part of the management 
re-organization has fractured the traditional culture of local 
imanagement (cf. Berry et al, 1985)*
Senior management control of appointments is a key mechanism by which 
top managers control^ subordinate managers. To secure the commitment 
of ground level management to commercial rather than production 
priorities Area Managers have been integrated into the Senior 
Management grades and are now recruited from higher tiers of the 
management hierarchy. Their functional assistants - Traincrew 
Manager, Operations Manager and Terminals Manager - are now often 
graduates in their first management appointment. This is a striking 
break with the past practice of aligning promotion patterns with the 
structure of management. Prior to two-tier a common career path was 
a progression from a blue collar/clerical post, through supervisory 
and local management positions to Division and beyond. For instance, 
four of the six traincrew managers interviewed were ex-footplate 
staff (26). This characteristic of local managers’ background helped 
to create a shared culture at workplace level which was particularly 
strong amongst the skilled grades. In practice, this culture gave 
rise to similar perspectives on staffing and labour relations 
practices. Since this culture is now being ruptured, such an 
approach can no longer be taken for granted.
Managerial attitudes to resourcing at local level, then, are 
undergoing change as a result of two tier. At the same time the
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steady removal of more traditional line managers has led in many 
cases to a loss of detailed knowledge at ground level of arrangements 
regulating the organization of work. The majority of union 
representatives interviewed argued that it was this dispersion of 
managerial knowledge which lay behind the increase in managerial 
violations of agreements rather than a deliberate management 
strategy. This situation has come about partly because of the 
deliberate transformation of local management character by senior 
management and partly because the major staff reductions associated 
with two tier were achieved by the early retirement of many 
experienced managers.
The effect of this has been felt particularly strongly in labour 
relations not only because labour management is open to greater 
diversity than other aspects of management practice but also because 
the now abolished Divisional Staff Organization acted as a resource 
to local managers, as well as a control on them, in the crucial area 
of national, regional and divisional agreements. Area Personnel 
Managers have been appointed to take their place but seem unlikely to 
fill (in the short term at least) the vacuum created by the abolition 
of the DSOs. For as this function appears to be conceived as a 
’first post’ position for graduates seeking a career in personnel, so 
such managers are unlikely to have a comprehensive knowledge of the 
vast array of agreements regulating work and employment. Footplate 
representatives identified this as a severe problem probably because 
their conditions of service and agreements on work organization are 
nore complex and extensive than for any other grade on the railway.
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Talking together the features of the two-tier re-organization 
described in this section it is misleading to postulate a management 
offensive against organized labour at ground level. Interview 
evidence indicated that labour relations had deteriorated but that 
this had been uneven and particularistic. Where violations of 
agreements governing the work organization have occurred, the cause 
could often be traced to a combination of the dissolution of the 
traditional social structure of ground level management and the 
associated dispersion of knowledge of labour management, the removal 
of restraints that had been hitherto exercised by the Divisional tier 
of management, and the tightening of budgetary controls on Area 
managers.
SUMMARY
Tie proposition that BR management has embarked on a sustained 
managerial offensive against labour has been found wanting in a 
nunber of respects in this examination of management structures and 
strategy:
1) though there is evidence of widespread attempts to re­
organize work on BR, these are not strategic in the sense 
described in Chapter Three but are instead largely the summation 
of the discrete activities of individual managers;
2) the deterioration in labour relations that results in some cases 
from these attempts to re-organize work are likewise not part of a 
strategy to weaken organized labour but are instead the result of
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increasing pressures being placed on production and line managers 
by their seniors and the removal of resources (including 
knowledge) to respond to these;
3) whilst some of the Sectors are giving active consideration to 
evaluating and changing existing patterns of labour management so 
as to improve Sector efficiency and performance, the strengthening 
of potentially conflicting management objectives by Sectorization 
largely prevents these being translated into uniform labour 
management strategies. Instead the changes that are implemented 
are generally ad hoc in character.
The broad conclusion from this, then, which sits uneasily with much 
contemporary comment in the business press, is that product-based 
management structures and devolved managerial accountability, both 
currently much in vogue, make the genesis and implementation of 
coherent strategies highly problematic.
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CHAPTER SIX
THE MANAGEMENT OF LABOUR RELATIONS
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INTRODUCTION
Academic interest in management strategy and the impact of the 
recession is currently stimulating research and comment on two 
central aspects of labour relations management. The first of these 
is management organization for the conduct of labour relations, and 
the second is the nature of management dealings with employees and 
their organizations. Research findings indicate that major changes 
are taking place in both. Furthermore, some commentators suggest 
they may well outlive the recession (for example, Bright, Sawbridge 
and Rees, 1983)*
Investigation of management organization has not led to consensus on 
either the nature or significance of the changes that seem to be 
taking place. Some writers have argued that the personnel function 
is declining in organizational status (for example, Manning, 1983). 
Others suggest instead that a fragmentation of the function is 
underway with the implication, though one that is understated, that 
some sections of personnel management could be coming to play a more 
important role than hitherto in wider managerial decision-making 
(Guest, 1982; Tyson, 1985).
There is broad agreement that personnel management has undergone some 
measure of decentralization in large organizations since around 1980 
(Evans and Cowling, 1985; Cowling and Evans, 1985; Kinnie, 1985b; 
Purcell, 1985). though it is not entirely clear from which levels of 
organizations this has taken place. The discretion of line managers
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in labour management matters is said to have increased with the 
decline of the personnel function above plant level (Kinnie, 1985a 
and b) but it is not clear yet what the distribution of 
responsibilities and authority between line managers and the 
'new*plant personnel managers in personnel matters is. Research has 
yet to establish whether decentralization of the personnel function 
makes a positive contribution to flexible patterns of management, as 
the supporters of decentralized management units claim (BIM, 1985). 
or else reinforces the tendencies towards ad hoc, reactive labour 
relations management traditionally found in Britain (Commission on 
Industrial Relations, 1973)•
Analysis of managerial policies in the conduct of labour relations is 
similarly characterised by lack of agreement. More left-wing 
commentators argue that there has been a widespread retreat from 
collective bargaining by managements, and that such 'macho 
managements' have exploited labour's weakness to unilaterally reduce 
union controls on work control (for example, Hyman and Eiger, 1981; 
MacKay, 1986). The evidence for such claims, however, is either 
based on a small number of possibly exceptional instances or else 
tencs to be inconclusive overall (1).
A mere widely accepted argument is that whilst managements are often 
seeking to restrict the scope of collective bargaining, they are 
nevertheless continuing to support workplace organization in some 
form (Terry, 1983b; 1984; Chadwick, 1983) and to maintain structured 
contact with their workforces. Evidence from large-scale surveys
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indicates that there has been a growth in the incidence of joint 
consultation and attempts to increase employee involvement (Daniel 
and Millward, 1983; Batstone, 1984). Less extensive studies suggest, 
furthermore, that managements have in some cases come to expand the 
scope of consultation from the traditional focus of ’tea and toilets’ 
to that of strategic issues of company policy (Joyce and Wood, 1984). 
According to Sisson (1984), such developments mark a shift from a 
management strategy of formal codification of management-labour 
relations to a more informal, consultative one. It has been argued 
that the twinfold objectives are to reduce trade union-imposed 
constraints on managerial flexibility and at the same time 
heightening employee motivation.
Have these movements also changed the patterns of labour relations 
management organization and policy on British Rail? It will be 
argued in the first part of this chapter that despite attempts by BR 
strategists to shift the conception of the personnel function to that 
of ’advisers and persuaders' to executive managers on human resource 
issues, labour relations management as a specific function continues 
to form a very important component of the personnel function for a 
number of reasons. These include the centralized nature of pay 
bargaining, the continuing strength of workplace organization 
(outlined in Chapter Four), and the failure to integrate labour 
relations policies with broader business strategies.
In the second half of the chapter, management conduct of labour 
relations will be examined. It will be contested that, contrary to
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consultation and attempts to increase employee involvement (Daniel 
and Millward, 1983; Batstone, 1984). Less extensive studies suggest, 
furthernore, that managements have in some cases come to expand the 
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issues, labour relations management as a specific function continues 
to form a very important component of the personnel function for a 
number of reasons. These include the centralized nature of pay 
bargaining, the continuing strength of workplace organization 
(outlined in Chapter Four), and the failure to integrate labour 
relations policies with broader business strategies.
In the second half of the chapter, management conduct of labour 
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developments discerned elsewhere, the scope of consultation is 
diminishing. This divergence is explained by a traditional balance 
between consultation and negotiation that differs from that of much 
of manufacturing industry, and the changing nature of the personnel 
function overall. Indeed, there are good grounds for suggesting that 
the new structures for managing personnel issues are, in the British 
context, incompatible with attempts to shift management dealings with 
employees to a more sophisticated, consultative level.
1. THE CHANGING NATURE OF THE PERSONNEL FUNCTION
The widespread belief that there has been a reduction in the 
importance of labour relations management (Manning, 1983; Tyson, 
1985), which in turn involves reduced power of trade union 
organizations, enables managers to pay less attention in decision­
making to the aspirations of labour. However, the evidence for this 
is far from conclusive. Manning argues that a major factor in the 
decline of personnel management is a decline in labour relations 
activity (2), and Tyson suggests that the ’model' of personnel 
management which is disappearing is that whose mainstay is labour 
relations management. Yet the U.M.I.S.T. survey indicates that, far 
from being in decline, the employee relations (3) element of 
personnel work is not only of primary importance but seems to be 
growing in this respect (Torrington, MacKay and Hall, 1985).
What does become clear, however, from this conflicting evidence is
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that a decline in the functions of labour relations management cannot 
he predicted from a hypothesised decline in the personnel function 
more generally. Unfortunately, assessment of the contemporary 
direction of the labour relations function is especially difficult 
because much of the research material does not fully differentiate 
between the various components of the personnel function. The 1978 
Warwick survey, for instance, asked questions about ’personnel and/or 
industrial relations management' (see Brown, 1981, pp. 26-3*0 with 
the result that, though an increase in the incidence of such managers 
could be charted, it is not possible to distinguish the degree of 
specialization of industrial relations management within the 
personnel function. Similarly, in the 1980 DE/PSI/ ESRC (Daniel and 
Millward, 1983) survey personnel work is used to cover both the 
industrial relations and personnel functions. (*0
It is not possible to conclude, then, on the basis of what is known 
about personnel management that changes to the status of the 
personnel function will be translated straightforwardly into 
corresponding shifts in labour relations management. If changes to 
the personnel function as a whole have masked. some degree of 
continuity in the structure of labour relations management, we might 
find a greater continuity in the approach to and style of labour 
relations than the macro-changes in the personnel function might lead 
us to expect.
There are several grounds for anticipating that the labour relations 
approach will be one that, whatever wider company policy, accepts the
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basic legitimacy of workforce and union organizations:
| 1) Tie recruitment of labour relations managers from workforce
i
representatives and union activists in Britain has meant that 
nationalization involved the appointment of senior trade unionists to 
the most senior personnel positions (5). More generally the well- 
developed internal labour markets that are found in nationalized 
industries, the Post Office and railways in particular, have provided 
greater opportunities than in many other firms for manual and 
clerical employees to gain promotion into the managerial hierarchy 
(6 ),
2) Labour relations managers and employee and union negotiators 
develop a shared commitment to maintaining the rules of the 
procedural game (Wilson, 1983) • Much of this arises from the 
bargaining process itself but is probably underpinned on the 
managerial side by the relative isolation of labour relations 
managers from core groups of managers, and their low status with them 
(7). Labour relations managers instead develop strong bargaining 
relationships with their union counterparts. The influence they do 
have with more senior managers is based to a large extent on the 
unique access to union policies and thinking arising from their 
possession of this relationship with union negotiators (cf. Batstone 
et al, 1984, p.127).
3) Continuing traditional patterns of recruitment and relatively low 
status in the management hierarchy should mean a persistence of a 
’traditional1 style in these managers dealings with labour
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megoiiators. If this status is reduced then this may lead such 
managers to rily more on them for support. This may be heightened by 
disinterest aiongst senior managers in the sphere of labour relations 
since it couli permit greater discretion to such managers in the day- 
to-d^y conduct of labour relations though the tighter central 
controls on ore managerial issues detailed in the previous chapter 
is likely to prevent this from taking place on core issues such as 
pay iettlemerCs. Furthermore, if labour relations comes to be 
perceived as t low level managerial activity then it is likely that 
it will come to be placed outside the favoured career routes of 
' high-flyer' canagers, and hence will permit the continued dominance 
of maiagers with ’traditional' orientations.
So, tie widely observed changes in the structure and authority of the 
persomel function as a whole do not have any necessary consequences 
for irdividual components of it such as labour relations management. 
Furthermore, a marginalization of the labour relations management 
function by other tiers and sections of management does not 
necesarily lead to a dramatic change in managerial style. We now 
deal with these issues in the specific context of British Rail.
2. FER10NNEL MANAGEMENT ON BRITISH RAIL
Study of BR indicates that whilst the personnel function has 
undergcne those changes observed to be widespread elsewhere (Evans 
and Coiling, 1985? Cowling and Evans, 1985), the practical results of
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this are not those which much of the literature would suggest. The 
main areas of change that will be examined are the diminution in the 
personnel function at corporate level, and the strengthening of 
ground level personnel management and its relationship to line 
management.
Sisson and Scullion (1985) draw attention to four types of corporate 
personnel function ranging from that which undertakes a wide grouping 
of activities including pay bargaining, management training and 
development, and human resources planning more generally, to those 
where the function is restricted to employee relations and management 
training and development, or just the latter. A fourth group has no 
corporate department at all. British Rail falls into the first 
category of these since the head office personnel department has 
dealt with training, management development, manpower planning, 
employee relations (including pay negotiations), welfare and 
pensions.
Evidence on recent changes in levels of specialist Board 
representation remain scarce of inconsistent (8). However, there is 
more agreement that the number of firms with personnel functions 
above plant level have declined (Batstone, 1984). In so far as there 
is a correlation between well-developed corporate personnel functions 
and centralized pay bargaining, then the decentralization of wage 
negotiations may well permit a dramatic reduction in the size, 
functions and authority of the corporate office (9)* If# as in BR’s 
case, bargaining continues to take place at company level then even
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if attempts are made to scale down the central personnel function it 
is likely that the labour relations management component of it will 
retain considerable significance.
The evidence indicates that there has been some diminution of the 
corporate personnel department on British Rail. In 1983 the incoming 
Director of Personnel was not given a seat on the Board (10), the 
department has been reduced in size, and the personnel function for 
the non-railway subsidiary companies have been hived off into the 
companies themselves. The department which is left is comprised 
largely of a bargaining unit, and a human resource management team 
responsible for management training and development policy and a 
management services team. Training of staff other than managers has 
been shifted to the Regions. There also seems to be a shift of 
elements of manpower planning to resourcing managers located within 
the business Sectors. Interview evidence indicates that the 
personnel department has very little input to the Corporate Plan, 
other than providing specialist information on redundancy payments. 
Instead what personnel input there is is found in the constituent 
Action Plans, and provided by specialists at lower levels of the 
organization.
There is evidence here, then, of a vertical and horizontal dispersion 
of the personnel function on BR. However, a note of caution is 
necessary prior to concluding that events on BR mirror those 
identified elsewhere. The removal of the Director of Personnel (re­
titled Managing Director, Personnel from 1983) from the Board does
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not solely represent a shift in conception of the personnel role in 
isolation but is instead one instance of a wider policy, promoted by 
the Government, to remove executive representation from the Boards of 
nationalized industries. (11) The new title of the head of personnel 
does reflect, hovever, a change in conception of the personnel
function from that of a bureaucratic department to that of a 
collection of sub-units within the organization.
Whatever these changes in philosophy, whilst pay bargaining continues 
to take place at company level and the structure of negotiating 
institutions continues unchanged, then labour relations management 
will continue to be an important function at headquarters.
Commentators on other industries would accept this but maintain that
senior managers outside this function now exercise greater control
over the parameters of labour relations issues such as wage 
determination (for example, Kinnie, 1985a and b). On the railways 
there do not seem to be significant changes in this respect. The 
Chief Executive and other top managers have long had considerable 
involvement (if behind the scenes) in pay negotiations because of the 
railway’s dependence on financial support from central government, 
and governments’ willingness to use this to influence other aspects 
of managerial strategy (12).
As well as pay negotiations conducted in the RSNC, headquarters’ 
labour relations managers have been responsible for negotiations at 
the specialized and general sections of the RSJC, the sub-committees 
of these and ad hoc working parties that report to them. They have
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continued to perform these roles but senior managers have sought to 
restrict the scope of bargaining to some extent by attempting to push 
down some of the detailed regulation of work arising from work re­
organization schemes to sub-corporate level. At the sub-committees 
of the RSJC which deal with 'failed to agree' claims on matters of 
principle that have risen through the Machinery, interview data 
suggests that headquarters labour relations managers are now less 
likely to make concessions. They reason that since these issues 
arise in the operating units they ought to be settled there. Study 
of documentary evidence indicated that these meetings now take place 
less frequently than in the late 1970s.
The second main aspect of change identified in the literature is the 
decentralization of the personnel function. The main evidence here 
is that over the last six years or so there has been a major shift 
towards 'ground level’ personnel management. Kinnie's investigation 
of four companies finds that in all cases the authority of ground 
level personnel managers has been increased (though they have also 
been subject to tighter central control)(1985b). Purcell's work too 
indicates a relative strengthening of operations level personnel 
management. The IPM survey of 50 large organizations mentioned 
earlier finds in virtually all cases a similar decentralization 
(Evans and Cowling, 1985; Cowling and Evans, 1985).
British Rail is no exception to this pattern. The personnel function 
in the traffic Divisions has entirely disappeared as a result of the 
elimination of these Divisions. That function provided specialist
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advice, acted as ’trouble shooter’ where labour relations arose, and 
undertook some executive functions in labour management issues both 
in the traffic divisions and in the engineering departments. To fill 
the gap created by the two-tier re-structuring, a specialist 
personnel function has been created at Area level in the operating 
and engineering organizations (13) •
Area Personnel Managers have been created as integral members of the 
Area Managers’ teams. The personnel function is not new at local 
level. Prior to two-tier Area Managers and their functional 
assistants dealt with LDC matters and day-to-day labour management, 
albeit with the assistance of the Divisional Personnel Officer; the 
Area Administation Assistant dealt with the routine administration of 
employment, and had a low status in the managerial hierarchy. The 
creation of Area Personnel Managers, and the expansion in the size of 
Areas, has upgraded the job of Administration Assistant and taken 
staff management and dealings with LDCs from other local managers, 
enabling the Area Manager to become primarily a business manager and 
the functional assistants resourcing managers. As well as taking over 
the duties hitherto performed by Area Managers and Divisional 
Personnel Officers, the remit of this new managerial post includes 
functions formerly performed by the Regional personnel departments.
In common with other organizations, the function of the Regional 
department is now largely seen as ’adviser and persuader' (Evans and 
Cowling, 1985) to the Area management units, and the Area Personnel 
Managers have been encouraged to develop their own policy guidelines.
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However*, an important residual function at Region is labour relations 
management that correspond to Sectional Council level, and indeed the 
Regional personnel function is now largely composed of such managers. 
The prime responsibility of these staff in fact has come to be 
restricted to that of the conduct and servicing of negotiations at 
the Councils, and they have lost their role of scrutinising change 
schemes drawn up at Area level.
The sections of the labour relations management element at Region 
have been merged to create a more flexible unit. Traditionally, the 
sectionalism of the bargaining institutions and trade unions has been 
reflected in seperate functions within the personnel department. 
Reporting to the (Regional) Chief Personnel Officer were three 
sections - Industrial Relations, Establishment, and Administration. 
Administration dealt with, for instance, supply of office services 
and nanagement information systems, whilst the functions of the other 
two were labour relations managment. ’Industrial Relations' was 
responsible for negotiation and consultation for concilation and 
workshop staff (Sectional Councils B, C, D and Regional British Rail 
workshops), whilst 'Establishment' covered salaried staff (Sectional 
council A). The Industrial Relations and Establishment departments 
ha\e now been merged and report to the newly created post of Regional 
Employee Relations Manager which, in turn, reports to the Regional 
Personnel Manager.
Not d.1 managers in the new Regional departments are engaged in 
labnu? relations management. The Regional Administration Manager has
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retained control of administrative services and has had an expanded 
training and development role added to his or her responsibilities. 
Interview evidence indicates that the senior managers - Regional 
Personnel Manager and Regional Employee Relations Manager - are no 
Longer closely involved in the conduct of labour relations (because 
mitich cf the work on changes schemes has been farmed out to the 
Areas), and instead are largely responsible for personnel policy 
formulation on the Region.
That tiis division of responsibilities has been established in a 
comparatively short space of time owes much to a deliberate rupture 
of traditional career structures as a consequence of two-tier 
'culture'. In the past the career structure matched the hierarchy of 
the organization and emphasised labour relations experience. A 
typ:cal career would involve a series of steps from say a clerical 
job in the Areas or Divisions, promotion to a position in the DPO, 
frou there to Divisional Personnel Officer or a negotiating post in 
the Regional Industrial Relations or Establishment to senior regional 
or teadquarters labour relations management. In consequence, senior 
personnel managers were usually steeped in labour relations culture 
and towards the end of their careers. Since 1983 they have been 
rephcec, on retirement, by younger managers, often with little of 
the practical labour relations experience of the past, and whose 
background has instead involved personnel policy and development at 
corprate headquarters (1^). This feature illustrates how Regional 
appantnent policies have changed with the diminution of the Regions' 
autoomy and the appointment of Regional General Managers who owe
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their lcyalty to headquarters rather than Regional traditions (cf. 
Jones aril Rose, 1985) •
From this summary of personnel management on BR's Regions it is 
apparent that not only has a vertical re-distribution of authority 
takei place but that also its role has been re-conceptualized. This 
may seem proof of Tyson's contention (1985) that personnel management 
is beconing increasingly fragmented between an ’administrative 
support' role, with minor decision-making responsibilities, and a 
'business manager’ role, that is concerned with identifying the human 
resource implications of business decisions. Tyson suggests that 
what he calls the 'systems-reactive' model, the main component of 
which has been labour relations is being dissipated because senior 
line managers have taken over much of the contact with trade union 
representatives.
It is doubtful how far this applies in BR's case. Though from a 
distaice the newly-formed Area Personnel Managers seem to fit the 
administrative support model, closer examination shows that they have 
taken over some negotiating functions to leave other managers to 
concentrate on business and resourcing issues. Furthermore, in so 
far as they provide inputs to Area Managers' business decisions, they 
perform the business manager function to some degree. In addition 
the need for labour relations management continues to exist at all 
levels of the organization. What this suggests is that the 
continuing strength of the railway unions, an entrenched Machinery of 
Negotiation and centralized pay bargaining will prevent a simple
i
172
movement towards the bi-polar model identified by Tyson.
So far we have seen that features of the labour relations 'system' on 
BR have required the retention of a specialist labour relations 
management function at corporate and Regional level. The second 
reason (outlined in the introduction) for the continuing importance 
of labour relations management is caused by the interaction of strong 
workplace representation with the new management structures created 
by two-tier. The reduction of the executive authority of the 
residual Regional personnel departments has added to the operational 
autonomy now possessed by Area management teams. The diversity in 
policies encouraged by this, and underpinned by tight budgetary 
controls and, in many cases, managerial unfamiliarity with the 
agreements has come up against strong LDC representation well-versed 
in the procedures and content of local and national agreements. The 
deterioration in labour relations that has resulted from this process 
provides Regional labour relations managers with a continuing role as 
’ trouble shooters’.
To fully understand the dynamics of this process it is necessary to 
briefly recount the traditional functions of the Regional labour 
j relations functions since it is Region that has acted as 'Court of 
j Appeal ’ to the Areas and Divisions. In addition to the conduct of
l|
(and support of negotiations, such managers were responsible for
j
I checking, amending and authorising change schemes devised at Area and
!■!
jpivisional level. These people sought to ensure that national and 
Regional agreements were not violated and that functional managers
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did not create precedents which could be exploited by the staff side.
Those Regional managers interviewed were quite explicit that their 
function was as much control of Area management as labour. Thus, the 
elevation of Area discretion and the restriction of the Regional 
labour relations department's executive authority was perceived by 
such managers as posing a number of dangers. These included the 
inadvertent creation of precedents by Area level managers which could 
be exploited by union organizations, and that this would lead to an 
ad hoc and fragmented approach to labour relations, based on local 
managers short term aspirations rather than a balanced assessment of 
Regional priorities and long term goals. Similar to the managers 
interviewed by Purcell (1985). these managers managers viewed the 
changes as a violation of professional competence (cf. Purcell,
1985).
The diminution in the authority of Regional labour relations 
management seemed likely to stimulate a fragmentation of labour 
management practices. The timing of the data collection precluded a 
comprehensive investigation of the extent to which these fears have 
been realised but the following findings did emerge. Overall local 
labour relations showed increasing diversity in terms of 
interpretations of agreements, such as promotional arrangements (15). 
and a large number of union respondents interviewed drew attention to 
a marked deterioration in local labour relations.
jThe reason for such a deterioriation seems to be threefold. Firstly,
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workers and their representatives were reluctant to deal with the 
Area Personnel Managers, wanting instead to deal with their ’proper 
boss’. The ’intrusion’ of such specialist managers injected a
I greater formality into aspects of the employment relationship.
!
Wheras line managers traditionally gave a 'nod and a wink' to workers 
on certain issues, such as minor disciplinary matters, Area Personnel 
Managers were more likely to follow formal procedures. Respondents 
thought this to be insensitive to the diversity of operational 
situations in which such issues arise. Secondly, knowledge of 
agreements was seen to be a major problem area. The new Area 
Personnel Managers are largely either upgraded Administrative 
Assistants or else recent graduates. Many representatives, 
particularly those on the footplate, argue that their knowledge in 
terms of local and national agreements and ’feel’ for agreements is 
poorly developed.
Thirdly, the tightening of central budgetary control resulting from 
the two tier re-organization has placed increasing pressures on Area 
level managers. As Kinnie has shown in his case studies (1985b) 
these Area managers have been encouraged at the same time by their 
superiors to take initiatives on operational matters. The 
combination of these factors has led to a diversity of responses 
which has conflicted on many occasions with the provisions of 
agreements and established customs and practices.
The interaction of these developments with workplace organizations 
that continue to possess organizational strength has resulted in
175
widespread labour relations difficulties. In consequence, the labour 
relations function at Regional level has retained an importance which 
the architects of the two tier structure probably did not forsee. 
Their 'trouble shooter’ role (performed by Divisional Personnel 
Officers before the run-down of the Divisions from the early 1980s) 
has been reinforced through the need to sort out labour relations 
problems which have arisen at local level. Thus, ad hoc tendencies 
in labour relations management are being stimulated. Furthermore, 
the poor state of local labour relations continues to provide a 
steady stream of LDC claims to the Sectional Councils so justifying 
their formal negotiating activities.
In part these developments arise out of the continuing strength of 
workplace organization. At a more fundamental level, however, they 
can be explained by the failure to either develop or integrate labour 
relations strategies and policies with wider business strategies. 
The restructuring of personnel management on BR arose out of that 
twin strategy (described in Chapter Five) to promote the primacy of 
business considerations in managerial decision-making through re­
distribution of managerial authority between functions, and to 
eliminate bureaucratic management styles through decentralization of 
responsibility.
As far as could be determined, the traditional pattern of labour 
relations was viewed as an activity that would decline in importance 
because of labour market movements. Furthermore, it was undesirable 
that labour relations should influence management decision-making as
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much as it had done in the past. Hence the strategists viewed labour 
relations as a residual function. It would occupy a less important 
place than hitherto in the new management structures, and residual 
functions would be retained at corporate and Regional levels merely 
to service those labour relations institutions whose existence was 
stipulated in the Machinery.
So for these reasons, analysis of the potential labour relations 
effects of the new structures, and of future labour relations 
policies that should be adopted were under-developed in these 
organizational strategies. In addition, the personnel department 
seems to have had little input in the design of the new structures, 
though as elsewhere the personnel units throughout the organization
Played an extensive role in their implementation and the allocation
of staff (see Evans and Cowling, 1985). Instead, top managers 
sought to promulgate an employee relations philosophy of flexibility, 
as an element of a new corporate culture of ’devotion to the
customer'. It seems to have been assumed that if employees could be 
made to internalize these beliefs then, given trade union weakness, 
commitment to union policy would decline over time and labour 
management issues would flexibly respond to customer-oriented
business practices (17)*
If senior BR managers had paid more attention to rigorous social 
science analysis and less to the corporate culture ’fad’ (Thackray,
1986) then they might have had more success in effecting a shift from 
traditional labour relations. For the evidence suggests that the
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effective translation of employee relations philosophies into 
practice requires the creation of institutions and policies that go 
beyoni rhetoric. The logical extension of this approach is the
replacement of unions by management specialists. But Foulkes work 
(1980) suggests that to keep companies union-free requires the
implenentation of sophisticated policies which, in practice, can be 
more restrictive on management than trade unions. Furthermore, 
management practice in other areas has to be consistent with the 
philosophy. Blackler and Brown (1981) show that Shell's 'new
(participative) philosophy of management’ conflicted with other 
management objectives (such as cutting back capacity) to create 
cycnicism towards the philosophy. Similarly, in BR's case 'customer 
care' is viewed cynically by many staff since it contrasts with
widespread managerial hostility to staff aspirations and sits 
uneasily with the cutback in rail services throughout the 1980s.
Since employee relations issues went no further in business 
strategists' thinking that this philosophy, BR management were ill- 
prepared for the labour relations effects of their new policies of 
management organization. Despite attempts to diminish the 
organizational significance of the labour relations function, labour 
relations management has continued to form an important, if often 
reactive, element of decision-making. Thus, the evidence from BR 
suggests that, in contrast, to much of the contemporary material on 
personnel management, a decline in the role of labour relations 
jnanagjement cannot be predicted from cutbacks in the personnel
f
function. Indeed, where organizational re-structuring pays
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insufficient regard to the labour relations features of the 
organization, such as the nature of pay bargaining and the strength 
of irade unions and workplace organization, labour relations 
management may have to a more important role than management 
strategists initially plan. Thus, that material (for example, Tyson, 
1985; Manning, 1983) which suggests that labour relations management 
is the element of personnel management in the greatest decline may 
have fallen prey to the wishful thinking that many managers seem to 
have done.
3. LABOUR RELATIOS POLICIES AND STYLE
Labour relations management continues to occupy an important place in 
BR's management structure. But such a continuity could be consistent 
with a radically different management style. It would not be 
surprising to find that the ’brinkmanship’ that has characterised 
BR's conduct of two major disputes has been translated into a 'macho- 
management'style in more routine labour relations practice. However, 
the research evidence indicated that this has not been generalized 
throughout BR. A more common management approach in industry in the 
1980s has been to seek to increase employee motivation through 
expanding employee involvement (Batstone, 1984). British Rail has 
expressed interest in such policies (Palette, 1984). However, its 
capacity to implement them is restricted because of the 
organizational diminution of the personnel function. Of particular 
importance here is the passing of responsibility for consultation to
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sponsoring managers. The primacy that they attach to short-term and 
individual implementation targets places obstacles in the way of any 
desire by senior managers to move the conduct of labour relations 
away from collective bargaining towards joint consultation and other 
forms of participation.
Interview evidence indicated that bargaining behaviour by managers at 
corporate level displayed elements of that identified as 'macho- 
management'. Managers believed that they were being more 'hard- 
nosed' in their approach, and trade union respondents drew attention 
to a more aggressive style. Major instances of an aggressive 
approach are provided, of course, by the 1982 and 1985 disputes. 
Other less dramatic components have already been referred to, such as 
trying to push consultation issues away from national level to the 
Regions and a reluctance to deal with individual claims passed 
upwards through the Machinery. ASLEF respondents also drew attention 
to misuse of Machinery procedures. One instance, to which 
respondents attached some significance, was a new practice at 
national level of management recording 'failed to agrees’ without 
union agreement. However, this corporate practice does not seem to 
have been translated into Regional practice. The near unanimous 
response of both Regional labour relations managers and Sectional 
Councillors was that labour relations were being conducted more or 
less as they always had been, and that values such as trust and 





Differential recruitment patterns seem to underlie these divergent 
styles. At headquarters, as old-style labour relations managers have 
retired they have been consciously replaced by appointees who are 
less * indulgent * towards the rail unions. Since corporate 
headquarters establishes corporate philosophy it is unsurprising that 
appointments at that level closely reflect it. At Regional level, 
however, the downgrading of labour relations has meant that the new 
senior positions in personnel have little involvement in labour 
relations. Those posts which contain a major component of 
negotiating activity have remained with ’traditional’ managers. 
Partly this is because the closure of the career route into the 
senior positions is likely to concentrate these managers in these 
functions. But it is also due to the steady contraction of 
managerial numbers on BR. Through established principles of 
! allocating managers displaced by re-organizations to newly-created
I
posts, there will be a steady supply of 'traditional' managers with 
prior claims to these posts within the personnel function for some 
time to come.
Because corporate philosophy emphasizes that labour relations is now 
jLess important than previously, then posts in labour relations 
Management are unlikely to be attractive to 'high-flyer' managers 
Mho might be expected to possess a more aggressive orientation to 
labour relations. Furthermore, where ’high- flyers take up such 
posts they are not likely to remain in them for long whilst career 
Advancement generally on BR requires frequent changes of job this is 
particularly marked with such ’fast-track’ managers. In these
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circunstances such managers may find it difficult to build up the 
knowledge of procedures and agreements to counter the acknowledged 
skill of union negotiators at Regional level. There are, of course, 
advantages to senior management in retaining ’traditional’ labour 
relations managers because their good lines of communications with 
the trace unions can be of decisive importance where labour relations 
difficulties inhibit the implementation of managerial policies in 
other areas (c.f. Batstone et al, 1984). We have already noted that 
features of the management re-organization are strengthening these 
managers’ ’trouble-shooter' role.
Although the conduct of Regional level negotiations displays 
considerable continuity for the reasons outlined above, the reduction 
in the executive authority of the personnel function does on 
j occasions lead to conflict between managers and union negotiators. 
One feature identified by some respondents was a greater emphasis on 
formal procedure than in the past. For example, senior LM management 
had insisted to personnel managers that agreements reached at sub­
committees would not be respected by line and other operations 
(Managers until ratified by the parent Sectional Council body. 
Similarly decisions on substantive issues were on occasions taken by
i
|enior managers to create a favourable impression in other quarters 
|governmental circles for instance) in a way that constrained the
f
||egotiating ability of labour relations manager and did little for 
fgood' industrial relations (18).
j
he conclusion so far is that the decline in importance attached to
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labour relations in BR’s management philosophy has not led to a 
uniform labour relations ’style*. Whilst corporate level bargaining 
displays evidence of aggressive management, the same is not generally 
true of Regional level negotiations. This suggests that there is not 
a uniform over-riding management strategy to reduce the scope of 
bargaining and that instead the conduct of labour relations is, to 
j  some extent, determined by other managemement priorities.
Although the conduct of negotiations displays continuity, union 
respondents drew attention to a major change in style in the 
cConsultation process. All Sectional Council representatives 
interviewed said that relations between management and workforce 
representatives in consultation had deteriorated significantly, and 
; that management was generally adopting a more aggressive stance.
! This finding is intriguing since senior BR management has indicated
i
that it wants to devote more attention to communications with 
employees than hitherto (Palette, 1984), as have many other major 
firms (CBI, 1985; Batstone, 1984). Furthermore, it conflicts with 
^evidence from industrial relations research. The DE/PSI/ESRC survey
jfound that the incidence of joint consultation is (at least up to the
|
pate of the survey) increasing (Daniel and Millward, 1983). whilst 
jbther commentators have suggested that the its scope is being 
extended by managements (Joyce and Woods, 1984) (19)* On the basis 
jbf these sorts of findings Sisson has argued that British managements 
are moving towards a consultative style in labour relations.
I
i
the explanation for this conflict of evidence seems to be that BR
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managers have failed to integrate policies on employee communications 
and the desirability of a shift from negotiation to consultation with 
other management strategies and policies. This is illustrated by a 
review of developments in the area of consultation. At headquarters 
level managers have both reduced the incidence and attempted to 
reduce the scope of consultation over change schemes. The 
justification is that since they largely refer to 'production* 
questions they should be dealt with in the Regions. So in this 
instance the managerial objective of separating out the functions of 
the operating units from the business strategy functions of 
headquarters is paramount. Consultation on the corporate plan still 
takes place in the Rail Council (see Chapter Three), though the 
earlier 'tacit' alliance between the BRB and rail unions (the NUR in
j
| particular) has been broken up. The Rail Council is now used largely 
! to announce management plans to the unions rather than to engage in a 
genuine dialogue (20).
Developments in consultation within the Regions are more significant 
since the great bulk of consultation has always taken place at this 
level of the organization. As far as could be determined there had 
been little change in the incidence of consultation over change 
However, a large majority of union and workforce 
Irespondents indicated that the scope of consultation had been 
dramatically reduced at both Region and Area. Now, in a great many
;j
jjpases, managers used consultative forum to tell and instruct
1
Workforce representatives what they were going to do, rather than
|
engage in a genuine dialogue. It was widely believed that managers
pchemes,
were less prepared to alter elements of their plans to take account 
of suggestions and objections from the workforce. Since no means of 
direct communication between managers and workers have so far been 
developed the BR case runs contrary to the trends in private 
industry.
The reason for this change in managerial style does not seem to have 
arisen from a major change of policy on consultation but instead from 
a policy to reduce the involvement of the personnel function in 
operational decisions. As former BRB chairman Sir Peter Parker has 
outlined the main element of this new policy (talking about change 
schemes), "I firmly regard line managers as being the initiators and 
I see the personnel function as playing a very important but 
nevertheless supporting role“ (1983. P* 17)* in accordance with this 
| philosophy responsibility for the consultative process passed in the 
garly 1980s from personnel departments to those managers sponsoring 
change.
Now, given that, as suggested earlier, line managers may have much in 
common with the sections of the workforce they manage (because of 
Similar occupational backgrounds), we might expect that this would 
jLead to more extensive consultation. However, an element of the two- 
fier strategy to raise the quality of managerial decision-making at 
j|rea level has been the elimination of managerial ’indulgence* to 
labour. Thus, ’traditional’ line managers have been steadily 
‘eplaced since 1984 by a new breed of resourcing managers whose 
lackground rarely includes shop-floor experience and who have less
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intuitive sympathy for workforce aspirations and fears about change. 
Furthermore, the enhancement of Area status has resulted in 
considerably larger Areas (in terms of staff numbers) with the result 
that additional workplaces have been been added to the 
responsibilities of such managers. This, too has served to weaken 
the ties between depots and line managers (21). The strategy to 
improve managerial decision-making, then, has conflicted with the 
philsophy of extending forms of communication.
That such managers are less sympathetic to labour than their 
predecessors is not reason in itself for a dramatic change in 
practices surrounding Consultation since individual attitudes are not 
necessarily translated into organizational activity. What is 
significant here is that the input of personnel managers has been 
! reduced, and, in particular, the detailed scrutiny of many schemes by 
experienced personnel managers has ceased and their capacity to 
impose amendments virtually eliminated. This has given those 
managers responsible for sponsoring schemes more autonomy in the 
generation, specification and proposed implementation of change 
schemes (cf. Kinnie, 1985b). As earlier research has shown, the 
urgency such managers attach to the implementation of their own 
schemes generally precludes detailed attention to their potential 
human and labour relations consequences (Legge, 1978). The budgetary 
pressures on local managers outlined earlier is currently 
accentuating this tendency.
jthe result of these processes is that the scope of Consultation has
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declined in the 1980s. Management attitudes, as already stated, are 
less favourable to workforce-inspired alteration to their programmes 
of change. In part this is the direct consequence of the factors 
outlined above; in part it is because Consultation now often takes 
place late in the the implementation process when scheme proposals 
have been largely 'firmed-up'. Traditionally, Consultation took 
place well in advance of the technical implementation of schemes to
!
j allow sufficient time for re-allocation of staff, since union and 
workforce consent to labour-displacing proposals was premissed on 
management taking a sympathetic attitude to the human results of
| change. At a Consultation meeting on the introduction of a 
innovative signalling scheme attended by the author in January 1984, 
management proposals seemed, to put it mildly, under-developed. The 
Sectional Council representatives present, however, argued that this 
was to the good since it allowed ample time to iron out both the 
human and technical problems arising from the scheme (22).
That Consultation now takes place later in the implementation process 
is due to a combination of factors which include the reduced 
involvement of personnel managers, the changing social character of 
{Line managers, the budgetary pressures upon them and the importance 
liow attached to 'vigorous' managerial practice in current management
tically research the longer-term labour relations impact of
this change in the Consultation process since large-scale data 
:ollection ceased not long after the transition to two-tier Regional 
lanagement. Unstructured and informal data collected since then (from
bought on BR and elsewhere. It has not been possible to
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respondents and documentary sources such as union newspapers) 
indicates, however, that the transition in management practice has 
led to the demise of active consent (already under strain at the time 
of data collection) amongst LDC and Sectional Council representatives 
to change schemes generally and its replacement by grudging and 
unwiLling acceptance.
In 1983/4 the main labour relations problems arising from 
Consultation in the Regions were concentrated at Area level. As well
f
j as managers at that level beginning to assert their authority to 
devise and implement change schemes, Sectional Council members were 
deeply concerned about procedural aspects of the Consultation process 
under two-tier. As part of the restructuring it had been decided 
that Area Managers would take charge of the Consultation process 
where more than one Area was involved, as well as of those confined 
to their own areas of responsibilty. Councillors argued that this 
made a mockery of Council level Consultation as ’fair’ arbitration by 
higher level managers of management-initiated schemes and workforce 
counter-claims. The Council would no longer be ’Court of Appeal', 
|nd instead, during Consultation at this level, Area Managers would 
fecome prosecution, jury and judge. Since 1984 Councillors appear to 
I tave come to terms to some extent with this change in practice and 
jiegional managers appear to have used this mechanism sparingly.
'rom 1984 labour relations difficulties arising from aspects of the 
'onsultafcion process have spread to Regional level Consultation. In 
art this is a reflection of the diminished role of the personnel
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department. More deeply, it is a consequence of the impact of 
Sectorisation on BR’s Regions. As the strategies of individual 
Sectors have developed and as Regional resistance to Sector claims 
has been diminished through the gradual replacement of old-style 
Regional managers by those committed to the philosophy of Sector 
management (23), so Regional management has been faced with often 
divergent and competing Sector objectives in the sphere of work 
organization. In consequence Regional decision-making has become 
less consistent than in the past and more unpredictable to the extent 
that Sectional Council trust in the veracity of managerial statements 




fhis evidence on trends in consultation with unions and employees on 
British Rail suggests labour relations is not following patterns 
Identified elsewhere. Instead of an increase in joint consultation, 
jhis study has found that the incidence (as reported by respondents) 
s more or less unchanged whilst the scope of much of the 
onsuitative process has been diminished. This could be because the 
alance between negotiation and consultation on BR has always tended 
a fawour a more meaningful role for the latter with the result that 
le widely-reported diminution in negotiating scope identified in 
bher organizations is found in BR's case in consultation rather than 
sgotilation. Alternatively, the detailed study of the processes of
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respondents and documentary sources such as union newspapers) 
indicates, however, that the transition in management practice has 
led to the demise of active consent (already under strain at the time 
of data collection) amongst LDC and Sectional Council representatives 
to change schemes generally and its replacement by grudging and 
unwilling acceptance.
In 1983/4 the main labour relations problems arising from 
Consultation in the Regions were concentrated at Area level. As well 
as managers at that level beginning to assert their authority to 
devise and implement change schemes, Sectional Council members were 
deeply concerned about procedural aspects of the Consultation process 
under two-tier. As part of the restructuring it had been decided 
that Area Managers would take charge of the Consultation process 
where more than one Area was involved, as well as of those confined 
to their own areas of responsibilty. Councillors argued that this 
made a mockery of Council level Consultation as ’fair’ arbitration by 
higher level managers of management-initiated schemes and workforce 
counter-claims. The Council would no longer be ’Court of Appeal', 
and instead, during Consultation at this level, Area Managers would 
become prosecution, jury and judge. Since 1984 Councillors appear to 
have come to terms to some extent with this change in practice and 
Regional managers appear to have used this mechanism sparingly.
From 1984 labour relations difficulties arising from aspects of the 
Consultation process have spread to Regional level Consultation. In 
part this is a reflection of the diminished role of the personnel
188
department. More deeply, it is a consequence of the impact of 
Sectorisation on BR’s Regions. As the strategies of individual 
Sectors have developed and as Regional resistance to Sector claims 
has been diminished through the gradual replacement of old-style 
Regional managers by those committed to the philosophy of Sector 
management (23), so Regional management has been faced with often 
divergent and competing Sector objectives in the sphere of work 
organization. In consequence Regional decision-making has become 
less consistent than in the past and more unpredictable to the extent 
that Sectional Council trust in the veracity of managerial statements 
in Consultation has been severely shaken (24).
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This evidence on trends in consultation with unions and employees on 
British Rail suggests labour relations is not following patterns 
identified elsewhere. Instead of an increase in joint consultation, 
this study has found that the incidence (as reported by respondents) 
is more or less unchanged whilst the scope of much of the 
consultative process has been diminished. This could be because the 
balance between negotiation and consultation on BR has always tended 
to favour a more meaningful role for the latter with the result that 
the widely-reported diminution in negotiating scope identified in 
other organizations is found in BR’s case in consultation rather than 
negotiation. Alternatively, the detailed study of the processes of
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consultation conducted here might well lead to different conclusions 
from that survey based material (such as Daniel and Millward, 1983) 
which is less able to record the qualitative aspects of such 
practices.
Whatever the basis of this divergence of evidence (be it 
methodological or substantive), the results reported here do not 
provide support for the type of Marxist view that extensive 
consultation is a ’phantom’ process designed by managements to 
achieve labour consent when labour is strong and to be dispensed with 
when it is weak (for example, Ramsay, 1977)* BR’s philosophy is to 
retain extensive consultation with its workforce and, in line with 
developments elsewhere, to extend it at the expense of detailed 
negotiation. However, such a philosophy has not been translated into 
a comprehensive, well-formulated labour relations strategy, and 
remains largely a pious statement of managerial objectives. In the 
absence of a clear strategy, the reduction in the organizational 
significance of the personnel function and the shifting of authority 
to line managers has set in motion processes which have reduced the 
scope of consultation. However desirable extensive consultation 
might be in theory, in practice current management practice results 
in it taking second place to considerations of immediate management 
effectiveness.
Such processes as these are reflected more broadly in the structure 
and practice of specialist labour relations management on British 
Rail. The personnel function at Regional and corporate levels has
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beien substantially reduced in size and authority, not as part of a 
coiherent set of labour relations policies but as one element of a 
strategy aimed at stimulating the importance attached to commercial 
considerations in managerial decision-making, and reducing those 
elements which Eight be described as 'bureaucratic*. Within this 
strategy, certain assumptions were made about labour relations: most 
importantly it was thought that union power would decline.
Furthermore the strategy embodied the view that labour relations
considerations ought to be removed from the core of decision-making.
Since labour relations issues were under-developed in this strategy, 
and because management expectations about the decline in union power 
were not soundly based, BR management has been unprepared for the 
continuing salience of labour relations. The relative importance of 
labour relations management in that part of the personnel function
that remains at Regional and corporate level has been increased
because of this. Since the role of labour relations managers has 
been circumscribed by BR strategists in relations to other areas of 
management decision-taking, labour relations management is taking a 
more reactive form than hitherto and displays an ad hoc character 
which industrial relations reformers were so critical of in British 
industry in the late 1960s and early 1970s.
191
CHAPTER SEVEN
MANAGEMENT STRATEGY AND TRAINCREW PRODUCTIVITY
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INTRODUCTION
In 1982 British Rail lost more working days through strike action 
than between 1948 and 1981 put together (Bagwell, 1984, p. 82). The 
majority of days lost arose from industrial action mounted by ASLEF 
against the introduction of 'flexible rosters' for footplate staff 
(1). Behind this dramatic change in railway labour relations lies 
the development from the late 1970s of a comprehensive package of 
measures to increase labour productivity. By 1982 flexibility around 
the length of the working day was at the forefront of the package, 
and the Board was determined to implement the measure with or without 
the agreement of ASLEF.
The events leading up to industrial action and the BRB's conduct of 
the strike apparently provide powerful evidence for the contention 
that British managements have been mounting an 'offensive' against 
organised labour. Since ASLEF resistance needed to be overcome to 
implement the new rosters, there seems to be a clear link between 
managerial policies to increase efficiency and those to reduce trade 
union involvement in labour management. This episode is a test case, 
then, for the counter hypothesis that far from generating 
comprehensive labour-focused strategies, management priorities in the 
1980s often heighten ad hoc features of labour management.
The flexible rostering case supports the latter hypothesis. By 1982 
the work re-organization strategy that BR had been carefully 
constructing from the late 1970s had largely broken down. In its
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ace were a number of ill-defined labour relations aims, all of 
:iich sought a reduction in union power, and which were largely 
sjsigned for external (government) consumption. As Ferner has shown 
1985). theneed for the BRB to achieve legitimacy with the government 
a^r outwieghed the potential efficiency benefits of flexible rosters.
j’o understand the events of 1982 it is necessary to outline why train 
drivers occupied the central role in the mangement strategy devised 
in the late 1970s to increase labour productivity through extensive 
work re-organization. Up until 1981 the underlying objective of the 
BRB was to shield itself from potentially damaging government 
interventions by demonstrating that it was capable of achieving 
icreases in efficiency without government enforcement. From then on, 
government interventions broke up the more comprehensive strategy, 
and more immediate labour relations objectives took its place. 
Attention here will focus on the pattern of job regulation in the 
train driving function which made it the subject of the original 
strategy, the formation of the labour productivity strategy, and its 
eventual demise under the weight of government involvement.
1 TRAIN DRIVERS AND THE CONTROL OF WORK
Train drivers were traditionally the aristocrats of the railway (see 
Hobsbawm, 1984). Their craft skills, acquired through a long 
’apprenticeship* as engine cleaners and firemen, were reflected in
194
\: hesive union organization and rewarded by high wages and a 
i ibstantLal degree of autonomy in the way they learnt and performed
Hfieir joi (2). Dieselization wiped out many of the skills of driving 
aid eliminated those of firemen and engine cleaners altogether (3). 
>ut drivers managed to retain many of the traditional advantages of
I
their cnft, such as high incomes (Hollowell, 1975) (*0 • ln large 
Sart thij was achieved through the establishment of extensive job 
controls at national level as protection against the potential
; I
lennploymert effects of technical change.
As a result, the organization of footplate work and drivers’ 
conditions of service are subject to a much greater degree of 
regulation than any other railway occupation. The traditional 
strength )f depot controls, both informal and formal, have come to be 
supplemented by extensive national agreements backed up by the 
substantiil involvement of union headquarters in work allocation. 
The exten; <of these controls are the reason why managerial attempts 
to increase labour productivity from the late 1970s took a strategic 
form, wheieas attempts to increase the productivity of other railway 
staff coild generally be pursued in a more incremental or 
decentralizesd manner. It is instructive to outline how these job 
controls crteate difficulties for management control of service 
planning/ operations and manpower planning since problems in these 
spheres f crimed the rationale for the strategy.
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vice p lann ing  and o p e r a t io n s
(comparison to manufacturing industries, the locus of detailed 
jfeicfcion planning in transport industries is generally relatively 
fcralized (5). On BR the Regional tier of management compiles 
||n services and plans the use of physical and human resources
|CNgssary to operate them (see Ford, 1979)* The production of
.1,
rtaincrew work schedules (’diagrams’) is the most technically 
jifficult part of the planning process because crews are subject, 
j nlike rolling stock, to working time constraints and the provisions
| If national agreements (Monopolies and Mergers Commission, 1980). In
[
constructing work programmes the traincrew diagramming office at 
Begion has to take account of the overall length of the working day, 
the components of the Manning Agreements, conventions surrounding the 
allocation of work to depots, and a number of time allowances 
established by national agreement (and fixed at depot level).
The manner in which staff are deployed on driving duties is 
substantially determined by the Manning Agreements. The main Diesel 
and Electric Manning Agreement dates from October 1965 when steam 
traction was about to be eliminated from British Railways and the job 
of fireman rendered redundant. This agreement sets limits in time 
aid mileage to aggregate and continous driving for single-manned 
passenger trains (it was extended to freight and parcels in 1970) 
(?). Thus, where a diagram exceeds the mileage or time limitation 
far single manning the train working is double-manned throughout by a 
d’ivsr and an assistant. The agreement introduced a Physical Needs
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)f thirty minutes on single-manned turns to be taken between
thxd and fifth hours of duty.
ialy single manning was possible only for part of the day. The 
lad sought single manning over the full twenty four hours in 
196 Agreement but after industrial action mounted by ASLEF a 
t <? Inquiry recommended that double manning be retained in the
A:
> ni;ht hours (Court of Inquiry, 1965; McLeod, 1970). In the Pay 
Eff.ciency Agreements of August 1968, single manning was extended 
the Board had originally wanted. Furthermore, agreement was 
lachedthat station pilots would be single-manned, and that on light 
conotve movements the driver's assistant could be replaced by a 
||Marc wlere the movement was not from one depot to another for the 
fptjirpcse of changing locomotives, and the journey comprised part of a 
|train service or 'trip' (local freight) movement. By 1970* then, 
jjgjj trains were single manned except those exceeding the time or 
Imileaje limit, light engine movements, steam heated trains (which 
r^equire a driver's assistant to tend to the heating boiler), and 
allast trains on site (7).
Since 19f0 there have been a number of changes to this picture. With 
the conversion of passenger and parcels trains to electric heating 
run off the locomotive generator there has been a decline in 
requirements for second men. The High Speed Train agreement (reached 
in 1976) stipulates that trains operating at speeds in excess of 100 
mph should be manned by two qualified drivers. The agreement also 
established a maximum weekly mileage per driver of 1750.
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place were a number of ill-defined labour relations aims, all of 
which sought a reduction in union power, and which were largely 
designed for external (government) consumption. As Ferner has shown 
(1985), theneed for the BRB to achieve legitimacy with the government 
far outwieghed the potential efficiency benefits of flexible rosters.
To understand the events of 1982 it is necessary to outline why train 
drivers occupied the central role in the mangement strategy devised 
in the late 1970s to increase labour productivity through extensive 
work re-organization. Up until 1981 the underlying objective of the 
BRB was to shield itself from potentially damaging government 
interventions by demonstrating that it was capable of achieving 
icreases in efficiency without government enforcement. From then on, 
government interventions broke up the more comprehensive strategy, 
and more immediate labour relations objectives took its place. 
Attention here will focus on the pattern of job regulation in the 
train driving function which made it the subject of the original 
strategy, the formation of the labour productivity strategy, and its 
eventual demise under the weight of government involvement.
1 TRAIN DRIVERS AND THE CONTROL OF WORK
Train drivers were traditionally the aristocrats of the railway (see 
Hobsbawm, 1984). Their craft skills, acquired through a long
’apprenticeship* as engine cleaners and firemen, were reflected in
194
cohesive union organization and rewarded by high wages and a 
substantial degree of autonomy in the way they learnt and performed 
their job (2). Dieselization wiped out many of the skills of driving 
and eliminated those of firemen and engine cleaners altogether (3). 
but drivers managed to retain many of the traditional advantages of 
their craft, such as high incomes (Hollowell, 1975) (*0 • I*1 large
part this was achieved through the establishment of extensive job 
controls at national level as protection against the potential 
employment effects of technical change.
As a result, the organization of footplate work and drivers’ 
conditions of service are subject to a much greater degree of 
regulation than any other railway occupation. The traditional 
strength of depot controls, both informal and formal, have come to be 
supplemented by extensive national agreements backed up by the 
substantial involvement of union headquarters in work allocation. 
The extent of these controls are the reason why managerial attempts 
to increase labour productivity from the late 1970s took a strategic 
form, whereas attempts to increase the productivity of other railway 
staff could generally be pursued in a more incremental or 
decentralized manner. It is instructive to outline how these job 
controls create difficulties for management control of service 
planning/ operations and manpower planning since problems in these 
spheres formed the rationale for the strategy.
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i) Service planning and operations
In comparison to manufacturing industries t the locus of detailed 
production planning in transport industries is generally relatively 
centralized (5) • On BR the Regional tier of management compiles 
train services and plans the use of physical and human resources 
necessary to operate them (see Ford, 1979)• The production of 
traincrew work schedules (* diagrams *) is the most technically 
difficult part of the planning process because crews are subject, 
unlike rolling stock, to working time constraints and the provisions 
of national agreements (Monopolies and Mergers Commission, 1980). In
constructing work programmes the traincrew diagramming office at
Region has to take account of the overall length of the working day,
the components of the Manning Agreements, conventions surrounding the 
allocation of work to depots, and a number of time allowances 
established by national agreement (and fixed at depot level).
The manner in which staff are deployed on driving duties is
substantially determined by the Manning Agreements. The main Diesel 
and Electric Manning Agreement dates from October 1965 when steam 
traction was about to be eliminated from British Railways and the job 
of fireman rendered redundant. This agreement sets limits in time 
and mileage to aggregate and continous driving for single-manned 
passenger trains (it was extended to freight and parcels in 1970) 
(6). Thus, where a diagram exceeds the mileage or time limitation 
for single manning the train working is double-manned throughout by a 
driver and an assistant. The agreement introduced a Physical Needs
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Break of thirty minutes on single-manned turns to be taken between
the third and fifth hours of duty.
Initially single manning was possible only for part of the day. The 
Board had sought single manning over the full twenty four hours in 
the 1965 Agreement but after industrial action mounted by ASLEF a 
Court of Inquiry recommended that double manning be retained in the 
deep night hours (Court of Inquiry, 1965; McLeod, 1970). In the Pay 
and Efficiency Agreements of August 1968, single manning was extended 
as the Board had originally wanted. Furthermore, agreement was
reached that station pilots would be single-manned, and that on light 
locomotive movements the driver's assistant could be replaced by a 
guard where the movement was not from one depot to another for the 
purpose of changing locomotives, and the journey comprised part of a 
train service or 'trip' (local freight) movement. By 1970, then, 
all trains were single manned except those exceeding the time or 
mileage limit, light engine movements, steam heated trains (which 
require a driver's assistant to tend to the heating boiler), and 
ballast trains on site (7).
Since 1970 there have been a number of changes to this picture. With 
the conversion of passenger and parcels trains to electric heating 
run off the locomotive generator there has been a decline in 
requirements for second men. The High Speed Train agreement (reached 
in 1976) stipulates that trains operating at speeds in excess of 100 
mph should be manned by two qualified drivers. The agreement also 
established a maximum weekly mileage per driver of 1750.
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National agreement establishes, then, the number of footplate staff 
to be deployed on trains on the basis of speed, type of train 
movement, mileage and time, and sets constraints on the overall 
length of working time and the use of time at work. The difficulties 
these cause in the process of matching footplate staff to driving 
work are added to by further constraints on available driving time 
posed by national agreements on time allowances for preparation and 
disposal of locomotives, walking time (the actual times are agreed at 
LDCs) between parts of the workplace, and for reading operating 
notices and instructions.
All of the above set limits on the amount of time that can in 
practice be diagrammed for driving duties. When the four elements of 
the shift - driving, allowances such as the PNB, preparation and 
disposal of locomotives and turn-round time (ie the time added to the 
end of the outward journey to allow for late-running) - were added 
together total productive time came to around six hours (Bowick, 
1976). This tightly regulated structure did not entirely preclude 
flexibility in work organization. For instance, diagrams in excess 
of eight hours could be permitted but the agreement of union 
headquarters was required (through Regional Manning Committees 
composed of Regional managers and union headquarters' officials). 
From the late 1970s the BRB sought greater flexibility through the 
revision of the set of agreements regulating train manning. In 
particular, it hoped to lengthen available driving time by varying 
the length of the working day ('flexible rostering'), lengthening the 
time and mileage that could be driven single-manned, displacing the
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second crew member on light engine movement, and re-timing the 
Physical Needs Break.
As well as extending driving time, railway management have also 
sought greater freedom to allocate work between depots. Traditional 
’spheres of influence* rather than national agreements largely 
determine the allocation of driving jobs to particular depots. This 
control is achieved through the consultation process around the bi­
annual timetable changes. In these meetings, drivers' Sectional 
Council and LDC representatives seek to prevent transfers of work 
between depots. Most of the Councils believe that it is a managerial 
duty to allocate new work on the most economical basis but they seek 
to restrict changes to existing work. This control is most extensive 
on the Eastern Region where the Council demands that management 
justify each transfer item-by-item with all LDCs on the Region in 
attendance.
Since many LDCs would refuse to undertake re-allocated work, 
diagrammers have not attempted to achieve covert modifications to 
spheres of influence through traincrew diagrams. Furthermore, as the 
BRB explained at the SCNI hearings in 1977. fluctuating depot 
establishments that could result from short-term re-allocations could 
conflict with longer term manpower planning (SCNI, 1977)• This is 
changing because with the decline in workload many LDCs seem to be 
les altruistic in their approach. In addition, Sector specification 
of services and their resourcing is putting pressure on diagrammers 
to change existing scheduling practices.
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An additional set of constraints on management command of work 
organization is provided by the process of allocating these work 
diagrams to footplate staff at depot level. The size of depot 
establishments (based on, but not entirely determined by, a 
computation of the number of diagrams) are agreed between Regional 
managers and Sectional Council representatives. The allocation of 
diagrams to staff is undertaken by the staff side of the LDC with 
tTraincrew management making little input (8).
In this process driving staff are divided into a number of workgroups 
called 'links *. Link membership is based on seniority (the length of 
time in footplate service), and footplate staff progress through the 
links over time. There are no nationally agreed criteria on link 
structures - they are governed instead by local agreement - and depot 
practices vary widely. Link size varies widely and is related to the 
variety of driving work: the larger the link the more diverse the 
jobs covered are likely to be. As well as ’progressive' links each 
depot generally has a number of residual links which contain staff 
medically or otherwise restricted from undertaking full driving jobs. 
Footplate LDCs generally seek to include both freight and passenger 
work in link content to provide job variety, though they vary in the 
extent to which they do this. By contrast, specialist freight and 
passenger links are common amongst guards, and link membership is 
determined by choice instead of seniority.
Link structure is mentioned here because it interacts with national 
agreements on training and union policy on long mileage work to
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strongly influence traincrew productivity (10). Since 1975 it has 
teen agreed that management and union would encourage the sharing of 
torus work as far as possible. Prior to dieselization, ’mileage 
jots' were allocated on the basis of seniority to the most senior 
drivers and their firemen. This underpinned the seniority system 
since those at the pinnacle of the profession and those whose family 
commitments were likely to be most pressing (firemen in their twenties) 
received the highest wages. This policy was changed since, with the 
ending of steam, a source of high income was eliminated for thosein 
mid-career and because the most senior drivers often found main-line 
diesel driving too stressful.
The change in union policy resulted in bonus work being in all or 
most of the progressive links with the result that the job content of 
each link became more varied. For this policy to be implemented many 
footplate staff required more extensive knowledge of routes and 
traction. The length of training for each is governed by national 
agreement and drivers are required by law to sign that they are 
familiar with the routes that they drive over every six months. To 
learn each route from a depot takes up to three weeks. This union 
philosophy of equalising work, then, makes heavy demands on training. 
Richard Pryke was highly critical of what he saw as excessive route 
knowledge in his submission to the Select Committee (1977)* He 
argued that if the work content of links could be specialized then 
training needs could be substantially reduced, and hence labour 
productivity increased. It was for similar reasons that the BRB 
sought some standardization of link construction when it came to
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devise its work re-organization strategy.
So far, the main controls exercised by ASLEF on the use of labour in 
the service planning process have been identified. In current 
operations the management labour is similarly constrained by a 
combination of local and national agreements. The focus of these 
agreements are the principles and methods to be adopted where 
deviations from planned schedules has to take place either because of 
staff shortages or because of the addition of new work.
Each LDC has a comprehensive written agreement with local management, 
the main elements of which are the procedures to be applied by depot 
administrators in the cover of staff absence from duty. The cardinal 
principle is that of seniority - the most senior spare driver within 
a certain time band gets the vacant turn of duty (11). This 
principle is strenuously enforced by footplate LDCs, and place 
substantial constraints on the flexibility available to roster clerks 
(who deal with changes to work programmes in advance) and supervisors 
(responsible for dealing with these problems as they arise). For 
instance, footplate LDCs generally insist that vacancies are covered 
on a daily basis, whereas guards’ LDCs are usually content to 
allocate spare staff on a weekly basis to cover long term absences.
National agreements give footplate LDCs a considerable role in the 
allocation of new or one-off items of work too. The Manning 
Agreement gives LDCs the right to scrutinise the diagrams of such 
jobs to check that the requirements for single-manning are complied
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with. Where scrutiny is unable to take place the job has to be 
double-manned throughout. As a result LDC representatives have to be 
booked-off normal duties to undertake this function.
The foregoing shows that local representatives' extensive control 
over the allocation of footplate staff to work rests on a combination 
of local and national agreements. Management control here is further 
constrained by the involvement of union headquarters, primarily on 
issues connected with the length of time on duty. ASLEF policy is 
against the diagramming of overtime and the working of Rest Days. 
This policy is enforced through agreement with the BRB that 
statistics on the level of overtime and Rest Day working are supplied 
every four weeks to the union (12). Furthermore, to keep overtime 
working low there is a further agreement that the BRB will approach 
ASLEF headquarters for permission before depots can work their Rest 
Days (13).
ii) Manpower planning
The restraints that comprehensive agreements and powerful union 
representation place on management in the sphere of work relations 
are compounded by controls in that of employment relations. 
Accordingly, managerial attempts to achieve greater flexibility in 
the organization of work have been accompanied by similar moves to 
increase managerial control over aspects of footplate conditions of 
service. As an element of the work re-organization strategy, it was 
proposed that restrictions be removed from the promotion and transfer
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arrangements and that the career structures for traincrews be 
reconstructed.
On British Rail the Promotion, Transfer and Redundancy Arrangements 
(P.,T. & R.) place controls on the movement of personnel between jobs 
and locations, and managerial freedom in employee selction. 
Superficially these arangements could appear to be the main mechanism 
of a management ’bureaucratic control’ strategy (Edwards, R. 1979)* 
Such an assessment would be mistaken, however, since these structures 
have in part emerged out of union aspirations to extend, rationalize 
and codify career possibilities. It is true that their existence has 
helped to achieve workforce and union consent to job displacing 
rationalization schemes (Palette, 1984), but their operation is also 
deeply problematic for line management since they remove all 
managerial control over promotion and selection of footplate staff.
Traincrew management have no freedom to select staff of their choice 
since the cardinal principle of the P.,T. & R. is seniority.
Furthermore, within this the agreement specifies that certain groups 
of footplate staff, such as those earlier displaced by a depot 
closure, have priority in the filling of vacancies. The problems 
this causes for management are severalfold. First, new staff may not 
be effective for some time because they need extensive training. For 
instance, drivers’ assistants at depots where the potential for 
promotion is limited transfer to depots to undergo driver training 
and gain promotion to the driving grade. Since the training period 
can last a year in total the depot remains under strength. Electric
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had suffered from this problem shortly before the interviews were 
conducted there, and the LDC had been driven to approach ASLEF
headquarters for permission to work Rest Days.
At least depots such as Electric are attractive to staff because of 
the large number of mileage turns there. Drivers thus tend to remain 
there for some time, and such training problems that arise are
usually temporary in duration. The second and more intractable 
problem is that of the so-called ’transit camp’ depots. The
difficulty here footplatemen transfer from depots with limited 
promotional opportunities listing as their second preference depots 
those with a large number of vacancies so as to get geographically 
close to their first preference depot. Then when the opportunity 
arises they exercise their right in the P.T.& R. to get into the 
depot of their first choice. As a result some depots can be
permanently short of trained men. Watford is a good example of this 
kind of depot - it is a highly unattractive depot to remain at since 
there is no mileage work and its staff are trained only on one form 
of traction (to operate the Watford-Euston/Broad Street lines) and 
thus cannot take on any other work. There is thus a continual 
turnover of staff and a permanently high level of vacancies (1^).
In response to these problems BR management have sought more flexible 
arrangements and the removal of some controls. The rail unions are 
not hostile to this eventuality since the current agreements do not 
pass control to them either. Sectional Council representatives (who 
monitor the workings of the scheme) are reluctant to exploit the
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problems outlined above to press for increased depot complements 
since as the rules are to a large degree beyond manipulation in the 
short term, depots could equally receive applications from drivers 
who are adequately trained. In these circumstances, management would 
probably attempt to reduce the labour surplus that results by 
declaring junior staff redundant.
The second element of employment relations that BRB managers would 
like to reform is the footplate’s entirely separate promotional 
hierarchy. In its place the BRB would like a new grade of
’trainman’, members of which would be able to perform the duties of 
drivers’ assistant, guard and, where the driver's exam had been 
passed, relief driver. Behind this proposal likes a number of major 
manpower issues that were facig the Board from the late 1970s 
onwards. One was the unbalanced age profile of BR's footplate staff. 
67.12% of drivers employed in 1983 were over 50 (15). Since traffic 
levels are likely to decline amd operational methods likely to change 
in the long-term, means that it is undesirable to recruit staff in 
the numbers necessary to replace these retirees in the short term.
Secondly, the work opportunities for drivers’ assistants (who 
currently provide the source of future drivers) have been steadily 
reduced because of the elimination of steam heating and the 
introduction of High Speed Trains. Flexibility in promotional 
hierarchies offers the potential for an alternative solution drawing 
on a wider pool of staff. The advantage of replacing the current 
career structure by the ’trainman concept* is that the supply of
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future drivers could be drawn to some extent from guards already in 
BR's employment, thus improving guards’ career opportunities (16). 
Such a facility would provide potential employment for those guards 
displaced by the proposed introduction of driver-only-operated 
trains, and at the same time would create flexibility of staffing in 
those situations where drivers needed some form of operational 
assistance.
To summarize so far, the regulation of work organization and 
conditions of service are expecially comprehensive in the case of 
BR’s footplate staff. Controls in local and national agreements and 
the involvement of union hedquarters result in the scheduling of 
traincews being particularly complex and restrictive. Some of these 
controls represent a continuity with craft practices whilst others 
were designed to defend them when they were threatened by technical 
change. It seemed by the late 1970s that any meaningful changes to 
them to increase labour productivity would need to be comprehensive 
in scope.
2. THE EMERGENCE OF THE WORK RE-ORGANIZATION STRATEGY
In the late 1970s labour productivity emerged as a major issue on BR 
after a decade of quiesence. From this a strategy was constructed to 
substantially reform the pattern of work and employment relations in 
the train driving function. Its underlying objective was to insulate 
the railways from the danger that governments might re-define railway
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objectives as part of a set of restrictive public expenditure 
policies. To achieve these work organization aims, BR attempted to 
achieve the active consent of the rail unions (cf. Ferner, 1985). 
Thus, this element of management plans formed a major component of 
the ’tacit alliance'. The genesis of the strategy and its eventual 
breakdown will be described here sice it provides the context for the 
analysis of the impact of flexible rosters.
Renewed interest in railway labour productivity was sparked~off by 
the Select Committee on Nationalized Industries' investigation of 
British Rail in 1976-77 (SCNI, 1977)* Though the remit was rail 
policy, the Committee's proceedings were dominated by the question of 
labour productivity because of a submission by two economists, 
Richard Pryke and John Dodgson. Drawing largely on their book The 
Rail Problem (197*0» they made extensive criticisms of work 
organization on BR. They were particularly critical of aspects of 
footplate work organization described earlier in the chapter such as 
the short length of average train-driving time per driver. Their 
recommendations included a number of reforms such as changes to the 
mileage bonus scheme, greater freedom for management to re-allocate 
work between depots, overhaul of the 'link' system of work groups 
and, most important, revisions to policies on route knowledge and 
training.
The Board's reply to these claims at the SCNI (op. cit.) are worth 
summarizing since they contrast with the stance adopted by BR 
headquarters more recently. Members' arguments fell into two main
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categories. The first was that Pryke and Dodgson's recommendations 
were unworkable since manpower policies were in part dictated by 
wider social factors. The second was that footplate productivity is 
substantially determined by rail service patterns, and labour 
controls have a lesser importance.
At this time, then, senior railway managers were sceptical of the 
scope for improvements in labour productivity in isolation from 
increased investment. But because of the SNCI’s investigation, 
labour productivity and the question of restrictive working practices 
started to emerge as a major issue. To respond to this, the Board 
commissioned a detailed study of European railway performance in 1978 
(BRB/Institute of Transport Studies, University of Leeds, 1980). The 
report provided a wealth of detail on comparative labour 
productivity. Overall, the data indicated that BR was above average 
in terms of labour productivity (measured as train miles per staff 
member) but that the despite considerably longer hours worked by 
British railway employees, it did not result in an equivalent high 
level of output per member of staff (17)* The researchers suggested 
that the restricted length of the standard working week on British 
Rail (Monday to Saturday) compared to that common in Europe was 
important here. In addition, British rostering practices were 
generally less flexible such that it was more difficult than on the 
continent to match the times when staff are on duty to the work 
required.
More detailed analysis of train crew productivity by type of traffic
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showed that whilst traincrew productivity on passenger services was 
relatively high on British Rail, on freight and parcels BR (along 
with the Italian Railways (FS)) required twice as many traincrew
members as other railway adminstrations run trains. Partly this can 
be attributed to low driver productivity but the primary reason for 
the discrepancy was that all other railways had largely abolished 
guards and/or driver’s assistants on freight trains. The authors 
suggested that the potential for increasing traincrew productivity 
through revision to manning arrangements was probably the clearest 
conclusion to arise from the study.
The election of the Thatcher Government in May 1979 coincided with 
this study. Early on it became obvious that the policies of this 
government would add to the pressures for increased labour
productivity in three main ways. Firstly, the new government 
believed that low labour productivity was a significant factor in 
Britain’s poor economic performance and that trade union ’restrictive 
practices’ were a major cause of this. Secondly, though the Thatcher 
Government did not have a clear policy towards the nationalized 
industries at the time of assuming office (see Chapter Three), it was 
nevertheless clear that it was likely to be hostile to the public 
sector and that there would be increasing constraints on public 
financial support as a result. Thirdly, the deflationary policies 
which this government semed highly likely to adopt would add to the 
problems presented to the rail business by growing economic
difficulties. Between 1979 and 1980, freight receipts droppped
dramatically by £90 million (total freight income in 1979 was £597
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million), and the total number of passenger miles dipped after a 
trend upwards since 1977 (see BRB, 1982).
In 1979 these contextual factors served to translate the growing 
interest amongst senior British Rail managers in labour productivity 
into a high level strategy aimed at improving it. At Board 
Headquarters number of productivity working groups were formed to 
prepare for the 1980 pay negotiations (see Monopolies and Mergers 
Commission, I98O). Some 200-300 items were generated by these groups 
from which, after evaluation by a coordinating groups, 52 items were 
finally selected for development. The criteria for this selection 
included the potential of such items to be implemented comparatively 
quickly and the levels of investment that would be required. The 
liklihood of acceptance by the rail unions was excluded from these 
criteria. Superficially, this might suggest that the Board was 
already beginning to take a firm line with the unions in implementing 
change. The reality, however, was that the sponsors did not want to 
constrain the generation of ideas for development at such an early 
stage.
In fact in this period the 'tacit alliance' between the BRB and rail 
unions became increasingly explicit. The BRB's strategy was to 
defend the railways from government intervention through reducing as 
far as possible the grounds for government to impose new and 
rectrictive policies. Central to this was action to increase labour 
productivity. In so doing, BR would be better equiped to respond to 
changing trading conditions, more able to adapt to cutbacks in
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financial support from central government, and (it was hoped) would 
impress upon the government that BR was not the inefficient 
organization the government appeared to believe it was. Fundamental 
to this strategy was that these measures would be achieved peacefully 
with the active consent of the trade unions and railway workforce 
(cf. Ferner, 1985).
From the beginning of the Thatcher regime senior managers sought to 
involve the rail unions in its strategy. Within weeks of Mrs 
Thatcher gaining office, the Board invited the officials of the rail 
unions to a special meeting to discuss the potential for improvements 
in productivity (Bagwell, 1984, p. 70). The main expression of the 
BRB’s thinking is to be found in The Challenge of the Eighties 
presented to the unions in November 1979* This document outlined a
fourfold strategy of withdrawal from unprofitable activities 
(primarily Collection and Delivery of parcels), development of market 
opportunities.through clearer product segmentation, investment in new 
technology and long term manpower planning. Essential to the success 
of this were revisions of traditional practices in the sphere of work 
organization. The philosophy behind the planned implementation of 
the strategy was that
"these improvements cannot be achieved without the unions’ 
active cooperation” (1979. P*2).
The proposals found in this document centre on the reform of the 
restrictions on labour deployment described earlier in the chapter. 
They included extensions of single manning of locomotives, the
212
introduction of driver-only operated trains, the creation of a new 
promotional hierarchy with progression from a ’trainman’ grade to 
either driver or a new grade of train conductor. On the issue of 
work allocation, the BRB proposed that depot work allocation should 
be determined on the most economical basis without reference to 
prevailing customs, and a standard method of determining depot 
complements and the grouping of depots for relief purposes should be 
established. They further proposed that individuals’ work
programmes should be compiled of variable days, including Sundays, 
that the timing of the Physical Needs Break for footplate staff be 
made more flexible, and that criteria be established at national 
level for determining link structures. In return, the Board offered 
to make significant improvements to conditions of service: basic pay
would be increased, hours of work reduced, and job satisfaction and 
career development enhanced.
The philosophy of making concessions in the sphere of job regulation 
in return for improved conditions was most readily embraced by the 
NUR. From then until Sid Weighell’s retirement in 1982 the NUR's 
policies and practice developed in tandem with those of the BRB. The 
union produced a parallel document, The Railwayman’s Charter (1980) 
which, like The Challenge of the Eighties, argued that if employment 
conditions were improved, the NUR would look favourably on reforming 
traditional working practices. Interview evidence suggests that the 
TSSA was in broad, if less open, agreement with the NUR strategy, 
whilst ASLEF’s willingness to discuss productivity measures was 
levertheless tempered by wariness of the implications of the Board’s
213
proposals for craft exclusivity.
From 1979 onwards the rail unions, the NUR in particular, and the BRB 
moved closer together to maintain consensual labour relations. The 
1980 Pay Agreement gave a rise of 20# on basic rates (18) and 
reduced the standard working week to thirty nine hours (to be 
implemented by November 1981). In return the rail unions undertook 
to give the Board’s productivity proposals active consideration. The 
•centrality of this strategy to the Board is revealed by the statement 
in the 1981-5 Corporate Plan that its successful achievement was 
premised on the implementation of The Challenge of the Eighties’ 
proposals, and that successful implementation was dependent on trade 
union involvement (BRB, 1981b).
As the Board's financial situation deteriorated, due to the combined 
effects of the recession and cuts in the PSO, the alliance between 
Board and unions grew closer. In The Balance Sheet of Change, 
presented to the unions at a meeting of the Rail Council in November 
1980, the Board asked that the unions consider a package of economy 
measures and review with the BRB the progress being made on the pay 
deal commitments (Bagwell, 1984, p. 73)• As a result of this meeting 
the NUR decided to ask the BRB to join the unions in a joint approach 
to the Minister of Transport to seek an increase in the External 
Financing Limit and the Public Service Obligation Grant and to 
approve a package of investment projects. In return the NUR would 
give full cooperation on those issues in The Balance Sheet of Change 
that fell within its remit (Bagwell, ibid.).
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The meeting of the Rail Council that took place in January 1981 with 
the Minister present represents the high point of the alliance that 
had been becoming more explicit since 1979* The history of BRB-union 
relationships in that period provides proof of the argument, put 
forward in Chapter Three, that consensual relationships have 
developed not primarily because the railways are insulated from 
market pressures but because of the hostility of governments to 
British Rail and the variability of government policy interventions. 
In these circumstances unions and management draw themselves together 
to protect themselves. This consensus was to be broken, however, by 
subsequent events.
3 . THE BREAKDOWN OF THE STRATEGY
In the strategy that had been developed so far flexible rosters were 
a relatively unimportant component. The Challenge of the Eighties 
had called for,
"a new approach to rostering, including the incorporation of 
Saturdays and Sundays in the standard rostered working week for 
those staff whose work at the weekends is essential to the 
railway’s operations: greater flexibility about the length of 
the rostered day, subject to turns not exceeding a given minima 
and maxima" (1979)•
Much more important in terms of cost savings were proposals to 
introduce driver-only-operation, ease the manning conditions on 
locomotives, and implement the Trainman Concept.
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At this stage the Board does not seem to have formulated specific 
proposals on rostering since it was viewed as something that would 
form just one element of other productivity initiatives, which taken 
together would increase flexibility for management. The BRB outlined 
its objectives in March 1980 to the NUR and ASLEF at the RSJC (Loco.) 
as,
"a new framework agreement which removed the rigidities from 
present rostering arrangements as far as practicable and also 
improve the effective use of working time as well as reducing 
the unsociability of roster and overtime requirement.” (19)
At this meeting the BRB's representatives suggested that this was a 
complex matter, and that a Joint Working Party was the best way to 
proceed.
In mid-198l the pluralistic approach faltered when the Board started 
to deviate from the strategy that it had adopted in 1979 • The main 
reason for this was that the Government had started to intervene in 
railway affairs, taking advantage of a major disagreement between 
Board and unions over the 1981 pay claim. In April 1981 the Board’s 
offer of 1% was rejected by all three rail unions, and the NUR’s 
claim was referred to the RSNT. The RSNT, reporting in July, 
recommended a two-stage increase. Basic rates should be raised by 8% 
from 20 April, whilst a further Z% should be paid from August 
onwards. But the BRB broke with the tradition of accepting RSNT 
awards by announcing that it would not implement the second stage of 
the award. At subsequent meetings of the RSNC, BRB negotiators told 
the unions that they would need government financial support to meet
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the award, and that such support would only be forthcoming with firm 
trade union commitment to the productivity proposals already 
presented to the unions.
These events suggest that from spring 1981 the Government was taking 
a closer interest in railway labour relations. There were a number 
of reasons for it to do so. Some commentators, such as Soskice 
(1984), believe the government’s change of tack in mid-198l had an 
explicit labour relations focus. He argues that prior to 1981 
government strategy had been to inhibit joint industrial action 
between public and private sector unions through allowing high pay 
settlements to the public sector. Once the danger of union unity had 
passed it was feasible to reconstruct British labour relations by 
using the public sector as a lead. Though subsequent events in the 
public sector give this view a certain plausibility, it probably 
overstates the coherence of government strategy (Riddell, 1983). 
Until 1983 the Thatcher Government was a fragile coalition, and its 
apparent lack of concern with public sector pay levels in I98O 
probably owes more to monetarist beliefs than labour relations 
policies (see Keegan, 1984, Ch.5).
Secondly, the framing of an agenda for railway management by the 
Government could well have arisen out of political divisions within 
the Cabinet. It is difficult to state such an argument with 
certainty because of the level of secrecy in British government, but 
a number of contextual factors suggests that this is not an 
unreasonable interpretation. The joint approach of Board and rail
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unions seemed to be winning the political battle for increased public 
financial support for the railways. In early 1981 the BRB had 
achieved a remarkable coup in gaining Department of Transport 
agreement in principle on the merits of network electrification 
(Department of Transport/BRB, 1981). There appears to have been a 
bitter Cabinet battle over this issue, with the Prime Minister (whose 
closest advisors at the time were vehemently anti-rail transport 
economists) strongly critical of the Secretary of State for Transport 
for allowing such a document to be produced. An issue was needed to 
get the Government off the hook. Labour productivity fitted the bill 
since it accorded with the Prime Minister’s own beliefs on the source 
of the BR's shortcomings.
From that point increases in labour productivity were to be the 
condition of increased investment. In the House of Commons, the 
Secretary of State announced that whilst agreement in principle to 
network electrification had been given, the Government would await 
the details of the implementation of productivity schemes before 
sanctioning expenditure on any particular scheme. From then on BRB 
representatives were to reiterate to the rail unions that achievement 
of increases in efficiency were vital if the BRB was to secure 
greater levels of investment finance (see Bagwell, 1984). 
Accordingly, the BRB started to prioritize certain measures out of 
the package contained in The Challenge of the Eighties.
The essence of the Government’s approach was active intervention to 
model management decision-making. It did this by taking advantage of
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the opportunities presented by a series of bargaining situations to 
increase the pressure on BR management to take a firm line with the 
unions. This is reflected by the BRB's successively more hostile 
approach to the rail unions at each stage of the 1981 pay claim. At 
the same time, the BRB was still attempting to keep control of the 
situation in July 1981 by seeking to win the unions consent to the 
productivity proposals at a set of crisis talks. However, this 
attempt was in vain since the dependence of the BRB on government 
funding to finance the unions' pay claim allowed the conflict within 
the Government outlined above to spill over into the industry's 
labour relations.
Sir Peter Parker's guarded recollections of this period are
nevertheless highly revealing:
"I went to the Department of Transport in the summer of 1981 
arguing to get part of the East Anglian electrification under 
way. In negotiating change, over time, you are climbing the 
mountain, you pull hard on the rope, ease a bit, pull again. But 
in the public sector, the relationships with Whitehall, between 
Departments and the Treasury and Number 10 are all part of the 
bigger scene - and the negotiators themselves turn out to not to 
be the only ones on the climbing rope. Some day, it will become
clearer what those other Whitehall factors were" (Weighell,
1984, p. 219).
The strategy of the BRB since 1979 was resting on very uncertain
foundations. As argued in Chapter Three, because the Government's
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interventions were primarily in the sphere of labour relations, it 
proved difficult to maintain the ’tacit alliance* in labour relations 
(which hitherto had been the response to uncertainty and variabiliy 
in government policy). As the Board’s practice became increasingly 
determined by government tactics, so the hands of the critics of the 
alliance in the unions were strengthened. When the BRB refused to 
pay the second stage of the 1981 pay award, the NUR Executive, many 
of whom were suspicious of their General Secretary’s closeness to the 
BRB, responding by calling a national strike.
Before the strike took place, the BRB and rail unions met under the 
auspices of ACAS. The degree of linkage between two agreements 
reached in these discussions was subsequently to be one of the major 
issues in the ASLEF strikes in 1982. In The Understanding on Pay the 
unions conceded that payment of the 3# would be delayed until January 
1982 as would implementation of the 39 hour week. In The 
Understanding on Productivity the parties committed themselves to 
reaching agreement on flexible rostering of traincrews and the easing 
of manning conditions on locomotives by 31 October 1981; the open 
station concept by 31 October 1981; the trainman concept and the 
removal of freight guards by 1 January 1982; and the single manning 
of passenger trains by May 1982.
By this stage flexible rostering had become an important element of 
the productivity proposals for two reasons. The most pressing was 
that the introduction of the shorter working week required some 
changes to the organization of work. In addition, the notion of
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flexibility seemed likely to appeal to those who believed that BR was 
riddled with rigid union-imposed practices. Development of detailed 
work on flexible rosters took place comparatively late, reinforcing 
the argument that they were not initially a significant element of 
the productivity package. In the discussions in July 1981 the BRB 
had been unable to supply specimen rosters to the unions since they 
had not been prepared, and it was only after the ACAS talks that the 
BRB presented specimen rosters based on two links at Nottingham depot 
to the unions.
When these rosters were considered at the RSJC (Loco) on 2 September 
1981 it became clear for the first time that not merely was the BRB 
seeking greater flexibility in rostering arrangements but changes to 
the payment arrangements too through abolition of the eight hour 
guaranteed day established in 1919* ASLEF negotiators, though 
willing to discuss flexibility in rostering, were oppposed to the 
latter since the latter was a fundamental principle of footplate 
conditions of service (see McKillop, 1950). As flexible rostering 
now involved wider issues than variation in the rostered day, 
agreement was impossible to reach and, after another five meetings of 
the RSJC (Loco), a ’Failed to agree' was finally recorded.
Once again it is possible to discern the hand of government. Though 
the Board initially accepted that the two Understandings reached at 
ACAS were separate, the BRB announced shortly before Christmas its 
decision not to introduce the shorter working week and to withhold 
payment of the 3% outstanding from the 1981 settlement to the train
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drivers. In consequence, on 13 January 1982 a series of one-day 
strikes called by ASLEF in protest commenced.
So by the beginning of 1982 the alliance between rail unions and the 
BRB had broken down, under the pressure of government interventions. 
Anthony Ferner (1985) has argued that the shift in management 
strategy is best explained by what he calls a 'calculus of 
rationality'. In this calculus the likely cost to management of 
industrial action came to be outweighed by the potential long-term 
benefits of achieving legitimacy with the government. This analysis 
is consistent with the argument in this chapter with two differences. 
The first is that such a 'calculus' tends to overstate the degree of 
choice available to BRB managers in this situation. Government 
interventions exploited the predicament of the BR to enforce at 
various stages its own conceptions of how improvements in 
productivity could best be implemented. Secondly, given such 
constraints on the BRB, it is misleading to suggest that the BRB 
adopted a new strategy. By now it was dependent, to a large extent, 
on events beyond its control.
SUMMARY
It is difficult to escape the conclusion that BR's work re­
organization strategy had failed in its underlying objective. A
strategy that had begun life to keep governments at bay had fallen 
victim to one. Footplate prodi^ivity had re-emerged as an issue in 
the late 1970s leading to fears amongst top rail managers that 
governments could exploit this to impose restrictive financial 
policies on the railways.
Senior managers were sceptical of the extent to which reductions in 
controls in agreements could improve labour productivity. More
substantial increases in labour productivity were more likely to come 
from investment schemes than modifications to agreements. But since 
the scope of footplate controls on work organization were so 
comprehensive, and were strongly adhered to by workplace 
representatives and union headquarters, any major change to existing 
practices could only be achieved by a top level strategy. The scope 
for more incremental changes at Regional or depot level was limited.
So far the late 1970s a major work re-organization strategy was 
constructed. The unity in its proposals was the achievement of 
flexibility in labour deployment and manpower planning. As the 
strategy was designed to ward-off potentially damaging labour
relations interventions, the philosphy underlying the implementation
of the strategy was that it should be achieved with the active 
consent of the rail unions. In this way Board and unions could 
present an effective front to government: the case for more
investment funds would be difficult to decline if BR and unions had 
’put their own house in order.’ In this way the strategy was 
integral to the ’tacit alliance’ described earlier. However,
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mounting financial pressure on the Board provided the Government with 
the opportunity to enforce its labour relations goals and prejudices 
on BR. Thus, as the work re-organization strategy broke down, the 
flexible rostering element was, in effect, taken from the wreckage to 
be used as a weapon to achieve other objectives. From this
perspective, the flexible rostering case is not the outcome of a 




FLEXIBLE ROSTERS AND MANAGEMENT CONTROL
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i .INTRODUCTION
Flexible rosters came to the forefront of the BRB's labour management 
priorities in 1982. The vigour with which the Board fought it's case 
against ASLEF could suggest that this issue was the cutting edge of a 
consistent strategy in which work re-organization and labour 
relations objectives were clearly linked. But by 1982 flexible 
rosters had become largely separated from the work re-organization 
strategy that had been constructed in the late 1970s. Instead, they 
provided a mechanism for the BRB to prove its legitimacy with the 
Government (Ferner, 1985) by inflicting a defeat on the train
drivers' union. However, the Board did not have a free hand to do 
this since the Government intervened at key points of the dispute to 
enforce other, not necessarily consistent, priorities (1).
The emergence of flexible rosters in this way proved fatal to their 
success as a labour management policy. Precisely because of the way 
flexible rosters were removed from the context of a more
comprehensive work re-organization strategy, and because introduction 
of them came to be of symbolic importance, insufficient attention was 
paid by BR management to the labour relations processes likely to 
surround their implementation and the way in which they would
interact with existing agreements. Radical perspectives on issues of 
this sort can tend to suggest that the immediate outcome of
industrial conflict represents the final balance of power between 
management and workforce. However, if the examination goes beyond 
this to the implementation process in full a different conclusion may
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well emerge. In this case flexible rosters have not shifted control 
of rostering away from workforce representatives. Indeed their 
potential to do so was compromised from the beginning because of the 
factors mentioned here.
The findings reported here substantially confirm Rose and Jones’ 
contention that
’’the dynamics of detailed strategy implementation may alter the 
pace or character of the changes in ways that are incompatible 
with the existence of a detailed and comprehensive type of 
control-oriented strategy” (1985, p. 91)*
Furthermore, apvopvos the current interest in flexibility in labour 
deployment (Atkinson, 1984; IDS, 1986), attempts to increase
flexibility in highly regulated work environments may provide few 
benefits to management. Indeed, if attention is not paid to
reforming the whole pattern of regulation, the introduction of 
flexible arrangements in one area of work relationships can tend to 
increase rigidity in labour management overall.
The results are reported here in a number of sections. The first 
outlines the immediate implementation process. The second summarizes 
the main effects of flexible rosters on work content and
administration, prior to presenting managerial assessments of their 
success in the third section. The fourth provides an analysis of the 
attitudes of footplate representatives to this new form of work
scheduling.
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1. THE INTRODUCTION OF FLEXIBLE ROSTERS
The pressure on the BRB to make a stand on flexible rosters was to 
have a decisive impact on their eventual operation in practice. 
Since quick agreement became vital, the rostering proposals were 
developed largely without reference to other agreements with which 
they would be likely to interact at depot level (2). Furthermore, 
because the labour relations objective of overcoming ASLEF resistance 
came to be central, the implementation of flexible rosters was 
inadequately planned. As a result the Board’s policies came to be 
open to amendment by unpredictable elements of the labour relations 
'system'.
The first major constraint placed on the BRB by labour relations 
institutions was provided by the Railway Staff National Tribunal to 
which the Board's proposals had been submitted as a solution to the 
impasse in March 1982 (3). At the Tribunal the Board's evidence, 
presented by the Board Member for Industrial Relations, Cliff Rose, 
consisted of three main arguments. First, the shorter working week 
had to be introduced at minimum cost; second, that flexibility of 
rostering could bring benefits to footplate staff; and third, that 
ASLEF negotiators were aware of the full implications of the Board's 
proposals at the ACAS discussions in August 1981 and thus, in 
registering failures to agree to them, was acting in bad faith (4).
If rosters could be varied in length, Rose argued, the amount of 
unproductive time could be minimised either by lopping if off the end
228
of a shift or else adding time on such that an extra driving turn 
could be performed. The Board contended that flexible rosters could 
bring benefits to footplate staff such as raising the number of rest 
days, facilitate the grouping of them to form long weekends and 
lessen the incidence of unsocial booking on and off times. This 
objective would be achieved by placing many of the longer turns on 
nights.
At the heart of variable day rosters, as the Board saw it, was the 
ending of the eight hour guaranteed day. In place of the 1919 
Guaranteed Day Agreement which provides that "in the event of a man 
being available for duty on any week day he shall be guaranteed a 
day's pay" (source), the BRB proposed that a guaranteed 39 hour week 
should be introduced "providing the rostered turns are worked". The 
Board's contention was that this was clearly understood in the August 
1981 discussions at ACAS. Subsequent discussions at RSJC (Loco), the 
Board said, were thus not about the principle but how flexible 
rosters could be implemented. Thus ASLEF's failure to agree to the 
BRB (and NUR proposals) was in breach of an agreement and an act of 
bad faith.
ASLEF argued that at no point in the ACAS discussions did the BRB put 
forward a direct proposal to eliminate the 1919 agreement, and, 
General Secretary Ray Buckton contended,
"The BRB was either acting under a complete misunderstanding of 
our position or indulging in wishful thinking" (ASLEF 1982b, 
paras. 16-18).
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For locomen and their union the eight hour guaranteed day is a 
fundamental principle of their conditions of service since it 
provided for eight hours pay if a man was available for work even if 
his train working was cancelled. In 1982 the Society had declared 
itself willing to discuss some flexibility of rosters but argued that 
any rostered duty over eight hours should be paid at overtime rates 
in line with existing agreements, whilst a driver working a seven 
hour diagram would receive eight hours pay. ASLEF maintained that at 
a number of large depots where rosters in excess of eight hours were 
already in operation that drivers could suffer a large drop in 
earnings if flexible rostering was implemented in the way the BRB 
proposed. The BRB argued, however, that to implement flexible 
rosters this way would cost an extra £10.9 million p.a. and require 
an extra four thousand Drivers Assistants.
As well as arguing that flexible rosters would affect pay and the 
number of jobs, ASLEF claimed that they would reduce flexibility. A 
whole range of local practices, such as swopping turns, the 
equalisation of earnings and the maintenance of an am/pm shift 
balance, would be disturbed by a variation in shift length. The 
process of rostering would, in effect, be centralized away from the 
depot to the Regional Diagramming Office. Furthermore, the diagrams 
that had been supplied by the Board indicated that work often 
reserved for medically restricted men, such as shed and loco disposal 
jobs, would be added onto the end of main-line driving turns, thereby 
eliminating productive work for them.
230
The RSNT's report attempted to strike a balance between the BRB's and 
ASLEF's claims (see Modern Railways, 1982a). In so doing, it reduced 
the scope for flexibility on railway management's part since, in 
trying to achieve a compromise solution to end the dispute, it 
stipulated that a number of existing features of depot practice 
should be left untouched by the implementation of the rosters. The 
RSNT agreed to the BRB's proposal to implement flexible rosters of 
between 7 and 9 hours (with an 8 week cycle length) and to amend the 
Manning Agreements to permit single manning up to nine hours but 
imposed the following safeguards:
1) The majority of rosters should not be over 8 hour hours and no 
more than 20% should be over 8 1/2;
2) successive turns over 8 hours should only be worked if mutually 
agreed;
3) there should be no increase in unsocial hours;
4) drivers should be given advance information of the 8 week 
programme cycles;
5) rostered overtime should be spread equally within depots;
6) significant increases in overtime should not be added to 
'specials' or spare turns;
7) local practices should not be significantly affected.
8) flexible rosters should not involve any re-allocation of work 
between depots;
9) flexible roster should not lead to any alteration to traction 
training or any major changes in existing link structure (RSNT, 
1982).
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The RSNT awarded that the introduction of the new rosters at depot
level should be specifically remitted to LDCs. In the event of
disagreement, then implementation should be deferred pending 
agreement within the Machinery, with a review after six months or 
longer if necessary. Thus, as the Tribunal put it, the RSNT extended 
the status quo principle and extended joint determination. Thus, any 
possibility that flexible rosters could decisively shift control to
management was restricted by both the stipulation that a range of
existing practices should be unchanged, and that the rosters should 
be implemented through existing labour relations institutions.
Once the Tribunal had reported, the BRB seems to have sought to 'get 
back to normal' labour relations. However, at this stage a second 
element of the railway labour relations system came into play. The 
democratic nature of ASLEF allowed union activists, not privy to the 
traditional workings of the 'tacit alliance' but hostile to the BRB 
because of its break from consensual labour relations over the 
previous months, putting pressure on ASLEF representatives to refuse 
to accept the award. Thus, in early May the ASLEF Executive voted 
not to accept the RSNT decision. During June the RSNC met on several 
occasions in an attempt to find common ground but as ASLEF's Annual 
Assembly of Delegates was now in session, conference activists played 
a very important role in the formulation of the Society’s bargaining 
position. When the BRB stated that it would shortly introduce the 
new rosters whether agreement had been reached or not, ASLEF called 
an indefinite national strike to start at midnight on Sunday 4 July.
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Once ASLEF had declared its hand, it seems the Government stepped-in 
to insist that the fight be fought to the finish (Bagwell, 1984, p. 
100). It is not proposed to discuss here the events of the strike 
(for accounts see Bagwell, ibid. ; Ferner, 1985; Atkin, 1982; Modern 
Railways, 1982b). The strike was eventually ended by TUC 
intervention. After two days of arbitration over the weekend of 
15/17th July the Finance and General Purposes Committee of the TUC 
recommended that:
1) BR should withdraw the dismissal threat and treat as provisional 
rosters posted at 71 depots, and introduce no further ones before 
August 2nd;
2) ASLEF should call off the strike, recall the AAD and recommend it
authorize the EC to enter into negotiations and conclude an
agreement on the basis of RSNT 77;
3) the negotiations should begin immediately after the special ASLEF
conference and be completed in six days (Bagwell, 1984).
The ASLEF EC accepted the decision as a basis for settlement, though 
TUC involvement was widely seen as a 'sell-out' by the Society's 
activists. The truth appears somewhat more complex. Some discussions 
(see Bagwell, 1984, p. 102) suggest that full-time officials, such as 
Ray Buckton, would have accepted some movement away from the eight 
hour day but that they were constrained by conference decisions. 
According to Weighell (1983, pp. 96-97)» members of the TUC Committee 
quickly saw that ASLEF's case was non-existent, and that much of the 
weekend was spent trying to find a face-saving formula for the ASLEF 
EC by now trapped in a corner. Weighell argues that the TUC saved
233
ASLEF from self-destruciton. Sources interviewed by this author 
indicates that Weighell's account is not entirely inaccurate.
Even with this apparently decisive defeat of ASLEF at national level, 
constraints on the implementation of the rosters emerged which 
immediately illustrated the difficulties of reducing the role of 
local representatives in work allocation. The recalled Annual 
Assembly of Delegates on 27 July voted to allow the EC to negotiate 
an agreement to introduce the rosters but stated that the new rosters 
would be worked under protest and that drivers would not accept 
responsibility for their smooth operation (6). The problem for BR 
management was that at the great majority of depots the organization 
of rosters and links had traditionally been the preserve of LDC 
representatives, with Traincrew Managers playing a minimal role. 
Managerial inexperience was exacerbated by the novelty of flexible 
day lengths and balancing out hours over eight weeks, the 
complexities of respecting the element of the agreement which 
stipulated that there should not be significant changes in local 
agreements and practices without LDC consent, and the lack of 
enthusiasm for the rosters amongst the workforce.
At a large number of depots where management was forced to take on 
the rostering process LDC representatives were able to delay 
implementation for some time. At Electric, for example, management 
drew up three sets of rosters, all of which were rejected by the 
staff side as offending local agreements on the placing of rest days 
and the sharing of mileage work. This depot, along with Northern and
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Mixed did not work flexible rosters until October 1983* Where 
flexible rosters were introduced in 1982 it appears to be largely due 
to staff side efforts. The Traincrew Manager at Western, the first 
depot on its Region to work the rosters, recorded in interview that 
implementation on time would not have been possible without the 
active co-operation of the staff-side of the LDC.
Discussions continued at national level through most of 1983 on how 
flexible rosters should be implemented at local level. A ’full and 
frank exchange’ took place at the RSJC in March 1983 over wide- 
ranging differences of interpretation. By this time a large number 
of ’failed to agrees’ were being recorded by LDCs. At the same time 
ASLEF was pressing for payment of the premium which the RSNT had 
awarded train drivers for working the new rosters. This proved a 
difficult issue since some depots had chosen to work them from summer 
1982, some had them imposed, whilst the rest had not yet implemented 
them. ASLEF argued that all train drivers should receive the payment 
from a common date once the differences of interpretation had been 
sorted out. Headquarters' labour relations managers shared ASLEF's 
view on this but were unable to concede it because of pressure from 
the Regions who wanted their 'loyal' depots to be rewarded. The 
continuing problems that flexible rostering caused railway management 
in 1983 and the divisions that were being prolonged in ASLEF led the 
BRB and ASLEF to issue a joint interpretation of the issue in 
September 1983 (7)*
So far we have seen that the proposals for flexible rostering were
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substantially modified because of the findings of the RSNT. This 
institution had become involved since BR management, under mounting 
pressure from the Government, shifted its objectives from the 
introduction of a set of productivity proposals towards the labour 
relations objective of overcoming ASLEF resistance to change. In so 
doing it became difficult, despite the exercise of ’macho’ styles of 
management, to plan for and control outcomes. Furthermore, because 
the Board did not have a labour relations strategy to implement the 
rosters, it failed to come to terms with the possibility that the 
position of the LDCs in work allocation might be relatively 
unaffected by defeat of the union on the national stage. With a 
continuing dependence on workforce representatives, well-versed in 
the details of job regulation, for the conduct of aspects of labour 
management, there would be persistent obstacles to the achievement of 
the flexibility that the BRB sought.
2. FLEXIBLE ROSTERS AND WORK RE-ORGANIZATION
It could well be argued that the involvement of LDC representatives 
in labour management and their exercise of controls over work 
allocation, leads to the successful exercise of managerial control of 
the production process overall (cf. Edwards, 1983). On this basis 
the introduction of flexible rosters, despite the controls that have 
been asserted by workforce representatives, might be seen to have led 
to increased managerial control of labour deployment and task content 
through increasing managerial flexibility. Assessment of this is an
236
important issue since the growing literature on flexible patterns of 
work has so far provided little detailed analysis of its practical 
results. Analysis of the data collected on train drivers suggests 
that attempts to increase flexibility of labour deployment in highly 
regulated work environments may provide few benefits to management 
and can lead to increased rigidity. This contention will be 
demonstrated by an examination of the impact of flexible rosters on 
work content and the administration of employment.
i) Work Content
In its evidence to the RSNT, the BRB stated that a central objective 
of flexible rostering was to match fooplatemen' s hours of work more 
precisely to the requirements of train services. By cutting time off 
some turns and placing it on others and thus re-working diagrammed 
duties, it would be possible to replace some unproductive time with 
train driving duties. The results from the project suggest that 
this aim has largely not been realized. The explanation of this is 
to be found in the nature of work operations at depot level in 
conjunction with the provisions of RSNT 77*
The main impact of flexible rosters has not been the wholesale re- 
diagramming of main-line driving duties as was originally feared by 
ASELF (1982b) but the addition of locomotive/train preparation and 
disposal duties and general shed duties at the beginning and end of 
shifts. On a number of turns, particularly medium length freight 
services, it has been possible to reduce the number of depots
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involved in the service. Since British Rail is largely a passenger 
railway the spacing of depots largely reflects the needs of a high 
speed passenger railway. In consequence, prior to flexible 
rostering, some freight services required crew changes very close to 
their destinations to keep within national agreements. With an 
extension of turn length it is possible for the crew to work the 
service throughout (8).
The impact of flexible rostering on employment has varied between 
depots. At Stone, for instance, six driving jobs were saved. At 
Northern, by contrast, an extra five turns were needed. Since the 
former is a freight depot whilst the latter is largely a passenger 
depot it was initially believed that variations in the impact of 
flexible rosters between depots could be explained by reference to 
the nature of the workload. Closer analysis of the data suggests 
that this is not the case (though the passenger/freight distinction 
seems to be important in explaining variations in footplate attitudes 
to flexible rosters) and the most important determinant is whether 
the depot is an ’initiating' or ’relieving' depot.
The most obvious instance of initiating depots are those at terminii 
stations where train services commence (and terminate). 'Relieving' 
depots are those which provide traincrew relief for services from 
elsewhere. In practice it is not always possible to make a clear 
distinction between them. Western, for instance, as well as being 
at the centre of a complex of regional and inter-regional workings, 
also initiates a large number of local and provincial services.
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Nevertheless the distinction has a useful heuristic value.
These dimensions structure the nature of diagram content under 
flexible rostering in two main ways. Firstly, the fact that train 
formations at ’relieving1 depots are largely fixed leads to a 
relatively lower requirement for preparation and disposal duties than 
is the case with initiating depots. Secondly, relieving depots are 
subject to patterns of train running which are beyond their control, 
the most obvious here being late running. To cope with this 
diagrammers build in margins of ’unproductive time' to cater for this 
eventuality. The possibility of late running also inhibits the 
addition of miscellaneous duties at the end of driving turns. It 
also inhibits the wholesale reworking of diagrams for fear of 
passing operating difficulties from one group of services to another. 
It has thus not proved possible to comprehensively re-allocate work 
within relieving depots, whilst at initiating depots it has only been 
possible to add relatively light duties at the beginning and end of 
shifts.
So, the impact of flexible rostering has been significantly 
influenced by the prevailing pattern of work operations, rather than 
revolutionizing them as some of their proponents in their more 
optimistic moments hoped. There are limits, for a wide variety of 
reasons, on how much time can be diagramed for productive work due to 
the degree of interdependence and complexity of the ’production' of 
rail services. As the Board argued in the 1970s (SCNI, 1977; Bowick, 
1976), the overall 'quality' of diagrams in productivity terms is
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very much influenced by the overall quality of train services. The 
more frequently particular services operate the easier it is to 
balance outward journeys with productive return journeys. On the 
Southern Region, for instance, where services operate at high 
frequency, it is possible to diagram some turns with up to 90% 
driving duties.
So far, flexible rostering has not led to major changes to job 
content. But it could do if work is redistributed between depots. 
The extension in working hours introduced by flexible rostering 
could, on the face of it, permit the redistribution and reworking of 
diagrams between depots, and enable a reduction in the number of 
depots, through facilitating longer driving time. Widespread fears 
were uncovered amongst LDCs that traditional depot ’spheres of 
influence’ will eventually be breached as a result of flexible 
rostering. As the LDC Chairman at Junction put it,
referring to this question, ’’the diagrammers could give us a bloody 
hiding if they wanted to”.
However, it seems unlikely that flexible rosters will be widely used 
for this purpose, though the extension of single manning to nine 
hours could facilitate it. As Ferner notes, the current depot 
strategy was underway before the new rosters were introduced (Ferner, 
1985). Furthermore, during the dispute the BRB was insistent that 
flexible rostering would not be used to initiate a major re­
allocation of work between depots, and this was incorporated in the 
RSNT award. At the time of the research BR management had used the
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extension of single manning up to nine hours to close a small number 
of very small depots. But the limited extent to which this had taken 
place suggested that the Regions were engaged in a ’tidying-up' 
exercise rather than a comprehensive re-organization of depot work 
allocation. This judgement now seems (in June 1986) open to re­
assessment since Sectorization has started to rupture the existing 
traincrew depot strategy and Sector priorities are now taking 
precedence over integrated production strategies.
ii) The administration of work
Flexible rostering, if it has made a negligible impact overall on 
work content, has vastly changed the organization and administration 
of work at depot level. Flexible rostering has made a fundamental 
rostering practice in separating man hours length from turn length. 
The problem that thus faces work arrangers at depot level - roster 
clerks, supervisors, managers and LDC - is to match them within a day 
length of between 7 and 9 hours, and to achieve 312 hours over an 8 
week cycle. The constraints on them in this task include national 
agreement that no more than 30% of turns should be over 8 hours, no 
more than 20# over 8 1/2 and that local practices on equalizing 
mileage jobs and route and traction knowledge should not be 
transgressed. The problem here is twofold. One is to get the turns 
to balance to 312 hours over 8 weeks within these constraints. The 
second is to reconcile payment arrangements with this. The argument 
in this section will be that the greater complexity of work
arrangements has reduced flexibility and strengthened the reliance of 
managers and supervisors on footplatestaff.
Prior to flexible rosters link size had been largely determined by 
the number of different driving jobs over the duration of the 
timetable, taking account of the necessity of maintaining adequate 
route knowledge and policies of equalizing mileage bonus earnings. 
Flexible rostering complicated this by adding time as the major 
determinant. To implement this new system, links had to be 
constructed of eight or blocks of eight drivers to fit in with the 
eight week cycle. In many cases links had to be completely 
reconstructed. This restructuring often conflicted with existing 
depot policies on maintaining route knowledge. Indeed interview 
evidence indicated that the early days of flexible rosters were 
marked by chaos since men were re-allocated to links for which they 
did not have adequate route or traction knowledge. In this situation 
traincrew managers, supervisors and roster clerks were forced into 
dependence on footplate cooperation to resolve such problems.
Flexible rosters were introduced into an already highly regulated 
work environment and the new arrangements have interacted with 
existing practices in a variety of ways. A large number of national 
and local agreements are premissed on a standard eight hour day. For 
instance, the agreement covering supply of relief drivers from one 
depot to another lays down limits on rostered work and travelling 
time which are in conflict with the contours of flexible rosters. It 
is a moot question which agreement takes priority. Since the LDCs
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eventually resumed their traditional role of compiling the rosters, 
they were forced to prioritize the range of existing practices in 
respect to links construction. As a traincrew supervisor at Northern 
put it,
'Flexible rostering has come to the front and pushed other
agreements out of the way'.
At Freight both the traincrew supervisor and the guards' LDC recorded 
in separate interviews that the ranking of agreements was unresolved 
and that they were hoping to avoid a situation where they would have 
to come to terms with this.
At Western the mileage agreement had to be modified to facilitate the 
movement of turns between links. At Electric the LDC was forced to 
abandon its traditional oppostion to compulsory overtime, and add it 
to the spare turns to retain the system of sharing all the work (and 
mileage turns), since it is only by adding time to the spare turns 
that 312 hours can be achieved over the 8 week cycle. At Mixed the 
LDC had to supplement the spare link with spare turns in the main 
links to achieve the balance. As signing on times for spare turns 
can be varied daily by two hours either way this can spread irregular 
signing on times to the depot as a whole. It is these compromises 
that LDCs have had to make to implement flexible rosters that provide 
continuing opposition to flexible rosters despite the negligible 
impact they have had on work content.
Time has been elevated to become the prime determinant of roster 
construction. Given varying diagram length and the constraints
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outlined above the only way that the cycle length can be achieved is 
through adjustments to the rostering of spare drivers and through 
adding time. At Northern, for instance, where all spare work is done 
by drivers concentrated in a spare link, 312 hours is only achieved 
in the main links by fpadding-outf turn lengths. Mixed too, tends 
to be short of time for 312 so the diagrams have to be padded-out.
LDC policy there is to pad to 8 hours in an attempt to get back to 
the 8 hour day. At Junction the LDC similarly uses the spare turns 
to achieve the balance, and since a high proportion of the diagrams 
are well below 8 hours, a number of spare turns are rostered in 
excess of 8 hours.
This data suggests that the central objective of flexible rostering 
to maximise the levels of productive time has been compromised by the 
difficulties of achieving the cycle lengths in practice. One 
Regional Employee Relations Manager was highly critical of the 
benefits to management of flexible rostering, arguing that,
"all flexible rostering has done is shift around the block of 
spare time."
Indeed ASLEF policy is opposed to padding precisely because it makes 
a mockery of the alleged productivity improvements brought about by 
flexible rostering. In furtherance of ASLEF policy, Northern
Northern (whose LDC is highly committed to ASLEF) depot
unsuccessfully attempted to get the amount of time each diagram was 
padded-out officially shown on signing-on sheets. Despite their
criticisms of this practice, most LDCs are nevertheless dependent on 
it to compile the rosters.
However, the problems of flexible rosters are compounded in that the 
use of spare turns to achieve the administrative requirements of 
cycle times conflicts with traditional methods of allocating work.
It is here that the consequences of the separation between person 
length and turn length can cause labour relations problems. To 
illustrate this consider the situation where a nine hour job arises 
at short notice but the only spare driver is on a seven hour turn. 
Traditionally, at most footplate depots the local agreement would 
stipulate the procedures the Traincrew Supervisor and/or Roster Clerk 
should follow to cover vacant turns. Since seniority is the 
cardinal principle of footplate conditions of service, in most cases 
the most senior driver (within broad time bands) would have got the 
job. However, since flexible rostering elevates time as a principle, 
where a nine hour job comes up and the most senior driver is on a 
shorter turn length, it is not clear who the Traincrew Supervisor 
should allocate the turn to. Where the job length is longer than the 
spare turn, a driver is entitled by RSNT Decision 77 to decline the 
job if it involves rostered overtime greater than one hour. Thus the 
necessity of using sparemen's times to achieve the administrative 
requirements of Decision 77 conflicts with the need to cover turns of 
varying lengths.
This contradiction has passed considerable power to drivers since in 
many instances they have the right to turn down work. The Traincrew 
Manager at Electric complained that it was not uncommon for trains to 
be left standing at the station with no driver. This situation was 
graphically illustrated on a visit to one depot when the crew booked
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to work an oil train refused to leave the mess room on the grounds 
that to have worked the train would have violated the overtime 
agreement. In this context the day-to-day negotiating role of 
traincrew supervisors, as the staff who deal with immediate work 
allocation difficulties, has been heightened. However, because of 
the detailed nature of the traincrew agreements and resentment 
amongst drivers in the wake of the rostering dispute, their resources 
to deal with such problems are limited. The Sectional Council 
representative conducting the visit suggested that supervisors were 
the group who had suffered most from flexible rostering since they 
had to resolve the immediate problems arising from it.
2. MANAGEMENT ASSESSMENTS OF FLEXIBLE ROSTERING
In highlighting some of the problems faced by work organisers at 
depot level as a result of flexible rostering, it is appropriate to 
turn to managerial assessments of its success of failure.
The senior managers interviewed were somehwat circumspect in their 
assessment of the merits of flexible rostering. No one interviewed 
at this level suggested that they had achieved their central 
objective of maximizing productive driving time. Indeed, off the 
record comments suggest that it is believed that flexible rostering 
has been a remarkable failure in this respect. The achievements that 
such managers pointed to are two fold - the limited extension of 
single manning and the introduction of the 39 hour week at minimum
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cost, neither of which are integral to flexible rosters per se (9).
It is difficult to assess the financial benefits that are claimed to 
arise from flexible rosters since the Board’s published information 
suffers from a lack of clarity (cf. Ferner, 1985). It seems likely 
that the savings largely come from the extension of single manning up 
to 9 hours, and the reduction in the requirements for second men. 
Since the agreement stipulate that no compulsory redundancies should 
arise in consequence and that earnings should be protected, these 
savings are spread over a number of years, as depot establishments 
are revised downwards as drivers retire and drivers’ assistants and 
relief drivers are promoted into the main driving links. Against 
this must be set the costs of flexible rostering. ASLEF respondents 
directed attention to increased levels of overtime arising from the 
need to balance out cycle lengths. In interview one ASLEF official 
pointed out that some depots which had never hitherto worked overtime 
were now working quite high levels. The Board has vigorously 
rejected these claims and has argued that any increase in overtime 
since 1982 has been marginal (10).
Of senior managers, labour relations managers were most critical of 
the new system of rostering. They claimed that it had failed to 
achieve more productive use of time, that it had increased rigidity, 
and that it had produced a continuing supply of claims from depots to 
higher reaches of the Machinery. Middle managers were more critical 
still; comments such as ’a bloody waste of time' were very common in 
interview responses.
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The depot managers interviewed were near unanimous in their criticism 
of flexible rosters. The loss of managerial control over aspects of 
work organization appears to have been felt most acutely at this 
level. A fairly typical evaluation is that of the Traincrew Manager 
at Western,
”It had a great initial impact but then lost it. It was very 
much a one-off, and indeed it has produced more problems than it 
solved. Flexible rosters are a bit of a gimic. Someone at the 
BRB thought it was the be-all and end all. But, to make these 
things work you have got to have practical experience of railway 
life.”
There are two main areas where depot managers feel some loss of 
control over work and its organization. The first is the difficulties 
of inserting amended workings and the refusal of LDCs in most cases 
to countenance it. The second is the difficulty of matching spare 
men to turns whose lengths differ and the right of drivers to turn 
down overtime. Both of these have been exacerbated by the bitterness 
in the footplate arising from the dispute. As the Traincrew Manager, 
at Electric put it,
”it has saved us money on BR, I guess, but on the practical side 
it has done us a lot of harm It is nowhere near as flexible as 
the 8 hour day. Under that if you got an overtime situation you 
paid it and that was that. Flexible rosters tried to take up 
unproductive time and as a result must have saved money I think, 
but it ties you down. We have lost a lot of goodwill too. You 
find that when a driver is on his long week he is often not
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prepared to make overtime. When he gets onto his short week he 
just wants to get home early so he won’t do any then either. 
Now they often won’t wait for late running trains for relief 
purposes. We had a better movement and utilization of men at 
depot level under the eight hour day."
Uncertainty as to the precise benefits of flexible rostering was 
repeated in numerous other interviews. Two local managers argued 
that the BRB would have been better to have sought to revise the HST 
Manning Agreement since -the benefits of saving drivers was not 
compromised by the complication of rostering arrangements.
Criticisms of flexible rostering was replicated in interviews with 
Roster Clerks and Traincrew Supervisors. Both deal with immediate 
issues of work allocation and hence the problems outlined above are 
felt particularly keenly. The Traincrew Supervisor often faces the 
most immediate problems since this function is responsible for 
minute-by-minute alterations to rosters. However, Roster Clerks have 
additional area of difficulty in that they are responsible for 
dealing with time sheets and wages, and resolving the complexities 
arising from the interaction of flexible rosters with payment systems 
and other conditions of service. Indeed, the Head of Rostering at 
Northern suggested this is far more problematic than rostering 
itself. The root difficulty is that it is difficult to keep track
of drivers’ hours where they transfer depots or move into new links 
in the middle of a roster cycle. It is particularly problematic in 
depot transfer since the promotion arrangements operate on a two- 
monthly rather than eight-weekly cycle. In such circumstances, there
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is the danger that drivers lose tbeir additional rest day and work 
considerable levels of overtime without payment. In the face of 
ardent scrutiny by LDCs and the absence of national agreements to 
govern these situations, Roster Clerks, as one put it,
"have to make up their own rules here just to keep the job 
moving".
As a result, the complexities of administering flexible rosters have 
stimulated the growth of informal payment practices which can run 
counter to ’good housekeeping’ policies promulgated by senior 
managers since 1979*
4. FOOTPLATE ATTITUDES TO FLEXIBLE ROSTERS
Footplatemen share the lack of enthusiasm of managers and supervisors 
for the new rosters. In fact, most footplatemen interviewed were 
scathing in their criticism. As a group of staff generally highly 
committed to the railway they are critical of a system which they 
perceive to be inefficient. And, unsurprisingly, the Board’s conduct 
of the dispute left a residue of resentment which managers believe 
will take some time to clear. Particularly galling to footplatemen, 
given their highly irregular hours of work, was the Board’s assertion 
that the guaranteed eight hour day precluded flexibility. As locomen 
oft remark, they are the most flexible grade on the railway. In this 
section the wide ranging criticisms of LDCs are outlined.
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LDC members suggested that the fears presented by ASLEF negotiators 
to the RSNT had been borne out in practice. For instance, shift 
balances had been disrupted by the mathematical complexity of
reaching 312 hours. At the Tribunal the Board had claimed that
flexible rosters could facilitate a reduction in the incidence of
unsocial booking on and off times by putting a high proportion of
long turns on nights. However, at the depots visited only a minute 
reduction of such booking on and off was in evidence, for the reason 
that the structure of work was largely structured by the prevailing
pattern of railway operations. At freight depots, in particular,
there appears to have been little change since Speedlink freight
traffic takes place largely at night. At Junction (a major Speedlink
freight depot) the majority of turns are late at night and in the
very early morning.
A further concern of ASLEF and its members was that the variation in 
turn length would prohibit the exchange of turns, a facility held
dear by footplatemen. As well as occasional swops, it has also
been the practice at some depots for exchanges to made on a rolling 
basis such that older men work all day shifts and younger men, to 
whom enhancements are more important, to work solely on nights.
Flexible rostering has made the practicability of such practices far 
more dependent on the individuals involved. It is not possible to 
formally exchange turns since the computer payment system cannot make 
the necessary adjustment. Thus, drivers have to settle up 
financially amongst themsflves.
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Against this must be set the overall reduction in working hours 
introduced by flexible rosters. The increase in overtime has to be 
set against this, but at evry depot the switch to the 39 hour week 
has been used to create an extra rest day every eight weeks. The 
practice adopted by virtually all depots is to use this to form a 
very long weekend away from work every eight weeks (11).
Although all LDC representatives interviewed were critical of 
flexible rostering, there were significant variations in the pattern 
of evaluation overall. Passenger and mixed traffic depots were most 
critical whilst the LDCs at the freight depots visited suggested that 
flexible rosters, as currently operated, could work to the 
footplate's advantage. The reasons for this divergence seemed to be 
differential levels of involvement in union policy and the nature of 
work operations.
Although freight only depots are generally as loyal as others to the 
union they are less centrally involved in Society policy, either at 
Conference, Executive Committee of Sectional Council level. There 
are three main reasons for this;
1) In terms of union office they are at an electoral disadvantage 
since they are generally smaller than passenger and mixed traffic 
depots;
2) Because freight traffic is generally slower than Intercity 
passenger trains there are fewer opportunities for mileage bonus 
work. For instance, at the time of the interview, Freight had 
one mileage turn, whilst Junction had none. Since earnings as a
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result are generally lower than main-line depots there is a 
tendency to transfer away from them. Thus, freight-only depots 
tend to have a much younger age profile and since 
adherence to the Society has usually been enforced by ’depot 
elders' in most depots adherence to Society policy is less deeply 
rooted than in main-line passenger depots (12).
3) Because of the nature of freight operations, such depots are 
somewhat apart geographically from the rest of the railway.
This physical separation from the rest of the railway, the 
concentration of work operations at night, the shorter distances 
worked, and the high levels of yard and depot working, set freight 
depots apart from the rest of the railway and contribute to a 
distinct freight depot culture. One element of this is that such 
depots tend to sort their own affairs out with less reference to 
outside institutions, be they Sectional Council or senior management. 
It was possible to discern a sense of a shared culture amongst 
managers, supervisors and traincrews greater than that found in 
passenger depots. Adherence to national agreements is less deep, and 
managers and workforce seemed more willing to 'bend' if not break 
national agreements.
The nature of operations at such depots enables flexible rostering to 
be turned to the footplate's advantage in two respects - hours of 
work and payment. As freight trains do not operate to the same rigid 
timetable as passenger trains, it is often possible to start freight 
trains early, if ready, and arrive back at the depot earlier. The
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existence of longer turns provides an incentive to do this. Indeed 
the Traincrew Supervisor interviewed Ft eight believed that one 
unanticipated benefit of flexible rostering had been an acceleration 
in Speedlink timings since on arrival back at the depot it was the 
custom to be booked-off. Another factor relevant to freight
operations is the frequent cancellation of trains by the customer. 
In these circumstances, similarly, the supervisor would generally 
allow the driver to go home early. At the same time as this 
reduction in working hours it is generally easier for locomen to make 
overtime if they should so desire . As passenger trains generally 
take precedence over freight * pathsf, particularly on high speed 
lines, it is easy, by a variety of strategems, for the driver to 
'lose* his path, leading to substantial late running and overtime. 
Many drivers, in the absence of mileage work, are not averse to 
making overtime on the short turns introduced by flexible rosters.
The freight depots studied, then, argued that flexible rosters did 
not uniformly work to drivers' disadvantage. The reasons for this 
re-affirm the argument outlined earlier that flexible rostering has 
not transformed work operations at depot level but instead has been 
substantially moulded by them.
CONCLUSIONS
Flexible rostering is one of the first major instances of a public 
corporation attempting to restructure working practices in response
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to governmental pressures. The objectives of the current government 
to improve labour productivity, dismantle trade union controls on its 
organization, and more generally weaken trade union power provides an 
explanation of how this issue came to the fore and, to a large 
extent, the conduct of the dispute. The evidence suggests that the 
Board's initial reponse to an anticipated radical government was to 
attempt to win the trade unions to a comprehensive strategy of reform 
of all areas of railway activity. The Board's autonomy to continue 
this traditional consensual approach was, however, curtailed by 
increasing financial pressure and growing government assertiveness in 
the restructuring of the public sector.
As Ferner (1985) has argued, the prime reason for flexible rostering 
assuming centre stage was essentially political. Managerial 
determination at first offered the opportunity for BR to prove its
legitimacy with the government; as the issue hardened into a dispute
it became vital. The financial benefits of new forms of rostering 
itself seem to have been negligible. The response of senior BR 
managers to this charge is that the benefit of flexible rostering lay
in its catalytic effect to the implementation of a range of
productivity improvements. However, the reverse has been the case as 
this disruption of consensual labour relations has impeded such 
amendments of other areas of working practice. But it may be that 
the determined stance of the Board on flexible rostering has 
contributed to a new respectability of BR management in key 
government circles which, in permitting increased levels of 
investment, has financial significance far beyond that of the issue
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of labour productivity.
At the level of workplace organization flexible rosters have been 
seen by many, management, union and workforce, as little short of a 
disaster. Work organization has been rendered vastly more complex 
with negligible gains in productivity measured in terms of driving 
time per driver. In a number of ways management have lost control of 
some aspects of production in consequence. The revision of 
timetables has been impeded by union adherence to cycle times and 
depot work organisers have had to resort to informal payment 
practices, in violation of ’good housekeeping' policy, to deal with a 
number of problems arising from the interaction of flexible rosters 
with other local and national agreements. The irony here is that 
flexible rosters have, in many ways, exacerbated the rigidity of 
these constraints. There is substantial evidence in this case, then, 
to support the argument of Rose and Jones that work re-organization 
and labour relations have a separate dynamic in practice, and that 
pursuit of certain objectives in one of these spheres may conflict 
with apparently similar goals in the other.
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CHAPTER NINE




The emergence of micro-processor technology in the 1970s led to 
considerable interest in the potential impact of technical change on 
skills and the nature of work. These concerns coalesced with the 
issues arising from Braverman’s Labour and Monopoly Capitalism (197*0 
to generate research into management strategies behind the 
implemention of changes in production methods. Initially, a number 
of researchers demonstrated that the pattern of management aims in 
implementing technical change did confirm the labour process view 
associated with Braverman (Zimbalist, 1979)* It was not long, 
however, before both historical investigation (see Lazonick’s account 
of the ’self-acting mule*, 1979) and research into contemporary 
change emphasized both variability in managerial objectives 
(McLoughlin, Smith and Dawson, 1983) and in the impact on skills 
(Jones, 1982). As these findings have come to be widely replicated 
they have come to represent something of a ’conventional wisdom’ on 
the subject.
So far the focus in this thesis has been management business 
strategies and managerial objectives in the organization of work. It 
seemed worthwhile to include a study of technical change in railway 
signalling in this research since an important long-term objective of 
railway managements has been to reduce the element of operator 
discretion in signalling operation (1). Since managerial aspirations 
have included attention to task performance, it seemed possible that 
the case of railway signalling could contradict the findings of that
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material which had been critical of the labour process perspective. 
The investigation thus attempted to explore the objectives and 
content of management strategies, taking as their focus the 
replacement of simple mechanical signalling systems by electrically- 
powered systems involving substantial degrees of automation. The 
development of railway signalling is outlined first, prior to an 
examination of how far the emergence of a management strategy to 
centralize operational control has been premised on gaining control 
of signalling tasks from signalmen.
1.THE DEVELOPMENT OF RAILWAY SIGNALLING
The fundamental purpose of railway signalling is to prevent more than
one train being in a block section on the same line at the same time
(BRB, 1972, p.2). When railway operation first commenced few 
companies saw the need for systems of regulating traffic (Andrews, 
1968), but after a number of railway accidents the necessity for some 
form of operational control soon became apparent. The first 
statutory intervention was the 1838 Railways Act. This legislation 
created a class of railway policemen whose duties were to enforce 
order amongst railway employees, of which one element was to secure 
adherence to embryonic bureaucatic operational rules. On the Great 
Western Railway the duties of these policemen were to,
"preserve order at stations, remove intruders, direct
passengers, assist in the case of accidents, keep the line free
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of obstructions, give and receive signals, superintend points 
and crossings, give notice of times of arrival and departure of 
trains, watch for movements of embankments and cuttings, inspect 
rails and sleepers, convey the earliest information on every 
subject to their superiors.” (Great Western Rule Book, quoted 
Andrews, 1968) (2),
The earliest form of systematic signalling used a time interval 
system whereby a second train would be allowed to enter a block 
section after a certain passage of time had elapsed since the 
previous train entered it. More intricate bureaucratization of work 
tasks was permitted by the application of the electric telegraph. 
Some reduction in the discretion of the railway policemen proved 
possible with the development of a system of ’Absolute Block' 
operation in which train movements could only take place after a 
telegraphic message confirming that the line was clear had been 
received from a location further up the line. The line was always 
assumed to be closed unless specifically cleared in this way for the 
passage of a train.
Pressure from the Railway Department of the Board of Trade on the 
railway companies to adopt the Absolute Block system, and technical 
experimentation by railway engineers led to the development of a 
separate signalling function and, associated with it, a re-division 
of railway labour. Hand signals came to be replaced by simple 
mechanical signals, and the controls for these were concentrated in 
mechanical signalboxes (3). Each signalbox controlled one 'absolute
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block’. The ’Absolute Block’ system of rules, and the mechanical 
interlocking of levers to prevent operators setting-up conflicting 
routes, were made compulsory by the 1889 Regulation of Railways Act. 
As a result of these developments the functions of railway policemen 
were re-divided and signalling was established as a discrete 
occupational function.
From the turn of the century a number of technical developments 
facilitated the transformation of the methods of railway signalling. 
It became possible to operate semaphore signals and sets of points 
using electric motors. The invention of the ’track circuit' in the 
late ninteenth century made it possible to use train movements 
themselves as part of the signalling system. Finally the development 
of the fail-safe electrical relay suggested that a replacement could 
be found for mechanical interlockings. Such devices as these were 
increasingly found in signalling schemes after the First World War.
The importance of these technical developments was that it appeared 
signalling safety could be achieved through building the safety 
functions into the equipment itself rather than relying on 
bureaucratic specifications of task performance and on signalmen’s 
knowledge and judgement of the application of the rules. 'Absolute 
Block' operation could be replaced by the less-restrictive 'Track 
Circuit Block Operation'. Since electrical relays ensure that the 
signalmen cannot make routing errors, it is possible to assume, in 
direct contrast to 'Absolute Block', that the line is always open 
unless closed by a train movement. The core element of the
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signalman’s job, the safe passage of trains from point to point, 
could be rendered redundant.
Initially these new elements of signalling operation were 
incorporated into traditional systems and operated by signalmen in a 
similar manner to that found in entirely mechanical environments. 
Electrically controlled points and signals were interlocked 
mechanically within the signalbox and operated individually by 
minature levers, acting as electrical switches. But the use of fail­
safe relays and track circuits permitted control of multiple 
functions by a smaller number of switches, and from the late 1920s 
the LNER pioneered the use of control panels and thumb switches in a 
number of signalling schemes north of York.
Two forms of operator control have been used to work ’route relay 
interlockings' of this sort, both of which are described in the ITF’s 
study of techical change on BR (International Transport Workers
Federation, 197*0 • The earlier is known as One Control Switch (OCS). 
Here, the operation of the group of signals and points at each 
junction is concentrated on multi-position switches with each
position openning a different route. This form of control was used 
at York, St Pancras, Crewe, Liverpool Street and Bethnal Green, and
as late as the early 1960s in the re-signalling schemes associated
with the Crewe-Manchester electrification. The second type, which is 
now standard on BR and on other European railways, is known as 
Entrance-Exit (NX). The automation of functions is more advanced 
than found in OCS systems since the pressing of two route buttons at
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the beginning and end of a route sets up all the points and signals 
on that route. In addition, stretches of plain line can be signalled 
entirely automatically by the passage of trains themselves.
Electrical operation of this sort revolutionised railway signalling 
since, as well as displacing the signalman's safety function, both 
the area of control of signalboxes and the intensity of operations 
could be considerably expanded. Power boxes were freed from the 
technical and statutory requirement placed on manual boxes to be 
sited at the junctions they controlled. Furthermore, with 'Track 
Circuit Block Operation' signals can be brough closer together (until 
the space between them is half the braking distance of the fastest 
trains) with the result that line speeds can be increased and a large 
number of train movements take place simultaneously in the area of 
control. By contrast, in 'Absolute Block' operation the 'block' is 
the distance between each signalbox. Since only one train can be on 
the block at any one time, line capacity and, to an extent, line 
speed are dependent on the spacing of signalboxes.
Until the early 1960s, however, the cost of cabling limited the 
potential area of control of each signalbox to around seven route 
miles (Johnson and Long, I98O). This constraint was removed by the 
development of remote control systems which permitted the 
installation of relay interlockings at locations removed from the 
main signalbox and controlled by coded messages. These were first 
used in resignalling schemes on the Crewe-Manchester line in the 
early 1960s, and are now commonly used in large-scale re-signalling
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schemes.
This technical development is important because it enabled a new 
managerial approach to be adopted to the provision of modem 
signalling. Prior to the use of remote control systems, re­
signalling schemes had generally proceeded on an incremental scheme- 
by-scheme basis, except where they formed part of wider 
electrification projects. Even here, though, the coherence of 
schemes could be compromised by variability in governmental policies. 
The plan to resignal the London-Crewe line with NX control throughout 
was thwarted by governmental anxiety over the rising costs of the 
electrification scheme of which it formed a part and the trenchant 
criticism of railway costing and investment procedures found in the 
Select Committee's report in i960 (SNCI, i960) (3).
The centralization of managerial authority which emerged after the 
creation of the British Railways Board facilitated the development of 
a strategic approach to operational and technical decision-making. 
In 1965 the Signals and Telecommunications Department at BRB 
Headquarters produced the National Signalling Plan (4). In place of 
the earlier ad hoc approach to signalling schemes, the central 
feature of the strategy was the concentration of operational control 
as far as possible in large 'control centres'. The objective, as 
stated by the Chief Signals and Telecommunications Engineer in 1975. 
was to work towards controlling about 90% of the network by about 70 
such centres with each controlling an average of 500 track 
kilometers. The remaining 10# of the network was of such low
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traffic density that it would not be financially or economically 
worthwhile providing the same level of centralized control (Cardani, 
1976).
A few examples should suffice to indicate the operational scale of 
the type of 'signalling centre' envisaged by the Plan. With the 
completion of the East Coast Main Line electrification in the late 
1980s the long-term aim of concentrating operational control in six 
large power boxes at Kings Cross, Peterborough, Doncaster, York, 
Newcastle and Edinburgh will have been realised. At the beginning of 
the 1970s the Southern Region planned to concentrate signalling in 
thirteen large signalboxes (Modem Railways, 1970). On the Western 
Region the situation was more complex since by the time of the NSP it 
was already well underway on a Region-wide policy to re-signal 
virtually the entire Region with standardised lineside equipment and 
control centres (5)•
The majority of the signalling locations visited resulted from the 
NSP. These 'control centre' signalboxes represented a major break 
with the past in terms of employment numbers and the nature of 
signalling work. Substantial continuity could be found between 
manual boxes and the early power signalboxes since in both the 
signalman often worked alone, and signalling was performed over a 
fairly small area. By contrast, in the signalling centres large 
numbers of signalmen were grouped together, generally under a 
supervisor, controlling a large number of train movements over a wide 
geographical area. These control centres could control up to 300
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track miles, taking over the work of sixty signalboxes and displace 
several hundred signalmen (6).
Table 1 The Employment Effect of large signalboxes
Location No, of No. of No of signalmen
signalmen boxes displaced displaced 
Pre-National Signalling Plan (NSP)
Welsh. 23 69* 234*
Central 12 34 136
West Country 18 16 44
NSP
Western 32 61 270
Eastern 31 50 214
Bridge 4l 16 154
]
South-Eastern 55 70 120
Airport
Interim-NSP
University 10 14 36
Cathedral 6 6 35
Late-NSP
Stone 19 12 n/a




Northern 12 3 28
Midland 18 44 78
{* these figures are the joint outcome of this scheme and a parallel 
scheme.
#  these signalboxes were on a small scale but were perceived as the 
nuclei of a larger signalling centre to be constructed later)
Information compiled from interview data, NUR records and various 
issues of Modern Railways.
As a result of the introduction of these large control centres 
signalling employment has fallen considerably since nationalization. 
7,9^1 signalmen were employed in 1978 compared with 25,190 in 1950 
(7). Taking signalmen and crossing keepers (operators of level 
crossings) together their numbers fell from 9 .638 in 1978 to 7*330 in 
March 1985 (8). The number of signalboxes fell from around in 1950
to 2,256 in 1979*
2. THE LABOUR PROCESS AND MANAGEMENT OBJECTIVES
In this brief history of railway signalling operation two themes 
apparently provide powerful support for a labour process perspective. 
The first is that managerial objectives appear to have centred on 
reducing the potential for operator discretion. The decision-making
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element of railway signalling appears to have been progressively 
diminished through the application of a bureaucratic set of work 
rules, the interlocking of human functions in the rules, the 
mechanical interlocking of manual signalling equipment, the gradual 
use of electrical supplements to this, and finally the vesting of the 
safety function in electrical relays and the automation of many 
signalling functions. The second is the formation of a high-level 
management strategy in the late 1960s to implement signalling schemes 
making use of this latter form of operation on a comprehensive scale, 
and hence rendering redundant the traditional signalman’s function of 
passing safely trains from A to B. To demonstrate that a labour 
process analysis is one that has solid empirical support, it would be 
necessary to prove that these two developments are closely connected.
The temporal conjunction of these two trends seem to support 
Braverman’s (197*0 case that managements have, through adoption of 
the principles of scientific management, steadily removed the 
judgmental elements from manual and white collar work. Since the 
characteristics of traditional signalling work, though physically 
demanding, require judgemental ability rather than manual dexterity, 
Braverman’s description of the degradation of white collar work is 
apposite here. As he describes it,
’the progressive elimination of thought from the work of the 
office worker thus takes the form, at first, of reducing mental 
labour to a repetitious performance of the same set of 
functions. The work is still performed in the brain, but the 
brain is used as the equivalent of the hand of the detail worker
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in production, grasping and releasing a single piece of 'data' 
over and over again. The next step is the elimination of the 
thought process completely” (1974, P*319)*
Ardent defenders of Braverman’s thesis are now hard to find. Critics 
have convincingly demonstrated that his concept of actors is highly 
abstract, since it ignores the potential for worker resistance to the 
process he outlines. As a result the Marxian link between the
productive forces and the relations of production is severed (Littier 
and Salaman, 1982). Empirically-based work indicates that managerial 
intentions behind changes to production methods are as often aimed at 
responding to market developments as to achieving internal objectives 
(Buchanan and Boddy, 1983; Kelly, 1985; Francis, Snell, Willman and 
Winch, 1982). Where potentially de-skillng technology is introduced, 
realisation of such an objective can be obstructed by a range of 
factors (Jones, 1982) and by continuing managerial reliance on
workers' ’tacit skills’ (Jones, 1983; Jones and Wood, 1984).
Nevertheless it is often possible to discern sympathy for the labour 
process perspectives based on evidence in the literature of
managements using new technology to achieve greater control of the 
production process at the expense of labour (see, for instance, 
Willman and Winch’s account of process innovation at Longbridge
(1985) and Wilkinson's set of case studies in manufacturing (1983).
Railway signalling appears to be a case where such suspicions are 
well justified because a long term objective has been to reduce
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operator discretion. Proof that the labour process view offers a 
valid perspective in this caseof requires the following:
a) that management be shown to have explicit labour control 
objectives as a central rationale for change schemes;
b) that foremost amongst the advantages of the particular scheme 
chosen is its abilities to facilitate managerial control of task 
performance and of work organization more generally.
Each of these will be examined in turn.
i) Strategic objectives
Turning to the first of these, the results of the project fail
support the contention that management undertook change schemes to 
wrest control of task performance from labour. In every case studied 
the investment was 'renewals-led', that is it took place to replace 
existing equipment that was life-expired. This is not to say that 
the details of schemes were entirely determined by renewals needs. 
Precisely, because the central strategy was to steadily concentrate 
control the opportunity was taken in a number of these schemes to 
replace certain equipment that was not life-expired or where the
immediate financial benefits were not always apparent.
a
Investment has been dictated by renewals needs because of the 
limitations on the Board’s access to investment finance. This 
provides a contrast with many other studies in the area. NTRG's
research on the adoption of TOPS by BR found that it was adopted by
the BRB as an attempt to stem deteriorating financial position of the
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freight business and its declining market share (McLoughlin, Smith 
and Dawson, 1983). Buchanan and Boddy’s study indicated that 
improved product and attempts to increase market share were important 
reasons behind process innovation (1983). Similar results were found 
in a survey of companies conducted by the Imperial College team 
(Francis et alt 1982).
To show that the primary management objective is to replace worn-out 
equipment does not preclude other objectives. Managements have 
choices in the form replacement equipment takes. Labour-focused 
objectives could well be important in this respect both as a
rationale for the configuration of the scheme overall and as an 
explanation for the selection of particular items of equipment. .
In the justification for signalling schemes reduction in labour costs 
and the improvement in labour productivity have an importance that is
probably greater than is found in other industries because of
Treasury investment appraisal procedures. Schemes over £5 million 
are subject to Governmental approval and have to achieve a Required 
Rate of Return of J% (8). To estimate the net financial benefit 
scheme designers have to weigh cost savings against^likely increased 
revenue. On the revenue side the improvements in train speeds and 
line capacity that result from modem signalling are converted by 
standard formulae into revenue gains. However, the scope for 
increasing revenue is believed to be limited. As one interviewee put 
it,
"investment on BR is essentially about stemming a long-term
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decline in market share rather than increasing it.”
Since technical changes on the railways provide limited product 
market advantages, the financial justification of signalling schemes 
largely comes from cost reductions. In a labour-intensive 
organization such as British Rail labour saving is the most 
significant source of this. Signalling schemes are largely financed 
by reductions in signalmen and crossing keepers, and to a lesser 
extent in signalling and track maintenance staff. So, although 
renewal of facilities rather than external market or internal labour- 
focussed objectives is the main reason for investment taking place, 
reductions in labour costs are the prime justification.
ii) Scheme design and control
Though the findings of the case studies indicate that enhanced 
managerial control of labour is not the reason . for undertaking 
resignalling schemes adherents of the labour process perspective 
might nevertheless wish to argue that the content of particular 
schemes both in terms of the nature of the equipment utilized and the 
design of the scheme overall owe much to managerial control 
objectives. For example, a number of Wilkinson’s case studies show 
that the configuration of equipment is susbtantially determined by 
management's labour objectives (Wilkinson, 1983). Two central 
features of the strategy adopted by BR since the late 1960s could 
embody such control aspirations. The first is that the higher 
standards of safety found in NX operation could be seen as dependent
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on reducing the signalman’s decision-making role. In this way 
signalmen could be said to be de-skilled. The second is that the 
importance attached to the centralization of operational control has 
directly deleterious implications for labour’s autonomy in decision­
making.
However, the results to be summariz-ed here indicate that BR 
management has paid little detailed attention in advance to the 
distribution of decision-making in the area of task performance. 
Furthermore, the shifts in control that have taken place occurred 
between operating functions rather than between management and labour 
(cf. Clark, Smith and Rose, 1984).
The main components of traditional signalling skills lies in the area 
of operator judgement. This has two elements - decision-making on 
the safety of allowing train movements to take place , and decision­
making on the priorities of these movements. Whilst changes in the 
two dimensions above may effect both these aspects, it is necessary 
for the proof of a labour process perspective that managerial
strategists are not only aware of these potential consequences but
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that they form a central rationale for strategy content. Interview 
questions sought to probe, therefore, the rationale for the adoption 
of 'route relay interlocking’ signalling equipment concentrated in 
large control centres.
We have already seen that a key feature of power signalling using the 
’Entrance-Exit’ form of operational control is that the signalman
273
sets-up a route by pressing buttons at the beginning and end of a 
route, leaving the ’route relay interlocking' to perform the control 
function of individual points and signals. Since the traditional 
signalman's tasks involved direct control of points and signals this 
may well seem a prima facie case of de-skilling. Whatever the
consequences, however, this is insufficient evidence for a managerial 
intention. Interview evidence overwhelmingly indicated that 
managerial intentions did not centre on de-skilling signalmen. 
Rather this form of operation was adopated chiefly because the
equipment was well-established technically. In this way, this 
element of the re-signalling strategy could be said to be
'engineering led.'
When NX operation was first developed in the 1930s it may well have
been believed by some rail managers that this form of operation would
eliminate the traditional signalling function, potentially allowing
route setting of trains to be performed by relatively unskilled
labour. However, evidence (which will be outlined shortly) that this
has not been feasible in practice has meant that such an objective
has not been present in subsequent managerial decision-making. Even
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at the time NX was first introduced, the main impetus for its 
development was the separate dynamic of technical advance and the 
long held objective of continually refining signalling safety rather 
than an explict aspiration to remove signalling skills. To achive 
greater safety same restraint on signalmen's discretion was 
necessary, and from the nineteenth century onwards mechanical and 
electrical devices have been installed in signalling systems to
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prevent human error. However, their main use has not been to
©  A
managerial dependence^signalmen’s skills but to reduce the reliance 
on short-term memory in signalling systems (9)•
We have already seen that a signalman’s skills are more akin to those 
of white collar workers rather than engineering craftsmen in that 
they are primarily based on knowledge rather than manual dexterity. 
The technical devices that have been adopted to reduce the scope for 
error can in fact make greater demands on operator knowledge and 
conceptual ability. All manual boxes are now protected by ’lock and 
block’ equipment which locks the signal and points levers and block 
instruments (the indication of line status) in place once set. This 
means that the signalman cannot allow another train onto the block 
until the first train movement has taken place. As a result the 
signalman must set up the right route since if he sets up a wrong one 
it can only be released by taking special action which is subject to 
investigation by signalling inspectors) and carries the possibility 
of disciplinary action).
Turning to large power signalboxes, it could be argued that the more 
advanced state of automation lessens the relianc^ on signalmen’s 
knowledge of train running and equipment. Andrews (1979) has argued 
that in equipment terms alone such third generation boxes do not 
make greater demands on signalmen than second generation signalboxes 
since much of the equipment is automated. Such an assessment pays 
insufficient heed to methods of organizing work in large signalboxes 
and to the manner in which automated equipment works in practice.
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Since each signalling panel carries a varying workload it was the 
practice in all the boxes visited for the signalmen to rotate round 
the panels on either a daily or weekly basis to give a break from the 
more ardous panels and to provide variety. This makes greater 
demands on knowledge of the equipment than where dedicated operation 
takes place. As a result signalmen get extra credits in the grading 
of the signalbox for payment purposes (10).
Furthermore, as a number of other studies have shown (Jones, 1982; 
Buchanan, 1984; Buchanan and Bessant, 1985)t automated and semi­
automated equipment tends not to be the panacea some of its 
supporters claim. It is no exaggeration to report that in every 
interview conducted with signalmen, their representatives and 
signalling supervisors and line managers, it was pointed out that NX 
equipment is not difficult to operate when it is working properly but 
that when it fails (as it frequently does), than considerable demands 
are made on signalmen's knowledge of both the equipment and the 
pattern of train movements. In interviews conducted at South-Eastern 
box it was pointed out that equipment failures were running at the 
rate of 600 a month. Two respondents from Northern argued that the 
feature of NX operation that demanded most skill were those long 
stretches of line equipped with automatic signalling since when this 
equipment 'went down' (ie indications of where trains fail to show up 
in the signalbox) it is more difficult than in the case of controlled 
signalling to assess where trains are and to regulate train working 
accordingly.
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This form of automation of signalling on sections of plain line is 
included in signalling panels which are otherwise composed of routes 
controlled by the signalmen. Potentially more damaging for 
signalmen's skills is the automation of signalling panels in their 
entirety. As yet there is one example of this in Britain in Airport 
signalbox (11). This system of operation, known as Automatic Route 
Setting (ARS), uses a computer data-base of train services to decide 
which routes to set up. Interviews were conducted at this signalbox 
but the results were inconclusive for any assessment of its potential 
impact on signalmen’s skills. The panel was operated by a signalman 
in more or less the conventional way since the equipment was newly 
installed and experiencing a number of teething problems and it has a 
high speed level crossing in the middle of it which has to be 
operated by a signalman or crossing keeper (12). Furthermore, the 
computers route decisions were based mainly on local assessments of 
operating priorities, and it was sometimes necessary to over-ride the 
computer where a disrupted pattern of train movements had 'knock-on* 
effects some distance away.
It seems likely that the implication of this form of operation for 
skills will depend on how widespread its use comes to be and the 
nature of the track layout and sevices operated by it. Much will 
depend on the form of work organization that is adopted to operate 
it. In theory signalmen could either be used purely to deal with 
situations where operator intervention is required in which case no 
great demand would be required of signalling skills, or else 
interventions could form one part of an expanded control function
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performed either by signalmen or supervisors. At the time of writing 
such issues as these have not found their way onto the negotiating 
agenda at either Regional or National level. Management want to deal 
with application of it on a case by case basis to preserve maximum 
flexibility, whilst union representatives are fearful that if a 
common policy is sought it will be at the expense of signalling jobs
(13).
The evidence so far suggests, then, that the adoption of NX equipment 
by management is not substantially influenced by a desire to reduce 
their dependence on signalling skills. Instead managerial policies 
are largely engineering led and labour management considerations seem 
to be secondary. In terms of outcomes, some elements of the 
traditional signalling function seem to be rendered redundant but 
equally signalmen in large power signalboxes need an expanded 
knowledge of the equipment they operate.
The second element of the signalling strategy followed since the late 
1960s is the centralization of signalling operation into large 
control centres. The prime reason for pursueing this policy is that 
operational control can be improved. The provision of centralized 
information on train running and the centralizing of decision-making 
on train running over a large area, facilitates a more efficient form 
of train regulation than is found where signalling control points are 
more dispersed. Enhancement of managerial control of current 
operations in this way may be thought to reduce signalmen’s decision­
making in train regulation. Instead of widely dispersed signalmen
making a number of isolated though connected decisions, the number of 
decisions are reduced and made more amenable to management control.
Even though a number of managers indicated that this was an advantage 
of centralized control, it is not evidence per se of a management 
strategy to control signalmen’s decision-making. Interviews with 
senior managers confirmed that such an objective did not form an 
element of management aims. Indeed what came over from these 
interviews was that these managers did not have a clearly 
quantifiable assessment of what precisely the advantages and 
disadvantages of centralized control was. Instead the advantages of 
centralized control were largely taken for granted, or else only 
became clear in particular operating contexts. As Rothwell (1985) 
has argued, control is often an implicit objective in technical 
change. Since control objectives are fairly weakly defined, policies 
to reduce (or increase) the signalmen's role in operational control 
have not been clearly formulated, and the approach to this question 
in the early years of the big-box strategy seems to have been an ad 
hoc one.
The assumption at the heart of a radical perspective is that 
relationship between railway management and signalmen in the sphere 
of operational control is a zero-sum one. That is, if managerial 
control is increased, then labour's control must be correspondingly 
reduced. Interview evidence indicated, contrary to this perspective, 
that both management and signalmen benefitted from the centralization 
of control (14). Managerial control was heightened by improved
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coordination of decision-making that resulted from the concentration 
of signalmen, whilst the signalman's role in train regulation has 
been considerably expanded because the area of control has grown. In 
other words the benefit to management arose from better decision­
making by signalmen rather than from its elimination.
Since the traditional safety function of signalman has been largely 
eliminated by power signalling, whilst the scope of decision-making 
on train running priorities has been substantially enlarged, the 
function of the signalman in large signalboxes has shifted to that of 
a 'controller'. This development has reduced the role of the other 
key function in railway operations - that of the Traffic Control 
Organization. Traditionally, manual signalboxes were responsible for 
signalling trains safely, whilst a centralized Traffic Control 
Organization ("the Brain's Trust") made decisions on train running 
priorities. As well as train regulation the 'classic' functions of 
Control were adjustments to locomotive and rolling stock allocation, 
and the provision of relief train crews (Burtt, 1926). Control's 
decisions on train running were made on the basis of information 
supplied by signalboxes, and were transmitted back as instructions to 
signalmen.
Since with power signalling information on train running is 
concentrated in the signalbox it is possible for the signalmen to 
take over this function of Control. As a result the train regulation 
function of Control has substantially declined. Furthermore, since 
the signalbox is the focal information point (with communication
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facilities to traincrew depots, freight yards, signals, management 
offices) it is often feasible for the signalbox to sort out current 
difficulties in stock allocation and traincrew relief directly with 
yard and traincrew supervisors without Control’s intervention (15)*
The degree to which this takes place seems to depend much on Regional 
traditions, which in turn draws on the practices of the railway 
companies before nationalization. Traditionally, on the Midland and 
Western main lines of the LMS the authority of the Control offices 
was substantial, leaving very little initiative to the signalman. By 
contrast, on the LNER and Great Western a much less rigid form of 
control was used (Marlow, 1956; Weighell, 1984,). As a former 
Western Region signalman describes the relationship,
”1 believe it would have been the correct procedure for the 
Freight Controller to instruct all signalmen on his patch when 
to put goods trains into loops and when to let them out, but in 
fact they system worked the other way round: the signalmen acted 
on their own initiative and Control was informed some time 
later. Indeed both signalman and controller were too busy for 
the system to work otherwise.. .signalmen were proud of their 
independence and they would have viewed instructions from 
Control as ’interference’ in the running of their signalbox.” 
(Vaughan, 1981 p.90).
In interviews with Western Region signalmen in particular great 
stress was laid on the fact that where operating difficulties 
occurred the signalmen sorted them out on their own.
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That these traditions moulded practices after the introduction of the 
big-box strategy indicates that management strategists had paid 
little attention to the precise details of the relationship between 
signalboxes and Control. Similarly, the transformation of the 
Control Organization as a result of the two-tier re-organization in 
1984 was moulded by existing Regional customs on the allocation of 
duties between large signalboxes and Control offices. This 
transformation was necessary since the Control function was 
concentrated at the Divisional tier of management. BRB policy was 
for most of the functions of Divisonal Control to be decentralized to 
Area level, as part of the wider policy of devolving managerial 
responsibility, or else eliminated, with locomotive control being 
centralized at Regional level (Holmes, 1984). However, three Regions 
studied had largely centralized the existing Divisional offices to 
Regional level since the power signalboxes already undertook the 
functions that it was envisaged would be decentralized to Area level. 
Only the London Midland Region (where Control has traditionally had 
more authority over signalmen and upon which there are still a large 
number of manual boxes) has implemented the Board’s policy (16).
This discussion indicates that the strategy to centralize control of 
signalling in large signalboxes was not accompanied by detailed 
policy or objectives on the allocation of decision-making between 
production functions. Such a finding suggests that the labour 
process perspective, which assumes that management have clear 
objectives towards labour and skills, is mistaken. Certainly, no 
policy to reduce signalmen’s or Control’s role in decision-making was
c
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uncovered prior to the 1984 re-organization. Instead, those 
responsible for designing large power-boxes seem to have assumed that 
traditional practices would continue or change gradually in response 
to events. As the big-box strategy developed it became clear that 
the scope of signalmen’s decision-making in the sphere of train 
regulation was considerably increased. But no attempt was made to 
correct this by management since the higher degree - of control 
exercised by signalmen in this respect brought operational advantages 
to management. Thus, the relationship between signalmen and 
operating management in technical change can best be seen as positive 
sum whilst that between operating functions is more accurately seen 
as zero-sum (17).
CONCLUSION
From the analysis presented here it is possible to draw a number of 
broad conclusions. The achivement of greater safety in railway 
signalling has required that the scope for operator discretion be 
systematically reduced. But, this long-standing policy has not been 
extended to form a uniform management strategy to de-skill signalmen. 
Indeed, some technical devices to achieve safer railway operation 
have made greater demands on signalmen’s skills.
The elimination of human error that railway managments have sought 
has focused primarily on one aspect of the signalling function - the 
safe passage of trains through signalbox areas. However, this is
©
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only one element of the signalman’s task. In practice, signalmen in 
most areas have traditionally exercised a degree of judgement in 
assessing train running priorities. The introduction of modern 
power-operated signalling has reduced, though not eliminated, the 
safety function but it has significantly enlarged the latter form of 
decision-making. Managements do not seem to have anticipated how the 
introduction of new forms of signalling technology would effect the 
control and distribution of decision-making in rail operations. 
Their policy to centralize operational control could be said to be an 
'engineering led’ strategy. The nature of task performance in the 
new signalling systems seems to have been a secondary consideration. 
For these reasons the case of railway signalling does not support the 
labour process view that reductions in labour skills are at the 








The strategy to control railway signalling from a small number of 
large signalboxes was not formed on the basis of detailed management 
consideration of the potential contours of signalling tasks nor a 
re-distribution of decision-making between the two main operational 
control functions. It might be anticipated, however, that 
managements gave more attention to work organization in the new 
signalboxes because of the labour relations implications of the new 
methods of operation.
There are a number of reasons why labour relations and work 
organization priorities would form a central element of a re­
signalling strategy on British Rail. These include the tradition of 
centralized management functional organization, the geographical 
interdependence of railway operation, and centralized negotiations 
on pay and conditions of service. In other sectors, such as 
banking, centralised management authority and integrated production 
have resulted in new technology strategies having an explicit labour 
management component (Child and Tarbuck, 1985). We could expect, 
then, that a comprehensive re-signalling strategy would integrate 
labour management policies and objectives to mirror the traincrew 
strategy that was developed in the late 1970s.
To investigate how far this has been the case requires consideration 
of the following issues:
a) to what extent have policies been devised at the centre on the
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division of labour and work organissation, within power 
signalboxes;
b) have labour management policies and practices associated with new 
signalboxes displayed innovative features or have they been 
largely moulded by existing policies, as writers such as Rothwell 
have argued for other industries (1985);
c) what are the structural determinants of the formulation and 
nature of these policies and practices?
These questions will be answered through a consideration of
1) work organization policies and practices in large signalboxes;
2) the labour relations response to the changes in signalling 
operation;
3) the institutional differences between traincrew and signalling 
labour management;
4) the impact of Sector management structures on signalling labour 
management.
1. STRATEGIES AND WORK ORGANIZATION
Prior to the fieldwork there seemed good grounds to anticipate that 
an element of the central technical/operational strategy would be 
comprehensive policies and objectives in the sphere of work 
organization in large signalboxes. However, it became apparent 
early on from interviews conducted in signalboxes that patterns of
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work organization were highly diverse between them. Furthermore, 
interviews with senior managers indicated that this diversity arose 
from the absence of central policy. Instead the details and many 
of the principles of work organization were left by the BRB to the 
Regions. Within the Regions themselves, the process of staffing 
signalboxes was largely undertaken by Divisional operating 
management (1). In many cases Divisional operating management’s
practices were an amalgam of rules of thumb, precedents and
negotiated outcomes. Given the past dominance of the Region in 
railway management it is perhaps unsurprising that policy was not 
determined at BRB Headquarters: it is more surprising that Regional 
policy has been relatively undeveloped.
One feature that is common to all major power signalboxes is the 
principle that each signalling control panel should have an
operator. The basis of this appears to be primarily managerial
perceptions of operational necessities rather than explicit concern 
with work organization. In the early years of the large box 
strategy it was the practice for each panel to be based on the main 
areas of operational activity, with each panel based on the area 
that less large power signalboxes might have embraced. For 
instance, the Western Western power box has a section of panel to 
cover the main station area, a set of junctions some miles North of 
the station, and main lines to the East and West. In this way 
signalman's workload and the definition of areas of control per 
signalmen is essentially determined by traditional notions of the 
main areas of operational activity being reflected in the
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engineering specification. As a result the levels of workload can 
vary substantially between panels. Two of Western's panels demand a 
high level of decision-making whilst the other two are considerably 
lighter. Similarly, Central's main panel demands constant attention 
and complex decision-making whilst the other two are relatively 
straightforward.
From the early 1970s more attention was given to ergonomic factors 
and more detailed attention paid to the design of panels. Unequal 
workloads, high levels of stress amongst some signalmen and constant 
minor labour relations problems in some large boxes indicated that 
that more attention needed to be paid to panel design (2). In the 
early stages of planning the box at Bridge it becaome clear that if 
the panels were based simply on the geographical layout of the 
railway, then it would not be possible to fit all of the routes on 
some parts of the panel and the signalmen would not be able to give 
sufficient attention to all of it (see Andrews, 1979)• Thus the 
panel area’s of control were designed on a 'rate of decision-making 
basis' and the operating console separated from the display panel so 
that the signalmen could perceive all the train movements on their 
’patch'.
However, greater attention to ergonomic factors by design engineers 
was not integrated with organization objectives and these ergonomic 
considerations have in practice made some manpower goals more 
difficult to achieve. Once operating consoles had been made clearly 
separate it reduced managements' flexibility in the allocation of
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staff since the argument of workforce representatives that each 
panel should have an operator became more difficult to contest. By 
contrast, where a set of combined operating panels-consoles form 
part of a long single panel there is more scope for flexibility in 
the size of sub-panels. In the late 1970s, however, management were 
seeking to reduce staffing at night on some panels by getting other 
signalmen to ’double-up.’ The NUR took this up with the Board since 
it believed this violated appropriate staffing principles. In its 
reply the Board maintained that the principle of ’one signalman per 
panel’ was invalid since the panel was the operating console in its 
entirety, and it was inappropriate for the BRB to specify how many 
people should operate this in each circumstance. However, the trend 
towards more discrete consoles dictates against the flexibility that 
the Board was trying to achieve, and makes it difficult for BR 
management to adjust staffing on the panels themselves.
In practice, then, management and union have tended to adopt the 
principle that each panel should be operated by a signalmen. There 
is much greater diversity in the organization of ancillary functions 
in large signalboxes sice it is less clear-cut what these -fee should fee 
comprised of. As a result where management have subsequently 
sought to adjust staffing, it is primarily in this area. These 
functions include back-up to the signalmen on the panel, train 
recording and train announcing.
There is considerable Regional variation over the nature of these 
posts and who occupies them. In general, on the Western Region
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these functions are performed by top-class signalmen, on the 
Southern Region by signalmen of varying grades, on the Eastern by a 
mixture of signalmen and clerically graded staff, and on the London 
Midland by signalmen, clerical and operating staff. The Western 
Region was notable for having in the established power boxes, 
'standby signalmen' (two in Western, one each in West Country and 
Welsh) . The function of this job is a loosely-defined and varied 
one, and includes the provision of relief for the signalmen on the 
panel, and outdoor work such as moving points by hand in the event 
of failure.
The outdoor functions are interesting since there are no direct 
equivalents on the other Regions. On other Regions work of this 
sort is performed either by signalling maintenance staff in 
conjunction with the signalbox itself, other operating department 
staff or else signalmen based permanently outside the signalbox (3). 
These functions seem to have emerged on the Western Region largely 
as an ad hoc response to the labour relations pressures encountered 
in the implementation process. In a period of low unemployment 
achievement of staff consent was premised on creating jobs to 
supplement the small number to be employed on the panel itself. 
Furthermore, the traditional strength of Sectional Council C on the 
Region (testified to by a number of interviewees) gave the workforce 
side the resources to successfully press for further staffing. For 
signalmen and their union the 'standby' function achieves some 
continuity in job demarcations and craft skills since it includes 
operating equipment at the lineside which prior to the signalling
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centre would have been operated by signalmen.
At the time of the research Western Region management was trying to 
depart from this practice of including *standby-signalmen' in the 
staffing of power boxes, on the grounds that they duplicated 
functions already carried out to some extent by other groups of 
staff. They had decided that standby-signalmen would not be created 
at Stone or Devon. However, their success in this respect was 
limited. Sectional Council representatives placed strong pressure 
on management to increase the proposed establishment of Stone since, 
as the age profile of signalmen in the area was comparatively young, 
not all surplus displaced signalmen could be accomodated through 
early retirement. The Divisional operating manager responsible for 
staff was sympathetic and had agreed an establishment level which 
included a number of 'spare' signalling posts. Within days a higher 
tier of management overturned this since it seemed to violate the 
new Regional policy.
The threat of industrial action that resulted put considerable 
pressure on management to the effect that the 'supervisory' position 
on the 'back-row' in the box was re-classified as a signalling post. 
At the same time local signalling maintenance staff had voted not to 
have a night shift and as a result there was no fault cover at 
night. The signalmen's Sectional Council argued that the 'standby' 
positions were especially relevant because of this, and management 
conceded that 'back-row* •signalmen would perform outside duties as 
required as long as there was not no alternative work in the box.
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The Council though this an unsatisfactory solution from an 
operational point of view since at the times when outdoor work was 
needed, it was most likely that the signalmen in the box would need 
assistance in the box. Nevertheless the the ’standby* principle was 
retained if in a diluted form.
In addition to the presence of standby-signalmen, Western signalbox 
and the three large Southern Region boxes visited had signalling 
posts whose function was to acquire ’long-range information’ on 
train running to give the signalmen and other staff adequate time to 
prepare corrective action where train operations were disrupted (ie 
re-time connecting services, provision of relief traincrews etc). 
Information would come into the box from other signalboxes and then 
be passed to the signalmen and to other relevant staff such as 
traincrew supervisors. In other Western and Southern boxes this 
information came directly to signalmen or supervisors from other 
signalbox supervisors or from the Control offices. In the small 
signalbox at University, for instance, most of the long range 
information came via teleprinter messages from Divisional Controls 
at Birmingham and Reading. The information acquiring role of large 
signalboxes duplicates one of the traditional functions of the 
Control organization, and in those cases where specific information 
posts were in existence, Control was often bypassed in practice (5).
Where a specific information function existed in Western Region 
boxes, it was staffed by top class signalmen. The Southern Region’s
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policy is to employ Information Signalmen, graded at Class D. This 
job is used as a training ground for work on the main panels and 
such signalmen can be called upon to work them in an emergency. 
Unfortunately, insufficient boxes were visited on the London Midland 
and Eastern Region boxes to gauge whether those visited were 
representative. At the LM location visited (Central) information on 
train running was passed through the signalbox supervisor and 
through an Area Information Centre located away from the signalbox 
close to the Area Managers office, functioning essentially as a 
duplicate Control. This centre was staffed by a clerical worker 
whose main function appeared to be receipt and issue of teleprinter 
messages. As well as bypassing the Control Organization, of which 
the Area Operations manager was dismissive (6), this Centre made the 
telegraph office (located in the signalbox) redundant. Unknown to 
the researcher at the time, this Centre was an experiment as a 
prelude to the London Midland's plans to abolish Divisional Control 
offices and replace them with Area offices.
Another function found in Western Region powerboxes, which was not 
found elsewhere, was that of train recorder. The object of this job 
is to note down the times that trains pass certain points. This 
task forms a continuity with manual boxes using 'absolute block' 
operation since in these there is a statutory requirement for the 
signalmen to record the times at which trains enter and leave the 
area. In the Southern and Eastern Region boxes this was performed 
automatically by Automatic Train Reporting equipment - the micro­
computer based train describer equipment could record automatically
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where trains were through their occupancy of particular track 
circuits. The times that trains pass certain points is printed out 
automatically in the Control offices and the signalboxes themselves 
(7).
In the Western Region boxes the train recorder position is classed 
as a main signalling position and is operated on a rotational basis 
by the panel signalmen. As well as forming a continuity with manual 
traditions, it also provides a break, once a week, from the stresses 
of working on the signalling panels. In the London Midland Region 
box at Central train recording was performed by a junior Railman on 
the grounds that this gave a useful introduction to the time 
disciplines of railway operation. In the early 1970s an additional 
signalman had performed this task but in the early 1980s this extra 
signalling post was integrated into the main signalling 
establishment to provide relief for the panel signalmen.
Western Region policy was to eliminate use of the train recorder. 
In the new boxes at Stone and Devon the passage of trains is 
recorded automatically. At the time of the research, management was 
seeking to remove it from other boxes on the Region after advice 
from the Railway Inspectorate that train recording was not necessary 
in power boxes using Track Circuit Block operation. The signalmen’s 
LDC and Sectional Council representatives argued that this function 
was a desirable supplement to the signalmen operating the panel 
itself even though it was legally unnecessary. When for instance, 
the equipment failed, leaving signalmen without indications of where
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trains are, the train recorder was able to assist from his records.
This issue was a contentious one at the time of the research. Faced 
with a management deadline in summer 1983, a number of LDCs had 
threatened strike action across the Region. This stayed 
management's hand for the time being but, during the period of data 
collection, labour relations on the Region were often tense (8). 
Information received after the project was completed indicated that 
managment had removed this function but that the LDCs had responded 
by requiring that the displaced signalmen stay in the mess room for 
their entire shifts so that their worth in 'out of order' situations 
would be clearly demonstrated.
Further diversity in staffing practices between the Regions can be 
found in the train announcing function. In general train announcing 
is not performed from manual boxes since it is not a traditional 
signalling function, and there are no marks allocated to it in the 
signalmen’s grading system (9). In Western Region power boxes 
train announcing for the immediate station is generally performed in 
the box (though usually away from the operating console so that 
signalmen's 'effing and blinding' is not broadcast across the 
station) by redundant signalmen at retained rates of pay. On the 
Southern Region platform indications are operated automatically by 
the train describers and the Master Timetable System (10). In the 
Eastern and Midland Region boxes the operation of platform 
indications and presentation of station announcements was undertaken
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from the signalbox by clerical staff.
The lack of a uniform policy between the Regions is found similarly 
in the sphere of supervision. In manual boxes and early power boxes 
signalmen worked without direct supervision, their competence being 
ensured by biennial examinations on the Rules and Regulations, a 
test of their competence (’passing-out') to work their signalbox and 
regular visits from the District (now Area) Signalling Inspector. 
In large ’signalling centres’ the opportunity was taken to put 
supervisors onto the operating floor. As far as could be determined 
by interviews this policy was not clearly articulated and it was 
difficult to trace when it had originally been formulated. It
seemed that supervision was seen as desirable chiefly because it is 
the 'normal' thing to do when a number of employees are grouped 
together, and because it provides a point of responsibility for such 
an important operating unit.
As far as could be determined there was no clear, widely accepted 
policy on the allocation of responsibilities between signalmen and 
box supervisors. Interviews with signalmen, supervisors, line 
managers and more senior managers on the Western Region suggested 
that the role of the box supervisor was primarily that of a co­
ordinator to assist the signalmen when normal operations were
disrupted. On the Southern Region and the Eastern Region box this 
function was undertaken by Assistant Regulators. Where these were
present, the role of the Regulator was weakly defined. The main
reason for the Regulator's presence seemed to be to provide a single
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point of responsibility that two Assistant Regulators could not 
provide. At South-Eastern the Area Operations manager was
encouraging the box regulator to undertake some managerial 
functions, such as taking responsibility for the administration of 
the box, to fill this vacuum.
The Western Region Council’s earlier success in maintaining some 
features of craft autonomy was replicated in the sphere of 
supervision. In response to Council pressure, Regional policy for 
some years had been that supervisors should be recruited from 
siganlmen. A similar agreement was found on the Southern Region.
In both cases supervisory staff did not perform any signalling
functions and their guidance to signalmen was restricted to
regulatory as opposed to signalling matters (12). Evidence from 
the one London Midland Region box visited suggested that the 
supervisor performed a more directive role and that signalmen’s 
decision-making autonomy was more restricted than on the other 
Regions. This aspect of the division of labour maintains the 
Regional tradition that signalmen are more subject to Control's 
authority than on the other Regions. Certainly there is no 
management-union agreement that supervisors should usually be 
recruited from the signalling grade.
The Eastern Region attempted to take this further by installing an 
Area Controller into Sheffield signalbox in the early 1970s 
(Cornforth, n.d.) Regional management argued that since the 
information used by Control was now available in the signalbox it
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would be most practical to have some of the Control organization in 
the box itself. The counter argument of union representatives was 
that as it was primarily telephone work the function was more 
appropriately seen as a conciliation grade job. Faced with this
opposition Regional management withdrew the proposal and to this 
date signalbox supervisors are not part of the the Traffic Control 
Organization.
The findings reported so far indicate that there has been no central 
strategy on the organization of work in large power signalboxes to 
match the centralized technical strategy. Instead, the Regions have 
been left by BRB Headquarters to their own devices in the staffing 
of these boxes. Although this finding contradicts the hypothesis 
proposed at the beginning of the chapter, such evidence is
unsurprising given the Regions’ traditional dominance in railway 
management. What is more surprising is that the primacy of
production and engineering considerations in decision-making has not 
been reflected in clearly formulated work organization policies 
within the Regions. It has been left to Divisional operating 
management to deal with establishment size and the division of 
labour within the signalboxes. These managers' work organization 
decisions essentially responded to the technical and operational 
features of signalling schemes. This both reflected and reinforced 
the secondary place of staffing issues to that of the quality of 
thee technical features in senior managers decision-making. As a 
number of union respondents complained, the main problem in the
implementation of signalling schemes was not that management were
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hostile to labour (as the labour process perspective would suggest) 
but that 'human considerations' were almosot inevitably neglected by 
scheme designers.
Since uniform work organization policies were not integrated in the 
'big box' strategy at the. outset, staffing managers had been 
susceptible to Sectional Council bargaining objectives (13)* Faced 
with union demands and the relative disinterest of senior managers, 
these managers drew on Regional traditions to guide them in 
deciding, box by box, staffing issues. As a result Regional work 
organization displayed some continuity with those in manual 
signalling environments. Thus, work organization within Regions 
displayed both diversity (according to the technical features of the 
box) and consistency in some respects.
The Western Region representatives have been particularly successful 
in maintaining craft continuity. In part this semed to be due to 
managerial empathy with the sense of craft exclusivity amongst 
Western Region signalmen. On the London Midland Region the more 
restricted scope of signalmen's decision-making was similarly 
reflected in features of box organization. The Southern Region is 
something of an exception since work organization in the three large 
signalboxes visited was more systematic. This deviation from the 
norm elsewhere is explained by a number of features largely unique 
to the Southern Region, such as the nature of the local labour 
market and the complex layout of it's network. Two of the boxes 
controlled areas that were managed by two Divisions with the result
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that some measure of Divisional policies had taken place. But these 
features of the Southern Region notwithstanding, it seems to be the 
case, as Rothwell has argued (1985), that existing practices tend to 
substantially determine the labour management outcomes of technical 
change.
2. LABOUR RELATIONS AND THE SIGNALLING STRATEGY
Since the organization of production has been primarily the 
responsibility of the railway Regions, it is unsurprising that the 
strategy to concentrate signalling control was not accompanied by 
detailed work organization objectives. But as a number of key 
elements of signalling labour relations - such as payment and 
grading structures - are the subject of national agreements, it 
could be expected that top strategists would have paid more 
attention to the labour relations consequences of the signalling, 
strategy. However, the findings to be reported here once again 
indicate that labour relations management primarily responds to 
technical and operating priorities.
This argument can be supported by a discussion of the signalling 
grading structure. Since 1922 signalmen's pay has been determined 
by a system of classification based on a computation of marks for 
the use of equipment such as signal levers. Signalmen’s pay was 
thus determined on a sort of piecework basis, linked, in manual 
signalling, to effort. Since in the 'signalling centres' the
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physical effort found in manual systems is virtually eliminated, and 
the nature of the task shifted away from the traditional signalling 
functions towards a wider operational control function, it is a moot 
question whether the traditional grading system is appropriate.
However, partly because detailed attention was not given to the 
likely effect on tasks of the new form of signalling, BR management 
did not investigate the potential for new systems of grading. 
Instead, new grades were added onto those already existing with the 
result that a more complex grading system was created. The 1962 
signalmen's classification agreement created two 'special' grades 
on top of the existing fourfold grading to take account of the 
growing size of signalboxes. A separate formula for power signalmen 
was added in 196^ which took account of equipment and traffic 
movements. This had to be added to in December 1967 to take 
account of the growing size of boxes (14). At the end of 1967» 
then, there were signalmen's gradings 1-4, power signalmen A-C, 
power signalmen A plus a number of cash 'bonuses', and two special 
classes for very busy manual boxes, as well as a number of relief 
signalmen classes.
This structure was rationalized primarily because of the widespread 
interest in re-structuring payment systems in the late 1960s (see 
Neal, 1970). In the Pay and Efficiency Agreements of August 1968 the 
grading system was substantially simplified by eliminating gradings 
that overlapped in marks terms, though the classes with cash 
supplements were retained for the top end of the range. The grading
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system was vastly simplified in 1972 to provide a simple unifed 
grading system of A-E (plus three relief grades) (15) in part as a 
response to the acceleration of technical change. A system of 
marking was adopted which provided for comparability of assessment 
between manual and power signalboxes. To a certain degree, this was 
to calm union fears that with the escalating use of ever-large 
control centres the signalling grade would become progressively 
fragmented between a small number of very large boxes and a large 
number of lowly graded manual boxes.
Power-signalmen took industrial action in 1972 against the new 
agreement on the grounds that duties were not adequately rewarded in 
the new agreement. As a result an extra grade (F) was created at 
the top of the hierarchy (16). This reflectd the operational 
importance of the new 'signalling centres' and the power of those 
employees who operated them. The trend of 'buying-off' these
signalmen continued through the 1970s. Regional operating
managements had responded to signalmen's power by up-grading a large 
number of Class E boxes to F under the discretionary clause present 
in signalling classification agreements. This set in motion a set 
of claims for upgrading by a number of large signalboxes to restore 
'traditional' relativities (17). Once again industrial action was 
ended through the reaching of a new classification agreement in 1980 
(18).
This review indicates that in the sphere of grading structures
management decision-making was essentially reactive. Where
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comprehensive changes were made to agreements it was initially in 
response to changing objectives within the sphere of labour 
relations itself. Perhaps the most striking feature of labour 
relations in this area of change is that BR management does not seem 
to have anticipated that the operational importance of these 
control centres would pass immense power to the signalmen operating 
them (cf. Legge, 1978). Once again, the explanation seems to be 
that the strategists primary concern with the technical features of 
these large boxes excluded active consideration of their 
consequences for labour management.
2. MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE AND THE ABSENCE OF STRATEGY
Labour management objectives and policies have been weakly developed 
in the strategy of centralizing operational control. This provides 
a striking contrast to the case of footplate staff, where a 
comprehensive strategy was compiled in the late 1970s to re-organize 
the work of the latter. The explanation of this difference seems to 
lie in aspects of management structure.
Interview evidence indicated that there was no managerial function 
which had specific responsibility for developing labour management 
policies appropriate to technical change in signalling, and that 
there was no central institutional source of policy to guide
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Divisional managers in their staffing decisions. Personnel managers 
have no input to the formulation stage of re-signalling schemes, and 
their practical involvement is limited to that part of the staffing 
process which allocates individuals to the job positions that have 
been created by others.
Furthermore there is no function within the operating department 
that is concerned with developing policy on work organization and 
manpower policy in the arena of signalling. By contrast, for 
traincrew functions there is a Traction and Traincrew Manager at BRB 
Headquarters who is responsible for devising manpower strategies on 
recruitment, training, promotion and grading. Similarly at Regional 
level there are Traction and Traincrew Officers responsible for 
devising Regional policies and implementing strategies devised at 
the centre. There are no equivalent posts for the signalling
function. This institutional focus seems to explain why it has been 
possible to develop traincrew change schemes more systematically 
than in the signalling function.
Since this failure to develop labour strategies can be explained by 
the lack of an institutional focus in the managerial hierarchy, the 
next question must be why BR management has not developed one. 
Since answer of this question relies on counterf actuals it is 
difficult to specify the relevant variables with certainty. 
However, a number of contextual variables can be identified. These 
fall into two categories - features of the signalling strategy 
itself, and more long-run labour relations features.
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During the 1970s no pressing need was identified by management for 
the development of a function concerned with manpower planning and 
the organization of signalling work precisely because the 
unemployment effects of the control-centre strategy provided a large 
pool of experienced signalmen. Thus there is no formalized training 
facility for signalmen on the Western Region and a small signalling 
school on the Southern Region was closed down in the 1970s. The 
consequences of this neglect are now becoming apparent since the 
pool of signalmen is drying-up. For a variety of reasons it is 
difficult to attract suitable labour to replace the large number of 
signalmen who retire in the next ten years (20). Interview findings 
indicated that a Working Party at BRB Headquarters was considering 
what to do about this but interviewees were unaware of the content 
of its deliberations. One possible solution under consideration is 
making power-signalling the second stage in an operational 
management career after a period of formal training (Holmes, 1984). 
The main obstacle to such a solution is that it would require a 
reversal of the principle of seniority in signalling promotions, to 
which union agreement would be highly unlikely. To the author’s 
knowledge this Working Party has not so far come up with a set of 
manpower policies for the signalling function.
The second set of reasons for the lack of managerial interest in 
signalling labour management can be found in the labour relations 
sphere. Firstly, the existence of headquarters level specialists 
can be attributed to train-drivers success in achieving industry­
wide agreements pre-nationalization, and national agreements post-
306
nationalisation, regulating not only basic pay and conditions but 
also many aspects of work organization. This has become more 
important since the 1960s as the drivers union has sought agreements 
to protect its members from the technical transformation of the
driving function. Faced with comprehensive regulation of work and 
employment at this level, . BR management needed to develop a
management function that could plan for efficient utilisation of 
human resources.
In turn this raises the question as to why ASLEF has been more 
successful than the NUR in achieving comprehensive national level 
job regulation. Much of this must be due to drivers' power in the 
production process, and the organization of drivers in a craft 
union. By contrast signalmen have traditionally been isolated from 
each other at work and they are represented by a union of which they 
form only one part. It is due also to the need to oversee the 
utilisation of traincrews above local level since driving work cuts 
across geographical boundaries. By contrast the organization of 
signalling work is much simpler, since all that is necessary is the 
provision of employees to staff boxes for the duration of their 
shift.
ASLEFfs response to technical change in train-driving was to seek 
national agreements regulating work organization. The NUR was 
unable to follow this approach for a number of reasons. First, the 
elimination of steam was an explicit nation-wide strategy, whilst
the big-box strategy, though formulated at national level, was put
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into effect over a number of years by by Regional managers. Those 
issues that the NUR took to national level in the 1970s were 
consistently met by the BRB's insistence that labour management was 
a matter for the Regions.
Secondly, the pursuit of national regulation was a risky path for 
the NUR to follow. Since Regional practices varied, an attempt to 
achieve standardization through national agreement carried the 
danger that the BRB would insist on standardization on the basis of 
the least advantageous option. Such a process would cause political 
problems between the NUR Executive and the section of its membership 
that would suffer as a result. For instance, there was a claim on 
the negotiating agenda for much of the 1970s, arising from the 
Signalmen's Conference, for "grounds frames, shunt frames (ie 
unmanned signalling equipment) to be manned by signalmen". The NUR 
was unable to seriously pursue this since if it failed it could have 
put at risk the Western practice of using 'standby signalmen.'
Secondly, the NUR's signalmen constituency was becoming increasingly 
fragmented between highly graded control centre signalmen and lower 
graded manual signalmen and it was difficult to devise a strategy 
which could balance these two groups. It is at least feasible that 
the NUR could have taken advantage of the power of control centre 
signalmen to win major improvements in the conditions of service of 
that group. To have done so would both have weakened the claim to 
craft continuity between the two groups and stretched the loyalty of 
the manual group. The NUR did take a claim to the RSNT in 1980 for
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Classes D-F signalmen to be granted salaried status. However, this 
claim also insisted that the pattern of union representation and 
promotional paths be unchanged. This claim does not seem to have 
been pursued with vigour and it was eventually declined by the RSNT.
The main objective of the union was to preserve as many jobs as 
possible and to maintain traditional craft skills as far as 
possible. Given the potential problems outlined above it seemed 
best to leave discussion of technical change to Regional level where 
advantage could be taken of the fragmented and often ad hoc ad hoc 
character of managerial decision-making. In these circumstances it 
did not seem appropriate or necessary to develop headquarters' 
functions to deal with the issue of technical change. The role of 
the NUR's Research Department (established as recently as 1979) is 
largely to compile information on pay and conditions of service 
issues (cf. Jones and Rose, 1985)* In the NUR, as in ASLEF, the job 
knowledge and negotiating skills of lay members in the Regions are 
widely believed by union activists to be sufficient to deal with 
technical change. Thus, the absence of an explicit management 
function to develop signalling labour management strategies and 
policies is mirrored by the lack of a parallel institutional focus 
on the union side.
4. SECTORIZATION AND LABOUR MANAGEMENT
There is some limited evidence, outlined above, that sections of BR 
management is beginning to take labour management in the signalling 
function more seriously. Analysis earlier in the thesis has 
suggested, however, that current features of BR's management 
structure and business stragegy contain elements which make the 
formulation and implementation of consistent labour management 
strategies more difficult. Investigation of the impact of 
Sectorization on signalling seems to confirm this hypothesis. This 
can be demonstrated by attention to two areas of causal 
relationships: one is the effect of Sectorization on the technical 
strategy; the other is the more direct impact of Sectorization on 
labour management. Fin^^ly, the additional impact of new forms of 
signalling technolgoy and the union response to it will be examined.
It soon became clear during the fieldwork that the 'big-box' 
strategy had fallen apart in the 1980s. Instead new signalling 
schemes are less ambitious and do not form part of a long-term plan. 
As one senior engineer put it,
"Resignalling schemes now have to be justified on their 
individual merits. It’s no longer possible to do the big ones 
just because they are big. If they are not financially viable 
they are not done. Financial constraints are now far more 
overpowering than grand planning notions.”
Financial stringency is part of the explanation but it is an 
insufficient one since cutbacks in investment funds in the mid-1970s 
resulted merely in the postponement of planned schemes or in longer
310
staging periods for schemes already underway. Instead the reason for 
the strategy’s demise is provided by the Serpell Report on Railway 
Finances and the new organizational structures adopted by British 
Rail from 1982 onwards.
Serpell argued that expenditure on railway signalling renewal should 
be £30 million (1982 prices) less than the NSA forecast (Serpell, 
1983. p.43). It is unclear why the Report proposed this particular 
figure, but it provided a number of reasons for this recommendation. 
The first was that procedures used by BR to appraise investment 
schemes were inadequate, with the result that projects put forward 
for authorisation often rested on a financial case that was over- 
optimistic. The second was the BR management tended to 'over- 
engineer* signalling schemes to meet 'worst case' operational 
requirements.
Instead the Report argued that a wider range of options, including 
disinvestment, should be evaluated when signalling equipment seemed 
due for renewal. Where it was found desirable for renewal to take 
place, it should only occur when the existing equipment had become so 
unreliable that BR was unable to run trains to the timetable. Until 
then a policy of minimum repairs should be adopted.
That Serpell's approach has been translated into practice on BR owes 
much to the creation of the Sector management structures in 1982. 
Sector management is the institutional mechanism through which 
financial restraints have been translated into specific signalling
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schemes. The Sector Directors, each with 'bottom line'
responsibility for profit and loss accounts for their sector are 
responsible for investment in the infrastructure allocated to them, 
and no scheme will now be authorized unless it has the support of the 
relevant Sector Director (21).
The creation of these product management structures has dramatically 
modified patterns of managerial authority in the planning of 
signalling schemes. Prior to Sectoriz-ation, signalling projects were 
developed between the operating and engineering functions. The 
'business' input was limited to the provision of proposed service 
patterns by Passenger Managers in the Divisional tier of management, 
from which the operators constructed an operational plan. Since 1982 
the role of the operating function has been much diminished in the 
formulation of signalling schemes. It has been replaced in some 
stages of the planning process by more direct contact between 
engineers and business managers. As interviewees in the engineering 
function described it,
"The Sectors are very involved in resignalling schemes - you are 
wasting your time if you haven't got them in from the beginning. 
You have got to get the scheme supported by the business sector 
responsible for the line.”
Interview data indicated that Sectorization has had a major impact on 
resignalling policy. The 'big box' strategy has fallen apart under 
the weight of competing Sector pressures. No formal top-level 
decision has been taken to end the strategy: as one engineer put it,
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"nobody has officially said that the plan has been abandoned but 
everybody knows it has been."
In its place signalling schemes are now generally smaller and display 
greater technical and operational diversity. Two schemes in the
planning stage at the time of data collection exhibit these 
characteristics. The Midland, scheme, originally costed at £23 
million was split into two at Sectorization, with the Intercity 
element being authorized in 1983 whilst authorization for Stage 2 was 
sought separately by the Provincial Sector in June 1985. The
NsSQsewi Northern scheme was planned as a 'big box' in I98O but in 
1982 the 'stops were put on'. The project has now been implemented 
but on a much smaller scale. The planners' view was that a 
'traditional' signalling scheme was preferable but, since renewals 
were urgent on the core section, it was risky to delay that scheme
through proposing a scheme that might not be authorized.
There are sound grounds for expecting that these changes to technical 
policies will lead to modifications in labour management policies 
since past policies and practices have been strongly influenced by 
technical and operational features of signalling schemes. An 
analysis of this indirect impact of Sectorization on labour 
management in new signalboxes is inevitably conjectural because only 
one major signalbox designed since 1982 has so far been brought into 
operation (this took place some nine months after the main phase of 
the research had been completed). Nevertheless, it is possible to 
identify trends in the twin spheres of work organization and labour 
relations.
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Since post-Sectorization signalling schemes are less extensive than 
those planned in the ’big box’ era, staffing levels and gradings are 
likely to change. The number of signalling staff needed to operate 
new signalboxes is likely to be much smaller than in the 1970s 
because the shift away from ’control centres' reduces the need for 
ancillary and back-up staff. Since the grading scheme for signalling 
staff is based on a computation of levels of traffic and amounts of 
equipment, the classification of new signalboxes will tend to be 
lower than those of ’signalling centres'.
Furthermore, since the operational characteristics of new signalboxes 
are likely to be more strongly determined by financial objectives 
than in the past, signalboxes are likely to display greater technical 
and operational diversity. In turn, this seems likely to inhibit the 
formation of new work organization policies, given the absence of an 
institutional function within management to develop signalling labour 
policies. Instead, a likely scenario is that the staffing principles 
of each new signalbox will be determined in an ad hoc way, just as in 
the early years of the ’big box’ strategy.
The conflicting pressures that managers responsible for staffing face 
seem set to be greater than those experienced previously. They have 
to take into account not only the diverse features of signalling 
schemes and the objectives of union and workforce organizations but 
also the imperatives presented by Sector managers. Large signalboxes 
are allocated to specific Sectors and thus contribute to Sector 
’bottom-lines’. As a result Sector managers take a close interest in
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the formation of new cost centres, such as new signalboxes. At the 
same time they are relatively uninterested in the labour relations 
implications of their decision^ since, they argue, that is an issue 
for production managers not business strategists.
The difficulties that this can cause production managers in designing 
work organization is well illustrated by the Stone case cited 
earlier. The Western Region policy to eliminate the function of 
train recording and ’standby signalmen’ was the result of pressure 
from a number of Sectors. In the staffing of the new box at Stone 
Stone, operating management had been presented with a budgetary 
framework by the relevant Sector which precluded the appointment of 
standby signalmen as the Sectional Council wanted. When signalling 
maintenance staff voted not to have a night shift, the Divisional 
operating manager was apparently let off the hook since extra 
signalling staff were now desirable and could be accomodated in the 
staffing budget overall. However, this solution was unacceptable to 
the Sector because of strong market pressures to cut costs. Within 
two days the decision was overturned by higher levels of management. 
In consequence workforce representatives voted for strike action. 
This was averted by a compromise solution that additional signalmen 
would be appointed to the box on an experimental basis.
The direct and indirect effects of Sectorization on signalling 
schemes seem likely to offer fewer jobs, lower grades and even less 
standard work organization policies than in the past. These features 
are likely to be intensified by technical developments during the
315
1980s. Microprocessor technology permits a variety of new forms of 
operation by signalmen including light pens on a VDU diagram, touch 
screens, computer keyboards in conjunction with VDUs, radio 
signalling using a combination of keyboard, VDU and radio 
transmitter/receiver, and Automatic Route Setting (ARS) where 
operation of points and signals can be competely automated (see RGI, 
1984b). Which of these, if any, are adopted as standard is 
uncertain but what is certain is that the •traditional' operating 
panel/train describer will be superceded since it forms the single 
most expensive piece of equipment in a signalling scheme (22).
The union response to these developments is likely to be less 
effective than in the past, despite the degree of success at Stone 
Stone. In the 'big box' era, Sectional Councils were often able to 
exploit the fragmented and ad hoc character of management decision­
making in the staffing process. Now that the contours of decision­
making are established at BRB Headquarters, the discretion of local 
production managers is limited. However, it is difficult for the 
national union organization to respond to the centralization of 
managerial authority since BRB managers argueji that signalbox design 
and staffing are production matters appropriate to Regional level and 
below. Anyway, the NUR head office does not appear to have fully 
identified the processes at work in the management hierarchy. 
Instead, instances such as that at Stone are believed to be the 
outcome of more aggressive management approaches (that result from 
the changed economic and labour relations climate) rather than from 
changes in the structure of managerial decision-making. But even if
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the significance of these latter processes had been identified they 
are difficult subjects to deal with in traditional bargaining 
institutions.
The capacity of the NUR to pro-act to the new forms of technology 
currently on trial is also limited by the prevailing grading system 
and the pressures from signalmen to retain the integrity of the 
current grading and promotional arrangements. New forms of equipment 
pose profound difficulties for the current grading scheme. The 
allocation of marks for equipment has for some years been based on 
lineside equipment (ie points and signals) and on discrete pieces of 
equipment within the signalbox operated by the signalman such as 
route-setting buttons, over-ride switches, levers etc. Thus, a 
continuity is provided in the grading system between the simple 
manual functions the operator performs in a manual box and those 
found in a power-operated signalbox. The VDU forms of operation 
dispense with a number of panel buttons for which credit is included 
in the 1980 Signalmen’s Agreement. Furthermore, the ’electronic 
token block1 form of operation dispenses with lineside signals with 
the result that a signalman can control a high mileage of track but 
be accorded a classification near the bottom of the scale.
However, if union negotiators propose alternative payment structures, 
then the integrity of the existing grading system could well be 
threatened. A successful union response is further obstructed by 
structural features of the labour relations system. Whilst
executive committee members negotiate at national level for marks for
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equipment, it is Sectional Councillors who deal with the 
implementation of signalling schemes in the Regions. This mis-match 
of bargaining structures, coupled with overloaded institutions at 
national level, means that it is difficult for Sectional Councillors 
to get a sufficiently speedy response on new equipment. This is now 
especially marked because the reduced size of headquarters’ labour 
relations functions makes it more difficult to arrange meetings to 
deal with issues that are not of primary importance in the range of 
negotiating issues overall.
In 1983-84 the NUR sought to overcome some of the difficulties 
arising from new technology by signing a New Technology Agreement 
with the BRB. However, the Board refused to proceed with 
negotiations on the basis that the undertakings the NUR sought would 
prevent management from exercising its right to manage (see Transport 
Review, 11/2/83, 24/6/83, 13/1/84). Since then this approach has 
slipped from the NUR’s priorities (cf. Williams and Steward, 1985). 
Initially the NUR responded by voting not to co-operate with the 
introduction of new technology but interview evidence indicated that 
this policy has rarely been observed by Sectional Councils since they 
are fearful of damaging the job or redundancy prospects of those 
affected by management change schemes.
SUMMARY
Although Sectional Councils continue to participate in the
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introduction of signalling schemes, it seems likely that the 
attitudes of signalling staff and their representatives to technical 
change will shift over the coming years. Since the early 1970s the 
passive consent of rail workers and the active consent of Sectional 
Councillors to employment-reducing changes has been based on changes 
providing a number of very well paid (in railway terms) jobs, a 
broadly predictable (within the Regions) and humane approach by 
management to the implementation of change. Furthermore, the 
absence of a management function concerned with developing signalling 
labour management strategies has meant that Sectional Councils have 
often been able to win significant concessions in the staffing of new 
signalboxes. This is reflected in diverse patterns of signalling 
work organization between the Regions. The Western Region Sectional 
Council appears to have been particularly successful in achieving 
some measure of craft continuity in large power signalboxes.
Sectorization, the pressure on costs, and the opportunities provided 
by new technology could undermine the consent of the signalling 
workforce and their representatives to re-signalling schemes. The 
smaller boxes arising from Sectorization are likely to lead to fewer 
jobs (proportionally) and lower gradings, a development reinforced by 
the potential of micro-electronics technology. The change in the 
pattern of management decision-making seems set to stimulate 
diversity in signalling schemes and to increase the variety in 
approaches to work organization. The policies of operations/ 
personnel management could well become less predictable particularly 
where they are faced with conflicting demands from the business
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Sectors. It is a fair bet that, taking all these factors together, 
the hitherto consensual approach to resignalling will be compromised.
Despite the differences it is possible to trace continuity in 
signalling labour management. The main element of this is that 
labour management has to respond to other management priorities. In 
the era of the ’big box’ strategy, staffing managers* decisions 
essentially responded to the technical and operational features of 
signalling schemes. Similarly, these managers now have to respond to
both these technical elements and to objectives formulated by groups
of management who have no direct involvement in staffing or
production issues. Because the impact of these Sector managers has 
been to diversify signalling schemes and since the budgetary control 
systems on BR are now very tight, it is likely that labour management 






If this thesis has been at all successful some contribution will have 
been made to the study of the managerial role in industrial 
relations. Despite the now frequent exhortations by industrial 
relations academics to pay closer attention to management, much of 
the literature charting contemporary changes in industrial relations 
and labour management either tends to take management objectives more 
or less for granted or else focuses on management to the exclusion of 
union organizations and the dynamics of workplace industrial
relations. At the outset there seemed to be a good case for 
examining both since attention to the latter enables some assessment 
to be made of the success of managements’ objectives or strategies. 
The subject of the thesis, then, has been both objectives and 
outcomes.
Prior to summarizing the main conclusions that emerged from the
study, it is worthwhile briefly outlining the main hypotheses that
guided the research. These were,
1) the increasing importance in the 1980s of achieving commercial 
targets and adopting private sector styles of management decision­
making would change the character of the conduct of labour 
management. The traditional tendency towards standardization 
would be steadily replaced by variety in management policies and 
practices. Variation in labour management would be underpinned by 
the subjugation of production management to new management 
structures created by organizational strategists to achieve 
business goals;
2) contrary to what might be anticipated, the involvement of
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government in labour relations would not bring about consistent 
strategies and practices in the arenas of labour relations and 
work organization. This is because government priorities could 
well differ from those of the industry's senior managers. 
Furthermore, the product market strategies adopted in response to 
financial targets set by central government could well be 
incompatible with consistent attempts to steadily reduce the 
involvement of union organizations in management decision-making;
3) taking (1) and (2) together, the management of labour on British 
Rail will become more variable in ways that do not uniformly 
enhance managerial control of labour.
These hypotheses direct atention to the formulation of management 
strategies and policies, the degree of integration of business and 
labour management, the mediation of strategies and policies through 
organizational structures, and the outcomes of management plans.
Since governments have a major influence on the formation of 
nationalized industrys’ objectives, it is appropriate to consider the 
second of these hypotheses first. One school of thought suggests 
that the autonomy of public sector managements in industrial 
relations has been progressively diminished during the Thatcher 
Governments. The epitome of this development is seen to be the 
miners' strike of 1984-5 when Government strategy seemed to be 
faithfully reflected in a management offensive to re-structure labour 
relations and the organization of production (Beynon and McMylor, 
1985). In BR’s case the evidence suggests that this perspective 
over-states the consistency of Governmental objectives and
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interventions. As far as could be determined interventions were 
often ad hoc and opportunist and, though linked by an unchanging 
labour relations philosophy, failed to exhibit those characteristics 
of careful construction and execution necessary to demonstrate the 
presence of strategies.
An adequate explanation for the form that government interventions 
have taken cannot be provided here since this question lies largely 
beyond the remit of the empirical invstigation mounted here. 
Nevertheless, one feature of the Thatcher Governments is worth 
briefly mentioning here. The degree of centralization within these 
Governments has sometimes made it difficult for government 
Departments to construct and maintain consistent policies in areas in 
which senior members of the Governments have had strong convictions. 
This is well illustrated by the Government’s approach to public 
sector organizations. Until 1981 the first Thatcher Government had 
no clear policy objectives for the nationalized industries. It was 
not until 1983 that a policy towards the railways emerged. Given 
this lack of direction, nationalized industries have been subject to 
interventions at the behest of senior politicians for a variety of 
pragmatic, political reasons. For instance, at the point when the 
joint BRB-rail union calls for increased government investment in the 
railways seemed to be making political headway, BR’s financial 
dependence seems to have been exploited by senior members of the 
Government to re-direct management attention away from the 
maintenance of good relations with the rail unions.
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A major problem with interventions of this sort which the miners’ 
strike inevitably obscures, is that they can disrupt management 
strategies that are already in the process of implementation. A good 
example here is the BRB’s strategy to increase traincrew 
productivity. Once the Government decided that the BRB had to 
achieve a symbolic victory over the rail unions, the strategy fell 
apart. A comprehensive work re-organization strategy was replaced by 
a confrontation over a relatively minor element of the initial 
strategy. Since this measure became insulated from a broader 
strategic context, it failed to achieve the flexibility it had been 
designed to, failed to substantially increase traincrew productivity 
and failed to reduce the involvement of ASLEF representatives in work 
scheduling.
A counter argument could be that the outcomes of particular issues in 
labour-management relations are less important than the achievement 
of the Government’s objective to diminish more generally the 
’indulgence’ of public sector managements towards organized labour. 
As a result, it is argued, the pace of change in work organizaiton 
has been accelerated. With the break-up of the 'tacit alliance’ at 
top level and the fragmentation of traditional railway culture at 
lower levels, it is indeed the case that workforce representatives 
are gradually being excluded from management decision-taking. But it 
is highly doubtful that the implementation of change has been 
quickened by this process. Some productivity items, such as the 
Trainman Concept, are little nearer implementation than they were in 
1981, whilst extensions of single-manning of locomotives (another of
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the major issues in 1981) has still not been agreed.
The forcible extension of Driver-Only-Operation in the summer of 1985 
seems to be an exception to ths argument presented here. Indeed, it 
may well be that it invalidates the arguments put forward in this 
thesis. Since this took place after data collection was completed, 
it is difficult to subject this episode to detailed analysis. 
However, a cursory examination indicates instead that it provides 
further support for the contentions presented here. In the spring of 
1985 the BRB appeared to be content with the pace of negotiations on 
this issue. It certainly wanted to avoid a confrontation with the 
unions because of the need to win back traffic that had been lost 
during the miners’ strike. However, the Government, freed from the 
constraints of the miners’ strike, seems to have turned its attention 
to the railways, exploiting BR's poor financial results for 1984-5 
(in large part due to the miners' strike) to force a confrontation 
over Driver-Only-Operation.
However, this intervention disrupted negotiations that had been 
taking place over the introduction of D.0.0. in Glasgow as part of a 
Strathclyde Rail Strategy. This strategy aimed to secure the future 
of the surburban network in Glasgow by boosting rail patronage and 
reducing operating costs. As an element of the latter, the role of 
train guards was to be re-defined to that provision of on-train 
customer service and revenue protection, thereby enabling a reduction 
in station platform staff establishments. Since management had 
guaranteed that no redundancies would result, this change in working
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practices could probably have been introduced peacefully. Because 
Glasgow was chosen as the site for the Goverment-inspired 
confrontation, the overall rail strategy for the region was nearly 
wrecked by the decline in traffic levels that resulted.
With the proviso that the D.0.0. issue may prove an exception, the 
hypothesis that government interventions would be inconsistent with 
the industry's own plans to reform aspects of labour management has 
been largely borne out. Furthermore, this episode supports the 
contention that government interventions will often conflict with 
business strategies as well as labour management objectives. The 
major confrontations in the 1980s have led to large losses in revenue 
which so far have not been counter-balanced by reductions in costs. 
In this way achievement of the Government's financial targets has 
been made even more difficult than it was already. The strategies 
that have been developed by the Sectors in response to these targets 
in some instances possess implications for laboaur management which 
conflict with Governmental philosophies towards labour. Intercity's 
strategy of moving 'up-market', through provision of improved customer 
service, demands a more consensual approach to work organization and 
labour relations than is deemed desirable by Government. In this way 
persistent instability has been introduced into labour-management 
relationships. It is only in the Freight Sector, where cost 
competition has been particularly severe, that the strategies derived 
from government targets have complemented government-defined labour 
objectives.
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Turning to the first hypothesis, the objective was to focus the 
investigation on the impact of organizational strategies and 
structures on the conudct of labour management. It was inspired by 
the belief that a number of current features of BR's business 
strategies would lead to intra-organizational diversity in management 
approaches to labour issues. In this way, the diversity that arises 
from the Government's interventions directly in the labour relations 
sphere would be intensified by the 'knock-on' effects of the 
financial targets set to guide rail management strategies. Though 
this hypothesis was developed in the context of BR, it could probably 
equally apply to many private sector organizations since BR's 
strategic and structural response to its market and political 
environment is currently similar to that of many management 
organizations in the private sector.
This hypothesis was borne out by the data gathered during the 
project. The financial targets set for BR in 1983 have contributed 
to growing variation in work organization and labour relations 
practices. In theory financial stringency is compatible with a 
variety of labour management practices and objectives. However, line 
manager have tended to resolve budgetary difficulties by varying 
labour practices because staffing is by far the largest component of 
Area budgets and is most amenable to management action in the short 
term. That such pressure has been keenly felt at Area level is due 
to a number of institutional changes that have taken place in the 
1980s. Significant here are the new corporate planning and budgetary 
control procedures which have greatly increased central financial
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control by BRB Headquarters, and the elimination of the Divisonal 
tier of management. R^emoval of the Divisions has both made local 
management units more directly accountable to higher tiers of 
management and has removed an important mechanism for enforcing 
standardization of labour management at ground level.
Growing variation in the practice of line management has been 
reinforced by the imposition of product management structures on BR's 
organization. Since each of these management units operates in a 
different market environment, with separate 'bottom-lines', there has 
been a move away from the traditional railway ethos of standarization 
towards greater diversity in labour management practices. The 
Freight sector, for whom the market context is most cost competitive, 
has often paid little heed to traditional practices and, furthermore, 
appears to be developing its own traincrew work organization 
strategy.
The institutionalization of product management in the Sector 
structures results in Headquarters' managers being more closely 
involved in the establishment and monitoring of ground level 
management budgets than hitherto (cf. Kinnie, 1985a). The competing 
interests of the Sectors has also made the formulation and 
implementation of production strategies, of which labour management 
is a very important element, much more difficult. Having said this 
the consistency of work organization and labour relations management 
prior to the 1980s should not be over-estimated. The organization of 
signalling work shows considerable diversity, whilst in the traincrew
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function, where greater consistency was achieved by extensive 
national agreements, the involvement of union headquarters and the 
presence of a specific managerial function concerned with traincrews 
at both Regional and Headquarters level of management, depot 
practices nevertheless varied.
As well as growing variation in labour management, the ideological 
importance currently attached to taking decisions on 'business' 
crtieria has resulted in labour management becoming more dependent on 
immediate business priorities. Because the authority of senior 
production managers has been subordinated to Sector managers, it is 
now difficult for the former to enforce uniform practices on the 
various Sectors. The 'creative tension' of Sectorization, then, has 
often led to ad hoc patterns of labour management since the 
formulation and implementation of uniform strategies has become more 
difficult. This is compounded by the impact of Sectorization in 
other areas of managerial decision-making. In the technical sphere 
the strategy of centralizing operational control in large signalboxes 
has fragmented under the pressure of competing Sectors. In turn, the 
diversity of signalling work organization seems likely to be 
stimulated.
On one interpretation the subordination of labour managment 
considerations to business priorities could be seen as desirable 
since, it could be argued, production has been made to flexibly 
respond to commercial considerations. This could be the case if
owe
there^no impediments to the translation of business into production
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objectives. But on BR the continuing strength of union and workplace 
organizations prevents this from happening. Instead, the variations 
in labour management provide a continuing supply of grievances into 
the labour relations machinery. In turn, the deterioration in labour 
relations that has arisen has resulted in workforce organizations 
taking a less cooperative attitude to management change schemes than 
in the past. At the same time, where radical work re-organization 
strategies are developed by individual Sectors, the chancres of them 
being fully implemented are minimal since union organizations are 
unlikely to consent to them. In some circumstances there will be 
restraints imposed by other Sectors on their forcible introduction 
since the potential costs of disruption would significantly outweigh 
any benefits that accrue to them.
The pressures arising from the management re-organization have made 
management's organization of work more ad hoc in character, whilst at 
the same time have led to a deterioration in labour relations. This 
has been accentuated by periodic presure from Government on the BRB 
to make stands on labour relations issues.
This process has directly conflicted with the Government's objective 
to diminish the organizational salience of 'traditional' labour 
relations. To respond to Government pressures, the BRB compiled a 
number of reforms to the labour relations machinery (which were 
presented to the rail unions towards the end of the period of data 
colleciton). These included tighter restraints on the movement of 
issues between levels of the machinery and the abolition of the
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Railway Staff National Tribunal. However these changes have not been 
implemented because the progress of issues through the machinery 
provides higher levels of management with some capacity to enforce 
some degree of standardization on labour management, whilst the 
traditional function of the RSNT as an escape valve has become 
especially important as labour relations tensions has steadily risen 
(cf. Chadwick's comments (1983) that resort to arbitration is still 
seen as valuable to managers and stewards as a means of saving face 
in difficult labour relations situations).
BR has not always been able to respond adequately to labour relations 
tensions because of the diminution of the role and executive 
authority of the personnel function in the 1980s. As in many private 
sector organizations, the personnel function has been re-structured 
so as to promote business considerations in management activity and 
to increase the pace of management decision-taking. In the 
decentralization of personnel management to Area level and the 
weakening of personnel's organizational status, one source of 
standardization of labour management practices has been removed. The 
ground level personnel function has been unable to take on this task 
because the conception of the role is to provide support for 
resourcing management, whilst modifications to career patterns have 
removed a source of knowledge of agreements.
At the same time, the weakness of the personnel function has made it 
difficult for BR management to formulate and implement personnel 
policies with that degree of sophistication and consistency necessary
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to channel the conduct of employee relations away from traditional 
patterns. Although senior BR managers would like to move towards a 
more consultative mode of employee relations, the combination of 
tight financial controls and looser controls on personnel issues, 
results in local managers often reducing, rather than extending, the 
scope of consultation. At the same time the weakness of the 
personnel functi on has meant that consistent strategies to build up 
alternative forms of employee participation and communication, such 
as quality circles and team briefings, have not been formulated. At 
the time of writing (June 1986) there is some evidence that 
individual managers are attempting to introduce institutions of this 
kind but since they are introduced in a context of deteriorating 
labour relations, without the broader support of other personnel 
policies, they are easily stymied by union opposition.
The second hypothesis was decisively borne out, then, by analysis of
the data collected from BR. The third hypothesis postulated that 
becasue of the developments outlined so far management control of 
labour management may well be diminished despite the apparently 
favourable conditions for management in the 1980s. It is not 
possible to decisively answer this hypothesis since it has been 
argued that the notion of a uni-dimensional 'frontier of control' is
not meaningful. Instead a number of dimensions of control can be
identified but which do not add up in any simple calculus of control. 
Furthermore, changes to the status of particular controls do not have 
any obvious consequences for control. What can be stated with some 
certainty as a result of the project are the following. First, the
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removal or reform of workforce job controls, as in the case of 
flexible rostering, may not lead to an increase in management’s 
control of work organization. Second, increases in senior managers’ 
control of their subordinates, may lead a loss of broader managerial 
control of labour management.
Drawing these findings together, the main conclusion that emerges 
from the research is that the management of labour on BR during the 
1980s has become less consistent and that in many ways it is coming 
to display an ad hoc character. This conclusion has a number of 
implications for the literature on management strategies and the 
management of labour. It seems likely that the ’management 
offensive’ perspective is mistaken because however aggressive 
management conduct is at certain times, management approaches to 
labour relations and work organization do not display the degree of 
consistency this perspective ascribes to them. Leaving the major 
confrontations aside, the widespread changes in working practices on 
BR appear to be the sum of unconnected managerial actions rather than 
the outcome of a carefully constructed over-arching management 
strategy. Indeed, the current form that the organizational structure 
takes appears to make the formulation and implementation of coherent 
labour management strategies problematic. Since the direction that 
BR management is taking in strategy and structure is mirrored by many 
private sector organizations, it seems possible that labour 
management in these firms could come to display similar 
characteristics, particularly now that the labour market power of 
skilled workers is rapidly increasing. Thus, many of those accounts
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in the business press which point to enhanced strategic capabilities 
of many firms and the new management structures associated with them 
may be painting something of a rosy picture of the practical outcome 
of these in the internal operations of them. Similarly, those more 
academic accounts, such as that of Kinnie (1985a), which argue that 
the reformulation of management authority has heightened central 
control of labour relations may well be wrong.
The new structures certainly heighten budgetary control of lower 
tiers of management. But it is precisely these pressures which, in 
BR’s case, are leading to diversity in the conduct of labour 
management. Some may wish to argue that this is a secondary issue 
compared with the long-term health of British industry. But if BR’s 
experience is representative, and if managerial ability to formulate 
labour and production strategies is not improved, it could well be 
that over the coming years many British companies will not be able to 
adequately adjust their internal operations to meet the rapidly 




1. Batstone, Ferner and Terry (1984) make a similar point about the 
labour process perspective. They point out that writers in this 
school tend "to see labour strategies flowing unproblematically 
from the goals of the capitalist firm" (p.2).
2. Kinnie (1982) suggests that it is not worthwhile for management 
to create bargaining structures away from the main source of 
management authority since union representatives will bypass them 
once they discover the managers involved in them have restricted 
discretion.
3. The project conducted by Michael Rose and Bryn Jones is 
'Procedural and Organisational Frontiers in British Industrial 
Relations', ESRC Grant Number HR 7504.
4. No progress has been made on the Trainman Concept and it seems 
unlikely to be implemented in the near future. Following 
protracted discussions on the revision of the Manning Agreements 
to extend single manning, the BRB submitted their proposals in 
late 1985 to the industry's arbitrating body, the Railway Staff 
National Tribunal. Since the rail unions argued against the BRB’s 
proposals on safety grounds which the Tribunal members felt unable 
to pass judgement, they proposed in May 1986 that the issue be 
submitted to the Railway Inspectorate of the Department of 
Transport since that institution is responsible for overseeing 
railway safety (see Financial Times, 20 May 1986).
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5. The functions of railway guards and signalling maintenance staff 
were also briefly examined since the opportunity arose on four 
occasions to conduct a small number of interviews with such staff. 
Fieldwork results suggested that these groups would provide a 
focus for future work re-organization schemes (after data 
collection had been completed). These findings were confirmed by 
the dispute over the displacement of guards on Driver-Only- 
Operated trains and the threat of industrial action against re­
organization of signalling maintenance in summer 1985.
6. The National Signalmens' Conference is one of eleven grade 
conferences that take place within the NUR annually. They have 
been held since 1932 and provide a limited forum for specialist 
organization within the industrial union. The conference can deal 
only with issues specific to the individual grade, and make 
recommendations to the union's Executive Committee (see Bagwell,
1982, pp. 106-8).
Chapter Two
1. Clegg argues that there is not much to choose between pluralist 
and Marxist approaches to industrial relations since both are able 
to examine processes as well as institutions (Clegg, 1979t Ch.
11). However, since radical approaches tend to group a wider 
range of management-labour relationships under the heading of 
'industrial relations, they sometimes tend to imply a degree of
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consistency between work organization and labour relations 
practices which is not actually present
2. Richard Edwardsnotes that most practices that form strategies of 
bureaucratic control are introduced in a piecemeal way in response 
to events.
3. Indeed, the main trend in organization theory in the 1970s has 
been a critique of the assumption of rationality in management 
writings. See Bryman (1984) for a useful review of this 
literature.
4. One recent article has suggested that ’control’ provides an ideal 
concept with which to bridge the separate disciplines of 
industrial relations, organizational studies, management science 
and industrial sociology (Storey, 1985b).
5. Some accounts have shown how employees adopt methods of 'making 
out' (ie of subverting managerial controls) to cope with the 
pressures of 'Taylorist' work environments which in effect result 
in self control (Buurawoy, 1979)•
6. It is this point that management decisions can have significant 
effects on labour management even though they not aimed at labour 




1. Ministers have often argued that industry Boards are responsible 
for day-to-day management as a reason for failing to supply 
detailed information on industry performance to Parliament 
(Minkes, 1985).
2. A welcome exception to this is Channon's review of service 
industry structure (1978).
3. Much of the deliberations of the Select Committee on Nationalized 
Industries' investigation of British Rail was taken up with this 
question of labour productivity. See SCNI (1977).
4. The structure that nationalized industries were given was called 
the 'Morrisonian Corporation' after the Labour politician Herbert 
Morrison. The London Passenger Transport Board created in the 
1930s by Morrison was the first corporation to embody the division 
of responsibilities between the elected authority and the industry 
Board subsbsequently adopted by the 1945-50 Labour Government for 
running the nationalized industries.
5 . Commencing with the Report and Accounts for 1984-5 (BRB, 1985), 
the main statutory obligations on the Board have not been 
published in the Report and Accounts. It is not clear whether any 
significance should be attached to this. However, the requirement 
established by the government in 1983 for the Intercity Sector to
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run on entirely principles could be seen to conflict with the 
statutory obligation (and EEC law - see note 6 below), enshrined 
in the 1974 Railways Act, on the BRB. With the current emphasis 
by the BRB on running the railway as a business it may have been 
thought best not to draw attention to such inconsistencies.
6. The 197^ Railway Act was the legislative response to EEC 
Regulation 1191/69 that railway administrations should provide an 
adequate transport service and that compensation should be paid to 
them for any financial burdens that arose in consequence.
7 . The meaning of ’socially desirable’ was never defined and was 
essentially decided, case by case, by the Minister of Transport. 
Cost benefit analysis of unprofitable lines was first used in 1969 
to analyse the Cambrian Coast line but, though used on a number of 
occasions in the early 1970s (Dodgson, 1984), it was never 
systematically used to guide rail policy. With the exception of 
the Victoria tube line in London, rail investment has never, unlike 
road expenditure, been subject to such forms of evaluation.
8. A recent TUC-Labour Party document on transport policy strongly 
argues for a national transport planning authority (see TUC-Labour 
Party Liason Committee, 1982).
9. As one historian put it, "we can only assume that their (the 
Stedeford Committee) criticisms were so frank and brutal that the 
position of the Transport Commission would have been rendered
3*t7
hopeless" (Kelf-Cohen, 1973)*
10.It is questionable how original the proposals in the Beeching 
Report for the creation of liner freight trains were. An 
account by a former General Manager of the London Midland 
Region suggests they were already well in hand (Pearson, 1964). 
Similarly, Beeching’s claim that railway costs had never been 
systematically analysed by railway management was not strictly 
true since a Traffic Costing Service had been set-up in the 1950s. 
As Pryke (1971) has suggested Beeching was probably trying to 
emphasize that the new policies were a decisive break with the 
past.
11.Sir Peter Parker had pressed the Government for some time to 
establish a comprehensive inquiry of railway finances and 
objectives. It seems to have been anticipated that the outcome 
of such an inquiry would put the Government-Board relationship on 
a clearer and firmer footing, possibly through the passing of a 
new Railways Act (see Parker, 1982).
12.Strongly influencing the Secretary of State was pressure from 
Conservative back benchers with Parliamentary seats in rural 
areas. See Financial Times 21/1/83.
13.The NEDO investigation suggested that the Heath Government’s 
pricing policy towards the nationalized industries was a very 
significant cause of the deterioration of government-industry
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relationships in the 1970s.
l^.The Modernization Plan proposed that £1200 million be spent to re­
equip the railways (BTC, 1956). The scale of the programme was 
subsequently revised downwards after the highly critical report by 
the Select Committee on Nationalized Industries in I960 (see BTC, 
1961).
15.Government approval is required for individual investment 
projects costed at more than £5 million. There is also a 
’courtesy' arrangement that the Board supplies the Department of 
Transport with details of all projects costing more than £1 
million.
16.Governments have not been averse, however, to 'massaging'
the presentation of financial information where it suited them.
One managerial respondent noted that expenditure on Continous 
Welded Rail (to replace jointed track) had been debited to Capital 
Account at the end of the 1960s rather than Revenue Account (as 
was the usual practice with such types of expenditure) so as not 
to detract from the claim that the 1968 Transport Act had put 
railway finances on a sound footing.
17.See Bagwell (1982, Ch. 7) for an account of the disputes between 
the rail unions and the Board in the era of the Industrial 
Relations Act.
3^ 9
18.See Joy (1973) for a comprehensive account of railway management 
costing techniques in the 1950s.
19.This analysis was less explicitly made by managerial responsdents. 
There are a number of reasons for this. As is widely found, 
managerial respondents tend to be more circumspect generally in 
responses to research investigation (Wood, 1982). In the specific 
case of the railways, most of the most senior rail managers of the 
1970s have now retired as it has traditionally been the practice 
that senior headquarters positions are occupied by managers 
towards the end of their careers. By contrast, senior positions 
in the rail trade unions seem to be gained at an earlier age, and, 
since many of them are elective, it is more difficult for the 
union organizations to formulate such selection criteria.
20.Around 70# of local BR managers interviewed in a survey conducted 
by Christine Edwards (1982b) said that they could rely on staff to 
put in extra effort or change their rostered duties 'always or 
most of the time*.
21. There are, of course, difficulties associated with the notion of 
’culture' as a unitary concept. It is difficult to define and 
hence to operationalise. As Pettigrew (1979) has noted, it is 
best regarded as a family of concepts, embracing symbol, language, 
ideology, ritual and myth.
22.See ASLEF (I98O) for accounts of the .1955 footplate strike.
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23.Similarly major reductions in workforce size in the coal industry 
have been achieved since the 1960s without conflict (until 1984). 
Good relationships between Coal Board and mining industry unions 
similarly seem to be responsible (see Turner, 1984)
24.This view is well expressed in the Financial Times of 29/8/81.
25.The government believed that the Serpell Report
was 'rubbished' pre-publication by a 'dirty tricks' propaganda 
unit operating within the BRB Press Office (see House of Commons 
Transport Committee, 1983)•
26.Even many ardent supporters of privatization believe that 
privatization of core railway activities are not feasible. Since 
railway operations make widespread use of large fixed assets (such 
as earthworks and bridges), and hence incur high fixed costs, it 
is conceded that railways could be a natural monopoly (Starkie, 
1984)
27.The wording in the 1984-5 Report and Accounts (BRB, 1985). which 
makes no reference to a definite timescale suggests that this 
requirement may have been dropped. Certainly, interviews 
conducted by Isaacs (1985) indicate that senior BR managers 
thought the government would adopt a lenient approach if Intercity 
failed to reach its profitability targets.
28.Until 1983 authorization was on occasion given to investment which
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did not meet the Required Rate of Return if it was essential for 
the operation of the ’social* railway since BR was under a 
statutory obligation to maintain passenger services at a similar 
level to those in 1974 (see Monopolies and Mergers Commission, 
1980).
29.The Ridley Report was leaded to the Economist, appearing in the 
issue of 27/5/78. It advocated a process of privatization and 
commercialization of the nationalized industries. To cope with 
the labour relations consequences of this it proposed that large 
stockpiles of coal be built up at power stations, that plans 
should be made for importing coal and oil in the event of a long 
strike in coal mining, that transport haulage firms should be 
encouraged to recruit non-union drivers, that strikers' welfare 
benefits should be restricted and that a large mobile force of 
police be formed to deal with picketing and social disorder.
30.Jessop, Bonnett, Bromley and Ling (1984) argue that the content of 
the Thatcher Governments’ actions is not as consistent as the 
style of the Prime Minister may suggest. Similarly, Riddell 
argues that ’these Marxist commentators (Hall and
Jacques, 1983) have conferred on Thatcherism greater coherence and 
consistency that it has had in practice. Many of the actions 
taken since 1979••• were much more a response to the failures of 
earlier policies and to short term pressures than the 
implementation of a carefully worked out blueprint” (Riddell,
1983, p. 19).
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31.In the 1984 pay round the Board insisted that the pay award be 
tied to commitments by the rail unions to make progress on 
extension of driver only operation on passenger and freight trains 
and the extension of single manning of locomotives. Faced with 
an overtime ban and work to rule by the NUR and ASLEF, the Board 
eventually climbed down. It was susbequently revealed in the 
Daily Mirror that the Government had intervened to achieve this 
since it was fearful of solidarity action with the miners being 
extended.
32.In the 1985 pay round the Board, contrary to standard practice in 
recent years, did not table any productivity commitments to be 
tied to the pay award. Since this took place after fieldwork was 
completed it was not possible to get any *insi de’ information on 
why this was the case. It seems a reasonable hypoB'csi* that the 
Board was anxious to avoid conflict with the rail unions since now 
that the miners’ strike was over the Government may have taken 
such an opportunity to place additional demands on BR management. 
On this interpretation the dispute in summer 1985 over driver- 
only-operation was the result primarily of the Government taking 
advantage of BR’s poor financial performance in 1984-5 to press 




1. For a contemporary account of trade unionism and labour relations 
on the railways in the early part of the century see Cole and 
Arnot (1917)»
2. The railways were by far the biggest road haulier and bus operator 
by the outbreak of World War Two (Thomson and Hunter, 1973.
P.130).
3. Source: personal communication from NUR, June 1986.
4. Source: personal communication from TSSA, February, 1986. Seglow,
Streeck and Wallace (1982) found that in 1975 20% of TSSA’s 
membership was employed outside the British Railways Board. The 
growth in membership employed outside the BRB seems to owe a lot 
to the privatization of Sealink and British Transport Hotels. The
TSSA was unable, however, to supply details of the impact of this.
5. For histories of ASLEF see Raynes (1921) and McKillop 
(1950).
Specialist enginemen's unions are found in numerous other railway 
administrations (see Seglow, Streeck and Wallace, 1982 for the 
German case), though in France the locomotive drivers’ union 
merged with the industrial union during the period of syndicalist 
fervour just before World War One (Stein, 1978).
6. Source: ASLEF*s Executive Committee's Report to the Annual 
Assembly of Delegates, June 1985» p. 1.
7 . Since the function of the Rule Book is to maintain safety in 
railway operations, this set of instructions as accepted as beyond 
the scope of negotiation by the rail unions. In turn, railway 
managements have not generally sought to achieve reform of working 
arrangements via changes to the Rule Book.
The NUR and ASLEF*s trust in rail management's integrity here has 
been shaken by events in the driver-only-operated trains episode. 
In response to ASLEF*s claim that driver-only-operated freight 
trains BRB managers claimed that the Railway Inspectorate 
(responsible for overseeing railway safety) had suggested to the 
Board that this was not necessary. It subsequently transpired in 
a meeting between the two unions and the Inspectorate that the 
latter had merely noted the BRB's plans and had not made any 
judgement on their safety aspects.
8. This figure is based on a computation of the number of footplate 
staff employed on BR in December 1983 (see BRB, 1984c) and the 
number of members on BR claimed by ASLEF in the EC REport to the 
Annual Assembly of Delegates, 1984.
9. See the Railwaymens' Charter, NUR (1979)*
10.A breakaway union of signalmen from the NUR - the Union of Power
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Signalmen - was formed after the Second World War but with the 
death of its founder it seems to have collapsed (Bagwell, 1982). 
The records of the union are deposited in the Modern Records 
Centre at the University of Warwick.
11.This legislation amalgamated the railway companies into the 'Big 
Four'. Grade councils, similar to the present-day Sectional 
Councils, were created in each of the new companies to deal with 
work arrangements whilst industry-wide bodies, the Central Wages 
Board and the National Wages Board, dealt with issues of pay and 
conditions. These statutory arrangements were largely a 
continuation of wartime practice when the railways had been under 
government control. See Bagwell (1963. Ch. 16).
12.Issues of lesser importance, arising from ambiguities in national 
agreements can be submitted to the RSNT Chairman for 
interpretation.
13. The 1978 Warwick survey found that 11% of manufacturing 
establishments were subject to company level agreements (see 
Brown, 1981, p. 8).
l^.At some footplate locations collective interviews took place in 
which it was not always possible to establish the branch 
involvement of all those present. Since the basis of signalling 
LDC representation is not the same as in the case of the footplate 
grades - with often only one signalling member on the LDC branch -
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involvement overall is likely to be lower. However, the fairly 
high involvement reported here is probably due to the fact that 
most signalboxes visited had their own specific LDC.
15.The approach to trade union democracy here is not a rigorous one. 
Martin’s (1968) argument that democracy varies according to ’’the 
status of the opposition”, in effect the constraints on the 
leadership ignoring opposition, is not entirely helpful since 
factional competition is formally discouraged in the NUR and is 
inhibited by a sense of craft loyalty to the existing leadership 
in ASLEF. Furthermore, it takes little account of how leaders can 
defeat oppositions politically, possibly through playing-off 
different factions against each other. The main element of the 
democratic ethos identified here is that individuals have fairly 
easy access to the institutions and positions where union policy 
is created or strongly influenced.
16.The bargaining teams are usually composed of two or three 
Executive members and an Assistant General Secretary.
In the NUR Executive members are elected for three years. At the 
end of this period, these members are not eligible to stand again 
for another three years. Elections for the NUR Executive are 
staggered so that the composition of the Executive changes every 
year. ASLEF Executive members are elected for three year periods 
but are eligible to stand for re-election. In the TSSA Executive 
members are eligible to stand for re-election once before
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returning to full-time employment.
17.A comparison of total union income with levels of expenditure
incurred on administration illustrates the small size of the full - 
time NUR organization. Whilst in 1983 the TWGU spent 72# of its 
income on administrative expenses, the GMWU 65% and the NUM (like 
the NUR. an industrial union) 59#, the NUR spent only 43#. 
Source: Annual Report of the Certification Officer. 1984.
18.See Financial Times 8/7, 10/7, 23/7 , 5/8, 10/8, 13/8/85.
19.See Financial Times I8/I/85 and ASLEF Executive Committee’s Report 
to the Annual Assembly of Delegates, 1985*
20.This question was not specifically put to LDC respondents but the 
answers to other questions on workplace labour relations strongly 
indicated that LDCs function separately.
21.Shortly before the interview took place the joint LDC committee
had threatened strike action against a material proposal to withdraw
a nursing post at the workplace.
22.Railway Staff Joint Council (Locomotive) Minute L574.
23.Edwards recognises that the access of LDCs to Sectional Councils 
and higher levels of management is an important dimension of 
workgroup power but it is treated as an exogenous variable. The
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contention here is that the involvement of these higher levels is 
an integral part of workplace labour relations.
2k.Other research in progress whilst this project was being conducted 
includes work undertaken by Southampton University’s New 
Technology Research Group into computerised freight traffic 
monitoring and changes in freight yard supervision (see Dawson, 
other refs), and research into re-signalling schemes and new forms 
of footplate work organization by the Jim Conway Foundation. As 
far as can be established, neither group has paid any attention to 
the involvement of Sectional Councils in the implementation of 
change.
25.See Bagwell (1982, Chs. 5 and 6) and McLeod (1970, Chs. 9 and 10) 
for extensive discussion of the Pay and Efficiency Agreements.
26.At the two negotiations sessions attended by the author, 31 out of 
52 and 10 out of 15 items related to claims that the allocation of 
staff had been done incorrectly by line management.
27.The Secretaries and Chairmen of all Councils are booked-off normal 
duties full time.
28.The drivers’ Councils refuse to arbitrate in the allocation of 
work between depots on the basis that it is management's job, not 
the union’s, to allocate work. Traffic Councils are generally 
prepared to liase with service planning managers to settle issues
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of work allocation between depots.
29.Two Councillors interviewed recorded the reluctance of district 
officials to get involved, and stated that management often turned 
to the Council for assistance in such matters.
30.This definition is the one adopted by Christine Edwards in the 
North East London Polytechnic study (see Edwards, 1982a).
31.This finding could have been influenced by strong personal 
antipathy between the managers concerned and the drivers’ LDC 
Chairman. Labour-management relationships at this depot were of 
some concern to both Sectional Council representatives and 
Regional industrial relations management. It was decided to 
establish a Joint Enquiry into this depot at a negotiations 
session attended by the author.
32. Both guards depots visited had their own LDCs separate from other 
grades of staff.
33-On the Western Region it seemed to be the practice for signalmen 
in power boxes to have their own LDC whether or not there were 
sufficient numbers of staff at the location to formally justify 
separate representation. To achieve the requisite number of staff 
signalling staff at other locations were included. At the London 
Midland power box where there were insufficient numbers of 
signalling staff in the power box to justify a signalling LDC,
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the signalling staff shared an LDC with platform staff.
34.Whilst footplate LDCs generally insist on covering vacancies on a 
daily basis, with each allocation decision being made on the basis 
of seniority, the guards’ LDCs interviewed were happy to re­
allocate staff on a weekly basis according to personal choice.
Chapter Five
1. The Scottish Region adopted a two-tier structure of Region and 
Area in 1968.
2. It is said that when Mrs Thatcher visited BRB Headquarters shortly 
before being elected to power she strongly implied that any 
manager worth his or her salt would not work for an organization 
as inefficient as British Rail (Taylor, 198I).
3. As Chandler puts it in The Visible Hand,
’It meant the employment of a set of managers to supervise 
these functional activities over an extensive geographical 
area ; and the application of an administrative command of 
middle and top executives to monitor, evaluate and co-ordinate 
the work of managers responsible for day-to-day operations. 
It meant, too, the formulation of brand new types of internal 
administrative procedures and accounting and statistical
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controls. Hence, the operational requirements of the 
railroads demanded the creation of the first administrative 
hierarchies in American business (1977. P*87)
Some of the earliest works on management organization took the
railways as their subject. See, for instance, Findlay (1891).
k. The railway companies were forced to give considerable thought to
their managerial structures after the amalgamations of the 1921 
Railways Act. Three of the ’Big Four’ continued to use the 
departmental form, whilst the London and North Eastern Railway 
(LNER) adopted a decentralised management structure based on four 
(later three) areas (see Bonavia, 1971. Chapter 2; Bonavia, 1981, 
Chapter 1). Indeed, the LNER can be counted amongst the pace­
setters in British organisations in adopting divisionalised 
structures. Its adoption of a decentralized structure based in 
large part on the main constituent companies avoided some of the 
problems of managerial rivalry arising from the amalgamation. By 
contrast, the highly centralized departmental structure adopted by 
the London, Midland and Scottish Railway (LMS) was aimed at 
enforcing standardization of operating practice on its diverse 
constituent companies.
5 . Gunz and Whitley's research on managerial cultures (1985) finds 
that organizations characterised by a 'specialist' managerial 
culture, exemplified by those with strong departmental structures, 
have responded to the current recession by either consolidation of
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their existing activities or retrenchment, whilst organizations 
built on a 'generalist* culture have behaved in an entrepreneurial 
mode and have generated new business strategies,
6. The relationship between the British Transport Commission and the 
Railway Executive was marked by intense rivalry. Whilst the BTC 
perceived its role to be to integrate the various modes of 
transport grouped under its aegis, the Executive viewed itself as 
the inheritor of the railway companies traditions. As a result 
the Executive believed it was best qualified to run the railways 
and hence attempted to minimise the involvement of the BTC in 
formulating railway policy. The Railway Executive largely 
excluded the Commission from the locomotive building programme 
with the consequence that new classes of steam locomotive were 
being built long after the technical and economic superiority of 
diesel traction had been recognised. When the strategy of 
dieselisation was formulated after the demise of the Executive, it 
was decided to make up for lost time by rapid dieselisation. The 
result of this was that a large number of unproved and 
unsatisfactory classes of locomotive were ordered, many of which 
saw only a few years service before being withdrawn. See Joy 
(1973) and Bonavia (1971)*
7* Fiennes was asked to resign from British Railways after the
publication of his book, I Tried to Bun a Bailway, (1967a), since 
it was highly critical of railway management policy.
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8. After the abolition of the Railway Executive, the British 
Transport Commission requested the Regions to draw up plans for 
re-organisation. The Eastern and London Midland Regions adopted a 
'Line* scheme whereby Line Managers reporting directly to the 
Regional General Manager were responsible for specific lines of 
route with functional managers to assist them. The other Regions 
created geographically-based Divisions which in the case of the 
Scottish and Southern Regions were based upon virtually self- 
contained railway systems. Beeching standardized the pattern of 
federal decentralization within the Regions upon such 
geographically based Divisions (see Bonavia, 1971).
9. The structure has been criticised for embodying the pretence that 
the BRB is a ‘genuine* diversified conglomerate wheras in reality 
it is a primarily a railway business with a number of ancillaries 
(Modern Railways, 1976a).
10.Many British M-Form firms differed from their American 
counterparts by possessing three rather than two tiers of 
management organization above the workplace. The relative 
importance of growth through merger in the British case seems to 
lie behind this. When levels of unemployment were low compared 
with those of the 1980s it was often difficult for firms to fully 
digest their amalgamations through creation of more ‘rational* 
structures because the potential unemployment effects would have 
been politically unacceptable. See Child and Francis (1981).
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11. 60% of the Freight Sector's turnover comes from trainload 'merry- 
go-round' coal traffic from pit to power station. This traffic is 
forecast to decline and Sector managers have sought to develop the 
wagonload Speedlink service. However, the unit costs of this 
activity are currently around 30% higher than road haulage, whilst 
the severity of price competition offers limited scope for 
competing on quality. As a result the Sector has to pay 
particular attention to cost containment.
12.Some idea of the magnitude of InterCity's task is revealed by the
loss of £232.6 million on a turnover of £577*2 million in the
fifteen months to March 31st 1985 (BRB, 1985).
13.The Serpell Committee was particularly critical of the process of 
corporate planning and indeed rejected the 1982 Corporate Plan 
prepared especially for their investigation for a combination of 
the reasons outlined here. See Serpell (1983)•
l^.The method of allocating join indirect costs prior to 1969 was 
that of allocating out all costs of track, signalling and
overheads according to the use made of them. It was given up as a
guide for management decision-making because it gve misleading 
information on service profitability (Lazarus, 1978; Fowler,
1977)* It nevertheless continued in use for the assessment of 
joint costs required by the Ministry of Transport in respect of 
grant-aided services.
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This basis of costing was modifed by the 1974 Railways Act. Since 
this legislation defined the prime function of BR as that of a 
passenger railway, freight and parcels were only to be charged 
their avoidable costs ie that share of joint indirect costs that 
could be specifically attributed to them. For passenger services 
the BRB adopted a system of contribution accounting whereby the 
direct costs of a service were subtracted from the revenue and the 
balance viewed as a net contribution to joint costs.
15.cf. Brown and Sisson's suggestion (1983) that more aggressive 
management of labour relations probably owes more to desperate 
market situations than a purposeful 'management offensive'.
16.At mid-April 1984 there were 255 footplate depots on British Rail. 
Source: ASLEF Circular, 144/1984. The long term plan is to reduce 
this number to 35 * super-depots'. A review of depot strategy took 
place between the rail unions and the BRB in summer 1984 at which 
information was supplied on depots that were safe, those that were 
scheduled for closure, and those whose future was uncertain.
17.Freight management is also apparently considering the re- 
introduction of overnight stays away from home for traincrews (see 
Locomotive Journal, May 1986) but such a measure seems highly 
unlikely to be implemented since the rail unions are unlikely to 
agree to it, and it is not in the other Sectors' interests for it 
to be implemented forcefully. Intercity, for instance is unlikely 
to want its services interrupted by industrial disputes over an
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issue of this sort because of the need to win customer confidence 
to achieve the Sector strategy and because the current location of 
traincrew depots is largely satisfactory for the Sector’s 
services.
18.On the Southern Region functional management teams had to be 
constructed prior to two-tier.
19.Between 1978 and 1982 loaded train miles fell from 246 million 
miles to 212.2 (see BRB, 1983). Many Areas in the late 1970s were 
composed of around 1000 staff. In many cases this was down to 
around 600 by the time of two-tier. As a result it was possible 
to amalgamate Areas as an element of two tier and for the Areas to 
be managed direct from Region without the Regional General 
Manager’s span of control becoming too wide.
20.The application of micro-electronic technology to operating and 
management functions appears to offer the potential to cut out 
those middle ranking managerial functions which were concerned 
with information processing (Child, 1984).
A good example is the Manpower Information System (MANIS) for 
personnel records. Traditionally, a major element of the 
Divisional personnel function's role had been the maintenance of 
personnel records. With MANIS retrieval of staff information 
could be doen directly from Area. At the time of the research, 
input of personnel information had been concentrated away from
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Division to Regional level but it was planned that this would be 
centralized to Areas.
21.This experiment has now been ended with the result that Western 
practice has been brought more into line with the other Regions.
22.See BR London Midland Region, 'Precis for the re-organization of 
the Euston, Watford and Willesden Areas’, (1984). See also Modern 
Railways (December 1985)• A former operations manager has 
strongly criticized this move to sector-specific Areas on the 
grounds that the function of the Area is to coordinate the needs 
of all the Sectors in production terms. See Rayner (1985).
23.Operational statistics are hard to come by on the grounds that 
they are sensitive commercial information. The breakdown of 
figures that BR publicly provides does not correlate with Sector 
definition of services so it is difficult to evaluate the true 
picture. Some interview responses suggested that there was 
concern in top management circles at a deterioration but how far 
this was the result of the re-organization is hard to say. The 
level of public complaints rose significantly in 1985 but once 
again it is not easy to determine how far this can be attributed 
to two-tier. See Central Transport Users Consultative Committee
(1985).
24.The new form that the disciplinary process has taken was strongly 
criticized by union respondents in interview. They argued that,
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with the elimination of the Divisional role, Area Managers could 
become prosecution, judge and court of appeal. Legal action has 
recently been threatened by ASLEF on the grounds that in certain 
cases this could breach 'natural justice', in that no person 
should be the judge in their own case. See Daily Mirror (21 
April 1986). The Board now seem to be taking this issue 
seriously.
25.Many current senior managers have this background. Of those
interviewed only two were graduates. All the others had commenced 
their working careers in clerical or blue colar jobs.
26.Of the two that weren't ex-footplate staff, one was an appointee 
since the two-tier re-organization.
Chapter Six
1. MacKay argues that 'macho-management' is widespread on the basis of 
responses that managers are more 'bullish' in the conduct of 
labour relations. This response could indicate that managers are 
more confident in their conduct of labour relations than hitherto 
but it does not necessarily show that managers are becoming 
consistently more aggressive against labour.
2. The tu>c factors Manning mentions as contributing to this decline 
is falling demand for recruitment work and a loss of faith in
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existing management development principles and schemes.
3. The employee relations component of personnel work includes 
sevicing forms of employee representation and involvement 
additional to the traditional institutions of labour relations.
4. The consequences of the failure to distinguish labour relations 
from other personnel management is shown by explanations for the 
growth in personnel management during the 1970s. The survey 
evidence indicates that the extent of collective worker 
organization is not a significant factor behind the increased 
specialization of management organization in personnel affairs 
(see Brown, 1981). Yet there are strong intuitive grounds for 
suspecting that there will be strong causal relationships between 
workforce organization and specialist labour relations management.
5 . In the railways case, John Benstead, the General Secretary of the 
NUR, was appointed to the BTC whilst ASLEF General Secretary 
William Allen was appointed to the Railway Executive.
6. All personnel managers interviewed bar one had joined British Rail 
in clerical or blue collar positions. One area traincrew manager 
interviewed had been a Sectional Council representative. Cliff 
Rose, the Board Member for Personnel at the time of the 1982 
strikes had started work on the railway as a booking office clerk.
7. Analysis of survey evidence indicates that the influence of
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personnel managers steadilydecreases the further the subject is 
removed from immediate industrial relations concerns (Batstone,
1984).
8. Batstone 1983 survey finds that the proportion of firms with 
specialist personnel Board representation was unchanged from 1978 
(Batstone, 1984). In two organizations studied by Purcell, the 
retiring personnel director had not been replaced in either case 
(1985).
9. The evidence on trends in the location of pay bargaining is 
inconclusive so far. An IDS study in 1981 found that some firms 
were centralizing whilst others were decentralizing (IDS, 1981). 
Batstone’s survey finds a decrease in the importance attached to 
establishment level bargaining between 1978 and 1983, and smaller 
corresponding increases in company and multi-compnAy bargaining 
(the balance being taken up by an expansion of unilaterally 
awarded pay deals (see Batstone, 1984, p. 203). Kinnie, by 
contrast, suggests that a decentralization of the location of pay 
bargaining is taking place (Kinnie, 1985b).
10.Prior to this there was a Board Member for Personnel. Reporting 
to this position was a Director of Industrial Relations and a 
Director of Personnel Development. Directors of Employee 
Relations and a Director of Management Services now report tothe 
Managing Director, Personnel.
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11.It is believed the appointment of part-time outsiders will
encourage the creation of more business-oriented stategies since 
such members will not have any loyalties to current organizational 
practices.
12.Governments have exercised close control over railway pay awards 
since 1962 (Thomson and Beaumont, 1978).
13.Since two-tier personnel work for the engineering functions has 
been undertaken by personnel managers located within each of these 
functions. See British Rail, Eastern Region ’Precis on the two- 
tier re-organization; personnel function’ (1984).
14.Whilst the fieldwork was underway, two Regional Personnel Manager 
posts that came vacant were filled not as traditionally by 
managers alrady reporting to them but by 'outsiders'. In one case 
the incoming Personnel Manager had been a member of the Soane 
Committee at BRB HQ that had devised the two-tier re-organization.
15.Footplate representatives were particularly critical of this since 
the footplate promotional arrangements are especially complex.
16.In some cases local workforce organization have taken industrial 
action for the first time. Certainly the number of disputes on 
the railways increased dramatically in 1984 from an average of 13 
per year between 1978 and 1983 to 33* Source: Department of 
Employment Gazette, various issues.
372
17.The thinking of a number of BRB strategists was strongly 
influenced by Peters and Waterman's book on excellence (1982). A 
good critique of the corporate culture 'craze' is provided by 
Thackray (I986). He argues that it is difficult, probably 
impossible, for managements to create a single organizational 
culture. Peters and Waterman were strongly criticized earlier in 
an article in the Harvavd Business Review (Cornell, 1983) which 
argued that the mechanisms by which Peters and Waterman's 
corporate objectives were achieved was left entirely unclear.
18.These claims for mileage bonuses were from drivers whose normal 
turns had been disrupted by the consequences of an earlier strike 
by drivers from other depots. Top management exploited a clause 
in the mileage agreements which restricts its payment in the event 
of industrial action.
19.MacInnes (1985) argues that the 'renaissance' of consultation is 
illusory. He argues that aggregate coverage of consultation has 
been stable since the end of World War Two. The growth reported 
in a number of surveys has been counterbalanced by it falling into 
disuse elsewhere. Part of his argument rests on the contention 
that ambiguous survey questions indicate that consultation 
arrangements are still present even when use of them has been 
discontinued.
20. The decisive change came with the stipulation of new government 
objectives in October 1983. In a special meeting of the Rail
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Council in January 1984 the union dissented strongly from the 
Board’s plans to adapt to these objectives through service cuts 
and fares increases. The NUR argued particularly strongly for a 
low-fares policy on BR (see Railnews, 1984a).
21.Two depot managers interviewed managed more than one depot. This 
development came out of the decrease in the number of Areas and 
the expansion in Areas’ geographical size in the move to two-tier.
22.The consultation was organized by Divisional managers. Subsequent 
contact indicated that the management approach had significantly 
changed when responsibility for organizing the consultation 
process had passed to the relevant Area.
23.Regional General managers are steadily being replaced by managers 
committed to Sectorization. In 1986 the London Midland General 
Manager is a former Sector Director, and it is said that the 
Eastern Region General Manager was ’forced out' because he was 
unsympathetic to Sector Management.
24.One traincrew depot at which interviews were conducted has
recently been listed for closure 'out of the blue’. As far as can 
be determined from newspaper sources, management decisions on the 
re-allocation of this depot's work seem to have been already taken 
and do not seem to be the subject of the usual Consultation 
process of re-allocating drivers and work to other depots. At the 
time of writing (June 1986) these same sources indicate that no
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further details have so far been given to the trade unions.
Chapter Seven
1. Total working days lost on the railways in 1982 were 1,116,000 of 
which 1,007,900 can be attributed to the flexible rostering 
strikes. The remainder are accounted for by the brief NUR 
national strike in June. Source: Department of Employment 
Gazette.
2. Drivers had no formal training for the job. Instead progression 
through the grades of engine cleaner and fireman gave drivers 
intimate knowledge of how locomotives worked and performed (see 
McKenna, 1970). As firemen, footplate staff would be expected to 
be allowed turns at the driving controls to gain driving 
experience. Additional knowledge, such as of the Rules and 
Regulations, was gained through attendance at Mutual Improvement 
Classes run by experience drivers.
3 . For an interesting account of the impact of dieselization on a 
community see Cottrell (1951)*
4. Train drivers were overtaken as the top blue collar earners on the 
railway in the early 1970s by top-class signalmen and signalling 
maintenance staff. In the current pay structure, Signalmen 
Classes E and F and Technician Officers have higher basic rates
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than drivers.
5. Hyman (1984) notes how production strategies are difficult to draw 
up because of the decentralized pattern of production planning in 
manufacturing.
6. For instance the limitation of driving express passenger trains 
single-manned is 350 miles or 6 hours, and for local freight 
trains 100 miles or 7 hours.
7 . Ballast train workings are eagerly sought after since not only do 
they require two crew members, but they also generally operate on 
Sundays when pay is at double time. Train planners have to be 
careful not to violate ’spheres of influence’ in planning these 
trains for fear of causing labour relations difficulties.
8. All but one traincrew manager interviewed argued that there was no 
need for them to have any detailed involvement since the LDCs are 
highly skilled and experienced in work allocation, and they 
perform it in a 'sensible and responsible' way.
9. Some depots allocate spare drivers to each link; others have a 
special link composed solely of spare drivers. The benefits to 
footplate staff of a specific spare link is that, if it is 
conceived of as an 'entry' link for newly-qualified drivers, it 
ensures that these drivers receive the widest route and traction 
training (so they can cover all the jobs in the depot). The spare
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link used to be known as the ’control link* since daily deployment 
of staff in it was under the control of the District Control 
Office to supply traincrews for special services, late running 
trains etc. (Fleming, n.d.). The advantage of allocating spares 
to specific links is that it generally results in a more regular 
work pattern for junior drivers.
10.After 200 miles bonus payments come into operation. Footplate
staff receive 30 minutes pay for each 15 miles run over this.
Since 1919. when mileage payments were introduced, drivers working
on a mileage bonus can agree locally to book on less than five
times per week if they can get more than equivalent to a week's 
_Q.. This arrangement is known as ’contract mileage.'p a y  •
11.A host of subsidiary principles cover the procedures to be 
followed where the supply of spare drivers is exhausted, the use 
of drivers' assistants 'passed' for driving duties (relief 
drivers), and the period of notification for changes to rostered 
duty.
12.The difference between footplate hours of work and those of other 
conciliation staff is substantial. Footplate hours of work are 
usually between 43 and 44.5 hours per person per week, whilst 
those of other staff are always in excess of 50. making these 
staff second only to prison officers in the hours worked in the 
public sector. Source: New Earnings Survey, various
issues.
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13.The BRB has made such requests in the past to cover exceptional 
circumstances such as where a temporary acute shortage of drivers 
has arisen. Permission is usually given by ASLEF Headquarters. 
However, given the declining state of railway labour relations and 
changing patterns of depot allocation arising from Sectorixation, 
permission is now less likely to be given. See ASLEF EC Report to 
the Annual Assembly of Delegates, 1985*
14.ASLEF has argued that an increase in depot establishment is the 
answer to this problem. The BRB in turn has sought to solve it by 
introducing Rest Day working. ASLEF Headquarters recently 
declined this request. See Note 13 above.
15.Source: ASLEF Headquarters’ Movements Department.
16.BR faces chronic problems of retaining guards in some areas (see 
Monopolies and Mergers Commission, 1980). The basic rate (after 
the 1986 pay award) of £104 per week puts guards near the bottom 
of the railway pay structure.
17.Each member of BR’s staff worked on average 2,200 hours per year, 
whilst those of other European railways worked in the region of 
1,700 (BRB/Institute of Transport Studies, 1980).
18.That such a large pay agreement was allowed by the Government was 
because of it’s adherence to the monetarist belief that the size 
of pay settlements are irrelevant to the treatment of inflation
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(see Keegan, 1984). More conspiratorially, Soskice (1984) 
suggests it wa an element of a goverment strategy to ’buy-off* the 
public sector.
19.RSJC (Loco.) Minute L76O.
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Chapter Eight
1. For instance, the BRB's ’hard line' in the first round of strikes 
was softened because of a Cabinet belief that it was the wrong 
time at which to seek a confrontation (see Bagwell, 1984, p. 98).
2. This contrasts with evidence from the scrutiny of bargaining 
records on footplate and signalling issues over a fifteen year 
time span. The usual practice was for exhaustive, joint 
consideration of the full ramifications of proposals to change 
national agreements.
3. Initially a Court of Inquiry took place outside the Machinery of 
Negotiation at BR's insistence. ASLEF refused to attend on the 
grounds that the normal procedures had not yet been exhausted.
The Court laid down a series of procedures to resolve the issue, 
the final stage of which was reference to the RSNT. Since 'failed 
to agrees' were subsequently recorded in the normal institutions, 
the issue was duly referred to the RSNT in March 1982.
4. See RSNT (1982a).
5 . As a result of the 'fudge' that was seen to result, two senior 
managers argued in interview that pendulum arbitration would be a 
more satisfactory form of arbitration.
6 . See Report of the Special Assembly of Delegates, ASLEF 1982.
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7. See ASLEF EC Report to the Annual Assembly of Delegates, 1983. 
1984.
8. Two of the three freight depots visited now worked throughout to a 
number of destinations where prior to flexible rosters crew 
changes had been necessary very close to the final destination.
9. An IDS study (1984) found that a common approach to implementing 
the shorter working week where production was continuous was for 
more rest days to be taken, leaving the basic shift pattern 
unchanged.
10.The total number of hours worked per footplate person per week is 
remarkably constant in the period 1979-85. But since the standard 
working week has been reduced by one hour, overtime per person has 
increased by one hour per week. Source: New Earnings Survey, 
various issues.
11.Some depots that accepted flexible rosters early on managed to 
create two extra rest days per cycle.
12.Similarly, interviews with guards sug^ted that there are major 
political differences between guards in main-line passenger depots 




1. Much of the material presented here was earlier presented in a 
paper 'Managerial strategy, new technology and industrial 
relations: the case of railway signalmen’ delivered at the Second 
Annual Conference on Organization and Control of the Labour 
Process, University of Aston, March 1984; and in a talk to the 
Department of Management and Administrative Studies, Huddersfield 
Polytechnic in October 1985 on ’From block-bells to micro­
processors: the revolution in railway signalling.’
2. Signalmen are often referred to as ’bobbies’, reflecting their 
origins as railway policemen.
3. Britain's first signalbox was openned at Bricklayers Arms in South 
London in 1842.
4. This Plan has since been renamed the National Signalling 
Assessment.
5. A number of respondents argued that the adoption of this 
comprehensive approach to re-signalling comparatively early 
reflected an insntitutional strength to the engineering 
departments which derived from Brunei’s pre-eminence in the Great 
Western.
6. Andrews (1979) argues that there are three generations of
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signalboxes in ergonomic terms. First generation boxes are 
mechanically operate, whilst second generation boxes contain more 
equipment and control a greater number of train movements. In 
third generation boxes signalling staff do not need that much 
greater knowledge of equipment since much of it is automated, but 
require much greater knowledge of train services.
7. Source: Bagwell (1982, p. 44). Part of this fall in employment 
numbers is due to line closures in the 1960s (ibid., p. 59). The 
more recent statistics are taken from the Board’s accounts for 
1978 and 1984-5-
8. Most large signalling schemes cost in excess of £20 million.
9. The main cause of serious railway accidents in the twentieth 
century has been signalmen forgetting they have a train on their 
section, particularly at night (Rolt, 1966, p. 194).
10.Railway managements have encouraged job rotation in signalboxes 
since it increases their scope for flexibility.
11.At Eastern and Bridge there was a limited form of fully automatic 
operation, enabling platform selection to be done without the 
signalman’s intervention. The signalmen at Bridge rarely used
this facility since it took considerably longer than when directly 
controlled by the operator.
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12.At the time of the research, trains additional to those specified 
in the data-base had to be signalled in the conventional way.
13.Scrutiny of documentary records confirmed that this issue had not 
been discussed in national level labour relations institutions up 
to mid-1984.
14.Dawson and McLoughlin’s study of freight supervisors found that 
after the implementation of TOPS, yard supervisors benefited from 
an expansion of their authority and responsibility at the same 
time as centralized control of freight operations was increased 
(Dawson and McLoughlin, 1986).
15.An an element of the two-tier re-organization, the role of the 
Control Office in the allocation of relief traincrews was formally 
ended.
16.The Controllers and their union fought a sustained campaign 
against the decentralization of Control to Areas. The issue was 
seen by a number of respondents to be the most contentious to 
arise from the re-organization.
17-Burtt argued that the relationship between Controllers and
signalmen was positive sum since information supplied from one to 
the other enabled each to perform their jobs better (1926). In 
practice, as the analysis in this chapter how shown, the two 




1. Area management have so far had little involvement in the 
implementation of large signalboxes. A member of the Area 
Manager's staff usually attends progress meetings but as far as 
could be determined their role is usually limited in practice.
2. A number of crass mistakes were made in the early yeais For 
instance, Central's main panel is too high for smaller signalmen 
to operate.
3. On the London Midland Region other signalmen perform any 
signalling duties on the main-line whilst other traffic grades can 
operate signalling equipment off the main line.
4. The other Western Region signalboxes which were commissioned prior 
to the big-box strategy controlled a much smaller area than 
Western.
5 . Dawson and McLoughlin found that the Area Freight Assistants 
created by TOPS tended to work directly with each other rather 
than via Control (Dawson and McLoughlin, 1986).
6. This Area Operations Manager started his railway career as a
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Controller. He transferred to signalling work in the 1960s 
because , as he put it, "the writing was on the wall" for the 
Control Organization.
7. This information is little used by signalmen for immediate action 
purposes. They tend to rely on their knowledge of train services 
rather than on this material. In the Southern and Eastern Region 
boxes there was a facility to access other signalboxes’ train 
describers (ie route layout and trian locations). This was 
installed to provide long range information. It seemed to be 
little used in the boxes visited. Instead signalmen acquired 
their information on train running from other sources.
8. Access to signalling staff was declined by local management in two 
cases whilst in two others it was difficult to obtain adequate 
interview responses.
9. Towards the end of the project documentary evidence suggested that 
a number of Area Managers wre attempting to install Public Address 
equipment in a number of manual signalboxes. Some of the 
signallig staff involved were prepared to ’black’ it since its 
operation was not a signalling function. Union headquarters 
advised against this since there is provision in the Signalmen's 
Classification Agreement for equipment to be installed prior to 
credits being given for it.
10.This is a data-base of all planned train services.
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11. Brewster and Richbell note that management policies are often 
implicitly held (Brewster and Richbell, (I983).
12. Where as signalman wants his work checked it is done by another 
signalman not the supervisor.
13.Implementation of signalling schemes is remitted to the
consultation procedure but in the past a considerable degree of 
negotation has taken place.




17.An especially difficult element of the problem for management ws 
that in London these relativities cut across Regional boundaries, 
and that anyaction to meet the signalmen's claims set in motion 
relativity claims across all four Regions with terminii in London.
18. T1356
(19.Not used)
20.The qualities that management look for in signalmen are
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intelligence, maturity, reliability and a strong sense of 
responsibility. Young workers with these qualities are often able 
to get significantly greater rewards than Class A signalmen (in 
effect the entry grade). After the 1986 pay award the basic rate 
for a Class A signalman is £97*95 per week.
21.For example a planned £20 million signalling scheme at Leeds was 
rejected by the Intercity Dirctor on the grounds that it was too 
ambitious.
22.In the scheme underway at London Waterloo ARS is to be used to 
control a number of major junctions. In the Midland scheme VDUs 
will be provided as an alternative means of operation to 




APPENDIX ONE INTERVIEW SCHEDULES
These interview schedules were used as guides to the main issues to 
cover in interview. Responses to each main question were probed 
where necessary, and supplemented with more detailed questions 
according to the issue.
INTERVIEW SCHEDULE FOR TRAINCREW MANAGERS/SUPERVISORS AND 
ADMINISTRATORS
1. Nature of individual’s job
2. Nature of work operations at depot
- number of drivers, relief drivers, drivers’ assistants etc.
- number of links, link structure, link content, mileage turns
- balance between freight and passenger, destinations, 'sphere of 
influence'.
- any recent changes in link structure, including work gained/lost
- relief arrangements, any supply relief undertaken
- policies and practices on route and traction knowledge
- any restday, overtime working. If so, how allocated
- frequency of programme alterations, special notices etc





type of issues discussed
- who sits on staff and management side 
style of staff side
- how far traincrews get their way 
relationships between LDCs
- how far do LDCs initiate work organization
- how much Sectional Council involvement in depot affairs
4. Flexible rosters
- when implemented
- what sort of changes did they involve
-affect all depot? What sort of turns mainly affected 
-any change to existing practices in local agreement (and 
custom and practice)
-'knock-on' effects
-any major differences between drivers and guards
-any modification or addition to agreement at national level
- effect on industrial relations
- any problems in implementation, remaining problems
- satisfaction with FR (has it led to increased management 
control?)
- any workforce counter proposals during implementation
5. Management philosophy and style in labour management
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6. Impact of two-tier re-organization
- effect on own job
- effect on relationship with other line managers
- effect on relationship with other levels of management
7. Impact of Sectorization
8 . Likely effect of implementation of other productivity 
proposals
9 . Perception of union objectives
10.Biography
TRAINCREW AND TRAINCREW LDC MEMBERS INTERVIEW SCHEDCULE
1. Nature of individual’s job
2. Nature of work operations at depot
- number of drivers, RDs, DAs, etc
- number of links, link structure, link content, mileage turns
- any recent changes in link structure, including work gained/lost
- relief arrangements, any supply relief undertaken
- any restday, overtime working. If so, how allocated
- nature of supervisors jobs
- how acquire route and traction knowledge
3. LDC
- organization of them
- how often meet
- type of issues discussed
- who sits on staff and management side
- style of management
- how far traincrews get their way
- relationships between LDCs
- how much Sectional Council involvement in depot affairs
- what think of Sectional Council
- usefulness of trade union policy and facilities
- relations with other traincrew depots
- relations with management/supervisors
4. Flexible rosters
- when implemented
- what sort of changes did they involve
-affect all depot? What sort of turns mainly affected 
-any change to existing practices in local agreement (and C 
and P)
’knock-on’ effects
-any major differences between drivers and guards
-any modification or addition to agreement at national level
- effect on industrial relations
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- any problems in implementation, remaining problems
- satisfaction with FR
- are you still able to exchange turns, any change to booking
times, effect
- effect on shift balance ie on am/pm balance
any counter proposals during implementation
5. Management style, philosophy
6. Impact of two-tier
7 . Impact of Sectorization




INTERVIEW SCHEDULE FOR SIGNALLING MANAGERS/SUPERVISORS
1. Nature of job
2. Nature of signalling operations
- number of signalboxes, manual/power, classifications, traffic 
levels
- staff numbers, how relief organized, ancillary posts
- number of supervisors, how organized
3. LDC
- organization of them
- how often meet
- type of issues discussed
- who sits on staff and management side
- style of management
- how far signalling staff get their way
- relationships between LDCs
- how much Sectional Council involvement in depot affairs
- what think of Sectional Council
- usefulness of trade union policy and facilities
- relations with other signalboxes
- relations with management/supervisors
4. Signalling change schemes
- when implemented
- where did scheme originate
- objectives of scheme. Part of wider strategy?
- what sort of changes did they involve
-affect all boxes in Area




-any modification or addition to agreement at national level
- effect on industrial relations
- any problems in implementation, remaining problems
- satisfaction with scheme
- any counter proposals during implementation
- effect on signalling skills
5. Management philosophy/style
6. Impact of two-tier
7 . Impact of Sectorization
8. Other signalling policies and strategies
9. Perception of union objectives
10. Biography
INTERVIEW SCHEDULE FOR SIGNALLING LDCS
As for signalling management. This information was supplemented by 
observation of working methods in signalboxes and informal 
conversations with signalmen, making use of a standard checklist.
Checklist
-nature of train running/volume
-number of signalmen and other ancillary staff
-how tasks split up in practice, jobs rotated/shared
-nature of shift system, levels/allocation of overtime
-equipment type
-automatic train reporting 
-passenger information equipment 
-automatic route operation 
-procedures that are followed when 
-traifv fails 
-equipment fails 
-out of sequence operation 
-’incidents on the line' etc
INTERVIEW SCHEDULE FOR SIGNAL ENGINEERS
1. Nature of individual's job
2. Nature of signalling strategy and objectives
3. Nature of particular schemes
- rationale
- nature of scheme
- new features
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- ancillary information technology
- satisfaction with outcomes
- involvement of other management specialisms/tiers
4. Role of BRB/Region/Division/Area in schemes
5. Effect of Sectorization
6. Effect of two tier
7. How far work organization/manpower management taken into account 
in schemes
- signalmen and regulators
- S & T maintenance
- anything built into equipment
8. Any industrial relations considerations behind particular form of 
scheme.
9. Involvement in implementation process
10.Involvement with Sectional CounciIs/union organisations
11. Organization of engineering function
12. Relations with other management specialisms
12. Biography
INTERVIEW SCHEDULE FOR OPERATIONS MANAGERS
1. Nature of individual's job
2. Nature of operations strategy/main policies
3. Nature of traincrew/signalling strategies
- rationale
- nature of schemes
- new features
- satisfaction with outcomes
- involvement of other management specialisms
4. Role of BRB/Region/Division/Area in schemes
5 . Effect of Sectorization
6. Effect of two-tier
7 . How far work organization/manpower management taken into account 
in schemes
8. Involvement in implementation process
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9. Involvement with Sectional Councils/union organisations 
10.Organization of operations function
11.Relations with other management specialisms
12.Biography
INTERVIEW SCHEDULES FOR PERSONNEL MANAGERS
1. Nature of individual’s job
2. Nature of personnel strategy/main policies
3. Involvement in traincrew/signalling strategies
4. Involvement in traincrew/signalling schemes
5. Role of BRB/Region/Division/Area in traincrew/signalling/personnel 
schemes
6. Effect of Sectorization
7 . Effect of two-tier
8. Involvement of personnel function in manpower and work 
organization policies
9. Nature and organization of labour relations functions 
10.Involvement in implementing change schemes
11.Relationships with trade unions and workforce representatives
12. Organization of personnel function
13. Relations with other management specialisms
14. Biography
INTERVIEW SCHEDULE FOR SECTIONAL COUNCIL REPRESENTATIVES
1. Nature of job
2. Nature of Sectional Council activity
- main issues arising
- method of working
- main focus of work
- how much time spent on Council business
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- which management functions deal with
3. Relationship with LDCs/other CounciIs/union organization
Involvement in change schemes 
~ type of issues
- management and Council objectives
- at what point Council involved
- relevance/usefulness of national union
- effect of schemes
5. Nature of management approach to labour relations
- differences between functions/levels
- management style and philosophy
6. Impact of two-tier
7 . Impact of Sectorization
8. Biography
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APPENDIX TWO TRAINCREW DEPOTS
Electric
This depot provides traincrews for main-line passenger trains. Much 
of the work is long distance Intercity work and there are a large 
number of jobs at the depot that carry the mileage bonus. The depot 
was openned in 1966 at the commissioning of an extensive 
electrification scheme. Since the depot is an attractive one to work 
at financially it attracts a large number of footplate staff from 
other Regions who, in many cases, have not been trained beforehand on 
the electric locomotives used at the depot. There is thus a chronic 
shortage of trained staff at the depot.
The staff establishment at the time of the interview was:
184 drivers grouped into four large links, one medically-restricted 
link, a local shunt link and a training link;
49 drivers' assistants grouped in one link;
80 guards in two links.
Interviews took place with the Traincrew Manager and the secretary of 
the drivers’ LDC.
Date of interview: 2nd August 1984.
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Freight
This is a medium-sized depot situated in the East Midlands and, as 
its pseodonym suggests, it deals exclusively with freight work. 
Although traincrews from the depot work over a large number of 
routes, there is very little milege bonus work at the depot.
The staff establishment at the time of the interview was:
109 drivers organized into 7 main links, a large link composed of 
spare drivers, and a number of small shunting and yard-work links; 
46 drivers’ assistants grouped into 2 links;
57 guards organized into 5 main links, a spare link and a local 
ballast-train link.
Interviews were conducted with the Traincrew Manager, the Traincrew 
Supervisor, two members of the guards’ LDC, and one member of the 
drivers' LDC (on a separate occasion).
Date of interviews: 29th August 1984.
Junction
This depot is situated in Wales and deals exclusively with freight 
traffic. The work is both heavy iron and coal bulk trains and the 
long distance Speedlink services. The depot had absorbed a large 
number of staff made redundant by the closure of an adjacent depot.
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It was announced in February 1986 to some surprise amongst the staff 
that the depot would close in 1987 (Transport Review, March 1986).
At the time of the interview (7th August 1984) the establishment was 
as follows:
139 drivers organised into 6 main line links and a pilot link;
52 drivers' assistants organised into 1 link;
Information was unavailable on the number of guards.
Interviews were conducted with the Traincrew Manager, the Roster 
Clerk, and all four staff side members of the drivers' LDC. More 
informal comments were supplied by the staff side secretary of the 
guards' LDC.
Nixed
This depot is located in the East Midlands, about ten miles away from 
Freight. It is a medium-sized depot and undertakes a mixture of
Intercity, local passenger and freight work. There is a fair amount 
of mileage bonus work at the depot. Shortly before the interviews 
took place railway management had planned to close the depot. The 
intention was to redistribute the freight work to Freight and the 
passenger work to a main-line passenger depot some fifteen miles 
away. After a lengthy campaign by the LDCs at the depot it was 
reprieved. The LDC claimed that the economic case for closure was 
bogus and had been constructed to achieve other objectives. It was
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neither possible to verify this claim nor to establish the main 
reason for the reprieve.
Staff numbers were as follows:
131 drivers grouped into 4 links and a 'spare’ link;
64 relief drivers (ie drivers' assistants 'passed' to drive) of whom 
56 were 'starred* (ie ex-firemen whose earnings as firemen were 
protected by the 1965 Manning Agreement);
104 guards grouped into 4 links.
A feature of the staffing at this depot was that for all three groups 
actual staff numbers were above establishment.
Interviews were conducted with the Traincrew Manager, all four 
members of the drivers' LDC, a traincrew supervisor, and a guards 
inspector.
Date of interview: 30th August 1984.
Northern
This is one of the largest traincrew depots in the country. It's 
traincrews are required to be familiar with a large number of 
locomotive types and lines of route. The drivers' LDC at Northern is 
notable for it's influence in ASLEF policy-making and its use of the 
Machinery of Negotiation to test out loopholes and interpretations of
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agreements (cf. Sayles' 'strategic work groups' (1958)). The depot 
undertakes all kinds of work but it is predominantly as passenger 
depot.
Staff numbers are;
298 drivers grouped into 7 main links, a spare link, and eight 
medically-restricted links each with a small number of drivers;
98 drivers' assistants (of whom 85 were 'passed* to driver and 67 
were 'starred* by the 1965 Agreement) grouped in one link; 
l6l guards in 9 links of varying sizes (the number of guards is well 
below establishment).
Interviews were conducted with the Traincrew Manager, a traincrew 
supervisor, the head of the rostering section and the four members of 
the drivers' LDC.
Dates of interviews: 30th July 1984, 26th September 1984.
Sittnt
This depot is a medium-sized freight depot in the West of England 
which provides traincrews mainly for operating stone trains (hence 
the pseudonymn) out a number of nearby quarries. This depot 
experienced recurrent labour relations difficulties (which seemed to 
arise from a clash of personalities) and was the subject of some 
concern by Regional management and Sectional Council representatives.
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Detailed information on depot work organization was not obtained but 
two interviews with the Traincrew Manager (on 21st May and 11th 
November 1983) provided a wealth of data on the impact of flexible 
rostering.
Western
This diesel depot is situated in the West of England. The bulk of 
its work is long distance passenger services. There is some freight 
work. The depot also provides crews for holiday specials during the 
summer, and hence the workload of the depot is uneven throughout the 
year. It is often necessary to ’farm' driving work out during the 
summer months to adjacent depots.
At the time of the visit (17th July 1984) the number of staff were as 
follows:
266 drivers organised into 16 links;
64 drivers' assistants grouped into 2 links;
12 traction trainees;
168 guards, organised into 6 conductor links and 4 freight links.
Interviews took place with the Traincrew Manager, the Roster Clerk, 
and the guard’s LDC staff side secretary. The driver's LDC secretary 
was unwilling to be interviewed. Relevant information on footplate 
matters was obtained from other sources knowledgable about the depot.
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APPENDIX THREE SIGNALLING LOCATIONS
Welsh
This power signalbox situated on the Western Region was openned in 
1966. Staffing on each shift consists of three signalmen on the 
panel, a supervisor, a train recorder, a station announcer and one 
standby signalman. All posts other than that of the supervisor are 
occupied by signalmen. The signalbox was classed F (at the top of 
the grading scale)
Interviews were conducted with the Area manager, Area signalling 
inspector, and the supervisory and signalling staff in the box. The 
data from the interviews with the signalmen was patchy due to 
management fears about discussing the issue of eliminating the train 
recording position.
Date of interview: 10th August 1983 
Central
This signalbox was similarly openned in 1966 as part of a 
comprehensive electrification scheme. It controls a very busy 
station, and its central operating console is said to be one of the 
busiest in the country. Staffing at the time of the interview 
comprised a supervisor, three signalmen on the panel, a train
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recorder, two platform announcers, and a spare signalman. Unlike any 
other signalboxes visited the platform announcers were female. The 
age profile of the signalmen was notably younger than at any of the 
other boxes also. The box grading was graded F.
Interviews were conducted with the Area operations manager, the 
supervisor and one signalman.
Date of interviews: 24th August 19&3
West Country
This box openned in i960 and stages subsequently added up to 1979* 
It controls mainly plain line, and is operated by two signalmen on 
the main panels and another signalmen who acted as train recorder and 
performed functions which elsewhere are performed by supervisors. 
One standby signalman is attached to the box.* The box is graded E.
Interviews took place with the Area signalling inspector and very 
briefly with two of the signalmen. Once again the sensitivity of the 
issues of train recording and standby signalmen precluded in-depth 
interviewing.
Western
This signalbox was openned in 1970 and, at the time, was the largest 
signalbox in terms of area controlled on the whole of BR. Its'
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signalmen are perceived to be the most militant in the Western Region 
and its activists certainly saw themselves as the standard bearers of 
signalling organisation on the Region. The box had been plagued by 
labour relations problems since its openning. This seems to be 
partly due to an attempt by management before it openned to exclude a 
number of signalmen from the new box on the grounds that they were 
not suitable.
The signalbox at the time of the visits was staffed by four signalmen
on the operating consoles, a train recorder, a supervisor, an
information signalman, and a train announcer. Two standby signalmen
were att&hed to the box. The box is classifed as F. a
Interviews were conducted with the Area manager, 2 supervisors, and 
seven signalmen. Three of these were LDC representatives who were 
met subsequently on a number of occasions.
Dates of interviews: 1st March 1983; 8th July 1983*
Eastern
This was the only signalbox visited on the Eastern Region of BR. It 
was openned in 1977 replacing 50 signalboxes on the East Coast Main 
Line. The operating console is staffed by 5 signalmen, supported by 
an assistant regulator, a supervisor, a meal relief signalman and two 
station announcers.
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Interview were conducted with the Area operations manager and a 
former signalling supervisor. Informal conversations were held with 
a number of signalmen.
Date of interviews: 12 January 1984 
Bridge
This signalbox controls a busy terminus in London. Like Suth- 
Eastern it controls two largely separate railway networks. It was 
the first signalbox on BR where detailed consideration was given to 
ergonomic factors in the design of the operating consoles. 
Altogether there are ten operating positions, backed by two assistant 
regulators, a supervisor and two information signalmen.
Interviews were conducted with the Area manager, an assistant 
regulator and two signalmen.
Date of interviews: 19th April 1984 
Sfuth-Eastern
A
This signalbox was brought into operation in the 1980s and is the 
largest signalbox on BR in terms of staffing. Altogether there are 
twelve panels. The signalmen rotate around all these panels whereas
406
in Bridge the signalmen are organized into two groups. There are in 
addition two assistant regulators, a regulator and two information 
signalmen.
Interviews were conducted with the Area operations manager, two 
assistant regulators, one information signalman and two signalmen.
Dates of interviews: 27th July 1984 
Airyort
Like Bridge and S^ith-Eastern this signalbox is to be found on the 
Southern Region of BR, and is a similar design. There are nine 
operating panels, supplemented by similar ’back-row' positions. This 
signalbox is notable for its trial use of Automatic Route Setting, 
whereby a micro-computer makes the routing decisions, by comparing 
information from the signalling computer with a data base of train 
services.
Interviews were conducted with the regulator, a training signalmen (a 
position unique to the erstwhile Central Division of the Southern 




This is a small Western Region box that was constructed half-way 
through the 'big box' signalling strategy. It was viewed as the core 
of a large box in the future but with the demise of the strategy it 
will probably stay unchanged for some years to come. It has one 
operating console, operated by one signalman. The box is staffed by 
two signalmen since an additional signalmen is believed to be 
necessary to monitor a TV screen present in the signalbox.
Interviews were conducted with the Area manager and two signalmen.
Date of interviews: 17th August 1983*
Cathedral
This signalbox is very similar to University. It is operated by one 
signalman for most of the day, supplemented by a back up signalman 
for the busiest part of the day.
Interviews were conducted with the Area Manager and two signalmen. 
Date of interviews: 24th September 1983
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Stone
This signalbox was in the process of being built for most the period 
of data collection. Initially management planned to operate it with 
two signalmen (one per panel) plus a supervisor. However, because of 
the dispute over standby signalmen recorded in the main text of the 
thesis> at the time of commissioning it was operated by four signalmen 
per shift on an experimental basis. Unlike other large Western 
Region boxes at the time train recording was done automatically.
Interviews were conducted with the Area Operations Manager and two 
signalmen in the box to be replaced.
Date of interviews: 21st May 1983.
Devon
This scheme was a sister scheme to that of Stone. The box was not 
commissioned until some time after the research was completed, and no 
information is held on the details of staffing. This box could be 
said to be the last signalbox on BR designed when the ’big box’ 
strategy was in operation. The location was visited when the
signalbox was being built and an interview was conducted with the 
Area perations manager on 15th August 1983.
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N o r t h e r n
This box was designed after the signalling strategy had broken down 
in the early 1980s and was brought into operation in 1985. The 
location was not visited but extensive information was gained from 
other interviews on the principles behind its design.
Midland
This was the first large box to be authorized after the breakdown of 
the strategy. It has not been completed yet and details on staffing 
are unknown. An interview was conducted with the Area operations 
manager and, as with Northern, detailed information was gained from 
other, more senior, management sources. This scheme is notable for 
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